(iv) SEKSYEN 114(G) AKTA KETERANGAN 1950 [59] Dalam menentukan sama ada anggapan bertentangan menurut s.114(g) AK 1950 terpakai atau tidak dalam kes tertuduh ini, adalah penting untuk ditekankan bahawa pemakaian peruntukan berkenaan adalah bergantung kepada budi bicara mahkamah berdasarkan 965 penelitian menyeluruh terhadap keseluruhan fakta sesuatu kes. Dalam keadaan di mana wujudnya suatu keterangan material yang boleh dikemukakan namun pihak pendakwaan memilih untuk tidak mengemukakan keterangan tersebut, maka anggapan bertentangan menurut s. 114(g) AK 1950 adalah terpakai. Anggapan ini akan 970 membenarkan mahkamah untuk menganggap bahawa sesuatu fakta itu mungkin telah berlaku setelah menilai setiap keterangan di dalam kes tersebut. Mahkamah merujuk kes-kes berikut: - Munusamy Vengadasalam v. PP [1987] 1 CLJ 250; [1987] CLJ 975 (Rep) 221; [1986] 1 MLRA 292, Mahkamah Agung telah menyatakan seperti berikut: “it is essential to appreciate the scope of section 114(g) lest it be carried too far outside its limit. Adverse inference under that illustration can only be drawn if there is withholding or suppression of evidence and 980 not merely on account of failure to obtain evidence. It may be drawn from withholding not just any document but material document by a party in his possession, or for non-production of not just any witness but an important and material to the case.” (penekanan ditambah) 985 - PP v. Mansor Md Rashid & Anor [1997] 1 CLJ 233 Mahkamah Persekutuan telah membincangkan skop penggunaan anggapan adverse inference menurut s. 114(g) Akta Keterangan 1950 mengulas seperti berikut: “The drawing of adverse inferences pursuant to s. 114(g) of the EA is not 990 a matter of an inflexible rule but depends on the circumstances of each particular case. The question to consider is whether the existence of a fact or state of things makes the existence of another fact or state of things so likely that it may be presumed to exist The answer must naturally vary according to the circumstances, the nature of the fact required to be 995 proved and its importance in the controversy, the usual and commonly recognised mode of proving it and the nature, quality and cogency of the evidence which has not been produced and its accessibility to the party concerned. In the instant case, no adverse inferences should be drawn against the prosecution for the non-production of both Chotar and 1000 Amran, at least at that stage of the trial. They were not material to the point in issue as the basis of the prosecution's case to substantiate the charge was on the "sale of cannabis resulting from negotiations". (penekanan ditambah) 1005 - Ghasem Hozouri Hassan v. PP [2018] 6 CLJ 133; [2019] 6 MLJ 231, Mahkamah Persekutuan telah memutuskan seperti berikut: “[48] The law pertaining to s. 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 is settled. Under s. 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 the court may presume that evidence which could be and is not produced would if produced be unfavourable to 1010 the person who withholds it The usage of the word 'may' gives the discretion to the court whether or not to invoke the adverse inference to a given set of facts, it is not a mandatory inference. To draw an adverse inference against the prosecution the court must be satisfied that the witness that was not offered was a material witness, the prosecution 1015 purposely withhold evidence which it possessed and which was always available: and that what the prosecution did was done with an ulterior motive to frustrate the defence (Nanda Kumar Kunyikanan & Anor v. Pendakwa Raya [2011] 8 CLJ 406; [2011] MLJU 1566). [49] The aforesaid authority above set out is the correct position of the law, that 1020 is, court will not invoke an adverse inference against prosecution if it believes that the facts and/or the prosecution's reasons for not calling the supposed material witnesses show no cause for it. Moreover, the prosecution only needs to produce witnesses who are necessary in the unfolding of its complete narrative, that is, to prove the essential elements 1025 of the crime and in this case, custody, control, and knowledge. Applying the above principles to our present case, we are satisfied that there was no evidence to suggest even the slightest inkling that the prosecution withheld testimonies by Javad @ Hasan Tiren and Samaneh Momen in a deliberate scheme to impair the truth or frustrate the appellant's defence. 