ISMAIL BIN MAMAT v Pentadbir Tanah Besut (TA-24-2-12/2024)

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DEPARTMENT OF DIRECTOR GENERAL OF LAND AND MINES ...DEFENDANTS GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT

This is an application by way of originating summons filed by the Plaintiff, Ismail Bin Mamat, against the First Defendant (the Land Administrator, District of Besut), the Second Defendant (the Terengganu State Government), and originally the Third Defendant (the Department of Director General of Land and Mines), though the Plaintiff subsequently withdrew his claim against the Third Defendant during case management on 13 April 2025.

The Plaintiff seeks, inter alia, declarations that the surrender of land known as Lot PT 3844, HSM 2403, Mukim Lubuk Kawah, Daerah Besut, Negeri Terengganu ("the subject property") dated 14 June 2022 is invalid and of no effect, declarations that he was the registered proprietor and person interested at material times during the land acquisition proceedings, and an order for a fresh enquiry to be conducted regarding the acquisition of the subject property. This matter raises fundamental questions concerning the interplay between land surrender procedures under the National Land Code, the indefeasibility of title under the Torrens system, and the constitutional protection of property rights under Article 13 of the Federal Constitution.

The factual matrix of this case requires careful examination as it spans nearly a decade of land administration proceedings. The Plaintiff originally acquired the subject property through auction on 11 September 2013, where he purchased the previous title GM 2392 Lot 442 Mukim Lubuk Kawah, Daerah Besut, following an Administrator's Sale Order due to foreclosure. On 29 April 2014, the Plaintiff applied for simultaneous change of condition and subdivision of this previous title under section 124A of the National Land Code. The State Authority, through the Majlis Mesyuarat Kerajaan Negeri (“MMKN”), approved this application on 17 September 2014, imposing inter alia a condition that the subject property, identified as Petak 18 in the Pre-Calculation Plan (Pelan Pra-Hitungan), shall be used for electricity substation enterprise and erecting buildings related thereto only, with the further condition that the use for electricity substation must first be registered and the title will be surrendered to the Government according to section 197 (Form 12A) and reapplied by Tenaga Nasional Berhad.

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The critical temporal context is that the subject property became involved in land acquisition proceedings for the East Coast Rail Link (“ECRL”) project. A Notice of Proposed Acquisition under section 8 of the Land Acquisition Act 1960 was gazetted on 16 December 2021 (Warta No. 1356), naming the Plaintiff as the registered proprietor. An enquiry was scheduled for 19 May 2022, and the Plaintiff appointed a representative and valuer to attend. However, during the enquiry, the Plaintiff's representative was informed that the Plaintiff was not entitled to any compensation as the property had been surrendered to the Second Defendant. On 24 July 2022, the Third Defendant confirmed this position by letter, enclosing an official land search showing the surrender endorsement dated 14 June 2022.

The Plaintiff's case is that he had no knowledge of the surrender proceedings, that the delayed registration of the surrender on 14 June 2022 was an afterthought designed to defeat his claim to compensation, and that he remained the registered proprietor and person interested throughout the acquisition proceedings. The Defendants contend that the surrender was effective from the 2014 MMKN approval, that the Plaintiff voluntarily applied for surrender in 2017, and that the delayed endorsement was merely a procedural formality that did not affect the legal reality that the property had already been surrendered to the State.

The issues that fall for determination in this application may be formulated as follows:

Whether the surrender registered on 14 June 2022 was vitiated by bad faith on the part of the Defendants;

Whether the Plaintiff remained the registered proprietor and a "person interested" under the Land Acquisition Act 1960 at the material time, notwithstanding the pending surrender;

Whether the Defendants' conduct in accepting quit rent and treating the Plaintiff as proprietor gave rise to a legitimate expectation that he would receive compensation;

Whether the procedural requirements of section 198(4) of the National Land Code were complied with, and if not, the effect of such non-compliance;

Whether the Defendants are estopped from relying on the surrender to defeat the Plaintiff's compensation claim; and

Whether the Plaintiff's right to adequate compensation under Article 13 of the Federal Constitution has been infringed. COUNSELS' CONTENTIONS Plaintiff's Submissions

Learned counsel for the Plaintiff, Encik Abdul Aziz bin Hasan, advance several interconnected arguments. First, he submits that the surrender dated 14 June 2022 was executed in bad faith (mala fide) and constitutes an afterthought designed specifically to defeat the Plaintiff's claim to compensation. They emphasize the temporal sequence: the acquisition notice was gazetted on 16 December 2021, the enquiry was held on 19 May 2022, yet the surrender was only registered on 14 June 2022, after these critical events. Counsel cites Pendaftar Hakmilik, Pejabat Tanah Dan Galian Negeri Selangor v Bank Pertanian Malaysia Bhd [2016] 2 MLJ 543 (CA) for the proposition that bad faith implies deliberate and intentional acts with ulterior motive to cause injury, and Asna Bte Hashim v Dato' Haji Wahid Bin Haji Dahlan [2008] MLJU 779 (HC) for the definition of bad faith as dishonest use of power.

