Jagatheason Ramiah Bertindak Atas Nama dan Gaya Tetuan Chand, Jag & Associates v Muhammad Muffaqir Bin Izuddin (MA-A72-15-04/2023)

Plaintif di dalam kes ini menuntut untuk Defendan membayar ganti rugi bayaran wang yuran guaman berjumlah RM71,221.00 2. Mahkamah telah meneliti keterangan saksi-saksi serta ekshibit-ekshibit yang dikemukakan dan di atas bukti imbangan kebarangkalian mahkamah ini mendapati pihak plaintif telah berjaya membuktikan kes plaintif. Justeru itu, tuntutan Plaintif di dalam kes ini dibenarkan sepertimana yang diputuskan dengan kos mengikut skala ditetapkan oleh undang-undang sivil sedia ada.

Plaintif dalam kes ini adalah Tetuan Chand, Jag & Associates yang telah memfailkan saman terhadap Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua atas satu waran bertindak bertarikh 3.7.2020 bagi menuntut jumlah wang pampasan ganti rugi bayaran wang guaman RM71,221.00 4. Defendan Kedua telah melantik Plaintif sebagai Peguam untuk bertindak bagi pihak anaknya Defendan Kedua bagi menuntut pampasan gantirugi am dan khas atas kecuaian kemalagan jalan raya yang telah difailkan di Mahkamah Seysen Muar, Johor.

Semasa kes kecuaian kemalangan jalan raya di Mahkamah Sesyen Muar sedang berjalan, Defendan-defendan telah membatalkan kuasa waran bertindak tanpa kebenaran Plaintif dan tanpa menjelaskan apa-apa bayaran guaman yang teraku sepanjang tempoh perlantikan Plaintif sebagai peguam yang mewakili defendan-defendan bagi kes tersebut.

Akibat daripada tindakan Defendan-defendan ini pihak Plaintif telah mengalami kerugian sebagai peguam yang bertindak pada ketika itu. Oleh itu, Plaintif tekah menghantar Notis tuntuan kepada Defendan-defendan pada 22.2.2023 bagi menuntut jumlah ganti rugi RM 71,221.00.

Pada 3.7.2020 Defendan Kedua telah menandatangi Waran Bertindak Peguamcara Tetuan Chand, Jag & Associates bertarikh 3.7.2020 bagi melantik dan memberi kuasa kepada Plaintif melalui firma guamanya menuntut pampasan ganti rugi amn dan khas terhadap pihak insurans pihak ketiga bagi pihak Defendan Pertama atas kecuaian kes kemalangan jalan raya yang berlaku di jalan Muar-Segamatv KM 33 pada 2.7.2020.

Melalui kuasa yang diberikan Plaintif dalam Waran bertindak tersebut , Plainitf telah menjalankan tuntutan kemalangan tersebut dengan mengeluarkan pelbagai kos dari masa ke semasa dalam mengendalikan kes Defendan Pertama di Mahkamah Sesyen Muar dengan no kes JB-A53KJ-100-04/2021 9. Kemudian pada 10.11.2022 Defendan secara tidak sah telah membatalkan kuasa Waran Bertindak tersebut tanpa kebenaran dan persetujuan Plaintif yang mana ia telah mengakibatkan kerugian kepada Plaintif sebagai peguam yang telah dilantik kerana telah memberikan perkhidmatan professional kepada Defendan-defendan

Pihak Defendan-defendan telah membatalkan kuasa waran bertindak terhadap Plaintif tanpa sebarang wang bayaran guaman diberikan kepada pihak Plainitif dan pada 22.2.2023 Plaintif telah menghantar sesalinan notis tuntutan kepada Defendan-defendan bagi menuntut jumlah ganti rugi wang yuran guaman dan perbelanjaan RM 71,221.00

Pihak Defendan-defendan dalam pembelaannya menafikan telah memberikan kuasa waran bertindak kepada pihak Plaintif dan juga menafikan bahawa bertanggungan terhadap wang yuran guaman kepada pihak plainitif.

Defendan-defendan menafikan bersetuju terhadap wang yuran guaman yang berjumlah RM 71,221.00 tersebut.

