Iskandar Waterfront Sdn Bhd v Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Johor Bahru (JA-24NCvC-1150-09/2024)

1.

STATE GOVERNMENT OF JOHOR … RESPONDENTS

This is the Appellant’s application (Enclosure 1), inter alia, to appeal against the decision of the Respondent under section 418 of the National Land Code 2020 [Act 828] in issuing two (2) Form 7A notices both dated 06.06.2024 (“Form 7A Notices”) pursuant to section 128 of Act 828 in respect of the lands held under titles PTB24831, HS(D) 626979 and PTB24832, HS(D) 626980 both in Mukim Bandar Johor Bahru, Daerah Johor Bahru, Negeri Johor. 21/02/2026 23:54:23

After considering all cause papers, the written submissions and oral submissions of the parties, I dismissed the Appellant’s application, with costs of RM5,000.00 to be paid by the Appellant to the Respondents.

Below are the grounds of my decision.

The background facts of this application are gathered from the Affidavits and submissions filed by the parties and set out in chronological order.

The land was originally a State land and under one plot, namely HSD 443036, PTB 21910, Mukim Bandar Johor Bahru, District of Johor Bahru, State of Johor (“Lot 21910”).

Lot 21910 alienated to Kumpulan Prasarana Rakyat Johor Sdn. Bhd. (“KPRJ”) on 25.04.2007 with the express conditions as follows: “Syarat-syarat nyata:

Tanah ini hendaklah ditanam dengan tanaman kelapa sawit

Pemilik tanah ini hendaklah sepanjang masa mengambil langkah-langkah menurut perintah yang dikehendaki oleh Pentadbir Tanah bagi menjaga tanah ini daripada hakisan.”. [Emphasis added]

The express conditions endorsed on the original title restrict the use of the said Lands to agricultural purposes, namely oil palm cultivation.

According to the Appellant, the alienation of Lot 21910 by the State to KPRJ was for the purpose of mixed development, despite the category of land use being “agriculture”. This can be seen in the letter from the Director of Lands and Mines, Johor to the First Respondent (“R1”) dated 13.12.2006 and the letter from R1 to KPRJ dated 10.01.2007 (see the letter from the Director of Lands and Mines, Johor to R1 dated 13.12.2006 and the letter from R1 to KPRJ at Exhibit “TAY-2” of Enclosure 6).

KPRJ is a company fully owned by the State Government of Johor, the Second Respondent (“R2”).

A Subscription Agreement dated 17.01.2007 (“Subscription Agreement”) was entered into between South Johor Investment Corporation Berhad (“SJIC”), Danga Bay Holdings Sdn Bhd (“Danga Bay”), KPRJ and Kota Selat Tebrau Sdn. Bhd. (“Kota Selat Tebrau”).

Lot 21910 was one of the lands that was injected by KPRJ to the Waterfront Project. As a whole, all lands injected by KPRJ were valued at RM327.30 million on the basis of commercial development land. This valuation is reflected in the 12.30% shares of Kota Selat Tebrau that were issued to KPRJ.

Subsequently and prior to 18.03.2010, the name of the following companies to the Subscription Agreement were changed:

SJIC was renamed to Iskandar Investment Berhad (“IIB”); and

Kota Selat Tebrau was renamed to Iskandar Waterfront Development Sdn. Bhd. (“IWDSB”).

A restructuring agreement dated 18.03.2010 (“Restructuring Agreement”) was entered into between KPRJ, IIB, Danga Bay, IWDSB and the Appellant. Pursuant to the Restructuring Agreement, it was agreed that Lot 21910 would be transferred to the Appellant for further development (see the Restructuring Agreement at Exhibit “IW-5” of Enclosure 2).

Lot 21910 was transferred from KPRJ to Kota Selat Tebrau on 19.06.2007, and was subsequently transferred from Iskandar Coast Sdn. Bhd. (previously known as Kota Selat Tebrau) to the Appellant on 05.10.2010.