Second, counsel rely heavily on the doctrine of indefeasibility of title under section 340(1) of the National Land Code, citing Tan Yin Hong v Tan Sian Sian & Ors [2010] 2 MLJ 1 (FC) where the Federal Court held that if a person's name appears on the registration, no one can claim that title. They emphasize that official land searches dated 7 April 2022 and 19 May 2022 confirm the Plaintiff as registered proprietor, and that the Plaintiff's name appeared in the Form E (Notice of Enquiry), Form I (Certificate of Urgency), and Form K (Notice of Possession) issued by the First Defendant.

Third, counsel submits that the Plaintiff had a legitimate expectation of receiving compensation, founded on the Defendants' conduct in demanding and accepting quit rent payments from 2017 through 2022, including a specific demand dated 7 February 2022 for payment of RM1,840.00 which the Plaintiff paid on 24 May 2022. Counsel cites The State Government of Sabah v Sipadan Dive Centre Sdn Bhd & Ors [2013] 2 MLJ 793 (CA) for the principle that legitimate expectation arises from clear and unambiguous representation by a public authority.

Fourth, counsel argues that the Defendants failed to comply with section 198(4) of the National Land Code, which requires the Land Administrator to notify the proprietor upon approving a surrender and to make a memorial on the register document. They contend that no such notification was given to the Plaintiff, and that the Defendants' failure to comply with this mandatory procedural requirement vitiates the surrender.

Fifth, they submit that the Plaintiff qualifies as "person interested" under section 2 of the Land Acquisition Act 1960, citing Lembaga Lebuhraya Malaysia v Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Klang [2019] MLJU 1350 (HC) where the court held that the registered owner is clearly a "person interested." They argue that as registered proprietor at the material time, the Plaintiff was entitled to participate in the acquisition proceedings and receive compensation.

Finally, counsel relies on Article 13 of the Federal Constitution and Semenyih Jaya Sdn Bhd v Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Hulu Langat & Ors [2017] 3 MLJ 561 (FC) to argue that the Plaintiff is constitutionally entitled to adequate compensation for the deprivation of his property.

Learned counsel for the First and Second Defendants, the State Legal Adviser (SLA) Encik Mohd Nawawi Bin Ismail, present a fundamentally different narrative of the factual and legal position. First, he submits that the Plaintiff voluntarily agreed to surrender the subject property as a condition of the MMKN approval dated 17 September 2014. He emphasizes that the Plaintiff signed the Pre-Calculation Plan (Pelan Pra-Hitungan) which designated the subject property for electricity substation use, thereby demonstrating his agreement to the surrender condition. He argues that the MMKN approval explicitly stated that the use for electricity substation must first be registered and the title surrendered to the Government under section 197 (Form 12A).

Second, the SLA contends that the Plaintiff's application on Form 12A dated 14 May 2017 was the fulfillment of this contractual obligation, and that the Plaintiff cannot now resile from his voluntary undertaking. The SLA points to the Plaintiff's signature on the Form 12A application and the surrender of the original title document as evidence of his informed consent.

Third, the SLA argues that the delayed endorsement on 14 June 2022 was merely a procedural formality that did not affect the legal reality that the property had been surrendered to the State. The SLA cites section 197(3) and section 198(4) of the National Land Code, submitting that these provisions do not prescribe any time limit for endorsement, and that the endorsement when made relates back to the original approval. He characterizes the delay as non-prejudicial to the Plaintiff since he had always known of the surrender requirement.

Fourth, the SLA submits that the Plaintiff was not the "person interested" at the material time because the property had already been surrendered to the State. He relies on the definition of "land" in section 2 of the Land Acquisition Act 1960, which means "alienated land," and argue that once surrendered, the property became State land and ceased to be alienated land capable of acquisition under the Act. The SLA distinguishes cases involving registered proprietors by noting that the Plaintiff's registered title was always subject to the surrender condition.

