Ismail Bin Daud v Muhammad Syafiq Bin Abd Jalil (PA-12B-4-04/2022)

The parties had agreed on apportioning liability at 50% - 50% respectively.

An efficient way to deal with this Appeal on quantum is to evaluate the findings and the reasonings of the SCJ item-by-item, and to decide whether to exercise appellate interference to vary the quantum awarded. LAW ON APPELLATE INTERVENTION [4] An Appellate Court should only interfere to disturb the findings of the first instance Court (here: the Session Court), if the first instance Court was “plainly wrong” in its decision.

The Federal Court, in Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v Wendy Tan Lee Peng (administratrix for the estate of Tan Ewe Kwang, deceased) & Ors [2020] 12 MLJ 67 (FC); [2020] 8 AMR 227; [2020] 10 CLJ 1; [2020] 6 MLRA 193, through the written grounds of Justice Zabariah Mohd Yusof FCJ, comprehensively expounded the genesis of the “plainly wrong” principle, through its development over the years, into its current meaning.

Ng Hoo Kui (supra) propounded that the primary “plainly wrong” principle, includes the following not-exhaustive elaborative principles, and I apply them here— S/N uB9psXw3y0G0prXiZGstg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 3 of 23 i. The SCJ’s decision is “plainly wrong” if it was arrived at through “no or insufficient judicial appreciation of the evidence”: referring to UEM Group Bhd (previously known as United Engineers (M) Bhd v Genisys Integrated Engineers Pte Ltd & Anor [2010] MLJU 2179 (FC); [2011] 1 AMCR 338; [2010] 9 CLJ 785; [2010] 2 MLRA 668. ii. This phrase of the “lack of judicial appreciation of the evidence” encompasses these three errors:- a. critical factual finding which has no basis in evidence (findings not based on the evidence); b. demonstrable misunderstanding of the relevant evidence (misunderstanding the evidence); c. demonstrable failure to consider the relevant evidence (failure to consider the evidence). iii. The SCJ’s decision is “plainly wrong” if it was arrived at through a “material error of law”: following Henderson v Foxworth Investments Ltd [2014] 1 WLR 2600 (UKSC). iv. The SCJ’s decision is “plainly wrong” if it “could not reasonably be explained or justified”, making it a decision “which no reasonable judge could have reached”: Tengku Dato’ Ibrahim Petra bin Tengku Indra Petra v Petra Perdana Bhd & Anor Appeal [2018] 2 MLJ 177 (FC); [2018] 1 AMR 517; [2018] 2 CLJ 641; [2018] 1 MLRA 263. S/N uB9psXw3y0G0prXiZGstg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 4 of 23 v. The High Court, as an Appellate Court, is to evaluate whether the SCJ’s decision was “reasonably made”: paragraph 77 of Ng Hoo Kui (supra). FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES ON AWARDING DAMAGES [7] The fundamental principle that damages must be proven as to liability and quantum, and not merely asserted, is reinforced in the Federal Court case of Datuk Mohd Ali Hj Abdul Majid & Anor (both practising as Messrs Mohd Ali & Co) v Public Bank Bhd [2014] 4 MLJ 465 (FC); [2014] 4 AMR 301; [2014] 6 CLJ 269; [2014] 4 MLRA 397. The Federal Court held—

The object of an award of damages is to give the claimant compensation for the damage, loss or injury he has suffered. The general principle governing the measure of damages has its origin in the words of Lord Blackburn in Livingstone v Rawyards Coal Co (1880) 5 App Cas 25 where he said: that sum of money which will put the party who has been injured, or who has suffered, in the same position as he would have been in if he had not sustained the wrong for which he is now getting his compensation or reparation.