The Appellant subsequently registered as the proprietor of Lot 21910. The Land is located in the Straits of Johor, between Johor and Singapore, and is completely submerged underwater. Part of Lot 21910 was subsequently acquired by the State Government on 21.01.2021

Following the land acquisition, Lot 21910 has been divided into two (2) plot of lands (see the photo below). R1 has issued two (2) titles for the remaining of the land, namely HSD 626979 and HSD 626980 on 06.11.2023 (the “said Lands”). Save for the difference in land area, all other particulars, including the express conditions endorsed thereon, remain the same with the original title.

On 06.06.2024, the Land Administrator of Johor Bahru, acting pursuant to statutory powers under section 128 Act 828, issued two (2) Form 7A Notices against the Appellant alleging breach of the express conditions of title.

Due to the above, the Appellant has on 06.09.2024 filed this Enclosure 1 to appeal against the decision of the Respondents in issuing the Form 7A Notices under section 418 of Act 828.

On 12.12.2024, the Appellant received Form 7B Notices (Breach of Condition: Notice to Show Cause) issued by R1 for failing to comply with the Form 7A Notices (see Exhibit “LWS-3” in the Enclosure 36).

On 11.12.2024, I have granted an ad interim stay of forfeiture proceedings pending the full and final disposal of Enclosure 10.

The Appellant contended that they had taken steps towards redevelopment of the area and had—

resubmitted planning permission applications to the local authority; and

filed an application for conversion of land use from agriculture to commercial on 29.10.2024.

Notwithstanding the above, the Respondents contended that until formal approval for conversion granted by the State Authority, the Appellant remained legally bound by the existing express conditions.

Dissatisfied with the issuance of the Form 7A Notices, the Appellant commenced the present proceedings to appeal against the decision of the Respondents in issuing the Form 7A Notices under section 418 of Act 828.

On 20.05.2025, I have dismissed the Appellant’s application in Enclosure 32 for stay of proceedings pending the transfer of proceedings for the other two (2) Originating Summons in another Johor Bahru High Court with costs of RM3000.00 to be paid to the Respondents.

The issue to be determined before this Court is—

whether the issuance of the Form 7A Notices were pre-mature, in light of the ongoing planning and conversion applications;

whether the Respondents acted irrationally and unreasonably in enforcing section 128 of Act 828; and

whether the Respondents exercised their statutory powers in bad faith or for an improper purpose. APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES

Pursuant to section 418 of Act 828, any person aggrieved by a decision of the State Director, the Registrar of Land Administrator has a right to appeal to the High Court.

The governing principle is that Form 7A and Form 7B Notices may be set aside on the grounds of irrationality, unreasonableness and bad faith. See Ambank (M) Bhd. v Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Gombak & Another Case [2014] 8 CLJ 34.

In deciding the issue, I need to balance the competing interests of both parties and ensure that the discretion is exercised judiciously.

Whether the issuance of the Form 7A Notices were pre-mature, in light of the ongoing planning and conversion applications

The Appellant submitted that the issuance of Form 7A Notices were pre-mature because it was issued less than twelve (12) months after the two (2) titles to the remaining Lands were issued and it contravenes section 115 of Act 828.

Section 115 of Act 828 reads as follows: “(1) Where any alienated land is subject by virtue of any provision of this Act to the category "agriculture", the following implied conditions shall, subject to subsection (3), apply thereto:

that no building shall be erected on the land other than a building or buildings to be used for one or more of the purposes specified or referred to in subsection (4);

that a bona fide commencement of cultivation of the land shall be made within twelve months of the relevant date;

that the whole area of the land, other than any part thereof—

occupied by or in conjunction with a building (whenever erected) used for one or more of the purposes specified or referred to in subsection (4); or

(ii) used for any of the purposes mentioned in paragraph

of that subsection, or any other purpose which the State Authority may specially authorize, shall be brought fully under cultivation within three years of the relevant date;

that the area of the land referred to in paragraph (c) shall be maintained and cultivated according to the rules of good husbandry; and

that the said area shall be continuously cultivated: Provided that the condition specified in paragraph (e) shall be regarded as complied with in the case of any area so long as any period during which less than the whole thereof is cultivated does not exceed twelve months.

