Ida Rahayu Binti MD Noor v Datuk Seri Rina Binti Mohd Harun (A52NCC-193-08/2021)

Defendan telah memfailkan Notis Permohonan bertarikh 28.10.2021 di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 (1)(a), (b), (c) dan/atau (d) serta Aturan 92 Kaedah 4 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah (KKM) 2012 untuk membatalkan tuntutan Plaintif tersebut. . B. Latar belakang kes secara ringkas [3] Plaintif dan Defendan merupakan sahabat dan Defendan pernah menumpang di rumah Plaintif sekitar akhir tahun 2009 hingga pertengahan 2018. 2

Defendan ingin membeli perniagaan francais JM Beriani House di Alamanda Putrajaya daripada Secret Heritage Sdn Bhd.

Bagi maksud tersebut, Defendan telah meminta bantuan pinjaman kewangan secara peribadi dari Plaintif.

Kedua-dua pihak kemudian telah menandatangani suatu Perjanjian Pinjaman Peribadi Tanpa Faedah bertarikh 26.05.2009 (Perjanjian tersebut). [7]

Tiada penyata tahunan [16] Tiada bukti Plaintif telah memberikan jumlah wang pinjaman kepada Defendan. [17] Klausa 13 menyebut bahawa Defendan akan menerima penyata tahunan untuk menunjukkan pembayaran dan baki yang kononnya masih terhutang oleh Defendan. 4 [18] Pada setiap masa, Defendan tidak pernah menerima penyata tahunan tersebut.

Perjanjian bersyarat [19] Perjanjian Pinjaman tersebut merupakan perjanjian bersyarat seperti dalam klausa 7 yang perlu dipatuhi oleh Defendan terlebih dahulu sebelum ianya mengikat pihak-pihak iaitu:

Defendan hendaklah mengemukakan cagaran sehingga Plaintif adalah berpuas hati; dan/ atau

sebarang cagaran lanjut yang akan dipegang oleh Plaintif berhubung dengan liabiliti Defendan kepada Plaintif. [20] Syarat-syarat tersebut tidak pernah dipenuhi oleh Defendan dan maka Perjanjian tersebut tidak mengikat pihak-pihak.

Dihalang oleh had masa [21] Kausa tindakan Plaintif bermula pada 7.3.2010 apabila Defendan gagal membuat pembayaran balik kali pertama pinjaman tersebut. [22] Tindakan Plaintif difailkan lima tahun selepas tamat tempoh had masa yang dibenarkan iaitu 06.03.2016. [23] Penegasan Defendan dijawab oleh Plaintif dalam Afidavit Jawapannya dan menegaskan bahawa Perjanjian tersebut:

disaksikan oleh adik Defendan;

Perjanjian tersebut telah diserah kepada Defendan kerana mereka tinggal serumah dan barang kepunyaan Defendan masih berada dalam rumah Plaintif; 5

jumlah pinjaman telah diserahkan kepada Defendan secara tunai di pejabat Plaintif di Bandar Baru Nilai;

Perjanjian tersebut telah dirangka mengikut keadaan kewangan dan kepentingan Defendan;

Defendan memerlukan pinjaman tersebut untuk membuka perniagaan dan Defendan ialah pengarah Secret Heritage Sdn

tiada bukti penyata tahunan akaun kerana Defendan tidak pernah membayar balik

tiada syarat duluan kerana pihak-pihak telah setuju untuk mengenepikan syarat duluan tersebut,

terdapat perubahan lisan pada kaedah dan tempoh pembayaran balik jumlah pinjaman pada tahun 2011; dan

tindakan ini tidak dihalang oleh had masa kerana Defendan telah bersetuju bahawa Defendan akan membayar balik pinjaman tersebut apabila diminta secara bertulis oleh Plaintif dan ini dilakukan pada 6.7.2021. D. Dapatan dan keputusan mahkamah [10] Undang-undang adalah mantap bahawa mahkamah perlu melaksanakan kuasa untuk membatalkan sesuatu pliding dengan penuh berhemah dan hanya apabila tuntutan itu atas permukaannya sahaja, jelas tidak dapat dipertahankan. Bagi permohonan di bawah A18 k.19(1)(a) KKM 2012, kausa tindakan itu perlu dilihat dari pliding Plaintif sahaja tanpa perlu menganalisa merit tuntutan seperti diperuntukkan dalam A.18 k.19 (2) KKM 2012. Bagi permohonan di bawah A18. k.19 (1)