SARASVATHY AP SINEVASAGAN (No. KP:740119-04 5198)- SP1

(ii) JAGATHEASON A/L RAMIAH (No.K/P: 690902-04-5285)- SP2 Defendan

MUHAMMAD MUFFAQIR BIN IZUDDIN ( NO KP: 040806-01- 1187) -SD 1

(ii) NAMA: IZUDDIN BIN MOKHTAR (NO KP: 740823-01-6753)- SD 2 ISU-ISU YANG DIBICARAKAN

Dalam penelitian Mahkamah terdapat beberapa isu dibicarakan yang dikemukakan oleh Plaintif dan juga terdapat isu dibicarakan yang dikemukakan oleh Defendan. Memandangkan terdapat dua versi isu dibicarakan yang dikemukakan oleh pihak-pihak di dalam kes ini, maka Mahkamah telah mengkaji fakta kes ini dan mendapati isu-isu relevan yang wajar dibicarakan adalah seperti yang berikut:-

Sama ada Defendan-defendan telah melantik Plaintif sebagai Peguam yang bertindak bagi pihak Plaintif bagi kes kemalangan jalan raya yang melibatkan Defendan Pertama ?

(ii) Sama ada Defendan-defendan telah membayar wang yuran guaman serta kos guaman kepada Plaintif semasa Plaintif bertindak sebagai Peguam Defendan pertama dalam mengendalikan kes kemalangan jalan raya Defendan pertama di Mahkamah Sesyen Muar ?

(iii) Sama ada Defendan-defendan telah membayar kepada Plaintif wang pinjaman peribadi yang telah diberikan oleh Plaintif kepada defendan-defendan dan wakil sah Defendan ? ANALISIS DAN DAPATAN MAHKAMAH Isu dibicarakan (1):-

Sama ada Defendan atau wakil sah Defendan telah melantik Plaintif sebagai Peguam yang bertindak bagi pihak Plaintif bagi kes kemalangan jalan raya yang melibatkan Defendan?

Mahkamah ini berpuas hati bahawa waran bertindak bertarikh 3.7.2020 ( P35 ) adalah bukti yang sah dan jelas menunjukkan Plainitif adalah peguam yang di lantik oleh Defendan Pertama melalui Defendan kedua bagi kes kemalangan jalan raya di Mahkamah Sesyen Muar. Keterangan yang di kemukakan oleh Plaintif SP 1 dan SP 2 mahupun keterangan SD 1 dan SD 2 tidak menafikan bahawa Plaintif adalah peguam yang dilantik melalui P35 sebagai peguam yang mewakili kes kemalangan jalan raya Defendan Pertama di Mahkamah Sesyen Muar bagi no kes JB-A53KJ-100-04/2020

Dalam kes TETUAN DENNIS NIK & WONG v. GNANARAJA M GNANASUNDRAM & ANOR HIGH COURT MALAYA, SHAH ALAM [2023] 8 CLJ 635 “There was an agreement between parties for legal fees. There was a warrant to act signed by the first defendant. The warrant to act clearly stated that the amount to be paid to the plaintiff was RM5 million being agreed fees, SST (if any) and disbursements. The warrant to act signed by the first defendant clearly stated that the RM5 million was a non-refundable fee to the plaintiff. The proforma would be issued periodically. There was nothing confusing or unclear about the amount the first defendant had agreed to in the warrant to act. The first defendant could not now state that he was not in the right frame of mind or that he was under stress when he signed the warrant to act. The first defendant was bound by what he had signed and pursuant to the warrant to act, the first defendant was required to make payment for the fees as per the fee proforma. The warrant to act did not state the second defendant. However, from the documents adduced, there was a nexus between the first and second defendants. This could be clearly seen from the application to release monies of the second defendant filed by the first defendant. Moreover, the first defendant had averred that he was the ultimate shareholder/beneficial owner of the second defendant. There were also trust deeds to demonstrate that the shareholders in the second defendant were holding their shares on trust for the first defendant. Therefore, even though it was only the first defendant who had signed the warrant to act, the plaintiff had not erred in including the second defendant in the application in encl. 1”

Dalam kes ini P35 adalah sah yang mewujudkan hubungan antara Plainitf dan Defendan-defendan bagi kes kemalangan di Mahkamah Sesyen Muar tersebut. Malah Plaintif telah melaksanakan tugas dengan pelbagai tindakan dari memfailkan kertas kausa ke Mahkamah sehingga membawa defendan pertama melaksanakan pemeriksaan kesihatan bagi mendapatkan rekod perubatan yang tepat dalam mengendalikan kes tersebut.

