in the case of a statement made by such person after his arrest, unless the court is satisfied that a caution was administered to him in the following words or words to the like effect- "It is my duty to warn you that you are not obliged to say anything or to answer any question, but anything you say, whether in answer to a question or not, may be given in evidence": Provided that a statement made by any person before there is time to caution him shall not be rendered inadmissible in evidence merely by reason of no such caution having been given if it has been given as soon as possible. [44] It is apt to refer to the case of PP v Abd Halim Marsin [2007] 8 CLJ 589, which discussed the legal requirements for administering such caution as follows: “[50] Mengikut SP11, OKT ada memberi pernyataan/maklumat kepadanya dan sebelum pernyataan atau maklumat itu disampaikan, beliau telah memberi amaran di bawah s. 37A(1)(b) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952. Amaran itu ditulis di atas sehelai kertas terlebih dahulu sebelum beliau membacakannya kepada OKT. SP11 juga mendakwa bahawa beliau menerangkan amaran itu secara lisan kepada OKT. SP11 menyatakan dalam keterangannya bahawa beliau ada bertanya kepada OKT sama ada OKT faham atau tidak amaran yang diberikan dan jawapan yang diberikan ialah beliau memahami amaran itu. Selepas jawapan itu diberikan, OKT tidak menunjukkan apa-apa reaksi yang negatif. Walau bagaimanapun, SP11 mengakui bahawa beliau tidak menerangkan peruntukan s. 37A(2) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 kepada OKT, iaitu hak untuk berdiam diri. [51] Pada pandangan mahkamah, keterangan SP11 mengenai perkara ini hendaklah diteliti bersama-sama dengan eks. P32 iaitu kertas di mana amaran itu ditulis oleh SP11 sebelum ia membacakannya kepada OKT. Walaupun terdapat tandatangan OKT di atas eks. P32 tetapi tidak terdapat catatan di mana-mana dalam eks. P32 itu bahawa amaran itu telah diterang dan dijelaskan kepada OKT dan sama ada OKT memahaminya. Mahkamah telah memberi pertimbangan kepada fakta bahawa keadaan yang wujud pada masa itu mungkin tidak membolehkan SP11 mencatat dengan terperinci apa yang berlaku di atas eks. P32. Walau bagaimanapun, mahkamah berpendapat bahawa sekiranya SP11 telah memikirkan wajar untuk menulis di atas sehelai kertas (eks. P32) sebagai rekod tentang perkataan perkataan amaran yang telah diberikan kepada OKT dan meminta OKT menandatanganinya, adalah munasabah untuk dijangkakan bahawa SP11 akan membuat catatan sekiranya penjelasan dan penerangan itu telah dibuat dan OKT telah memahami akibat daripada pernyataan yang dibuatnya selepas itu. Catatan semasa (contemporaneous note) atas eks. P32 atau dokumen lain seperti diari siasatan atau laporan polis akan memberi nilai keterangan yang penting. la bukan sahaja boleh menyokong keterangan SP11 tetapi boleh membantu mahkamah untuk menentukan sama ada penjelasan dan penerangan itu sebenarnya telah dibuat dan OKT memahaminya. Malangnya perkara ini tidak dilakukannya. Dalam keadaan kes ini, mahkamah tidak berpuashati bahawa penjelasan dan penerangan amaran itu telah diberikan kepada OKT sebagaimana yang dikehendaki oleh undang-undang. Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa kehendak untuk memberi penjelasan dan penerangan kepada OKT sehingga memahami implikasi dan amaran itu adalah penting kerana sekiranya kehendak itu tidak diberi penekanan, mana-mana pegawai polis boleh datang dan memberi keterangan dalam mahkamah bahawa beliau telah membaca amaran yang ditetapkan dalam statut dan dengan demikian keterangannya mengenai amaran itu boleh diterima oleh mahkamah tanpa apa-apa kecacatan. Hak untuk berdiam diri atau perlindungan terhadap inkriminasi diri (self-incrimination) yang dikanunkan dalam amaran statutori itu hendaklah dijelas dan diterangkan dan difahami sepenuhnya oleh OKT yang kebanyakannya tidak berapa memahami undang-undang. Adalah munasabah untuk dinyatakan bahawa seseorang OKT tidak akan dengan secara sukarela memberi pernyataan yang boleh membabitkan dirinya dengan suatu kesalahan terutama kesalahan yang membawa hukuman mati seperti kesalahan pengedaran dadah melainkan beliau benar-benar telah insaf dan bertaubat terhadap kesalahan yang telah dilakukan. Oleh itu OKT perlu dibuktikan telah memahami amaran berkenaan sebelum keterangan itu dapat diterima masuk sebagai keterangan. [45] In Mohamad Alraziq bin Ramli v. PP [2023] 1 LNS 1307 it was held: “[30] Setelah meneliti keterangan SP2 dan SP3 mengenai isu kata-kata amaran, kami bersetuju dengan hujahan peguam perayu bahawa HMT telah terkhilaf bila memutuskan SP2 ada memberikan kata-kata amaran kepada perayu dengan hanya berpegang kepada keterangan lisan SP2 dan keterangan SP2 