(b), (c) dan (d) KKM 2012, pihak Defendan hendaklah mengemukakan keterangan bagi menunjukkan tuntutan Plaintif tidak mempunyai merit 6 untuk dibicarakan. Prinsip yang mantap ini telah diputuskan dalam kes Mahkamah Agung, Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd v. United Malayan Banking Corporation [1993] 4 CLJ 7, Seruan Gemilang Makmur Sdn Bhd v. Badan Perhubungan UMNO Negeri Pahang Darul Makmur (via his secretary Dato' Ahmad Tajudin bin Sulaiman) [2009] 1 LNS 1457 [11] Dalam menentukan permohonan untuk pembatalan pliding, ujian yang perlu diguna pakai telah dinyatakan dalam kes Seruan Gemilang Makmur Sdn Bhd v. Badan Perhubungan UMNO Negeri Pahang Darul Makmur [supra] dan See Thong & Anor v. Saw Beng Chong [2012] 1 LNS 817, iaitu bukan sahaja suatu pliding itu tidak dapat dipertahankan, ianya mestilah jelas tidak dapat dipertahankan. [12] Dalam kes New Straits Times (Malaysia) Bhd v. Kumpulan Kertas Niaga Sdn Bhd & Anor [1985] 1 MLJ 226, Mahkamah Persekutuan menyatakan ujian yang perlu dipakai untuk penentuan dengan terangnya, kausa tindakan tidak dapat dipertahankan di bawah A.18 k.19(1)(a) KKM 20212 hanyalah dengan melihat Penyataan Tuntutan sahaja iaitu tidak menunjukkan kausa tindakan munasabah atau Penyataan Pembelaan tidak mempunyai pembelaan, “It is therefore clear law that in an application to strike out pleadings under order 18 rule 19(1) (a), no evidence shall be admissible, and the court must consider only the pleadings for the purpose of determining whether the Statement of Claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action or the Statement of Defence disclosed no defence. The test to be applied is whether on the face of the pleading, the court is prepared to say that the cause of action or the defence is obviously unsustainable (see AG of the Duchy of Lancaster v L and NW Ry Co) [1892] 3 Ch 274.”. 7 [13] A18 k 19(2) KKM 2012 tidak membenarkan apa-apa keterangan dikemukakan bagi permohonan di bawah A18 k19(1)(a) KKM2012, “19. Striking out pleadings and endorsements (O. 18 r. 19)

No evidence shall be admissible on an application under subparagraph

(1)(a).” [14] Maka saya hanya meneliti pliding Plaintif dan Defendan sahaja seperti diputuskan dalam kes Accolade Land Sdn Bhd v. Mass Rapid Transit Corporation Sdn Bhd & Ors [2020] 2 CLJ 295 seperti berikut, ““Held (allowing appeal with costs in cause) Per Mary Lim JCA delivering the judgment of the court:

... What is required is that a cause of action must be clearly pleaded according to the rules of pleading. The success or merits of that cause of action is not for determination at this interlocutory stage unless it is plainly and obviously unsustainable.”. [15] Perenggan 3 dan 4 Pernyataan Tuntutan Plaintif menyebut bahawa Plaintif dan Defendan merupakan kawan serumah dan atas permintaan Defendan, Plaintif telah memberi pinjaman tersebut berjumlah RM130,000.00 seperti dalam Perjanjian tersebut. [16] Fakta yang diplidkan oleh Plaintif diakui oleh Defendan dalam perenggan 4 Pembelaannya. Walaupun Defendan mengakui Perjanjian tersebut telah ditandatangani, Defendan hanya menafikan menerima jumlah pinjaman tersebut kerana tiada bukti penyerahan ada dibuat sedangkan Plaintif memplidkan bayaran telah dibuat secara tunai. 8 [17] Tuntutan Plaintif hanyalah untuk mendapatkan kembali wang pinjaman tersebut yang tidak pernah dibayar oleh Defendan berdasarkan dokumen dan kandungan Perjanjian tersebut walaupun penangguhan pembayaran balik pernah diberikan akibat perniagaan Defendan yang mengalami kerugian. [18] Mahkamah Tinggi dalam kes Mohamad Yusop Bin Abdul Wahab v. American Express (M) Sdn Bhd [2002] 6 MLJ 507 menyatakan seperti berikut, “It is said that a reasonable cause of action would mean a cause of action with some chances of success when only the allegation in the pleadings are being considered”. [19] Undang-undang telah mantap bahawa pihak-pihak terikat dengan terma-terma kontrak yang dimasuki seperti diputuskan dalam kes Mahkamah Persekutuan, Tractors Malaysia Bhd v. Kumpulan Pembinaan Malaysia Sdn Bhd [1978] 1 LNS 220; [1979] 1 MLJ 129 , 'where a contract has been reduced to writing, it is in the writing that we must look for the whole of the terms made between the parties.”. [20] Setelah membaca semua pliding dalam Kandungan 2, 8 dan 9 efiling, saya berpendapat bahawa tuntutan Plaintif dibuat berdasarkan tort kemungkiran kontrak yang mana pihak-pihak tidak menafikan kewujudan Perjanjian tersebut. Kausa tindakan Plaintif memerlukan Plaintif membuktikan pemberian jumlah pinjaman dan kemungkiran pembayaran balik. Kandungan peruntukan Perjanjian tersebut perlu diteliti dengan sepenuhnya untuk melihat pemakaian dan kesannya kepada kedua-dua pihak. 9 [21] Perkataan “frivolous or vexatious” “scandalous” dan “abuse of the process of the court” dalam Aturan 18 r.19 (1) (b) (c) and (d) telah dijelaskan dalam beberapa kes. Tan Bak Lee v. Chen Siew Lee & Ors [2019] 1 LNS 1362 yang menjelaskannya seperti berikut, “[9] I also kept in mind the following established principles:

Only in obviously unsustainable cases that recourse should be had to the summary process under O. 18 r. 19(1) (Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v. United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 4 CLJ 7).

(ii) The phrase "frivolous or vexatious" in paragraph (b) of O. 18 r. 19(1) refer to groundless actions or pleadings with no prospect of success. In considering whether any pleading is frivolous or vexatious, one is entitled to look at the whole history of the matter. However, it is not appropriate in striking out proceedings to resolve dispute of facts on affidavit evidence (See Thong & Anor v. Saw Beng Chong [2012] 1 LNS 817; [2013] 3 MLJ 235). [22] Perkataan ‘scandalous’ dalam A18 k.19 (1) (c) telah dijelaskan dalam kes Lim Peng Khoon v. Tea Chun Hia @ Teoh Chun Hia & Ors [2109] 1 LNS 827, “[19] "Scandalous" was decided to mean wholly unnecessary and irrelevant, not just unpleasant allegations ...”. [23] Terma penyalahgunaan proses mahkamah telah dijelaskan dalam kes Seruan Gemilang Makmur Sdn Bhd v. Badan Perhubungan UMNO Negeri Pahang Darul Makmur (via his secretary Dato' Ahmad Tajudin bin Sulaiman) [supra] seperti berikut, "The terms abuse of the process of the court in O. 18 r. 19(1 (d), has been given a wide interpretation by the courts. It includes consideration of public policy and the interest of justice. This term signifies that the process of the court must be used bona fide and properly and must not be abused. The court will prevent the improper use of its machinery it will prevent the judicial process from be used as a means of vexation and oppression in the process of litigation. The categories of conduct rendering a claim frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process are not closed and will depend on all the relevant 10 circumstances of the case. A type of conduct which has been judicially acknowledged as an abuse of process is the bringing of an action for a collateral purpose, as was raised by the respondents in Lonrho v. Fayed (No 5) [1993] 1 WLR 1489, Stuart Smith LJ stated that, if an action was not brought bona fide for the purpose of obtaining relief but for some other ulterior or collateral purpose, it might be struck out as an abuse of the process of the court (see Boo Are Ngor (P) v. Chua Mee Liang (P) [2009] 6 MLJ 145 at p 151)." Sama ada Perjanjian Pinjaman merupakan perjanjian bersyarat dan tidak mengikat pihak-pihak Sama ada perlu ada penyata tahunan pembayaran balik pinjaman tersebut [24] Namun demikian, berdasarkan pliding, terdapat beberapa tindakan dan kelakuan pihak-pihak yang menyebabkan pelaksanaan dan tafsiran Perjanjian tersebut dipertikaikan. Beban pembuktian terletak pada Plaintif untuk membuktikan fakta-fakta yang diplidkan olehnya. Lihat seksyen 101,102 dan 103 Akta Keterangan 1950. [25] Defendan bergantung kepada seksyen 33 Akta Kontrak 1950 dan kes Mahkamah Rayuan, GPQ Sdn Bhd v. Constant View Sdn Bhd [2017] 1 LNS 821 mengenai keperluan untuk memenuhi syarat duluan, “33 Enforcement of contracts contingent on an event happening

Contingent contracts to do or not to do anything if an uncertain future event happens cannot be enforced by law unless and until that event has happened.