Ia adalah amat janggal apabila pihak defendan-defendan menafikan bahawa wujudnya P35 apabila defendan pertama sendiri dengan rela hati membuat pemeriksaan kesihatan di Hospital Mahkota Medical Centre sepertimana yang telah di aturkan oleh pihak Plaintif bagi pihak defendan untuk kes defendan pertama di Mahkamah Sesyen Muar.

Pada pandangan Mahkamah P35 adalah bukti yang sah menunjukkan bahawa benar Plaintif ini dilantik oleh Defendan Kedua yang merupakan waris sah bagi mewakili Defendan Pertama iaitu anaknya bagi kes di Mahkamah Sesyen Muar.

Oleh itu, Mahkamah ini berpuas hati bahawa P35 adalah sah yang menunjukkan hubungan Plaintif sebagai peguam dan Defendan sebagai anak guam yang di wakili bagi kes kemalangan jalan raya di Mahkamah Sesyen Muar walaupun P35 di tandatangani oleh SD 2, namun SD 2 adalah wakil yang sah bagi SD 1 pada setiap masa yang relevan. Isu dibicarakan (2) dan (3) :-

(ii) Sama ada Defendan-defendan telah membayar wang yuran guaman serta kos guaman kepada Plaintif semasa Plaintif bertindak sebagai Peguam Defendan pertama dalam mengendalikan kes kemalangan jalan raya Defendan pertama di Mahkamah Sesyen Muar ?

(iii) Sama ada Defendan-defendan telah membayar kepada Plaintif wang pinjaman peribadi yang telah diberikan oleh Plaintif kepada defendan-defendan ? Bagi tujuan penyediaan Alasan Penghakiman ini, Mahkamah ini merangkum secara bersekali kedua-dua sub perenggan (ii) dan (iii) kerana kedua-dua isu ini saling berkaitan antara satu sama lain.

Bagi isu ini , setelah Mahkamah meneliti ekhsibit-ekshibit yang di kemukakan dan keterangan saksi-saksi Plaintif serta saksi-saksi Defendan, Mahkamah ini mendapati Defendan perlu membayar wang khidmat guaman dan kos perbelanjaan yang telah di keluarkan oleh pihak Plaintif semasa mengendalikan kes kemalangan jalan raya yang melibatkan Defendan di Mahkamah Sesyen Muar. Ini adalah berdasarkan P44 (a) dan (b) yang di kemukakan oleh peguam Plaintif bertarikh 22.2.2023.

Mahkamah ini merujuk kes SGV BUILDERS SDN BHD v. KIRANJIT RANDHAWA & CO AND OTHER CASES HIGH COURT MALAYA, SHAH ALAM SHAHNAZ SULAIMAN J [2023] 10 CLJ 632 “The crux of the second issue was whether the invoices issued by the defendant to the plaintiffs on the specified dates were bill of costs as per the LPA and Rules of Court 2012. Perusal on these invoices showed that they had invoice numbers but did not have the words 'bill of costs'. Nonetheless, the 'invoices' detailed the work that had been conducted by the defendant on behalf of the plaintiffs at the time it represented them. The said documents stated the action taken by the defendant in the conduct of the plaintiffs' case. Therefore, these 'invoices' amounted to bill of costs. Whatever the name or title of the documents, they were, in essence, bill of costs. Bill of costs had been served to the plaintiffs. Therefore the issuance of the invoices or notices of demand was sufficient to constitute a delivery of bill of costs within the context of the LPA.”