It is trite law that a claimant claiming damages must prove that he has suffered the damage. The claimant has the burden of proving both liability and quantum of damages, before he can recover the sum claimed. This follows from the general rule that the burden of proving a fact is upon him who alleges it and not upon him who denies it, so that where a particular allegation forms an essential part of a person’s case, the proof of such allegation falls on him (see s 103 of the Evidence Act 1950). If he fails to prove both the liability and the quantum of damages, he loses the action. S/N uB9psXw3y0G0prXiZGstg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Therefore, in a claim for damages, it is not sufficient for the plaintiff to merely state the amount of damages that he is claiming, he must prove the damage that he had in fact suffered to the satisfaction of the court. This principle is borne out in the case of Bonham-Carter v Hyde Park Hotel (1948) 64 TLR 177 where Lord Goddard CJ observed: Plaintiffs must understand that if they bring actions for damages it is for them to prove their damage; it is not enough to write down the particulars, and, so to speak, throw them at the head of the court, saying: ‘This is what I have lost, I ask you to give me these damages.’ They have to prove it. This statement was cited with approval by Edgar Joseph JR FCJ in Tan Sri Khoo Teck Puat v Plenitude Holdings Sdn Bhd [1994] 3 MLJ 777. [emphases mine] EVALUATION OF THE SCJ’S ASSESSMENT OF QUANTUM [8] First, in his Grounds Of Judgment, the SCJ cited these two cases to extract the principles to follow when assessing the quantum of damages—

Wong Li Fatt William (an infant) v Haidawati Bte Bolhen & Anor [1994] 2 MLJ 497 (HC); [1994] 1 LNS 196; [1994] 4 MLRH 458, where Justice Richard Malanjum J (later CJ), propounded the principle that when considering the quantum of damages, the award “must be fair” i.e. there must be “proper compensation” for the injuries suffered; and

Fletcher v Autocar and Transporter Ltd [1968] 2 QB 322; [1968] All ER 726 at 750 through Lord Salmon LJ, that the amount of damages awarded should be an amount that “the ordinary sensible man” considers to be “sensible and fair”. S/N uB9psXw3y0G0prXiZGstg Page 6 of 23 [9] The SCJ also stated that he considered the rising price of things, the high cost of living, the inflation rate, the goods and services tax (GST), and the current value of our currency: the Ringgit. [10] The SCJ goes on to cite the case law authority of Multar Masngud v Lim Kim Chet & Anor [1982] 1 MLJ 184 (FC); [1982] CLJ 107; [1982] CLJ Rep 237; [1981] 1 MLRA 157, where the Federal Court, at MLRA paragraph [21], held that “with inflation”, Courts should consider that the amount of money today “cannot be regarded as having the same value” as before. [11] Here, the accident happened in April 2017. And the SCJ wrote his Grounds Of Judgment in April 2022 (5 years after). [12] But in contrast to these very principles that he cited, the SCJ appeared to have just chosen the lower amount of the parties’ respective submissions on the quantum for each injury. [13] Second, I do not see the Compendium being used or referred to. [14] Third, I do not find the citing of or the reference to pertinent case law authorities, to ascertain the amount that is in-line with the current awarded amounts for the relevant injuries. THE PERTINENT PRINCIPLES TO APPLY [15] As such, I proceed to apply the principles enunciated in the Federal Court Judgment in United Plywood & Sawmill v Lock Ngan Looi [1970] 2 MLJ 237 (FC); [1970] 1 LNS 164; [1970] 1 MLRA 57, which are that an S/N uB9psXw3y0G0prXiZGstg Page 7 of 23 Appellate Court should interfere with an assessment of quantum by the first instance Court, only if the quantum is—

“inordinately low or inordinately high”, so as to compel the Appellate Court to vary the amount awarded; or