If the event becomes impossible, such contracts become void. ILLUSTRATIONS

A makes a contract with B to buy B's horse if A survives C. This contract cannot be enforced by law unless and until C dies in A's lifetime. 11

A makes a contract with B to sell a horse to B at a specified price, if C, to whom the horse has been offered, refuses to buy him. The contract cannot be enforced by law unless and until C refuses to buy the horse.

A contracts to pay B a sum of money when B marries C. C dies without being married to B. The contract becomes void.:. [26] Saya berpendapat bahawa sama ada klausa 7 dipatuhi atau tidak oleh Defendan perlu dibicarakan untuk menentukan sama ada syarat-syarat duluan perlu dipenuhi atau telah diketepikan atas persetujuan bersama pihak-pihak. Mahkamah merupakan forum yang sesuai untuk melihat isu undang-undang ini dan Plaintif perlu diberi peluang untuk membuktikan kesnya terhadap Defendan sama ada jumlah RM130,000.00 telah diterima oleh Defendan dan sama ada perlu mematuhi syarat duluan. [27] Dalam Afidavit Balasannya, Defendan mengakui adik Defendan ialah saksi kepada Perjanjian tersebut dan Defendan ialah pengarah Secret Heritage Sdn Bhd yang menjalankan perniagaan nasi biriyani. Ini disokong oleh dokumen-dokumen yang dikemukakan dalam Afidavit Jawapan Plaintif. [28] Berdasarkan keterangan Afidavit dan eksibit, terdapat hubungkait antara Defendan, Secret Heritage Sdn Bhd dan perniagaan nasi briyani yang dijalankan oleh Defendan maka tuntutan Plaintif ini tidak remeh dan menyusahkan. Keterangan afidavit yang dikemukakan relevan dan perlu dengan tuntutan yang difailkan. 12 [29] Walaupun Defendan menafikan penerimaan jumlah wang pinjaman dan tiada penyata tahunan dieksibitkan, mahkamah berpendapat, Plaintif mempunyai dokumen-dokumen lain dan saksi yang telah dinyatakan dalam Afidavit Jawapannya dan tidak wajar bagi mahkamah untuk menutup terus tuntutan yang mempunyai isu untuk dibicarakan. Tuntutan Plaintif bukan merupakan penyalahgunaan proses mahkamah. sama ada tindakan saman yang difailkan di sini adalah dihalang oleh Akta Had Masa 1953 [30] Dalam kes Khazanah Jaya Sdn Bhd v. Hisco Malaysia Sdn Bhd [2021] 1 LNS 2196 Mahkamah Rayuan telah menyatakan seperti berikut, “ Thus, when a defendant raises a plea of limitation, it would then be required of the plaintiff, if he so wishes to challenge that plea, to plead in his reply to the defence the material facts that would defeat the defence of limitation. This would be consonant with the provisions O. 18 r. 8(1) of the Rules of Court 2012:

Matters which shall be specifically pleaded (O. 18 r. 8 )

A party shall in any pleading subsequent to a statement of claim plead specifically any matter, for example, performance, release, any relevant statute of limitation, fraud or any fact showing illegality-

which he alleges makes any claim or defence of the opposite party not maintainable;

which, if not specifically pleaded, might take the opposite party by surprise; or

which raises issues of fact not arising out of the preceding pleading.” (digariskan sendiri) [31] Plaintif telah memplidkan mengenai pembelaan had masa dalam perenggan 5(b) dan (c) Jawapan Kepada Pembelaan bahawa kausa tindakan Plaintif hanya bermula apabila Plaintif mengemukakan surat 13 tuntutan seperti yang dipersetujui oleh pihak-pihak. Tuntutan hanya dibuat pada 06.07.2021. [32] Sekyen 6 Akta Had Masa 1953 memperuntukkan seperti berikut : “6 Limitation of actions of contract and tort and certain other actions