Justeru itu Mahkamah ini memutuskan Defendan hendaklah membayar wang khidmat peguam dan kos perbelanjaan guaman yang telah di berikan oleh Plaintif yang bertindak sebagai Peguam bagi mewakili Defendan Pertama dalam kes kemalangan jalan raya di Mahkamah Sesyen Muar sepertimana dalam P44 (A&B)

Setiap keterangan yang di kemukakan oleh Sp 1 dan Sp 2 adalah selari dengan dokumen yang di kemukakan oleh pihak Plaintif bagi membuktikan bahawa Plaintif ini telah berkhidmat sebagai Peguam Defendan Pertama dalam kes kemalangan jalan raya di Mahkamah Sesyen Muar yang melibatkan Defendan Pertama. Keterangan Sp 2 telah disokong oleh keterangan Sp 1 yang mengesahkan khidmat guaman telah diberikan dan kos perbelanjaaan telah dikeluarkan semasa mengendalikan kes kemalangan Defendan di Mahkamah Sesyen Muar sehingga kes tersebut telah di tetapkan tarikh bicara bagi no kes JA-A53KJ-100-04/2021. Malah tiada pertikaian langsung terhadap dokumen yang dikemukakan iaitu resit kemasukan wang , baucar dan penyata akaun bagi mengesahkan bahawa terdapat kos perbelanjaan yang telah di keluarkan oleh Plaintif semasa mengendalikan kes defendan di Mahkamah Sesyen Muar.

Defendan-defendan tidak langsung mengemukakan sebarang bukti yang menafikan bahawa terdapat pinjaman wang peribadi yang diberikan oleh Plaintif dalam mana pihak Plaintif telah mengeluarkan kos perbelanjaan ini semasa mengendalikan kes Defendan Pertama di Mahkamah Sesyen Muar. Pihak Defendan pada hari ini tidak boleh dan tidak wajar menafikan penerimaan itu setelah pihak Defenda-defendan menikmati khidmat guaman dan perbelanjaan yang telah di berikan oleh Plaintif semasa mengendalikan kes Defendan Pertama di Mahkamah Sesyen Muar.

Walaubagaimanapun apabila Defendan-Defendan telah menghentikan Plaintif daripada mewakili defendan pertama dalam kes tersebut melalui surat bertarikh 10.11.2022, pihak Defendan hendaklah menyelesaikan segala wang khidmat guaman yang telah diberikan dan segala kos perbelanjaan yang telah dikeluarkan oleh pihak Plaintiff semasa mengendalikan kes Defendan Pertama di Mahkamah Sesyen Muar.

Mahkamah merujuk Seksyen 116(1) Akta Profession Undang-Undang 1976 menyatakan:-

Advocate and solicitor may enter agreement for costing contentious business

Subject to the provisions of any written law, an advocate and solicitor may make an agreement in writing with his client respecting the amount and manner of payment for the whole or any part of his costs in respect of contentious business done or to be done by such advocate and solicitor, either by a gross sum, or otherwise, and either at the same rate or at a greater or lesser rate than the rate at which he would otherwise be entitled to be remunerated.

Every such agreement shall be signed by the client and shall be subject to this Part.

Manakala Seksyen 118 akta yang sama yang memperuntukkan seperti yang berikut:-

Enforcement of agreements

No action or suit shall be brought or instituted upon any agreement as is referred to in section 116, but every question respecting the validity or effect of any such agreement may be examined and determined, and the agreement may be enforced, varied or set aside by suit or action by summons, motion or petition by any person or the representatives of any person being a party to such agreement, or being alleged to be liable to pay, or being or claiming to be entitled to be paid the costs, fees, charges or disbursements in respect of which the agreement is made, by the Court in which the business or any part thereof was done, or a Judge of the Court, or, if the business was not done in any Court, then by the High Court or a Judge of the High Court. The first issue for determination here is whether s. 116 is a mandatory provision requiring any costs relating to contentious matter by advocate and solicitor to be reduced in writing and signed by the client.