Fifth, the SLA argues that the other 17 subdivided lots were all transacted to third parties, demonstrating that the Plaintiff had enjoyed the benefits of the subdivision approval while only the subject property, which is designated for public purpose, was retained by the State as agreed. The SLA submits that it would be inequitable to allow the Plaintiff to claim compensation for a property he had agreed to surrender.

Finally, the SLA submits that the Defendants are not estopped from denying the Plaintiff's title because the acceptance of quit rent was a ministerial act that does not create estoppel against the State, and in any event, the quit rent paid has been refunded to the Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff's primary attack on the surrender is grounded in the allegation of mala fides or bad faith. The critical question is whether the registration of the surrender on 14 June 2022, after the commencement of acquisition proceedings, was actuated by improper motive or designed specifically to defeat the Plaintiff's compensation claim.

The temporal sequence is undoubtedly suspicious. The acquisition notice was gazetted on 16 December 2021. The enquiry was conducted on 19 May 2022. Yet the surrender was only registered on 14 June 2022, which was after the Plaintiff had already participated in the acquisition process by appointing representatives and relying on the appointed valuers. This timing suggests, at minimum, administrative inefficiency or, at worst, deliberate manipulation.

However, the concept of bad faith in administrative law requires more than mere suspicion or unfortunate timing. In Pendaftar Hakmilik, Pejabat Tanah Dan Galian Negeri Selangor v Bank Pertanian Malaysia Bhd (supra), the Court of Appeal defined bad faith as involving "deliberate and intentional" acts with "ulterior motive...to cause hurt or injury to another" or doing something "which he is not authorised in law to do." Similarly, in Asna Bte Hashim, bad faith was characterized as "dishonest use of power."

Applying these definitions, I am not persuaded that the Defendants acted in bad faith. The documentary evidence establishes that the Plaintiff himself applied for surrender on Form 12A dated 14 May 2017, more than four years before the acquisition notice. The endorsement of this application was made on the title document on 16 May 2017. While the memorial of approval was only registered on 14 June 2022, the application itself was made voluntarily by the Plaintiff and long predated the acquisition proceedings.

The Plaintiff's argument that he had no knowledge of the MMKN conditions or the surrender requirement is difficult to accept. The Pre-Calculation Plan signed by the Plaintiff clearly designated Lot 18 (the subject property) for "TNB" use, and the MMKN approval explicitly stated the surrender condition. The Plaintiff's participation in the subdivision process, which yielded 17 other lots that he subsequently sold, demonstrates that he benefited substantially from the approval that was conditional upon the surrender.

The delay in registering the approval appears to be administrative in nature rather than conspiratorial. Section 198(4) of the National Land Code requires the Land Administrator to notify the proprietor and make a memorial upon approving a surrender, but it does not prescribe a specific timeframe. While the delay of over five years is regrettable and suggests poor administrative practice, it does not without more establish bad faith. The Defendants have offered a plausible explanation that the delay was due to pending confirmation of the surrender status from various departments.

However, the Defendants' conduct in accepting quit rent payments until 2022, including a demand dated 7 February 2022, does create an appearance of inconsistency. If the property had been effectively surrendered in 2017 or 2014, the continued demand and acceptance of quit rent from the Plaintiff is difficult to reconcile. The Defendants' explanation that this was ministerial error and that the quit rent has been refunded is technically accurate but does not fully address the equitable concern that the Plaintiff was treated as proprietor until it became inconvenient for the State.

I find that while the delay in registration was improper and the continued demand for quit rent created legitimate confusion, these factors do not elevate the conduct to the level of bad faith required to vitiate the surrender. The Plaintiff's voluntary application in 2017, made with full knowledge of the subdivision conditions, constitutes a valid legal foundation for the surrender that predates the acquisition proceedings.

This issue requires careful analysis of the Torrens system and its application to land acquisition proceedings. Section 340(1) of the National Land Code provides that the title of a registered proprietor "shall, subject to the following provisions of this section, be indefeasible." In Tan Yin Hong v Tan Sian Sian & Ors [2010] 2 MLJ 1 (FC), the Federal Court emphasized that "if A's name appears on the registration, no one can come and claim for that title."

The Plaintiff's name undoubtedly appeared on the register at critical times. The official land search dated 19 May 2022 confirms his proprietorship. The acquisition documents i.e. Form E, Form I, and Form K, all named him as registered proprietor. Under a strict application of the indefeasibility principle, the Plaintiff would appear to have an unassailable position.