“so much out of line with the discernible trend or pattern of awards in reasonably comparable cases”, such that the quantum is seen as “a wholly erroneous estimate”. [16] It is beneficial to set out some of the pertinent words of the Federal Court. The Federal Court, speaking through Justice Gill FJ, stated this (at MLJ page 2380— As has been said again and again, the assessment of damages in cases of personal injury is one of the most difficult things for either a judge in the first instance or a Court of Appeal. When a man has lost his arm there is no sum in the world that can in the true sense compensate for it. Yet compensation in the form of money is the only way in which he can be granted redress for the injury he has suffered…in order to maintain some semblance of uniformity, the amounts awarded in past cases, which bear reasonable comparison with the case under review, should serve as a useful guide. The general principle is that an appellate court can only interfere with an assessment if it is considered so inordinately low or inordinately high…or if it is so much out of line with the discernible trend or pattern of awards in reasonably comparable cases that it must be regarded as a wholly erroneous estimate. [emphases mine] [17] I also apply the principles propounded in the Federal Court Judgment of Tan Kuan Yau v Suhindrimani Angasamy [1985] 2 MLJ 22 S/N uB9psXw3y0G0prXiZGstg Page 8 of 23 (SC); [1985] 1 CLJ 429; [1985] CLJ (Rep) 323; [1985] 1 MLRA 183, that is that an Appellate Court should be “disinclined to interfere” with the findings of the first instance Court, just because the Appellate Court would have awarded a different amount if it had heard the case as the first instance Court. Instead, the Appellate Court should only interfere if the first instance Court had acted on a “wrong principle of law”, or awarded an amount that is too high or too low. [18] The Federal Court puts it in this manner (at MLJ page 23)— Now, in an appeal on quantum of damages it is essential in order to come to a conclusion to bear in mind certain principles which are well established. The appeal court is slow, disinclined to interfere with the Judge's finding merely because the appeal court thinks that if the case had been before it in the first instance a lesser sum would have been awarded. Azmi, C.J. (Malaya) (as he then was) giving the Judgment of the Federal Court in Topaiwah v Salleh [1968] 1 MLJ 284, 285 said that: "… So far as this court is concerned we should, to paraphrase Greer L.J. in Flint v. Lovell be disinclined to reverse the finding of a trial judge as to the amount of damages merely because we think that if we had tried the case in the first instance we would have given a lesser sum. To justify reversing him, we should be convinced that he acted upon some wrong principle of law, or that the amount awarded was so extremely high or so very small as to make it an entirely erroneous estimate of the damage. The assessments which the courts have made over the years form some guide to the kind of figure which is proper and which the appellate court will follow in the light of the special facts of each particular case." (See Flint v Lovell [1935] 1 KB 354). [emphases mine] S/N uB9psXw3y0G0prXiZGstg Page 9 of 23 THE ITEMS OF GENERAL DAMAGES AWARDED [19] This brings me to the Items or Heads of damage that the Appellant Plaintiff (P) is appealing against, and the Respondent Defendant (D) is fortifying. Item 1—Closed fracture right midshaft fibula [20] P submits the amount of 55K. D submits the amount of RM30K. The SCJ awarded RM30K (the lower amount submitted). [21] To support this amount of RM55K that P seeks, P cites the case of Reminder Kaur Charan Singh v Lim Poh Lai [2014] 1 LNS 1 987 (HC), where the High Court awarded RM50K for the fracture of both the fibulas (calf bones) of the right leg, with a right leg shortening of 1cm. [22] To support the D’s amount of RM30K, D cites two cases and the Compendium—

Mohamad Faiz bin Mohamad Rasul v Mohamad Fazlie bin Ariffin & Anor Faiz Mohd Rasul [2021] 2 PIR [15] (SC), where the Sessions Court awarded RM30K for the fracture of the left tibia and fibula.

Tan Chor Har (menuntut sebagai balu dan wakil peribadi harta pesaka Patheven a/l CH Dorasamy, si mati) & Anor v Narayanan a/l Balachanderan [2019] 2 PIR [51] (SC), where the Sessions Court awarded RM15K for the closed fracture of the left fibula.