Dalam kes , SULAIMAN & TAYE v. BORNEO SYNERGY (M) SDN BHD HIGH COURT MALAYA, KUALA LUMPUR NORDIN HASSAN J [2018] 5 CLJ 259 [14] Here, the word 'may' in s. 116(1) should be given its ordinary and natural meaning which is, it is permissive and not mandatory unless it can be shown otherwise. In Jagdish Kapoor v. New Education Society AIR [1968] MP 1 the judge said this: It is well settled that 'may' is a discretionary and enabling word, unless the subject matter shows that the exercise of power given by provision using the word 'may' was intended to be imperative by the person whom the power is given. [15] In the present case, there is nothing to indicate or basis to conclude that the word 'may' in s. 116(1) of the LPA, should be read as 'shall' or 'must'. [16] The Federal Court in Gurbachan Singh Bagawan Singh & Anor v. Vellasamy Pennusamy & Ors And Other Applications [2012] 2 CLJ 663 citing with approval Lord Diplock's dictum in Eng Mee Yong & Ors v. Letchumanan [1979] CLJU 18; [1979] 1 LNS 18 agreed that the word 'may think just' means only a discretion. [17] Here, the wordings of sub-s. 116(1) are clear and unambiguous that an advocate and solicitor 'may' make an agreement in writing with the client with regard to the legal fees. The word 'may' here gives the option for advocate and solicitor whether to have a written agreement for the legal costs with the client or otherwise. [18] I am of the same view with Justice Idris Yusoff in Dato' H.L. Wrigglesworth v. Zakaria Yusoff [1995] 3 CLJ 64 which says this: To my mind the wordings of s. 116 are clear. Section 116 is not a mandatory provision requiring the agreement to be reduced to writing - it merely says that the solicitor may make an agreement in writing and to make it binding, the client is required to sign it. If, however, for some reasons the agreement is not reduced to writing, it does not totally shut out the solicitor from claiming his cost for he can still fall back on s. 121(1). In so doing the onus of proving that the costs are fair and reasonable, as usual, is on him unless it is a gross sum bill. He cannot avail himself of whatever benefits conferred by s.

The avenues as created by s. 121(1) give the solicitor the right of option, whether to present a bill containing detailed items or a gross sum bill. (emphasis added) [19] The meaning of the word 'may' in s. 116(1) has also been discussed and followed in the case of Asbir, Hira Singh & Co v. Supramaniam Pitchaimuthu & Ors [2000] 1 CLJ 7, where the judge explained as follows: In fact, even without the written agreement, the plaintiff, on the facts, would have still succeeded in enforcing the oral agreement agreed to with D1 in 1982. It is not mandatory, to reduce that oral agreement into writing, for the plaintiff to prove that it was fair and reasonable. In Dato' HL Wrigglesworth v. Hj Zakaria bin Yusoff [1995] 3 CLJ 64, it was held by Idris bin Yusoff J, that: Section 116 is not a mandatory provision requiring the agreement to be reduced to writing - it merely says that the solicitor may make an agreement in writing and to make it binding, the client is required to sign it. lf, however, for some reasons the agreement is not reduced to writing, it does not totally shut out the solicitor from claiming his costs for he can still fall back on s. 121(1). (emphasis added)

Dalam kes ini Mahkamah berpendapat walaupun tiada apa-apa perjanjian bertulis yang di kemukakan oleh pihak Plaintif tetapi ia tidak menafikan bahawa berdasarkan P35 tersebut Plaintif telah memberikan khidmat guaman terhadap Defendan Pertama dalam mengendalikan kes kemalangan jalan raya di Mahkamah Sesyen Muar. Ini juga tidak menafikan hak Plaintif bagi pembayaran caj khidmat guaman dan juga segala kos perbelanjaan yang di berikan sebagaimana dalam P44 (a) dan (b)

Mahkamah ini juga menekankan bahawa pihak Plaintif berhak untuk dibayar wang pinjaman peribadi yang telah di berikan kepada defendan-defendan semasa mengendalikan kes defendan-defendan di Mahkamah Sesyen Muar apabila Plaintif telah berjaya membuktikan bahawa pembayaran wang pinjaman peribadi telah diberikan dan di terima oleh Defendan-defendan melalui penyata akaun defendan-defendan berdasarkan keterangan Sp 1. Malah dalam keterangan Sp 1 menyatakan bahawa Sp 1 mengesahkan segala wang pinjaman peribadi yang telah diberikan melalui baucer telah dikeluarkan oleh defendan-defendan dan ini boleh disahkan melalui penyata bank akaun Plaintif yang dikemukakan oleh Sp 2 semasa memberi keterangan di mahkamah.