In subsection (1) "relevant date" means the date on which the land became subject to the category: Provided that, where any land becomes subject to the category on its amalgamation with other land already so subject, the date on which a register document of title to the amalgamated area is first registered shall become the relevant date as respects the whole of that area.

The conditions specified in subsection (1) shall be implied in the case of any land to the extent only that they are not inconsistent with any express conditions to which the land is for the time being subject.”. [Emphasis added]

The Appellant contended that when the Form 7A Notices (Notice to Remedy a Breach of Condition) issued by the Respondents in the respect of the said Lands on 06.06.2024 for failing to plant palm oil trees within twelve (12) months from the date of the alienation of the said Lands pursuant to section 115 of Act 828, the Appellant was required to comply with the express conditions in the title of the Lands for agriculture use and cultivation of palm oil trees within 180 days from the service of Form 7A Notices on the Appellant.

The Appellant argued that the date of twelve (12) months should run from the date of two (2) titles namely HSD 626979 and HSD 626980 issued on 06.11.2023 and therefore the Form 7A Notices issued on 06.06.2024 were less than twelve (12) months. Hence, it is pre-matured. The Appellant cited the case of Ng Chin Siu & Sons Rubber Estate Sdn. Bhd. v Pentadbir Tanah Hilir Perak & Anor. [2013] MLJU 1590 and Ee Chong Pang & Ors.v The Land Administrator of the District of Alor Gajah & Anor. [2013] 2 MLJ 16 which emphasize the need for strict compliance with procedural requirements that protect constitutional property rights under Article 13 of the Federal Constitution.

In respect of the Stay Application in Enclosure 10, the Appellant submitted as follows:

a stay of the forfeiture proceedings is warranted under subsection 417(1) of the Act 828 to prevent irreparable harm and to preserve the appeal’s substratum, i.e. the said Lands;

Ambank v. Pentadbir Tanah Gombak (supra) and Kosma Palm Oil Mill Sdn Bhd v. Koperasi Serbausaha Makmur Bhd [2004] 1 MLJ 257, show that special circumstances, including the risk of rendering the appeal nugatory, justify granting a stay; and

the forfeiture proceedings are likely to result in the loss of the disputed Lands before the appeal is fully resolved, leading to serious and irreversible consequences for the Appellant. Therefore, maintaining the status quo is crucial to a fair and effective resolution of the appeal.

In contrast, Respondents submitted that the Appellant was mistaken and misled when they considered that the title of PTB 24831, HS(D) 626979 and PTB 24832, HS(D) 626980 was a new title, but in fact it was a continuation title after the partial acquisition of Lot 21910.

The Respondents contended that after the partial acquisition of Lot 21910 for RTS Project, R1 has issued two (2) titles, namely PTB 24831, HS(D) 626979 for 14.468 hectares and PTB 24832, HS(D) 626980 for 47.656 hectares are titles in continuation pursuant to subsection 26(1) of Act 486 and subsection 166(1) of Act 828. A title in continuation is issued where only part of the land has been acquired by the state and the part left unacquired has been resurveyed. Such continuing titles are the same as the original title, save for the difference in land area. All other particulars, including ownership, encumbrances, express conditions endorsed thereon, remain unchanged from the original title. Therefore, owner of the continuing title held the same responsibility and obligation as an owner of the original title.

The Respondents submitted that after the partial acquisition of Lot 21910 has been completed and Form K being registered, the registering authority need to correct the boundaries of Lot 21910 shown on the register document of title according to subsection 6(3) of Act 486 and return the document to the person who delivered it.