The Compendium cites the range between RM12K – RM14.5K. S/N uB9psXw3y0G0prXiZGstg Page 10 of 23 [23] RM30K for one fractured fibula is merely RM5K more than half the RM50K awarded for the fracture of two fibulas i.e. RM25K each in Reminder Kaur (supra). [24] RM30K is the same amount that was awarded for the fracture of a fibula in the 2021 case of Mohamad Faiz (supra). [25] RM30K is higher than the RM15K awarded for the fracture of a fibula in the 2019 case of Tan Chor Har (supra). [26] RM30K is also higher than the entire range recommended in the Compendium. [27] I therefore find that the SCJ’s award of RM30K for the fracture of one fibula bone is reasonable. It is not at all too low, as P submits. I affirm this award for RM30K. Item 2—Laceration wound on right foot and right elbow [28] P submits the amount of 10K. D submits that no damages should be awarded at all under this Item. The SCJ again favoured D’s submission, and awarded no damages. The SCJ dismissed P’s claim under this Item—“Laceration wound on right foot and right elbow”. [29] To support this amount of RM10K that P seeks, P cites two cases—

Saifudeen Apandi (suing by Apandi Salleh, his father and next friend) & Anor v Lenggang Ak Nuing [2011] 5 LNS 2 (SC), where the Session Court, at paragraphs [34] and [35], referred to and followed the case of Aizuddin Arif b Ash’ri (seorang S/N uB9psXw3y0G0prXiZGstg Page 11 of 23 kanak-kanak yang belum dewasa mendakwa melalui sahabat wakil dan bapanya yang sah iaitu Ash’ri b Sekor) v Lam Kwang Keong & Anor [2009] 2 PIR [54], which awarded RM10K for “laceration wounds on the dorsal surface of right forearm, face, hands and feet (multiple laceration wounds)”.

Muhammad Amirol Shazzwan bin Jamal (seorang budak yang mendakwa melalui bapa/sahabat wakilnya, Jamal bin Mat Salleh @Sharif) v Mohamad Zamri bin Natha @ Moktar [2014] 1 PIR [75], which awarded 10K for “multiple lacerations”. [30] To support his submission for zero damages, D argues that the SCJ was correct to dismiss P’s claim under this Item. [31] But then D goes on to cite the case of Yoon Chee Keong v Muhamad Azfar Bin Ismail [2020] 1 PIR [40], which awarded RM3K for a “6cm laceration over the right calf”. To my mind, this constitutes D admitting that some amount of damages should be awarded for this Item—“laceration wound on right foot and right elbow”. [32] The SCJ did not award any amount for this injury. I cannot see the SCJ’s rationale for not awarding any damages. I find this award of no amount in damages at all for this injury to be fundamentally erroneous. P should be compensated for these injuries. [33] Based on the case law cited by P, I find that RM10K is a reasonable sum to award for this injury. S/N uB9psXw3y0G0prXiZGstg Page 12 of 23 [34] I am therefore varying the SCJ’s award by increasing the amount by RM10K i.e. + RM10K. Item 3—Multiple abrasion wound [35] P submits that another RM10K should be awarded under this Item. D accepts the amount of RM6K. The SCJ awarded RM6K. [36] To support P’s submissions for RM10K, he cites 2014 and 2018 cases which awarded RM7K and RM8K for “multiple abrasion wounds”—

Ismail Mohd Nor & Satu Lagi v Saud Bakar [2018] MLRHU 389 (HC)—RM8K;

Suzana Samsuri v Zainab Rani & Anor [2014] 1 PIR [10] (SC)— RM7K;

Muhamad Khairul Nachzemie Bin Abdullah v Norpaiza Bin Abdullah & Anor [2014] PILRU 97 (SC)—RM8K. [37] D cited 2020 and 2021 cases which awarded RM3K for multiple abrasions—

Nallathamby a/l Kaveri vv Suprmaniam a/l Raman & 2 Ors [2020] 1 PIR [15] (Magistrates Court)—RM3K;