Dalam kes DATO’ THRUNGANASAMBANTHAN A/L SUBRAMANIAM v PEMBINAAN KOTA LAKSAMANA (MELAKA) SDN. BHD. [2024] CLJU 80 Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur memutuskan seperti yang berikut:- [17] The matter at hand is about the payment for legal services rendered by the Plaintiff which Bill No.18/2021 was duly served on the Defendant. The fact that the Defendant did not respond to the Plaintiff’s Letter of Demand nor seek for the Plaintiff’s bill to be taxed in accordance to the Legal Profession Act 1976 shown that the contention by the Defendant was a mere denial by simply stating that it has not received Bill No. 18/2021 and disputing the contents of the bill. [18] In this regard, section 124 of LPA provides-

Except as authorized by this Act, no advocate and solicitor shall without the leave of the court commence or maintain any action for the recovery of any costs due for any business done by him until the expiration of one month after he has delivered to the party to be charged therewith, or sent by post to, or left with him at, his office or place of business, dwelling house or last known place of abode, a bill of costs, which bill shall be signed either by the advocate and solicitor, or in the case of a partnership, by any of the partners, either with his own name or with the name or style of the partnership, or by another advocate and solicitor employed by the first-named advocate and solicitor or the partnership, or be enclosed in or accompanied by a letter, signed in the like manner, referring to the bill.

RUJUK BAUCAR MS 216 – 222 IKATAN DOK B, SIAPA TT DI SITU-CEK DI

TT OLEH MR JEGATHESON APA BUKTI DALAM HAL INI BAUCAR DI TT OLEH DEF 1 DAN DEF 2-

BAYARAN YANG DILEUARKAN UNTUK DEFENDAN 216 HINGGA 222, DIMANA BAUCAR TT OLEH DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN-DEF TIDAK HADIR KE FIRMA, SO KITA BANK IN KAN ATAU PUN RUNNER

DEFENDAN SETUJU ATAU TIDAK SEDIA DOK PINJAMAN TIADAK PENGETAHUAN TT PENGURUSAN PENYAMPAIAN WANG KEPADA DEEFENDAN-SAYA

BERJAYA DI AMBIL OLEH DEFENDAN MENGIKUT STTMNT BANK SAYA NYATA PUAN TIDAK KETAHUI SAMA ADA TELAH SAMPAI KEPADA DEFENDAN TETAPI PUAN YAKIN HANYA BANK-SAYA YAKIN SEBAB PIHAK DEFENDAN BOLEH PRINT BANK STATEMN MEREKA

Where a bill is proved to have been delivered in compliance with subsection (1) it shall not be necessary in the first instance for the advocate and solicitor to prove the contents of the bill and it shall be presumed until the contrary is shown to be a bill bona fide complying with this Act. [19] Section 124 LPA was deliberated in S.P. Veloo Co. v. Affin Bank Bhd [2017] CLJU 1041; [2017] MLJU 1042; [2017] 1 LNS 1041, where the Court of Appeal held - “[22] As we have stated earlier that a solicitor’s bill of costs has special protection by statute and section 124 gives the protection. It does not require the solicitor to prove the contents and it shall be presumed until the contrary is shown a bill bona fide complying with this Act…”. [20] In Templer Park Golf & Resort Bhd & Anor v. Tetuan George Varughese [2010] 8 CLJ 754; [2010] 1 MLRH 583, it was held: “The contents of the solicitor’s bill were presumed by law to be bona fide and the necessity to prove the contents of the bill and to tax the bill on the facts of this case did not arise due to several provisions of the LPA 1976. Under s. 124(2) once the bill had been delivered in compliance with sub-section (1) it shall not be necessary in the first instance for the advocate and solicitor to prove the contents of the bill and it shall be presumed until the contrary is shown to be a bill bona fide complying with this Act.” [21] Generally, this means that based on section 124 of LPA, a solicitor is not required to prove the bill as the bill is presumed bona fide bill and in compliance of LPA until the contrary is shown. [22] Further, section 121(1)(a) and (b) of LPA provides- “121 Where remuneration of advocate and solicitor not subject of agreement.

Where the remuneration of an advocate and solicitor in respect of contentious business done by him is not the subject of an agreement made pursuant to section 116, the solicitor’s bill of costs may at the option of the advocate and solicitor either contain detailed items or be for a gross sum: Provided that—

at any time before service upon him of a writ or other originating process for the recovery of costs included in a gross sum bill and before the expiration of three months from the date of the delivery to him of the bill, the party chargeable therewith may require the advocate and solicitor to deliver to him in lieu of the cost a bill containing detailed items, and the gross sum bill shall thereupon be of no effect

where an action is commenced on a gross sum bill, the Court shall, if so requested by the party chargeable therewith before the expiration of one month from the service on that party of the writ or other originating process, order that the bill shall be taxed; [23] Moreover, section 126(1) of LPA provides- “126 An order for taxation of costs to be made within 6 months of delivery of bill of costs.

