PENTADBIR TANAH DAN DAERAH JASIN ... RESPONDEN-RESPONDEN GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT A. INTRODUCTION [1] This originating summons concerns land held under Hakmilik GMM 1332, Lot 2362, Mukim Umbai, Daerah Jasin, Melaka. According to the Supporting Affidavit, the land is registered in the names of the Applicant and the Respondents as coproprietors, with the Applicant holding an undivided fourfifteenth (4/15) share. The Applicant seeks orders under ss 145 and 417 of the National Land Code 1965 to terminate the coproprietorship by way of partition and to obtain a separate issue document of title for Plot 1 in accordance with the proposed survey plan. [2] The application is brought principally under ss 145 and 417 of the National Land Code 1965 ("the Code"). By this originating summons, the applicant seeks orders terminating the existing co-proprietorship by way of partition in accordance with Proposed Survey Plan No. 103-2024-(D) dated 26 September 2024 prepared by a licensed surveyor engaged by him. He further seeks orders that the shares of the remaining co-proprietors be consolidated into Plots 2 and 3, that the surrender of land for a road reserve be dispensed with as a condition of the partition, that the consent of a deceased registered proprietor be dispensed with, and that an individual issue document of title be issued to him in respect of Plot 1. [3] The application is opposed on two fronts. The first respondent, in her affidavit in reply, challenges both the Applicant's entitlement to the relief sought and, more particularly, the fairness of the proposed plan of partition on the ground that it prejudices the interests of the remaining co-proprietors. The second and fourth respondents support that opposition. The seventh respondent, the Land Administrator, does not oppose partition in principle. Instead, it raises a jurisdictional objection, contending that the National Land Code provides a statutory administrative procedure under ss 141A and 142 whereby a co-proprietor may seek partition without the consent of the remaining co-proprietors, and that the Applicant ought first to have invoked that procedure before seeking relief under s 145 of the Code. It is accordingly contended that the present proceedings amount to an abuse of process. [4] Against that background, three issues arise for determination. First, whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the present application under s 145 of the National Land Code notwithstanding the administrative procedure prescribed under ss 141A and 142, and, if so, whether the commencement of these proceedings constitutes an abuse of process. Secondly, what is the nature and scope of the jurisdiction conferred upon the Court by s 145. Thirdly, whether, having regard to the affidavit evidence and the statutory discretion vested in the Court, the Applicant has established that the orders sought should be granted. [5] One further feature of the application should be noted. It is common ground that one of the registered co-proprietors is deceased and that no personal representative of that estate has been made a party to these proceedings. The Applicant therefore seeks an order dispensing with the consent of the deceased registered proprietor as a condition for the termination of the co-proprietorship and the proposed partition. B. MATERIAL FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY [6] The land is held under Hakmilik GMM 1332, Lot 2362, Mukim Umbai, Daerah Jasin, Melaka, measuring 0.3236 hectare. It is agricultural land subject to the express condition "Untuk Kebun Sahaja". These particulars appear from the private land search exhibited as JP-1 to the Applicant's Supporting Affidavit affirmed on 11 November 2025 and are likewise reflected in the documentary evidence before the Court. Although parts of the intitlement refer to the Mukim as "Alai", the register document of title and the private land search consistently identify the land as being situated in Mukim Umbai, and I proceed on that basis. [7] The registered shares, as disclosed by the private land search, are as follows. The Applicant holds an undivided four-fifteenth (4/15) share. The First to Sixth Respondents together hold the remaining eleven-fifteenth (11/15) shares, of which the Sixth Respondent's one-third (1/3) share is the largest individual holding. The Applicant acquired his interest by way of a transfer from the Sixth Respondent, registered on 22 July 2002. The register further shows that some of the remaining registered interests were acquired through transmission upon death and subsequent distribution pursuant to small estate proceedings. [8] Prior to commencing these proceedings, the Applicant engaged a licensed surveyor, Saharuddin El-Asas, to prepare a proposed plan for the partition of the land. The proposed survey plan, numbered 103-2024-(D), forms the basis of the relief sought in this application. Under the proposal, the Applicant seeks the issue of a separate document of title in respect of Plot 1, whilst the shares of the remaining co proprietors are to be consolidated into the remaining land comprised in Plots 2 and 3. [9] Before commencing these proceedings, the Applicant, through his solicitors, issued notices to the registered co-proprietors and to the persons believed to be the heirs of the deceased registered proprietor, informing them of the proposed partition and seeking their cooperation. According to the Applicant, whilst some recipients responded, a number of the notices were returned unclaimed or undelivered. Those notices and the returned postal articles are exhibited to the Supporting Affidavit. [10] The sealed Originating Summons, dated 13 November 2025, and the Supporting Affidavit were served on all seven Respondents by A.R. registered post, as deposed in the Affidavit of Service affirmed by the Applicant's solicitor on 11 February 2026 (Enclosure 7). Service on the Sixth Respondent was effected at her former address. [11] By her Affidavit in Reply, the First Respondent opposes the application. She contends that the proposed survey plan was prepared unilaterally without the agreement of the remaining co-proprietors; that Plot 1, which the Applicant seeks to obtain, occupies the more advantageous and valuable portion of the land; that houses, business premises and livestock structures belonging to the Respondents are situated on Plot 1; that implementation of the proposed partition would prejudice those in occupation and impose a financial burden upon them; and that no compensation has been offered notwithstanding the comparative value of the proposed portions. She further contends that the licensed surveyor was appointed without consultation with the remaining co-proprietors. The Second and Fourth Respondents support those objections. [12] By an affidavit affirmed on 24 February 2026, the Seventh Respondent, the Land Administrator, states that it has no objection in principle to the proposed partition. It