Mohamad Faiz Mohamed Rasul (supra) [2021] (SC)—RM3K [38] I reiterate, however, that D accepted RM6K. [39] The SCJ awarded RM6K for “scars/abrasions”. The SCJ did not give a reason for awarding RM6K. He appeared to have again preferred D’s submissions. But P seeks a higher award than the RM6K awarded, S/N uB9psXw3y0G0prXiZGstg Page 13 of 23 because the cases P cited awarded the higher amounts of RM7K and RM8K. [40] I find the SCJ’s RM6K award to be reasonable, and not inordinately low, since RM10K was already awarded under Item 2 for “Laceration wound on right foot and right elbow”. And so, I will not disturb this award. Item 4—Permanent abrasion scar over posterior right elbow [41] P submits RM8K. D submits RM6K. The SCJ awarded zero damages here, as he had already awarded RM6K for “scars/abrasions” under Item 3—“Multiple abrasion wound” above. [42] To support P’s submission for RM8K for a “permanent scar over the posterior right elbow”, P cites the case of Mohamed Nazir Bakar & Anor v Wan Darulsalam Wan Zain & Ors [2017] 1 LNS 205 (HC), in paragraphs [22] and [23], which awarded RM10K for a laceration scar along the right eyebrow (on the face). [43] D cited these two cases, but D cited them under “scars and abrasion”—

Muhammad Farith Aiqal bin Shukri & Anor v Azian binti Othman [2019] 2 PIR [37]—RM3K for “scar over the back with keloid formation”;

Mohd Rashidi bin Abdul Rahman & 3 Ors v Mohamad Tarmizi bin Zahari [2021] 1 PIR [57]—RM2K for “multiple scars”. [44] The SCJ did not award damages for scars separately. The SCJ awarded damages for scars combined with “multiple abrasion wounds”. I S/N uB9psXw3y0G0prXiZGstg Page 14 of 23 am of the view that the SCJ should have separately awarded damages for the “permanent abrasion scar over the right elbow”, because scars or scarring is a recognised separate Item of injury (Head of damage). [45] I will increase the combined award for scars and abrasions at RM6K, with another RM6K i.e. + RM6K, for the permanent abrasion scar over the right elbow, separately. I arrived at this RM6K figure as the figure between the low-end from case law (RM2K) to the high-end for scarring to the face (RM10K). Item 5—Cerebral Concussion [46] P submits RM8K. D submits RM5K. The SCJ, yet again favoured D and awarded RM5K. [47] P cites these cases and the Compendium—

Murugesh Krishna & Satu Lain v Goo Soon Siang & Satu Lain [2022] PILRU 7 (SC) at paragraph [20]—RM10K for cerebral concussion;

Sendy Kanaiyah v Lim Teck Seng & Anor [2008] PILRU 90 (SC), at paragraph [15]—RM10K for cerebral concussion;

Jescika Patrick & Anor v Lai Foo San & Anor [2008] PILRU 38 (SC), at paragraph [12]—RM10K for cerebral concussion;

Maha Devi Elia Perumal & Satu Lagi v Muhammad Zawawi Zabidi & Satu Lagi [2014] PILRU 63 (SC) at paragraph [12]— RM15K for severe concussion, citing these two cases above for cerebral concussion—(1)Sendy Kanaiyah (supra); and

(2)Jescika Patrick (supra). S/N uB9psXw3y0G0prXiZGstg Page 15 of 23 [48] D cites—

Raka v Kamarudin bin Alias [2020] 2 PIR [19] (SC)—RM5K for cerebral concussion.