1030 [50] Further, in the case of Siew Yoke Keong v. Public Prosecutor this court had succinctly laid down that witnesses for prosecution are indispensable only insofar as they are necessary in establishing a prosecution's case beyond a reasonable doubt Thus, any calling of witness beyond that minimum requirement is within prosecutorial discretion. In the end, it is 1035 the sufficiency of the evidence that matters. As long as there are no unsatisfactory features or gaps in the prosecution's case, an order of adverse inference is not imperative, It is our view, on the facts of this case, adverse inference under s. 114(g) of the Evidence Act, could not be invoked against the prosecution.” (penekanan ditambah) 1040 [60] Berdasarkan panduan dan prinsip yang telah digariskan dalam nas-nas duluan berhubung penggunaan anggapan adverse inference menurut s. 114(g) AK 1950, Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa ketiadaan keterangan pemilik berdaftar Alza tersebut Ah Seng/Ah Beng sebagai 1045 saksi pendakwaan juga tidak mencacatkan atau mewujudkan sebarang kelompangan dalam naratif kes pendakwaan. Malah jika dipanggil sebagai saksi pendakwaan juga, tidak memberi sebarang weightage kepada kes pendakwaan. Tidak wujud sebarang niat jahat di pihak pendakwaan yang boleh memprejudiskan pihak pembelaan. Pada 1050 hemat kami, pemilik berdaftar Alza tersebut dan Ah Seng/Ah Beng adalah saksi-saksi yang tidak material. Justeru, mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa isu anggapan bertentangan menurut s. 114(g) AK 1950 yang cuba dibangkitkan oleh pihak pembelaan ini sama sekali tidak bermerit dan tiada sebarang keadaan “suppression of evidence 1055 that had robbed the appellant of a right to a fair trial” telah berlaku. [61] Selanjutnya, mengenai kebolehterimaan keterangan saksi-saksi pendakwaan khususnya keterangan SP2, SP6, SP7, SP8 dan SP9 yang saling menyokong antara satu sama lain. Pada pandangan kami setelah 1060 kami menilai keseluruhan keterangan SP2, SP6 dan SP9 secara mendalam, kami berpuashati bahawa keterangan yang diberikan SP2 sebagai saksi mata dan disokong keterangan saksi polis SP6 dan SP9. SP2 ada seorang saksi yang kredibel dan boleh dipercayai. Selanjutnya, tiada sebab untuk kami meragui dan menolak keterangan SP6 dan SP9 1065 di dalam menjalankan tugas mereka sebagai pegawai polis. Dapatan ini bersandarkan kepada nas-nas berikut : - Md Zainudin Raujan v. PP [2013] 4 CLJ 21, Mahkamah Pesekutuan memutuskan seperti yang berikut: 1070 “[55] PW5 was a police witness. The learned trial judge found him to be a credible witness. It is true that the prosecution's case rested solely on the evidence on PW5. However, under the law there is no requirement for his evidence to be corroborated. The learned trial judge believed PW5 and as such his evidence was sufficient to establish the case for the 1075 prosecution. Any requirement for PW5’s evidence to be corroborated will conflict with s. 134 of the Evidence Act 1950 which provides that no particular number of witnesses shall in any case be required for proof of any fact (see Balachandran v. PP [2005] 1 CLJ 85).” (Penekanan ditambah). 1080 - PP v. Dato' Seri Anwar Ibrahim [2014] 4 CLJ 162, Mahkamah Rayuan menyatakan seperti yang berikut : "It must be borne in mind that s. 114 illustration © of the Evidence Act 1950 provides that the court may presume that judicial and official acts 1085 have been regularly performed. In State of Punjab v. Rameshwar Dass [1975] Cri LI 1630, the Punjabi & Haryana Court held at p. 1631 as follows: ‘It is well settled that prima facie the public servants must be assumed to act honestly and conscientiously. It would, therefore, be basically wrong, without other cogent ground to consider them as 1090 untrustworthy witness in respect of their activities in performance of their official duties merely because of their official status unless the evidence is considered to be suspicious and that the conviction of the accused cannot be sustained on the statements of the official witnesses. The presumption that a person acts honestly applied as 1095 much in favour of a police officer as of other persons,and it is not a judicial approach to distrust and suspect him without good grounds’".