Intan Shahnazlah Binti Abdullah v Muhammad Naim Bin Ghulam Muhammad (BA-12B-97-09/2024)

This is an appeal by the Appellant/Defendant against the decision of the learned Sessions Court Judge (SCJ) dated 29 August 2024, which allowed the Respondent/Plaintiff’s claim for defamation and dismissed the Appellant’s counterclaim. The Sessions Court awarded general damages of RM50,000.00 and costs of RM10,000.00 to the Respondent.

The appeal concerns a defamation claim arising from a series of social media posts made by the Appellant on TikTok, Facebook, and WhatsApp, which the Respondent claimed were defamatory, malicious, and damaging to his personal and professional reputation as a police officer.

Having examined the written and oral submissions, including the grounds of judgment of the learned trial judge and the Record of Appeal, I find no appealable error. I, therefore, dismissed the Appellant’s appeal. These are my reasons.

The Respondent is a police officer attached to the Royal Malaysia Police (PDRM). The Appellant is his former partner.

The Respondent’s claim was based on multiple postings by the Appellant on her social media accounts, which included words, images, videos, and captions. These posts allegedly portrayed the Respondent as dishonest, immoral, and unfit to be a police officer. The posts contained vulgar language and personal insults, references to pornography, and derogatory remarks about race and religion.

The Appellant denied that the statements were defamatory and raised, among other issues, questions of authorship, technical pleading deficiencies, and argued that the posts were not directed at the Respondent.

The learned SCJ ruled in favour of the Respondent, holding that the impugned statements were defamatory, specifically referred to the Respondent, and were published to third parties. The counterclaim was dismissed.

It is trite that an appellate court will not readily overturn findings of fact made by a trial judge unless it is shown that such findings were “plainly wrong”. This principle is based on the understanding that the trial judge has the advantage of observing witnesses first-hand.

The Federal Court in Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v Wendy Tan Lee Peng, (administratrix for the estate of Tan Ewe Kwang, deceased) & Ors [2020] 12 MLJ 67 reaffirmed the “plainly wrong” test, and held: “(1) The COA erred in reversing the findings of fact of the trial judge and allowing the appeal of the respondents. The COA’s observation that there was ‘no judicial appreciation of the evidence’ by the trial judge was unsustainable in view of the findings the trial judge had made in his judgment. The COA had erroneously applied the ‘plainly wrong’ test in a broad and general manner without identifying specifically why the trial judge’s findings were plainly wrong on the key issues, namely the purpose of the payments made by Ng. Essentially, the COA disagreed with, and reversed, the trial judge’s conclusion as to the purpose of the payment by Ng of RM6m to TEK and took the approach that it could reach a different conclusion from that of the trial judge on the facts and evidence (see paras 81, 150 & 154).

It was not sufficient for the COA to reverse the findings of fact merely because on a particular point of evidence it disagreed with the trial judge’s conclusion on whether one party or the other was to be believed on the evidence adduced. Although there might have been inconsistencies in the evidence - which meant that another judge might have reached a different conclusion - this was not relevant when considering if a trial judge’s findings could be overturned (see para 151). …

The ‘plainly wrong’ test operated on the principle that the trial court had had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses on their evidence as opposed to the appellate court that acted on the printed records. The ‘plainly wrong’ test was not intended to be used by an appellate court as a means to substitute its own decision for that of the trial court on the facts. As long as the trial court’s conclusion could be supported on a rational basis in view of the material evidence, the fact that the appellate court felt like it might have decided differently was irrelevant. In other words, a finding of fact that would not be repugnant to common sense ought not to be disturbed. The trial judge should be accorded a margin of appreciation when his treatment of the evidence was examined by the appellate courts (see paras 34, 76 & 148).” (emphasis added)

Similarly, in Gan Yook Chin (P) & Anor v Lee Ing Chin @ Lee Teck Seng & Ors [2005] 2 MLJ 1, the Federal Court held that an appellate court may only intervene where the trial court failed to appreciate or properly evaluate the evidence, amounting to a lack of judicial appreciation.

Upon careful consideration of the Record of Appeal, the grounds of judgment by the learned SCJ, and the written and oral submissions from both parties, this Court finds no reason to overturn the decision below. The trial court's findings were supported by a proper appreciation of the evidence and a consistent application of established legal principles in defamation law.