Vadivello a/l Perumal v Chu Wei Seong [2021] 1 PIR [9] (SC)— RM5K for cerebral concussion. [49] There are case law authorities that awarded RM10K for cerebral concussion, and there are case law authorities that awarded RM5K for cerebral concussion. [50] The Compendium prescribes RM5K – RM6K. [51] I find that the SCJ’s award of RM5K, which is in accordance with the Compendium and case law, is reasonable. I hence affirm this RM5K award. Item 6—Muscle wasting [52] P submits RM10K. D submits RM3K. The SCJ again favoured D’s submission and awarded RM3K. [53] P’s cases—

Nor Azni Arshad v Azrul Ali [2020] 1 SMC 229 (SC)—RM10K;

Sivakumar Subramaniam v Muhammad Nur Alif Zainal & Satu Lagi [2015] 5 LNS 12 (SC)—RM10K. [54] D’s cases— S/N uB9psXw3y0G0prXiZGstg Page 16 of 23

Parthiban a/l Paidthaly v Khairunurashid bin Chek Wan Padzilah [2019] 1 PIR [61] (MC)—RM4K;

Faiz Ullah v Nurul Fatehah binti Abdul Rashed & Anor [2021] 1 PIR [16] (SC)—RM3K. [55] The Compendium prescribes RM3K – RM5K. [56] The SCJ awarded RM3K, which is the lowest amount from the authorities cited. In contrast, both the 2015 and 2020 cases cited by P awarded RM10K. I find that RM3K is demonstrably low. I find that it is not reasonable to ignore the top end of the award for this injury i.e. RM10K. [57] I therefore vary the award from RM3K to RM7K (+RM4K), which is between the low-end of RM3K and the high-end of RM10K. [58] I will now decide on Items 7 and 8 together. Item 7—Right medial and lateral meniscus tear with mild right effusion of the right knee and subchondral bone injury of the right lower femur [59] P submits for RM50K. D submits no damages. The SCJ dismissed this Item. Item 8—Post-traumatic arthritis of the right knee [60] P asks for RM60K. D submits no damages. The SCJ similarly dismissed this Item. S/N uB9psXw3y0G0prXiZGstg Page 17 of 23 [61] For Items 7 and 8, the SCJ did not award any damages. His reasons include—

He ascertained whether this right knee injury was suffered on the date of the accident (18.4.2017). He referred to the testimony of P’s expert: Dr. Liau Kai Meng (Consultant Orthopaedic Surgeon), who said “I cannot confirm for sure that diagnosis of the meniscus tear is because of the accident” and “Additional injuries suffered by P due to the accident can only be verified by the doctor who treated him at Hospital Seberang Jaya”.

He also referred to the testimony of D’s expert: Dr. Khaw Kar Teng, whose testimony about P’s right knee injury was consistent with P’s expert: Dr. Liau. Dr. Khaw said: “Based on the MRI examination conducted on Plaintiff after 3 years and 5 months, the Plaintiff suffered from a “medial and lateral meniscus tear with mild joint effusion of the right knee and subchondral bone injury of the right lower femur”. Dr. Khaw also said that: “Those additional injuries are to be confirmed by the doctor from Hospital Seberang Jaya who had treated the Plaintiff initially”.

The doctor who initially attended to P when the accident occurred was Dr. Muhammad Afifi bin Idris. He testified that P suffered pain in the right knee due to the “closed fracture right midshaft fibula” and the “abrasion on the right knee”, which does not tally with Dr. Khaw’s diagnosis of a “medial and lateral meniscus tear with mild joint effusion of the right knee and subchondral bone injury of the right lower femur”. S/N uB9psXw3y0G0prXiZGstg Page 18 of 23

Dr. Afifi also testified that there were no other injuries suffered at the accident other than those stated in P’s Medical Report from the Hospital Seberang Jaya.

After the initial treatment on the day of the accident (18.4.2017), P only had two follow-up visits. On the first follow-up visit on 3.5.2017, P complained of pain in the right knee. P was given painkillers. On the second follow-up visit on 24.5.2017, the pain and the swelling had decreased, and no follow-up date needed to be given for P to go in again. The swelling at the right knee subsided and P no longer needed any more treatment. These facts were not consistent with someone suffering from a meniscus tear.