dikatakan disokong oleh SP3. Kami mendapati HMT gagal mengambilkira fakta bahawa SP2 tidak mencatit kata-kata amaran ini di dalam P11 dan WSSP2. Ini menunjukkan versi pembelaan bahawa amaran tidak diberikan adalah benar. Nas undang-undang yang dirujuk jelas menyatakan adalah penting untuk kata-kata amaran yang sebenar yang dibacakan dicatit untuk membolehkan mahkamah menentukan sama ada amaran yang berkesan mengikut kehendak seksyen 37B(1) ADB disampaikan kepada OKT. Dalam kes ini, oleh kerana kata-kata amaran tidak dicatit, adalah jelas bahawa SP2 telah mereka-reka kata-kata amaran itu kemudian setelah beliau sedar amaran ini adalah keperluan mandatori. Kata-kata amaran yang kononnya dibacakan oleh SP2 itu juga tidak menepati kehendak seksyen 37B(1) kerana tidak dinyatakan dengan jelas bahawa perayu boleh mendiamkan diri. Fakta ini disahkan oleh SP3. Adalah amat diragui bahawa perayu memahami kata-kata amaran yang kononnya dibacakan oleh SP2.” [46] SP3 during the cross-examination agreed with the suggestion put forward by the Accused counsel that P17 did not specify the actual words used in the caution. [47] In fact, SP3's explanation that another officer named Kumar explained the caution in Tamil was not clearly recorded in P17, let alone showing that the Accused truly understood the caution. The burden lies on the prosecution to prove that the caution was not only administered to the Accused but also explained to and understood by the Accused. [48] Since this caution did not comply with the requirements of Section 37B of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952, any statement made by the Accused person to the Investigating Officer cannot be admitted as evidence. [49] When the statement allegedly made by the Accused to SP3 cannot be accepted as evidence, the entire foundation that the prosecution is trying to build through that evidence will collapse. There is no longer any direct evidence linking the Accused to the discovery of drugs at the Paragon Suites premises. G. The Accused’s Knowledge of the Seized Drugs [50] The prosecution also needs to prove that the Accused had knowledge of the drugs found in the drawer in a room at the Paragon Suites. Without the element of knowledge, the element of possession cannot be proven. [51] In Toh Ah Lok & Mak Thim v Rex [1948] 1 LNS 72, the court discussed the element of knowledge in respect of possession as follows: “Possession, in order to incriminate a person, must have the following characteristics. The possessor must know the nature of the thing possessed, must have in him a power of disposal over the thing, and lastly must be conscious of his possession of the thing” [52] In Public Prosecutor v Badrulsham Bin Baharom [1987] 1 LNS 72 it was held: “As the prosecution has succeeded in invoking the presumption under section 37(d) against the Accused, it behoves this court to give a correct interpretation of the word "possession" as used in the said section in order to be able to do justice to the instant case. I believe it is well settled at least by our courts that to establish possession by an Accused person of any dangerous drugs or to impute to him possession of the said drugs it must first be shown that he had knowledge of the drugs which were found to be in his possession. The earliest authority, which I could find, that expounded this principle is the case of Chiah Tian v Rex [1937] MLJ 105 where the then Chief Justice of Singapore said at p. 106: "In my opinion, possession to be an offence must be possession under such circumstances that a court is justified in finding that the Accused (or the servant in cases of constructive possession) was conscious of the possession. As Pollock C.B. put it in The Queen v Woodrow 16 LJ MC 122, 'a man can hardly be said to be in possession of anything without knowing it' and I think that a person is not guilty of the offence of possession if he is not aware of the possession.” [53] The Court of Appeal in Ng Peng Seng v. PP [2017] 4 CLJ 561, held as follows: “[15] The law is well settled that having only custody or control over the said drugs is insufficient to establish "possession". The physical act of custody and control must be accompanied with evidence that the Accused had knowledge of the said drugs. In the absence of any statutory presumption, knowledge has to be proved either by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence. Mere knowledge alone without exclusivity of either physical custody or control or both is insufficient in law to constitute possession, let alone trafficking. (See the case of Chan Pean Leon v. PP [1956] 1 LNS 17).” [54] No facts were presented indicating that the Accused had knowledge of the drugs found. Premised upon