An order for the taxation of a bill of costs delivered by any advocate and solicitor may be obtained by a petition as a matter of course by the party chargeable therewith, or by any person liable to pay the cost either to the party chargeable or to the advocate and solicitor, at any time within six months from the delivery of the bill, or, by the advocate and solicitor after the expiration of one calendar month, and within a year from, the delivery.”. [24] Bill No.18/2021 was served upon the Defendant on 25.08.2021 (Exhibit DTS-5). However, the Defendant failed to exercise its rights under section 121 and 126 of LPA. [25] In this regard, section 128 LPA further states128. Order for taxation of advocate and solicitor’s bill on notice given (1) After the expiration of six months from the delivery of a bill of costs, or after payment of the bill of costs, no order shall be made for taxation of a solicitor’s bill of costs, except upon notice to the advocates and solicitors and under special circumstances to be proved to the satisfaction of the Court [26] Accordingly, section 128 LPA provides that after the lapse of six (6) months from the delivery of Bill 18/2021, no order for taxation can be made. Further, section 128(2) LPA states that “(2) No such order for taxation shall in any event be made after the expiry of one year from the delivery of the bill of costs.”. [27] This Court finds that if a client has not exercised his/her rights under section 128(1) of the LPA, the right to taxation is lost. In the instant case, the Defendant did not seek taxation of Bill No. 18/2021 at any point in time and the period mentioned in section 128(2) of the LPA has expired. By operation of the statutory prohibition in section 128(2), the amount claimed in the Bill No. 18/2021 has become final and payable. It cannot be disputed or challenged and as such section 128(2) LPA sets in as an absolute bar which made the Defendant lost its statutory rights (See Tetuan Kang & Kang v. Kirana Studio Sdn Bhd [2014] MLJU 1937)

Dalam kes ini Mahkamah ini berdasarkan kes yang dinyatakan di atas DATO’ THRUNGANASAMBANTHAN A/L SUBRAMANIAM (Supra), P44 (a) dan (b) yang telah di kemukakan kepada pihak defendan tidak pernah sekali dicabar dan tiada keterangan daripada pihak Defendan-defendan bahawa P44 (a) dan

ini diberikan taksiran dalam tempoh masa yang diberikan di bawah Seksyen 121 Akta Profession Undang-Undang 1976. Maka secara tidak langsung pihak defendan-defendan telah melepaskan hak statutorinya untuk menafikan taksiran dalam P44 (a) dan (b) yang telah di kemukakan oleh pihak Plaintif melalui keterangan SP 1 dan SP 2.

Oleh itu Mahkamah berpandangan Defendan-defendan kini tidak boleh menafikan wang yuran guaman dan wang pinjaman peribadi yang telah diberikan oleh Plainitf semasa mengendalikan kes Defendan Pertama di Mahkamah Sesyen Muar tersebut setelah Defendan-defendan menikmati kemudahan yang diberikan berdasarkan nas undang-undang yang dinyatakan di atas dalam kes DATO’ THRUNGANASAMBANTHAN A/L SUBRAMANIAM (Supra) KEPUTUSAN MAHKAMAH Mahkamah memutuskan setelah menilai semua keterangan saksi-saksi dan mempertimbangkan kesemua ekshibit yang telah dikemukakan serta meneliti hujahan dari kesemua pihak bagi kes ini, maka di atas imbangan kebarangkalian Mahkamah memutuskan membenarkan tuntutan Plaintif seperti berikut:

Jumlah sebanyak RM71,221.00

(ii) Faedah pada kadar 5% setahun ke atas jumlah RM71,221.00 dari tarikh penghakiman sehingga penyelesaian penuh;

(iii) Kos mengikut skala sebagaimana Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 Peguam Plaintif: T/n GUNALAN & ASSOCIATES Peguam Defendan: T/n SAHLAN & ASSOCIATES Bertarikh pada 30 haribulan Jun 2025 ……………. t.t. …………….. (NABILAH BINTI NIZAM) Majistret Mahkamah Majistret Melaka