Thereafter, R1 will issue title in continuation for the remaining land of Lot 21910 pursuant to subsection 26(1) of Act 486. Subsection 26(1) of Act 486 provides that—

“Title in continuation where part of lot acquired

Where part of a lot has been resurveyed pursuant to subsection 25(1), the proper registering authority shall-

in the case of land held under Registry title or Land Office title, issue title in continuation to the part retained by the proprietor as if he were issuing title in continuation to land as a whole…”. [Emphasis added]

Further, subsection 166(1) of Act 828 provides the circumstances where the title in continuation will be issued and the provision stated as follows: Circumstances in which title in continuation may be issued to land as a whole

The circumstances in which title in continuation may be issued under this Chapter to any land as a whole are as follows:

… …

where only part of a piece of land has been acquired by the State and the part left unacquired has been resurveyed; …

For the purpose of paragraph (1)(h), if the part acquired refers wholly or in part to underground land, the title in continuation to be issued for the part left unacquired shall be endorsed in accordance with subsection 92b(2).”. [Emphasis added]

Upon perusing the two (2) titles issued by R1 (see exhibit “IWK-1” of Enclosure 2), it clearly shown that the two (2) titles are in continuation of the original title HSD 443036 PTO 21910. It is not a new title as claimed by the Appellant. Therefore, based on subsection 26(1) of Act 486 read together with subsection 116(1) of Act 828, I rule that the two

titles issued on 06.11.2023 by R1 for two (2) plots of lands are titles in continuation. All the particulars, including ownership, encumbrances, express conditions endorsed thereon, remain unchanged from the original title. Therefore, the Appellant is obligated to comply with the express conditions of the said Lands.

Section 115 of Act 828 provides that where alienated land is categorized as agricultural land, there is an implied condition that a bona fide commencement of cultivation must be made within twelve

months from the relevant date. The “relevant date” is defined as the date on which the land first become subject to the agricultural category. In this present case, at the time Lot 21910 was alienated to the KPRJ on 25.04.2007, the land has been categorized as agricultural land.

Thus, the relevant date is commenced from the alienation date which is on 25.04.2007. Accordingly, I rule that the twelve (12) month period commenced on 25.04.2007 and expired on 24.04.2008.

The Appellant further submitted that they had taken steps towards the redevelopment of the area and had resubmitted planning permission applications to the local authority and by filing an application for conversion of land use from agriculture to commercial on 29.10.2024. However, this contention is not supported by the evidence.

While it is true that the Appellant had resubmitted planning permission application, the evidence shows that the said planning permission was not approved by Johor Bahru City Council on 30.11.2022. I refer to Exhibit “IW-7” in the Affidavit in Support (Enclosure 6) at page 437-439 where “Borang C(2) Penolakan Kebenaran Merancang bagi PTB 21910 HSD 443036 Mukim Bandar Johor Bahru” clearly states that Johor Bahru City Council had decided to reject application for planning permission by the Appellant. The Appellant only resubmitted the planning permission on 08.10.2024 and filed the application for conversion of land use on 29.10.2024 which is after four (4) months of the issuance of Form 7A Notice. These actions are clearly an afterthought.

The Appellant further submitted that the said Lands were intended for commercial development, as stated in the letter from the Director of Lands and Mines, Johor to R1.

However, I am not persuaded. I refer to the letter from the Director of Lands and Mines, Johor to R1 dated 13.12.2006 and the letter from R1 to KPRJ dated 10.01.2007, both letters were issued about seventeen

years ago and the express conditions on the said Lands remained unchanged when the Lot 21910 was transferred to the Appellant on 05.10.2010. Thereafter, when the two (2) titles were issued to the Appellant on 06.11.2023, the conditions of the said Lands remain the same.

I further find that although the Appellant has applied for planning permission to the Johor Bahru City Council in year 2022 which is almost twelve (12) years after they became the registered proprietor of Lot 21910, the application has not been approved by the Johor Bahru City Council. Since then, the Appellant did not resubmit a new application for planning permission and only resubmitted the new application on 08.10.2024 which is four (4) months after the issuance of the Form 7A Notices.

Therefore, based on the particulars/conditions endorsed on the land titles, the express conditions stated therein prevails. It is settled law that under the Torrens System, the register is “everything” and therefore any change to the use of land must be reflected by an endorsement on the titles.

In light of the foregoing findings, the Form 7A and Form 7B Notices issued by the Respondents to the Appellant cannot be said to be pre-mature.

