All the above are triable issues. Order 14 Rule 1 of the ROC [28] The law on summary judgment is trite. It is only in plain and obvious cases that recourse should be given to the summary process under Order 14 Rule 1. It should only be made if the Court thinks it is a plain case and ought not to go to trial (refer to Esso Standard Malaysia v. Southern Cross Airways (M) Bhd [1972] CLJU 31 and National Company for Foreign Trade v. Kayu Raya Sdn Bhd [1984] 1 CLJ Rep 283). [29] However, the Defendants should not be shut out from defending a claim unless it is apparent they have no case in the action. A complete defence need not be shown (see Alloy Automotive Sdn Bhd v. Perusahaan Ironfield Sdn Bhd [1986] CLJ Rep 45). The defence setup need only show that there is a triable issue (Bank Negara Malaysia v. Mohd Ismail & Ors [1992] 1 CLJ 627). [30] Merely raising an issue does not mean that the issue is triable. The Federal Court in Voo Min En & Ors Leong Chung Fatt [1982] CLJU 47 held that ".. the pertinent principle being one where it is not enough for the S/N XnyEbazuaEilgCtR4KGlag defendant "to raise an issue or any issue". The Defendant must instead raise such issue as would require a trial in order to determine it." Order 18 Rule 19 of the ROC [31] There is also no necessity to reiterate or reprise the trite principle of law on striking out of an action under O18 R19 as it was well established by clear decisions of the Federal Court in Bandar Builders Sdn Bhd v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd (1993) 4 CLJ 7 on the test for striking out applications. [32] The Court of Appeal, in Sivarasa Rasiah & Ors v. Che Hamzah Che Ismail & Ors [2012] 1 CLJ 75, adopted the well-settled principle of striking out in the following passage: "A striking out order should not be made summarily by the Court if there is issue of law that requires lengthy argument and mature consideration. It should also not be made if there is issue of fact that is capable of resolution only after taking viva voce evidence during trial (see: Lai Yoke Ngan & Anor v. Chin Teck Kwee & Anor [1997] 3 CLJ 305; [1997] 2 MLJ 565 (FC))." [33] The primary task of this Court is to determine whether the issues arising from the facts canvased fall within the limbs of Rule 19(1). Analysis and Findings Preliminary Objection [34] In the present case, the Defendant had referred and exhibited a document which was acquired from an ex-parte Anton Piller order dated 27.3.2023 from Kuala Lumpur High Court in suit no: WA-22NCC-93- 02/2023 as disclosed in paragraph 16 of enclosure 12. S/N XnyEbazuaEilgCtR4KGlag [35] The Plaintiff objected to the reference to the document (WhatsApp text messages) and requested it to be expunged. [36] I agree with the Plaintiff's submission on the issue, and based on the authority cited, when a party obtains documents or information through compulsion in civil proceedings, they are bound by the undertaking not to disclose such material for purposes other than the intended use for which the discovery was granted (see Extreme System Sdn Bhd v Ho Hup Construction Company Bhd No 4 (2011) 10 CLJ 186 and Makonka Electronic Sdn Bhd v Electrical Industries Workers Union & 2 rs (1997) CLJU 86). [37] As Defendant's reference and reliance on the document was in breach of their undertakings of the Anton Piller order, paragraph 16 of enclosure 12 and exhibit SG-1 is expunged, and Defendant is therefore precluded from relying on the same. Summary Judgment application – enclosure 7 [38] As narrated by the Plaintiff on the dealings and transaction allegedly agreed by both parties, I will now determine whether there is an issue or question in dispute which ought to be tried and whether Plaintiff had established a prima facie case that they had become entitled to judgment to be recorded summarily (see O14 R3 ROC and National Company for Foreign Trade v Kayu Raya Sdn Bhd (1984) 1 CLJ Rep 283). Once this threshold is met, the burden shifted to the Defendant, who must show a fair probability of a real or bona fide defence (see Syarikat Kerjasama Serbaguna Tunas Muda Sungai Ara v Ghazali bin Ibrahim (1985) 2 MLJ 225). [39] It is undisputed that Plaintiff agreed to charter, and Defendant, as the carrier, agreed to operate an aircraft with a payload guaranteed up to S/N XnyEbazuaEilgCtR4KGlag 15,000 kg for the charter price of USD 26,500 per flight from SZX to KUL route. [40] Defendant issued invoices for an amount, as stated earlier, and it was paid by Plaintiff to Defendant's account. Defendant admitted to receiving the amount but disputed that it was paid by Plaintiff. [41] As it is, the Defendant's case is relatively straightforward. Defendant's main argument was based on the representation that its former CFO had acted alone in negotiating the charter flight and that the BSAs were entered into without the involvement and knowledge of Defendant's