that, any statement made by the Accused can no longer be used as a basis to prove knowledge. In this regard, the element of knowledge has not been proven by the prosecution. H. Access to Paragon Suites Premises [55] To prove drug possession against the Accused, the prosecution must exclude access by any other individuals other than the Accused to the Paragon Suites. This can be done by summoning individuals who, based on evidence, have access to or are connected with the premises. [56] If access to the premises by other individuals cannot be excluded, then the element of possession of the drug items in the charge cannot be proven. In Husin Sitorus v. PP [2012] 7 CLJ 205, the Court of Appeal decided as follows: “[15] There is a welter of authoritative precedents which have held that for possession to be established, accessibility by others to the place where the drugs are found should be excluded by evidence by the prosecution (PP v. Kang Ho Soh [1991] 3 CLJ 2914; [1991] 3 CLJ (Rep) 5 57 HC, PP v. Tang Chew Weng [1969] 1 LNS 141 HC. The onus is not on the defence to prove possibility of access by others but on the prosecution to exclude such possibility and the issue must be answered in favour of the appellant if there were more than one way in which the evidence adduced by the prosecution might be viewed such as in the present case, implicating the appellant or the other persons who were present in the boat. (Abdullah Zawawi Yusoff v. PP [1993] 4 CLJ 1 SC). In other words, exclusivity of custody and control of the drugs ought to be established by the prosecution.” [57] In Abdullah Zawawi Yusuff v. Pendakwa Raya [1993] 4 CLJ 1, it was held as follows: “The Judge was of the view that though the house was still under construction there was no evidence to show that there had been access to the house through the uncompleted part. With respect, given the fact that this was a case where the police were acting on a tip off undoubtedly by an informer, who might have been a paid informer, and the further fact that the house was still under construction, the onus was not on the defence to prove possibility of access by others but on the prosecution to exclude such possibility. Of course, the defence could besides taking advantage of infirmities in the prosecution case in this regard, have gone further, and shown the possibility of access by others, but this they were not, in Law, obliged to do. Having examined the evidence led by the prosecution afresh, we found that the evidence left too many questions unanswered with the result that the proverbial cap might have fitted not just the head of the Appellant but that of others as well.” [58] SP6, the housing agent, had failed to provide certainty that the Accused was the individual who rented House 46. The “Tenancy Agreement” Exhibit ID-20 clearly shows that the agreement was signed by oen named Karan a/l Ramis as the tenant and not by the Accused. Karan a/l Ramis however, was not called as a witness to explain whether the Accused had any interest, control or access to the premises. [59] Neither was the Court given any explanation as to whether there were other individuals who had access to the house; therefore, not rule out the possibility that other individuals could have had access to the premises. [60] The failure of the prosecution to exclude access by other individuals to the house has created a significant gap in the prosecution's case and this reason alone is sufficient to acquit and discharge the Accused from the charge. Based on the evidence, it could be safely concluded that the prosecution has failed to prove the elements of possession, custody and control of the drugs against the Accused. [61] Thorough investigation before prosecution of a case is crucial. The Court of Appeal in Mohd Helmi Akmal Bin Mohd Ali v. PP [2017] MLJU 393 had said the following: “Dalam hubungan ini, barangkali suai manfaat jika kami perturunkan beberapa petikan keputusan Mahkamah Agung India yang menekankan bahawa siasatan hendaklah dijalankan dengan adil dan saksama. Siasatan bukan sahaja tertumpu kepada pengumpulan keterangan yang boleh menunjukkan bahawa tertuduh telah melakukan kesalahan tetapi meliputi juga pengumpulan keterangan yang boleh menentukan tertuduh tidak melakukan kesalahan yang menjadi hal perkara yang disiasat.” [62] The Federal Court in Zaifull Bin Muhammad & Anor v PP [2013] 2 CLJ 383 had this to say on discrepancies in evidence: “(2) It was incumbent on the prosecution to offer some explanation for the discrepancies. With the discrepancies left unexplained, it created a reasonable doubt as to the identity of the drug exhibit. In the circumstances, the defence should not have been called at the close of the prosecution