Save as hereinafter provided the following actions shall not be brought after the expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued, that is to say:-

actions founded on a contract or on tort;" [33] Memandangkan pihak Defendan telah menimbulkan isu had masa, beban kini berpindah pada Plaintif untuk membuktikan sebaliknya seperti diputuskan dalam kes Ong Ah Bee v. Hii Chung Siong, Robin [1993] 1 CLJ 504, “Held: [1] The plaintiff suffered damage on the date of the execution of the Sale & Purchase Agreement, namely on 24 June 1985 and his right to sue accrued on that date. The writ was taken out on 18 September 1991 and the plaintiff had therefore exceeded the six years limit. [2] The burden of proving the action was brought within the limitation period was on the plaintiff. The plaintiff's affidavit-in-opposition merely denied the defence of limitation which could not be considered as proving the issue.”. [34] Pemakaian seksyen 6(1) khususnya mengenai kausa tindakan kemungkiran kontrak telah dijelaskan dalam kes Mohd Arif Muda v. Kerajaan Malaysia [2021] 1 LNS 150, “[10] The law of limitation is based on the well-known doctrine 'interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium', i.e. it is in the interest of the state that there should be an end to litigation process. However, whether, the defence of limitation is available to a defendant is an issue of law depending on a finding of fact. Section 6 of the Limitation Act 1953 provides that 14 the limitation period starts to run six (6) years from the date on which the cause of action accrues. Where the defence of limitation is raised, the burden to prove the action was commenced or instituted within the limitation period shifts to the Plaintiff (see Ong Ah Bee v. Hii Chung Siong, Robin [1993] 1 CLJ 504). [11] Reference is made to the Federal Court case of Nadefino Ltd v. Kevin Corporation Sdn Bhd [1978] 1 LNS 127; [1978] 2 MLJ 59 where it was decided that the limitation period starts to accrue only when there has been a complete cause of action. [12] According to the Federal Court case of Nasri v. Mesah [1970] 1 LNS 85; [1971] 1 MLJ 32, time begins to run for the purposes of limitation from the date of any infringement or threat of infringement of the appellant's right under the agreement. And that a cause of action on a contract accrues on the date of breach and in the case of actions founded on contract, time runs from the breach. Gill F.J. delivering the judgment of the Federal Court had this to say at page 34 of the report:- "A 'cause of action' is the entire set of facts that gives rise to an enforceable claim; the phrase comprises every fact which, if traversed, the plaintiff must prove in Order to obtain judgment (per Lord Esher M.R. in Read v. Brown [1889] 22 Q.B.D. 128, 131). In Reeves v. Butcher [1891] 2 Q.B. 509, 511, Lindley L.J. said: 'This expression, 'cause of action', has been repeatedly the subject of decision, and it has been held, particularly in Hemp v. Garland L.R. 4 Q.B. 519, decided in 1843, that the cause of action arises at the time when the debt could first have been recovered by action. The right to bring an action may arise on various events; but it has always been held that the statute runs from the earliest time at which an action could be brought.' In Board of Trade v. Cayzer, Irvine & Co. [1927] A.C. 610, 617, Viscount Dunedin described 'cause of action' as that which makes action possible. Now, what makes possible an action founded on a contract is its breach. In other words, a cause of action founded on a contract accrues on the date of its breach. Similarly, the right to sue on a contract accrues on its breach. In the case of actions founded on contract, therefore, time runs from breach (per Field J. In Gibbs v. Guild [1881] 8 Q.B.D. 296, 302). In the case of actions founded on any other right, time runs from the date on which that right is infringed or there is a threat of its infringement (see Bolo v. Koklan & Ors. L.R. 57 I.A. 325). It would seem clear, therefore, that the expressions 'the right to sue accrues', 'the cause of action accrues' and 'the right of action accrues' mean one and the same thing when one speaks of the time from which the period of limitation as prescribed by law should run. For the reasons I have stated, the period 15 of limitation in the present case can be said to have begun to run only from the first clear and unequivocal threat to the plaintiff's right to a transfer of the land. " " [13] Cause of action arising from a contract here means circumstances where a party in a contract obtains the rights and grounds to institute legal action against the other party who has defaulted the terms and conditions of the contract. For the cause of action to occur, there must have been breach of the contractual duty. Cause of action also means 'a right to sue'. There cannot be 'right to sue' until and unless there is an accrual of the right asserted in the suit and its infringement or at least a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that the right of the defendant against whom the suit is instituted (see Padang Serai Kilang Kayu Bhd v. Khor Kia Fong & Ors [1997] 5 CLJ 428).”. [35] Mengenai isu had masa ini, Defendan merujuk semata-mata kepada klausa 8 (a) atau (b) Perjanjian Pinjaman tersebut. Bayaran pertama bagi Perjanjian Pinjaman tersebut bermula pada 01.03.2010 selama seratus tiga puluh (130) bulan yang berakhir pada iaitu sebelum hari ketujuh pada kalendar bulan (‘before 7th days of month calendar’). Kausa tindakan untuk guaman ini hanya akan timbul pada 07.03.2010 dan tamat pada 06.03.2016. [36] Plaintif menghujahkan bahawa Plaintif telah pada 2011 bersetuju secara lisan untuk memberi penangguhan kepada Defendan untuk membuat pembayaran balik pinjaman tersebut akibat kerugian yang dialami oleh Defendan dalam perniagaannya. Had masa hanya bermula apabila surat tuntutan dikeluarkan seperti diputuskan dalam kes Mahkamah Rayuan Ramesh a/l Rajaratnam v Ravindran a/l Sivasubramaniam [2020] MLJU 898 yang dirujuk oleh Plaintif, “[32] It would then be fair to assume then that parties had intended that liability to pay will only arise upon demand and not before. Since no repayment date was stated in the agreement, the circumstances were analogous to a guarantee given for a loan agreement. The obligation to pay is always there but the cause Ramesh a/l Rajaratnam v Ravindran a/l 16 Sivasubramaniam [2020] MLJU 898 of action only arises after a demand is made. The learned Judge was therefore right to hold that the limitation period commenced when the demand was made some 6 months after the loan agreement was signed. [33] In a somewhat similar case, Tham Chin Choy v K Mohamed Ismail & Anor