Whether Respondents acted irrationally and unreasonably in enforcing section 128 of Act 828

The Appellant further submitted that the issuance of Form 7A Notice was irrational and unreasonable because the lands are fully submerged underwater. As such cultivation of palm oil trees on the said Lands are practically impossible. Even if reclamation of the said Lands were feasible, the time frame of 180 days from the date of Form 7A Notice is plainly insufficient. This contention is supported by Appellants’ experts witnesses, who stated that minimum period required to commence oil palm cultivation is approximately 1,276 days (approximately 3.5 years) and the minimum period to begin commercial development is 1,456 days (approximately 4 years).

The Appellant relies on Ambank (M) Bhd v Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Gombak (supra) to support its contention. In the Ambank’s case, Form 7A Notice was issued and served on Delpuri Corporation Sdn. Bhd., imposing fourteen (14) days timeline to remedy the breach of condition by erecting apartment buildings in Plot A and B. The High Court held that the imposition of the fourteen (14) days deadline was an arbitrary act and not based on any proper consideration or appreciation of the surrounding, circumstances and facts. Accordingly, both Form 7A and Form 7B were set aside on the grounds of irrationality, unreasonableness and bad faith.

The Respondents argued that the Respondents have discretion to decide what is the reasonable time to remedy the breach under paragraph 128(1)(b) of Act 828. The Respondents cited the case of Hamidah Mohd. Khalid & Yang Lain v Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Gombak [2016] 7CLJ 936 to support their arguments. As such, the Respondents submitted that the time frame 180 days was reasonable for Appellant to remedy the breach of the express conditions. The Respondents sought to distinguish the fact of the present case from Ambank (M) Bhd. v Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Gombak (supra), where the Appellant only given fourteen (14) days to remedy the breach of the conditions of the said Lands. In contrast, the Appellant in this present case has been given 180 days and did not apply for an extension of time.

I find that although the interpretation or definition of a reasonable period of time is not specifically stated or provided for in land laws whether in the Act 486 or Act 828, however, for the purpose of issuing the Form 7A Notices to the Appellant, a period of 180 days to remedy the breach of the condition is sufficient. Therefore, based on subsection 128(1) of Act 828, R1 has discretion to determine the time frame for the Appellant to remedy the breach. I then rule the reasonable period of time to remedy the breach is to be determined based on circumstances of each case.

I further find that the facts in the present case can be distinguished from the case cited by the Appellant in Ambank (M) Bhd. v Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Gombak (supra). The Appellant in that case had taken appropriate action and had tried to comply with the conditions imposed by constructing some buildings on the plots of land involved, but in this case no action had been taken by the Appellant after the original title was received or even after the titles of continuation for the said Lands being issued following partial acquisition of Lot 21910.

In this regard, I refer to the case of Singma Sawmill Co. Sdn. Bhd. v Asian Holdings (Industralised Buildings) Sdn. Bhd. [1980] 1 MLJ 21 where the Federal Court held that— “In the present case, the breach of the express condition is wilful, if not, contumacious. There is a clear intention on the part of the appellants to use the subject-matter of the agreement i.e. the land on which the factory was created, for an unlawful purpose. The object of the express condition is that the land must be cultivated with rubber and pineapple; the category of land use is agriculture, and any unilateral conversion to industry is not permitted. Indeed neither party had power to waive the express condition which inextricably runs with the land. If that is permitted it would be entirely to ignore the object of the express condition which is for the public good and to defeat the law relating to land use.”. [Emphasis added]

In the instant case, the Appellant clearly had knowledge from the very beginning that Lot 21910 is completely submerged underwater and the category for land use of the Lot 21910 was for agricultural purposes when they became the registered proprietor for Lot 21910 on 05.10.2010. Despite the Appellant knew the express condition of the said Lands, the Appellant did not take any action to comply with the conditions. The Appellant also knew the approval of the State Government that the Lot 21910 to be used for the mixed development since 2006 yet until the date of issuance of Form of 7A Notices, the Appellant has failed to take any action to apply for the conversion of the said Lands for commercial purpose since 05.10.2010.