However, the Torrens system is not absolute. Section 340(2) provides exceptions for fraud, misrepresentation, and other specified circumstances. More fundamentally, the registration of title is subject to the provisions of the National Land Code itself, including the provisions governing surrender.

The Defendants' argument that the Plaintiff held the title on a "temporary" or "trust" basis for the State, pending formal surrender, has some merit in equity though it finds limited express support in the statutory framework. The MMKN approval and the Plaintiff's acceptance of its benefits created a species of constructive trust or equitable obligation that is not fully captured by the registration alone.

In Lembaga Lebuhraya Malaysia v Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Klang (supra), the court held that the registered owner is clearly a "person interested" under section 2 of the Land Acquisition Act. However, this case did not involve a situation where the registered owner's title was subject to a condition of surrender. The definition of "person interested" includes "every person claiming an interest in compensation," but this must be read in the context of the Act's definition of "land" as "alienated land."

The critical question is whether the property remained "alienated land" at the material time. Under section 197, upon approval of a surrender, the land reverts to State land. The approval of the Plaintiff's surrender application, whenever it was formally memorialized, had the effect of terminating his alienated title. The registration on 14 June 2022 was the formal recognition of a legal reality that had already occurred i.e. the Plaintiff's voluntary surrender of his interest to the State.

I find that while the Plaintiff was the registered proprietor in a formal sense at the time of the acquisition notice and enquiry, his title was subject to a valid surrender application that had been pending since 2017. The equitable position is that the Plaintiff had already committed to surrender the property and had received the benefit of the subdivision approval on that basis. To allow him to claim compensation would be to permit him to profit from his own undertaking while resiling from his obligations.

However, the Defendants' argument that the Plaintiff was not a "person interested" goes too far. The Plaintiff had a registered title, was named in the acquisition documents, and had participated in the acquisition process. At minimum, he had a contingent or defeasible interest that required determination. The proper course would have been for the First Defendant to investigate the surrender status before or during the enquiry, rather than allowing the Plaintiff to incur costs in participating in a process from which he was ultimately excluded.

I find that the Plaintiff was a "person interested" at the commencement of the acquisition proceedings, but that his interest was subject to the surrender application which was subsequently approved. The Defendants were entitled to give effect to the surrender, but the manner in which this was done, i.e. after the enquiry and without clear prior notification, was procedurally improper.

The doctrine of legitimate expectation, as articulated in The State Government of Sabah v Sipadan Dive Centre Sdn Bhd & Ors (supra), requires a "clear and unambiguous representation made by a public authority." The Plaintiff argues that the Defendants' conduct in demanding and accepting quit rent payments, treating him as registered proprietor in acquisition documents, and allowing him to participate in the enquiry created such an expectation.

There is considerable force in this argument. The Defendants' conduct over an extended period was consistent only with the Plaintiff being the proprietor entitled to compensation. The demand for quit rent dated 7 February 2022, just months before the enquiry, was particularly significant. If the property had been effectively surrendered, the State would have been liable for quit rent, not the Plaintiff.

However, legitimate expectation is not absolute. It can be overridden by countervailing public interest or by legal realities that predate the representation. In this case, the Plaintiff's own application for surrender in 2017, made pursuant to the MMKN conditions he had accepted, constituted a legal reality that predated the acquisition proceedings. The Defendants' conduct, while creating an appearance of proprietorship, could not override the Plaintiff's own prior undertaking to surrender the subject property.

Moreover, the refund of quit rent, while not negating the earlier representations, does demonstrate an attempt to rectify the administrative inconsistency. I find that the Plaintiff had a legitimate expectation of participating in the acquisition process and receiving a determination on his entitlement, but this expectation did not extend to receiving compensation for property he had agreed to surrender. The proper protection of his legitimate expectation would have been proper procedural treatment, including clear notification of the surrender status before the enquiry, rather than substantive compensation to which he was not equitably entitled.

The Plaintiff's argument under section 198(4) of the National Land Code has considerable merit. That provision states that upon approving a surrender, the Land Administrator "shall (a) notify the proprietor; and (b) make, or cause to be made, a memorial of the surrender on the register document of title to the land."

The evidence does not establish that the Plaintiff was notified of the approval before the registration on 14 June 2022. The First Defendant's letter dated 24 July 2022 appears to be the first formal notification, and this was after the registration. The Defendants' reliance on the Plaintiff's knowledge of the MMKN conditions and his own surrender application does not satisfy the statutory requirement of notification under section 198(4).