Consequently, the SCJ did not grant the claim for special damages that relate to the right knee meniscus injury such as the cost of physiotherapy, and the cost of knee orthoses, like knee braces and knee straps. [62] I evaluated the SCJ’s Grounds Of Judgment and found the SCJ’s reasoning to be sound. I do not see a fundamental error in the SCJ’s analysis of the evidence from the two respective experts, and the doctor who treated him at the beginning, which led to his finding that there is insufficient evidence to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that the meniscus injury on the right knee was caused by the accident. CONCLUSION [63] I considered the SCJ’s appreciation of the evidence and the SCJ’s application of the legal principles on damages, and I find that the SCJ S/N uB9psXw3y0G0prXiZGstg Page 19 of 23 committed errors which are “plainly wrong” on certain Items, namely Items 2, 4 and 6. [64] I do not find the SCJ’s other awards to be “plainly wrong”; or fundamentally erroneous; or that the SCJ had not sufficiently appreciated the evidence; or that the SCJ’s other awards were not reasonably made. [65] And so, I will interfere with the SCJ’s award only for Items 2, 4 and

I increase Item 2 from nil to RM10K i.e. an increase of RM10K. I increase Item 4 from nil to RM6K i.e. an increase of RM6K. And I increase Item 6 from RM3K to RM7K i.e. an increase of RM4K. [66] As such the award for damages is as follows— Items Award 1 RM30K 2 RM10K (+RM10K) 3 RM6K 4 RM6K (+RM6K) 5 RM5K 6 RM7K (+RM4K) RM64K ============ [67] I award damages in the amount of RM64,000.00 with interest at 5% p.a. from the date of the Writ (9.10.2019) to the date of Judgment (25.3.2022); S/N uB9psXw3y0G0prXiZGstg Page 20 of 23 + interest at 2.5% p.a. on special damages from the date of the accident (18.4.2017) to the date of Judgment (25.3.2022); + interest at 5% p.a. on the Judgment amount from the date of Judgment (25.3.2022) to the date of full payment. [68] This is the Order that I now make—I allow P’s Appeal, with the award of damages and interest as stated above, with costs of RM3K to be paid by D to P by 17.2.2023. The Sessions Court’s Judgment dated 25.3.2022 is accordingly varied. Dated: 14 September 2023 signed KENNETH ST JAMES Judicial Commissioner Penang High Court Counsel/Solicitors For the Appellant: Saravana Kumar [Messrs. Jega Kumar & Paartners (Pulau Pinang)] For the Respondent: Joshua Narendran [Messrs. Ajmer Sandhu & Ong (Pulau Pinang)] S/N uB9psXw3y0G0prXiZGstg Page 21 of 23 Legislation referred to: - Cases referred to:

Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v Wendy Tan Lee Peng (administratrix for the estate of Tan Ewe Kwang, deceased) & Ors [2020] 12 MLJ 67 (FC); [2020] 8 AMR 227; [2020] 10 CLJ 1; [2020] 6 MLRA 193.

UEM Group Bhd (previously known as United Engineers (M) Bhd v Genisys Integrated Engineers Pte Ltd & Anor [2010] MLJU 2179 (FC); [2011] 1 AMCR 338; [2010] 9 CLJ 785; [2010] 2

Henderson v Foxworth Investments Ltd [2014] 1 WLR 2600

Tengku Dato’ Ibrahim Petra bin Tengku Indra Petra v Petra Perdana Bhd & Anor Appeal [2018] 2 MLJ 177 (FC); [2018] 1 AMR 517; [2018] 2 CLJ 641; [2018] 1 MLRA 263.

Datuk Mohd Ali Hj Abdul Majid & Anor (both practising as Messrs Mohd Ali & Co) v Public Bank Bhd [2014] 4 MLJ 465 (FC); [2014] 4 AMR 301; [2014] 6 CLJ 269; [2014] 4 MLRA 397.

Wong Li Fatt William (an infant) v Haidawati Bte Bolhen & Anor [1994] 2 MLJ 497 (HC); [1994] 1 LNS 196; [1994] 4 MLRH 458.

Fletcher v Autocar and Transporter Ltd [1968] 2 QB 322; [1968] All ER 726 at 750.