Subsection 54(2) of the Interpretation Act 1948 and 1967[Act 388] provides that— “(2) Where no time is prescribed within which anything shall be done, that thing shall be done with all convenient speed and as often as the prescribed occasion arises.”. [Emphasis added]

In this regard, I refer to the case of Chua Kian Voon v. Menteri Dalam Negeri Malaysia & Ors [2020] 1 CLJ where Federal Court decided that— “[67] Section 5(4) of the 1985 Act allows the Minister to prescribe regulations stipulating time but as apparent from the above, the Minister has not done so. We then turned to s. 54(2) of the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 which stipulates that where no time is prescribed within which anything shall be done, that thing shall be done with all convenient speed and as often as the prescribed occasion requires. Simply put, for any matter where time has not by law been prescribed, such matter ought to be completed as soon as practicable and without inordinate delay.”. [Emphasis added]

Further, subsection 103(1) of Act 828 provides the scope and interpretation of the terms as follows: "condition subject to a fixed term" means any condition which requires the proprietor of any land to do any act before, or refrain from doing any act until, the expiry of any particular period, or the occurrence of any particular date or event, specified in the condition.”. [Emphasis added]

Subsection 106(1) of Act 828 states the followings:

“Time to be of the essence of fixed-term conditions of a positive character Time shall be deemed to be of the essence of every condition subject to a fixed term by which the proprietor of any land is required to do any act.”. [Emphasis added]

Based on the authorities above, the Appellant is expected to comply with the express condition of the said Lands to cultivate the oil palm trees within twelve (12) months commenced from the date the original title was granted to KPRJ on 25.04.2007 or twelve (12) months from the date of 05.10.2010 when the Lot 21910 transferred and registered in the name of the Appellant. The Appellant has delayed in applying for the conversion of the category of land use for the said Lands even though they knew the said Lands are not suitable to cultivate palm oil trees.

The Appellant has had a sufficiently long period of time to comply with the express conditions of the said Lands, namely almost fourteen (14) years from the date of the original title owner until the date of the issuance of the Form 7A Notice to them. Inevitably, the Appellant has the responsibility to comply with or remedy the breach of the conditions immediately. I rule that the Appellant has breached the express conditions of the said Lands and this breach is willful and contumacious.

Although the Appellant at all times had knowledge that the process for planting oil palm on Lot 21910 and the process for reclamation of the said Lands for development were long and time-consuming process, yet no action was taken for years until the Respondents issued the Form 7A Notices.

The Appellant himself was the one who delayed compliance with the express conditions of the said Lands, without presenting solid and concrete evidence to explain the excessive delay on their parts. The Appellant has failed to demonstrate bona fide efforts to remedy the breach of the conditions. Instead, the Appellant chose to maintain the status quo of the said Lands by pursuing an application for conversion of land use under subsection 124(1) of Act 828 after the issuance of the Form 7A Notices by R1. The Appellant did not apply for any extension of time to remedy the breach.

The Respondents have given the Appellant several years of opportunity to comply with the express conditions of the said Lands, but it was in vain as the condition and status of the said Lands was the same as when the Appellant first acquired the original title in 2010.

I find that the Respondents only issued Form 7A Notices some fourteen

years after the said Lands were transferred to the Appellant. This shows that the issuance of the Form 7A Notices was made with relevant and proper consideration, and was not done hastily or arbitrarily.

Therefore, I find the contentions of the Appellant devoid of merits. I rule that the issuance of the Form 7A Notices by the Respondents to the Appellant was an action taken in good faith and bona fide, based on the provisions under the Act 828 as a result of the Appellant's own failure. It was not an action that was blindly or arbitrarily taken for any interest.

Whether the Respondents exercised their statutory powers in bad faith or for an improper purpose

The Appellant contended that the Respondents have acted in bad faith where the Respondents are fully aware that the said Lands were alienated for the development of the Waterfront Project, and the Appellant has been actively complying with planning requirements to develop the said Lands. However, via the Form 7A Notices, the Respondent seeks forfeiture on grounds unrelated to the development of the said Lands and it has contradicted the original intent for the said Lands. Additionally, similar notices have been issued for lands owned by related companies of the Appellant, showing a broader pattern of bad faith actions.