In the case of Raub Australian Gold Mining Sdn Bhd v Hue Shieh Lee [2019] 3 MLJ 720, the Federal Court explained as follows: “[29] Defamation is committed when the defendant publishes to a third person words or matters containing untrue imputation against the reputation of the plaintiff. Liability for defamation is divided into two categories, that of libel and slander. If the publication is made in a permanent form or is broadcast or is part of a theatrical performance, it is libel. If it is in some transient form or is conveyed by spoken words or gestures, it is slander (see: Gatley on Libel and Slander, (9th Ed) at p 6). [30] In Ayob Saud v. TS Sambanthamurthi [1989] 1 MLJ 315; [1989] 1 CLJ 152; [1989] 1 CLJ (Rep) 321, His Lordship Mohamed Dzaiddin J (as he then was) has clearly laid down the necessary procedure in establishing claim for libel (with which we agree), when he said at p 361 (MLJ); p 155 (CLJ): In our law on libel, which is governed by the Defamation Act 1957, the burden of proof lies on the plaintiff to show (1) the words are defamatory; (2) the words refer to the plaintiff; and (3) the words were published. … [31] In other words, the plaintiff must prove three elements of the tort of defamation, which are:

the plaintiff must show that the statement bears defamatory imputations;

the statement must refer to or reflect upon the plaintiff’s reputation; and

the statement must have been published to a third person by the defendant. [32] What is ‘defamatory imputation’? There is no precise test to be applied to determine whether or not any given words are defamatory. His Lordship Mohamed Azmi J (as he then was) in the case of Syed Husin Ali v Syarikat Percetakan Utusan Melayu Berhad & Anor [1973] 2 MLJ 56 at p 58, quoting Gatley on Libel and Slander, (6th Ed) at p 4, stated the following: There is no wholly satisfactory definition of a defamatory imputation. Any imputation which may tend ‘to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right thinking members of society generally’, ‘to cut him off from society’ or ‘to expose him to hatred, contempt or ridicule’, is defamatory of him. An imputation may be defamatory whether or not it is believed by those to whom it is published. It was further quoted that: A defamatory imputation is one to a man’s discredit, or which tends to lower him in the estimation of others, or to expose him to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to injure his reputation in his office, trade or profession, or to injure his financial credit. The standard of opinion is that of right thinking person’s generally. To be defamatory an imputation need have no actual effect on a person’s reputation; the law looks only to its tendency.” [emphasis added]

Therefore, to establish defamation, the Respondent must prove that: a. The statements are defamatory in nature. b. The statements refer to the Respondent. c. The statements are published to a third party.

When assessing whether the statements are defamatory, the Court must interpret the words in their natural and ordinary meaning, as they would likely be understood by a reasonable person of ordinary intelligence (see: Rajagopal v Rajan [1972] 1 MLJ 45).

As the Court of Appeal held in the case of Chok Foo Choo @ Chok Kee Lian v The China Press Bhd [1999] 1 MLJ 371, the ordinary and natural meaning includes any implication or inference that a reasonable reader, relying solely on general knowledge and unaffected by strict legal rules of interpretation, would derive from the words. Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as his lordship then was), in his judgment, stated that- “It cannot, I think, be doubted that the first task of a court in an action for defamation is to determine whether the words complained of are capable of bearing a defamatory meaning. And it is beyond argument that this is in essence a question of law that turns upon the construction of the words published. As Lord Morris put it in Jones v Skelton [1963] 3 All ER 952 at p 958: The ordinary and natural meaning of words may be either the literal meaning or it may be an implied or inferred or an indirect meaning: any meaning that does not require the support of extrinsic facts passing beyond general knowledge but is a meaning which is capable of being detected in the language used can be a part of the ordinary and natural meaning of words (see Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1963] 2 All ER 151). The ordinary and natural meaning may therefore include any implication or inference which a reasonable reader, guided not by any special but only by general knowledge and not fettered by any strict legal rules of construction, would draw from the words. The test of reasonableness guides and directs the court in its function of deciding whether it is open to a jury in any particular case to hold that reasonable persons would understand the words complained of in a defamatory sense. In my judgment, the test which is to be applied lies in the question: do the words published in their natural and ordinary meaning impute to the plaintiff any dishonourable or discreditable conduct or motives or a lack of integrity on his part? If the question invites an affirmative response, then the words complained of are defamatory. (See JB Jeyaretnam v Goh Chok Tong [1985] 1 MLJ 334.) Richard Malanjum J, in an admirable judgment in Tun Datuk Patinggi Haji Abdul-Rahman Ya'kub v Bre Sdn Bhd & Ors [1996] 1 MLJ 393, collected and reviewed the relevant authorities upon this branch of the subject and I would, with respect, expressly approve the approach adopted by him.”