18 MLJ 71, the facts were as follows. A promissory note was signed on 8 February 1948 but was not neither dated nor stamped. The date of 6 October 1948 was later inserted with the consent of the defendant. It was held that the period of limitation was extended to run from 6 October 1948. In that case, although the promissory note was payable on demand, it was not intended by the parties that it should be paid for a period of 6 months or so. [34] It can therefore be surmised that although generally the limitation period commences from the date of a promissory note, the parties can through agreement extend the date or evince an intention that the period should commence from the date of demand.” [37] Surat tuntutan Plaintif bertarikh 6.7.2021. [38] Jika pun ianya dipertikaikan, isu had masa merupakan isu yang boleh dibicarakan seperti dalam kes Mahkamah Rayuan yang dirujuk oleh Plaintif iaitu Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur v Pembinaan RT Sdn Bhd [2013] 2 MLJ 873, “[12] On the issue of limitation, as raised by the appellant, the appellant argued that the cause of action (if any) arose on 30 August 1994, ie the date when the purported breach occurred. The respondent on the other hand contended that the limitation period only started to run from the date the respondent learnt that the said land had been approved for a hotel and a school, in September 2007. Since the writ was filed on 28 June 2010, the respondent claimed that the action was well within the limitation period of six years. [13] This is also a triable issue, which need for trial for evidence to be adduced and parties to submit at a greater length.” [37] Berdasarkan nas dan dapatan di atas, saya berpendapat bahawa sama ada tuntutan Plaintif dihalang oleh had masa perlu dibicarakan 17 kerana fakta telah diplidkan adanya perlanjutan masa bayaran balik akibat masalah perniagaan Defendan dan tuntutan hanya berkuat kuasa apabila Plaintif mengemukakannya secara bertulis. E. Kesimpulan [38] Sebagai kesimpulan, mahkamah mendapati bahawa Defendan tidak menafikan kewujudan Perjanjian Pinjaman tersebut namun isu mengenai sama ada terdapatnya perjanjian lisan untuk mengenepikan syarat duluan, pemberian hutang kepada Defendan, penangguhan bayaran balik dan kelakuan pihak-pihak selepas Perjanjian tersebut di tandatangani perlu dibicarakan. Defendan telah gagal membuktikan tuntutan Plaintif menepati peruntukan A.18 k.19 (1) KKM 2012. [39] Permohonan Defendan untuk membatalkan tuntutan Plaintif ditolak dengan kos RM4000.00 sebagai kos dalam kausa. Tarikh: 21 Februari 2022 (ROHATUL AKMAR BT ABDULLAH) Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen 9 Shah Alam Selangor 18 Peguamcara Plaintif Tetuan W.A Wan Adnan & Associates Peguambela & Peguamcara, Shah Alam, Selangor. Peguamcara Defendan Tetuan Rahman Rohaida Peguambela & Peguamcara, Kuala Lumpur