This procedural non-compliance is significant. While section 198(4) does not prescribe a specific timeframe, the mandatory language ("shall") and the protective purpose of the provision i.e. ensuring that proprietors are informed of actions affecting their title, require reasonable compliance. The failure to notify the Plaintiff before the registration, and particularly before the acquisition enquiry in which he participated, was a material procedural irregularity.

However, the question is whether this irregularity vitiates the surrender or merely gives rise to a claim for procedural relief. In Pendaftar Hakmilik, Pejabat Tanah Dan Galian Negeri Selangor v Bank Pertanian Malaysia Bhd (supra), the court emphasized that procedural irregularities do not necessarily invalidate substantive actions unless they cause substantive prejudice. Similarly, the Court of Appeal in Semantan Estate

Sdn Bhd v. The Government of Malaysia & Ors [2025] 5 MLJ 768 (CA) per Lee Swee Seng FCJ, held that while procedural non-compliance may render an acquisition irregular, it does not entitle the landowner to recovery of the land. Here, the Plaintiff was aware of the surrender application he had made, and the substantive effect of the surrender was consistent with his own prior undertaking. While the procedural failure was regrettable, I am not persuaded that it renders the surrender void ab initio. ISSUE 5: Estoppel

The Plaintiff's estoppel argument is founded on the Defendants' conduct in treating him as proprietor throughout the acquisition process. The elements of estoppel, i.e. representation, reliance, and detriment, are arguably present. The Defendants represented through their conduct that the Plaintiff was the proprietor entitled to compensation; the Plaintiff relied on this by incurring costs in appointing representatives and valuers; and he suffered detriment when the surrender was belatedly invoked to defeat his claim.

However, estoppel against the State requires careful consideration. In The State Government of Sabah v Sipadan Dive Centre Sdn Bhd & Ors (supra), the Federal Court recognized that legitimate expectation can ground relief against the State, but also emphasized the need to balance private expectations against public interest. Here, the countervailing factor is that the Plaintiff's own prior undertaking to surrender the property predated and conditioned his participation in the acquisition process.

I find that while the Defendants' conduct was inconsistent and created legitimate confusion, a full estoppel preventing the State from relying on the surrender would be disproportionate. The Plaintiff was not misled into believing he had absolute title. He knew of the surrender condition and had himself applied for surrender. The appropriate response to the Defendants' inconsistent conduct is procedural protection, not substantive compensation to which the Plaintiff was not equitably entitled.

Article 13(2) of the Federal Constitution provides that no law shall provide for the compulsory acquisition or use of property without adequate compensation. In Semenyih Jaya Sdn Bhd v Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Hulu Langat & Ors (supra), the Federal Court held that "adequate compensation" requires placing the person in the same financial position as if there had been no compulsory acquisition.

However, Article 13 applies to the deprivation of property. If the Plaintiff had already surrendered his interest to the State, there was no deprivation of his property for constitutional purposes. The property had already been committed to the State under the surrender application. The Plaintiff's constitutional argument assumes the conclusion of his proprietary claim, which I have found to be defeasible by reason of his prior undertaking.

The Court of Appeal in Semantan Estate (1952) Sdn Bhd v The Government of Malaysia & Ors (supra) held that while section 29(1)(b) of the Government Proceedings Act 1956 precludes recovery of land against the Government, this does not leave the landowner without remedy. Reading section 29(1)(b) of the Government Proceedings Act 1956 in tandem with Article 13(2) of the Federal Constitution the Court of Appeal ordered, inter alia, adequate compensation to be assessed as at the date of deprivation, with interest at 6% per annum from that date to the date of payment.

However, the availability of compensation under this framework is not automatic. It depends on whether the landowner has been deprived of property without adequate compensation and without having received a countervailing benefit. In Semantan Estate

Sdn Bhd v The Government of Malaysia & Ors (supra) the landowner had received initial compensation at the Collector's awarded rate, which it accepted without prejudice, but it had received no countervailing benefit beyond that statutory compensation. The Government had taken the land, and the landowner received nothing more than the statutory payment. The Court of Appeal therefore held that the landowner was entitled to have the adequacy of that compensation reviewed, with any additional compensation assessed as at the date of possession plus interest.

In the present case, the Plaintiff is not in a comparable position. Unlike the Semantan Estate landowner, the Plaintiff received a countervailing benefit beyond any compensation: the MMKN approval dated 17 September 2014, which allowed him to subdivide his original land into 18 lots. He proceeded to sell the 17 lots that were not subject to the surrender condition. The commercial value of those sales, which the Plaintiff has retained, constitutes the benefit he obtained in exchange for his undertaking to surrender Lot 18. To now award him compensation for Lot 18 would be to permit him to profit from his own undertaking while resiling from his obligations. It would also result in unjust enrichment: the Plaintiff would have received both the profit from the 17 lots (which the subdivision approval made possible) and compensation for the lot he agreed to surrender.