The question then this Court must ask is whether the said statements tend to lower the estimation of the Respondent in the minds of right-thinking members of society generally, and whether the Respondent is at risk of hatred, being avoided, shunned or ridiculed. Do the statements published in their natural and ordinary meaning impute to the Respondent any dishonourable or discreditable conduct, motives, or lack of integrity on his part? If the answer is in the affirmative, the statements are defamatory. Whether the Appellant was the author of the postings.

The trial court accepted the evidence that the Appellant was the account holder of the TikTok and WhatsApp accounts used to publish the impugned material. This was not seriously contested in her pleadings or witness statement.

In her own defence and testimony, the Appellant admitted to uploading the relevant content, although she denied it was defamatory. The argument that others could have changed the account name or profile was unsupported by evidence and purely speculative.

I find no error in the trial court’s conclusion that the Appellant was responsible for the publications. Whether the impugned statements referred to the Respondent

The postings contained references to the Respondent’s name, his father’s name, occupation, and past relationship with the Appellant. The learned SCJ correctly concluded that an ordinary, reasonable reader would recognise the Respondent as the person being referred to.

The Appellant’s denial that the statements were directed at the Respondent was unconvincing, particularly in light of her own admissions and the context of their relationship. Whether the statements were defamatory in nature

The language used in the postings, such as “anak haram,” “perangai macam anak haram,” “babi,” “sial,” “berhati bangkai,” “bodoh,” “banyak makan duit haram,” and repeated references to “anjing hitam,” is clearly vulgar, offensive, and insulting. The suggestion that the Respondent engaged in pornography and lodged false reports was a serious allegation of misconduct, particularly considering his status as a police officer.

The learned SCJ correctly applied the test, which requires the court to assess whether the words tend to expose the Respondent to hatred, ridicule, or contempt in the eyes of right-thinking members of society. The learned SCJ was correct in fining that the impugned material conveyed such a defamatory meaning. Whether the publication to third parties was proven

The Respondent provided evidence of third-party viewership, including “likes,” shares, and witness testimonies confirming they had seen the posts. The Appellant did not deny that the posts were public nor that they were uploaded to platforms with open access.

The learned SCJ’s conclusion that the publication element was satisfied is fully supported by the evidence.

The Appellant raised procedural objections, such as failing to specify the TikTok account name in the Statement of Claim and questioning whether the documents marked as "ID" should be admissible.

I find these objections to be devoid of merit. The account was sufficiently described, and the Appellant never disputed authorship in her pleadings. Therefore, the trial judge correctly admitted the documents based on implied admission and the lack of challenge during discovery and trial. This Court agrees with the Respondent’s argument that the objections were tactical rather than genuine. Courts should not be misled by strategic denials when admissions have already been made. The Appellant’s counterclaim was correctly dismissed.

This Court agrees that the Appellant’s counterclaim was vague and unsubstantiated. The learned SCJ found that the Appellant failed to prove her claim on a balance of probabilities, and I see no reason to disturb that finding. Whether the award of RM50,000.00 in damages was excessive

General damages in defamation cases are at the court's discretion and should be evaluated based on the severity of the statements, the Respondent’s status, the extent of publication, and the Appellant’s motive.

The Respondent is a police officer. The allegations involved misconduct, immorality, and racial insults, which were widely shared on social media. The Appellant showed no remorse and continued to post during the proceedings.

Considering the circumstances, the award of RM50,000.00 in general damages and RM10,000.00 in costs is not manifestly excessive nor based on any incorrect legal principle. The award reflected the seriousness of the defamation and the harm caused.

Having carefully considered the parties’ submissions and the record of appeal, I find no merit in the appeal. The learned SCJ applied the correct legal principles, provided cogent reasons, and made findings of fact that were supported by the evidence.

Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed in its entirety, and the decision of the Sessions Court is upheld. The Appellant is to pay the costs of RM5,000.00 to the Respondent. Dated 29 SEPTEMBER 2025 -sgd-JAMHIRAH ALI JUDGE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA SHAH ALAM SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN To the parties’ solicitors: For the Appellant : Irman Al-Syafeeq bin Mohd Simin Muhammad Izhar bin Mohd Salehuddin (Messrs Abdul, Low & Partners ) For the Respondent: Mohammad Yunus bin Razak Khairul Anuar bin Musa (Messrs Khairul & Shuhada)