case. As such, it would not be safe to uphold the appellants’ convictions…” c) THE ACCUSED AT THE TIME, DATE AND PLACE STATED IN THE CHARGE HAD COMMITTED AN OFFENCE OF TRAFFICKING IN DANGEROUS DRUGS [63] In the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused had possession, namely, control and custody of the dangerous drugs, the question of whether the Accused committed the offence of trafficking the dangerous drugs does not arise. Therefore, the prosecution has failed to prove this crucial ingredient. Consequently, the presumption under s.37(da) of the DDA could not be activated against the Accused. FINDINGS OF THIS COURT [64] Section 180(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) states that the standard of proof for the prosecution at the end of the prosecution case is to prove a prima facie case beyond reasonable doubt. When the prosecution case is concluded, the Court shall consider whether the prosecution has established a prima facie case against the Accused. If the Court finds that the prosecution has not proven a prima facie case against the Accused, the Court shall record an order of discharge and acquittal. If the Court finds that a prima facie case has been made against the Accused for the alleged offence, the Court shall call the Accused to defend himself. [65] It is a well-established legal principle that the Court must conduct a maximum evaluation of the evidence presented by the prosecution at the trial stage when deciding whether to call the Accused to enter his defence. PP v. Mohd Radzi bin Abu Bakar [2006] 1 CLJ 457, Ooi Kow Chai & Anor v. PP [2003] 1 CLJ 734. [66] In this case, it is clear that the prosecution relies entirely on inferential evidence to prove the possession of drugs by the Accused. Regarding this issue, the recommendation of the Supreme Court in the case of Choo Chang Teik v. PP [1991] 3 CLJ 2387; [1991] 1 CLJ (Rep) 54 needs to be taken into consideration where the Supreme Court stated the following on page 2391 (page 59): “... we feel that in offences involving capital punishment such as trafficking in drugs, evidence by inference alone is not sufficient to support a conviction of the appellant without some proof of the element of control.” [67] In Magendran a/l Mohan v Public Prosecutor [2011] 6 MLJ 1 Federal Court has this to say: “Before parting with the case, it is necessary to state that from the facts and circumstances of this appeal it would appear to us that the investigation had been somewhat shoddy. Undoubtedly, heinous crimes are committed under great secrecy and that investigation of a crime is a difficult and tedious task. At the same time the life and personal liberty of a citizen is a precious one guaranteed by art 5 of the Federal Constitution and its deprivation shall be only in accordance with law. Thus, before accusing an innocent person of the commission of a grave crime like the one punishable under s 302 of the PC, an honest, sincere and dispassionate investigation has to be made and to feel sure that the person suspected of the crime alone was responsible to commit the offence. Therefore, greater care and circumspection are needed by the investigating agency in this regard.” [68] From the analysis of the case facts, it is clear that there are many gaps and questions in the prosecution's case that require answers. However, those answers were not provided through the prosecution witnesses. Therefore, this Court finds that the prosecution has failed to establish a prima facie case on a maximum evaluation against the Accused based on the analysis of the facts that have been considered above. The Federal Court in the case of Sia Soon Suan v PP [1966] 1 MLJ 116 has summarised as follows: “Nevertheless, the requirements of strict proof in a criminal case cannot be relaxed to bridge any material gap in the prosecution evidence. Irrespective of whether this court is otherwise convinced in its own mind of the guilt or innocence of an Accused, its decision must be based on the evidence adduced and nothing else. This is axiomatic.” CONCLUSION AT THE END OF THE PROSECUTION’S CASE [69] Based on the maximum evaluation of the evidence presented by the prosecution, this Court finds that the prosecution has failed to establish a prima facie case against the Accused and therefore this Court acquits and discharge the Accused without being called to enter his defence. Dated 7th July 2026 - TT - Abdul Fareed bin Abdul Gafoor Judicial Commissioner High Court 3 (Criminal) Johor Bahru Prosecution : TPR Foo Fang Leong Timbalan Pendakwa Raya Aras 2, Bangunan Dato’ Jaafar Muhammad Kota Iskandar, 79100 Nusajaya Johor Darul Ta’zim Counsels : Messrs Nor Shahid Abd Malik & Associates No. 33-02, Jalan Adda 3/1