entire management. [42] On the issue of payment of invoices for the SZX-KUL and the SZX-BKI routes, Defendant admitted to issuing the invoices but averred that it could not identify the entity who made the payments and further investigation was required to confirm whether Plaintiff had paid the invoice amount. [43] I find such contentions are mere denial. Defendant had only made a bare assertion on uncertainty over some of the payments made to its account under the invoices issued and elected not to refund the payments claimed by Plaintiff. Defendant, through numerous instances in its pleadings and affidavit, had admitted to issuing such invoices and receiving the payments, including for the unperformed flights. [44] The fact that payments were made to a third party, it was not denied that the CFO had the authority in the dealings with Plaintiff and from the email communications tendered, the flight arrangement made between Plaintiff and Defendant was not restricted within the knowledge of the CFO himself but also by the other employees. S/N XnyEbazuaEilgCtR4KGlag [45] I, therefore, find that the above allegations were insignificant in denying liability and resisting their contractual obligations. The Defendants' internal mismanagement should not be a reason to deviate from their agreed obligations in the transactions. [46] Plaintiff further submitted that the allegation of collusion or conspiracy advanced by Defendant was not pleaded and did not fulfil the requirement under O. 18 r.12 of ROC. The Defendant was merely making vague references to its previous CFO of him receiving some personal benefits to establish inappropriate conduct without any evidence. [47] I find merits in the above contention. Allegation of a conspiracy by the CFO is not a valid and genuine triable issue in determining the contractual liability and obligation between both parties. [48] In conclusion, I am satisfied, based on the discussion above, that this is a clear and plain case of the Defendant's failure to return the deposit paid. I see no necessity for this matter to proceed to trial in order to determine the issues raised. [49] Having heard both parties on both applications and after careful examination of the facts narrated by the Plaintiff to fully understand the transactions, dealings and agreement between both parties, based on the contemporaneous documents exhibited by the Plaintiff and having perused the submissions, I find that the Defendant has not established any issue or question in dispute which ought to be tried or raised any bona fide defence to the Plaintiff's claim. Thus, the Plaintiff's application for summary judgment is allowed with cost. S/N XnyEbazuaEilgCtR4KGlag Striking out of the Defendant's counterclaim – Enclosure 9 [50] With regard to the Defendant's counterclaim, I find that it does not disclose a reasonable cause of action and only intended to deny and delay the Plaintiff's claim. [51] Defendant counterclaimed a sum of RM242,210.00 (invoice No 22- 03115), RM236,088.50 (invoice No 22-02631), USD26,500.00 (unpaid flights on 13.11.2022), RM301,620.00 (invoice No 22-03116), USD87,000.00 (invoice No 22-03908) and USD29,000.00 (invoice No 22- 03909) being outstanding and unpaid by the Plaintiff. [52] Defendant opposed the Plaintiff's application to strike out and requested that the Court consider the entire history of the case to determine that the counterclaim was not frivolous or vexatious. [53] Instead of submitting on the allegation of the allegedly unpaid amount, Defendant persistently accused its former CFO of giving instructions on the payments to PETRONAS and maintaining close relations with Plaintiff to influence payment decisions fraudulently. [54] Those allegations constitute a separate cause of action against Defendant's former CFO/employee, which does not relate to the allegedly unpaid flight transactions. I am of the opinion that the alleged cause of action was merely to divert this Court on the internal dispute of Defendant with its former CFO, and the alleged claim was a bare averment by Defendant and had no grounds or prospects of success. Final Order [55] Based on the above discussion, enclosures 7 and 9 applications are allowed with a cost of RM5000 each subject to the allocator. S/N XnyEbazuaEilgCtR4KGlag [56] Defendant was ordered to pay Plaintiff the sum of RM1,165,030.50 plus interest at the rate of 5% per annum from the date of judgment until full and final settlement of the sum awarded. In addition, the Defendant's counterclaim dated 13.12.2023 is hereby struck out. Dated this: 28th August 2024 ~signed~ (NOOR HAYATI BINTI HAJI MAT) Judicial Commissioner Shah Alam High Court NVCV 9 Counsels: For the Plaintiff: Dason Raj a/l Selvaraj together with Loh Ze Rong Messrs Dason Raj & Partners For the Defendant: Harjit Singh Sandhu together with Navinjit Singh Golen Messrs Harjit Sandhu, Wan & Associates