Multar Masngud v Lim Kim Chet & Anor [1982] 1 MLJ 184 (FC); [1982] CLJ 107; [1982] CLJ Rep 237; [1981] 1 MLRA 157.

United Plywood & Sawmill v Lock Ngan Looi [1970] 2 MLJ 237 (FC); [1970] 1 LNS 164; [1970] 1 MLRA 57.

Tan Kuan Yau v Suhindrimani Angasamy [1985] 2 MLJ 22 (SC); [1985] 1 CLJ 429; [1985] CLJ (Rep) 323; [1985] 1 MLRA 183. S/N uB9psXw3y0G0prXiZGstg

Reminder Kaur Charan Singh v Lim Poh Lai [2014] 1 LNS 1 987.

Mohamad Faiz bin Mohamad Rasul v Mohamad Fazlie bin Ariffin & Anor Faiz Mohd Rasul [2021] 2 PIR [15].

Tan Chor Har (menuntut sebagai balu dan wakil peribadi harta pesaka Patheven a/l CH Dorasamy, si mati) & Anor v Narayanan a/l Balachanderan [2019] 2 PIR [51].

Saifudeen Apandi (suing by Apandi Salleh, his father and next friend) & Anor v Lenggang Ak Nuing [2011] 5 LNS 2.

Aizuddin Arif b Ash’ri (seorang kanak-kanak yang belum dewasa mendakwa melalui sahabat wakil dan bapanya yang sah iaitu Ash’ri b Sekor) v Lam Kwang Keong & Anor [2009] 2 PIR [54].

Muhammad Amirol Shazzwan bin Jamal (seorang budak yang mendakwa melalui bapa/sahabat wakilnya, Jamal bin Mat Salleh @Sharif) v Mohamad Zamri bin Natha @ Moktar [2014] 1 PIR [75] [2014] 1 PIR [75].

Yoon Chee Keong v Muhamad Azfar Bin Ismail [2020] 1 PIR [40].

Ismail Mohd Nor & Satu Lagi v Saud Bakar [2018] MLRHU 389.

Suzana Samsuri v Zainab Rani & Anor [2014] 1 PIR [10].

Muhamad Khairul Nachzemie Bin Abdullah v Norpaiza Bin Abdullah & Anor [2014] PILRU 97.

Nallathamby a/l Kaveri vv Suprmaniam a/l Raman & 2 Ors [2020] 1 PIR [15].

Mohamed Nazir Bakar & Anor v Wan Darulsalam Wan Zain & Ors [2017] 1 LNS 205.

Muhammad Farith Aiqal bin Shukri & Anor v Azian binti Othman [2019] 2 PIR [37. S/N uB9psXw3y0G0prXiZGstg

Mohd Rashidi bin Abdul Rahman & 3 Ors v Mohamad Tarmizi bin Zahari [2021] 1 PIR [57.

Murugesh Krishna & Satu Lain v Goo Soon Siang & Satu Lain [2022] PILRU 7.

Sendy Kanaiyah v Lim Teck Seng & Anor [2008] PILRU 90.

Jescika Patrick & Anor v Lai Foo San & Anor [2008] PILRU 38.

Maha Devi Elia Perumal & Satu Lagi v Muhammad Zawawi Zabidi & Satu Lagi [2014] PILRU 63.

Raka v Kamarudin bin Alias [2020] 2 PIR [19].

Vadivello a/l Perumal v Chu Wei Seong [2021] 1 PIR [9].

Nor Azni Arshad v Azrul Ali [2020] 1 SMC 229.

Sivakumar Subramaniam v Muhammad Nur Alif Zainal & Satu Lagi [2015] 5 LNS 12.

Parthiban a/l Paidthaly v Khairunurashid bin Chek Wan Padzilah [2019] 1 PIR [61].

Faiz Ullah v Nurul Fatehah binti Abdul Rashed & Anor [2021] 1 PIR [16] S/N uB9psXw3y0G0prXiZGstg