The Appellant contends that any decision made in bad faith are liable to be set aside by this Court and relies on United Development Company Sdn. Bhd. v The State Government of Sabah & Anor. [2011] 7 MLJ 209. In this case, the High Court held that the wide powers of the government to compel private individuals to give up their lands must not only be exercised in good faith but must manifestly be seen to be exercised in good faith, otherwise, the decisions made are liable to be set aside.

The Respondents contended that the Appellant has failed to prove the Respondents have exercised their statutory powers in bad faith or for an improper purpose. The Respondents refer to the case of Hamidah Mohd. Khalid & Yang Lain v. Pentabdir Tanah Daerah Gombak (supra) to support their contentions.

I agree with the contention of the Respondents as there is no evidence to support such allegations. The Respondents had allowed a period of fourteen (14) years for Appellant to fulfill the conditions stipulated on the said Lands. Further, upon the issuance of the Form 7A Notices, the Appellants was also given 180 days to remedy the breach of condition.

In addition, the Appellant was fully aware of the condition of the said Lands when they became the registered proprietor of Lot 21910 on 05.10.2010 and they are obligated to comply with the express conditions under subsection 115(1) of Act 828. Nevertheless, throughout the fourteen (14) years period, the Appellant did not take any step to comply with the conditions imposed.

Therefore, as long as there remains a continuing breach of the express conditions of land use, the Respondents as the statutory authority is mandated to enforce compliance pursuant to subsection 128 (1) of Act 828.

Accordingly, I answer this issue in negative.

The Respondents contended that the Affidavit of the Experts in Enclosures 29, 30 and 31 filed by the Appellant (the “said Affidavits”) are an afterthought and should be set aside. The said Affidavits are filed after the submission for the planning permission to the Johor Bahru City Council on 08.10.2024 and the application for conversion of land use to R1 on 29.10.2024. The said Affidavits were filed last minutes to strengthen their appeals and it has prejudiced the Respondents. The Respondents further argued that the said Affidavits would not assist the Appellant as it would not change the facts that the Appellant has breached the express conditions of the said Lands.

I agree with the contention of the Respondents that the said Affidavits would not change the fact that the Appellant has breached the express conditions of the said Lands. The matters mentioned by the experts in their Affidavits regarding the suitability of the said Lands to cultivate the palm oil trees should have been submitted to the R1 for the purpose of conversion of land use and the matter regarding time taken for reclamation of the said Lands would be a mitigating factor that they should have submitted to R1 for extension of time to remedy the breach. Should the Appellant have taken steps to comply with the express conditions or to convert the land use of Lot 21910 since they became the registered proprietor on 05.10.2010, they would not have faced the risks that the said Lands would be forfeited by the Respondents.

As such, I decide that the said Affidavits are not to be considered by this Court in deciding Enclosure 1.

Having considered the affidavits, submissions, and applicable legal principles, I am satisfied that the issuance of the Form 7A Notices were neither arbitrary nor tainted by bad faith. The Respondents had given the Appellant ample time, namely fourteen (14) years to comply with the conditions imposed on the said Lands, followed by a further 180 days after the issuance of the Form 7A Notices. Despite this, the Appellant failed to take any meaningful steps to remedy the breach.

Accordingly, I dismissed the Appellant’s application in Enclosure 1 with costs of RM5,000.00 to be paid by the Appellant to the Respondents. Dated 15th February 2026. Signed by: sgd ……………….. Wong Mee Ling Judge High Court of Malaya Johor Bahru Johor Darul Ta’zim. Counsel/Solicitor For the Appellant: Mr. Raymond Mah with Mr L.M Looi and Mr Joseph Khor Messrs. Mah WengKwai & Associates Counsel/Solicitor For the Respondents: Datuk Abd Aziz Bin Engan with