The Plaintiff's reliance on Semenyih Jaya Sdn Bhd v Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Hulu Langat & Ors (supra) is therefore misplaced. That case involved a clear compulsory acquisition of the Plaintiff's registered interest with no voluntary undertaking by the landowner. Here, the Plaintiff's interest was subject to a surrender that he voluntarily applied for in 2017, and he had already received and retained the benefit of the subdivision approval that was conditional upon that surrender. The constitutional protection under Article 13(2) does not extend to compensation for property that the owner has voluntarily agreed to surrender to the State, particularly where the owner has already received the commercial benefit of the transaction.

For the reasons set out above, I make the following findings and orders:

First, the surrender of the subject property registered on 14 June 2022 is valid and effective. While the registration was procedurally delayed and the Defendants' conduct in accepting quit rent was inconsistent, the surrender was founded on the Plaintiff's voluntary application dated 14 May 2017, made pursuant to MMKN conditions that the Plaintiff had accepted and benefited from. The delay in registration does not vitiate the substantive legal effect of the Plaintiff's undertaking to surrender the property.

Second, the Plaintiff was the registered proprietor in a formal sense at the material time of the acquisition notice and enquiry, but his title was subject to the pending surrender application. He was a "person interested" entitled to procedural participation in the acquisition process, but his interest was defeasible and subject to the surrender that was subsequently given effect.

Third, the Plaintiff is not entitled to compensation for the acquisition of the subject property. The property had been committed to State ownership through the Plaintiff's surrender application, and the State's subsequent use of the property for public purpose (the ECRL project) was consistent with the purpose for which the surrender was required (electricity substation for public benefit). To award compensation would permit the Plaintiff to receive payment for property he had agreed to surrender, while retaining the benefits of the subdivision approval that was conditional upon that surrender.

Fourth, the Defendants' procedural failure to notify the Plaintiff of the surrender approval under section 198(4) before the acquisition enquiry were improper and caused the Plaintiff unnecessary cost and confusion. However, these procedural defects do not entitle the Plaintiff to substantive relief in the form of compensation or declaration of invalidity of the surrender.

Fifth, although the Plaintiff's substantive claim was dismissed, the Court could not overlook the Defendants' inconsistent conduct in accepting quit rent payments up to

For that reason, no costs were awarded against the Plaintiff. Dated: 1 April 2026 Yusrin Faidz Bin Yusoff Judicial Commissioner High Court of Malaya Kuala Terengganu For the Plaintiff: Abdul Aziz bin Hasan Messrs. Nordin Kassim & Aziz, No.134-L, Tingkat 2, Jalan Sultan Zainal Abidin, 20000 Kuala Terengganu, Terengganu Darul Iman. For the First and Second Defendants: Mohd Nawawi Bin Ismail (Together with Aliah Binti Mohd Zahiruddin) Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Terengganu, Tingkat 14, Wisma Darul Iman, 20200 Kuala Terengganu, Terengganu Darul Iman.

Pendaftar Hakmilik, Pejabat Tanah Dan Galian Negeri Selangor v Bank Pertanian Malaysia Bhd [2016] 2 MLJ 543

Asna Bte Hashim v Dato' Haji Wahid Bin Haji Dahlan [2008]

Tan Yin Hong v Tan Sian Sian & Ors [2010] 2 MLJ 1 (FC).

The State Government of Sabah v Sipadan Dive Centre Sdn Bhd & Ors [2013] 2 MLJ 793 (CA).

Lembaga Lebuhraya Malaysia v Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Klang [2019] MLJU 1350 (HC).

Semenyih Jaya Sdn Bhd v Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Hulu Langat & Ors [2017] 3 MLJ 561 (FC).

Tan Yin Hong v Tan Sian Sian & Ors [2010] 2 MLJ 1 (FC).

Semantan Estate (1952) Sdn Bhd v The Government of Malaysia & Ors [2025] 5 MLJ 768 (CA).

Sections 124A, 197, 198(4), 340(1) of the National Land Code.

Section 2 of the Land Acquisition Act 1960.

Article 13(2) of the Federal Constitution.

Section 29(1)(b) of the Government Proceedings Act 1956.