nevertheless objects to the prayer dispensing with the surrender of land for a road reserve and takes the position that adequate access complying with the requirements of the National Land Code should be provided. In reply, the Applicant exhibits an amended proposed survey plan incorporating a road reserve. By a further affidavit, the Applicant maintains that he had, over a number of years, unsuccessfully attempted to resolve the matter with the other co-proprietors, that the requisite notices had been issued, and that the objections raised by the First Respondent are unsupported by evidence. [13] The principal dispute between the parties is therefore not whether the co-proprietorship should ultimately be brought to an end, but whether the Applicant is entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court in the manner adopted and, if so, whether the proposed partition reflected in Proposed Survey Plan No. 103-2024-(D) is fair and should be sanctioned. The Seventh Respondent maintains that the statutory procedure under ss 141A and 142 of the National Land Code provides the appropriate administrative mechanism for obtaining approval for partition where the consent of the remaining coproprietors cannot be obtained. The First, Second and Fourth Respondents further contend that the proposed partition is neither fair nor equitable for the reasons already outlined. In support of their opposition, the First, Second and Fourth Respondents, by their reply submissions, relied upon ss 141, 142 and 145 of the Code and upon the decision of the High Court in S Subramaniam & Ors v Inderjit Kaur d/o Karnail Singh & Anor [1997] 3 MLJ 366, to which I shall return. C. ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION [14] Against that factual background, three issues arise for determination. [15] First, whether the Court has jurisdiction under s 145 of the National Land Code to entertain an application by a coproprietor to terminate a co-proprietorship notwithstanding the administrative procedure for partition provided under ss 141A and 142 and, if so, whether the commencement of these proceedings without first invoking that procedure constitutes an abuse of process. [16] Secondly, if such jurisdiction exists, what is the nature and scope of the Court's powers under s 145 and, in particular, whether the Court may order the termination of the co-proprietorship in accordance with the proposed survey plan, dispense with the statutory requirements relied upon by the Applicant, and direct the issuance of a separate document of title. [17] Thirdly, whether, having regard to the affidavit evidence and the statutory discretion conferred by s 145, the Applicant has established that the relief sought ought to be granted. [18] The statutory scheme governing the partition of land held under co-proprietorship is contained in Chapter 2 of Part Nine of the National Land Code. Where the co-proprietors are in agreement, partition is effected administratively under ss 140 to 143A, subject to the approval of the appropriate land authority and compliance with the conditions and procedures prescribed by the Code. Under s 140(1), the land may be partitioned so that each co-proprietor is vested, under a separate title, with a portion of the land corresponding as nearly as may be to his undivided share in the whole. Section 141(1)(b) makes that proportionality a condition for administrative approval of the proposed partition. [19] Section 141A creates an exception to the consensual requirement prescribed by ss 140 and 141. It provides that, notwithstanding those provisions, any co-proprietor may apply for approval to partition the land where the other co-proprietors neither join in nor consent to the making of the application. Such an application is to be made in accordance with s 142. Where an application is made under s 141A, the Land Administrator is required to notify the remaining co-proprietors of the proposed partition and invite any objections within twenty-eight days of service of the notice. If objections are received, the Land Administrator must hold an enquiry and, if satisfied that good grounds exist, reject the application or, where the approval of the State Director is required, recommend its rejection. Otherwise, the Land Administrator may approve the application or recommend that it be approved. Where no objection is received, the Land Administrator may, after due consideration, approve the application or recommend its approval, as the case may be. [20] Two features of the statutory scheme bear directly on the present case. First, the land is agricultural land measuring less than two-fifths of a hectare. By virtue of ss 140(3), 142(5) and 143A of the National Land Code, an application for its partition falls to be determined by the State Authority rather than by the Land Administrator alone. Secondly, s 141(1)(c) incorporates into the partition regime the conditions prescribed by s 136(1), including the requirement in s 136(1)(h) that each proposed portion have a satisfactory means of access. In the case of agricultural land, s 141(3) empowers the State Director or, as the case may be, the Land Administrator to waive that requirement. Whether, and to what extent, those provisions affect the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction under s 145 is one of the principal questions arising in this case. [21] Section 145 confers a distinct jurisdiction upon the Court to facilitate the termination of a co-proprietorship. It applies where a co-proprietor will neither join in nor consent to an application for partition under Chapter 2 of Part Nine, or where partition cannot be approved by reason of the operation of s 136(1)(f). In such circumstances, the Court may, upon the application of any co-proprietor and subject to the applicable rules of civil procedure, "make such order as it may think just for the purpose of enabling the co-proprietorship to be terminated." Without limiting that general power, s 145(2) authorises the Court to deem an application for partition to have been made by all the co-proprietors, subject to such equitable payments as the Court considers appropriate having regard to the comparative values of the proposed portions; to order the transfer of an undivided share to one or more of the remaining co-proprietors; or to direct that the land be sold. [22] Section 145 forms part of the same statutory scheme but confers a separate jurisdiction upon the Court. Unlike ss 140 to 143A, which prescribe the administrative process for partition, s 145 empowers the Court, in the circumstances specified therein, to make such order as it thinks just for the purpose of enabling a co-proprietorship to be terminated. The relationship between the administrative procedure under ss 141A to 143A and the judicial jurisdiction conferred by s 145 lies at the heart of the first issue for determination. D. ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION [23] The first issue is whether the Applicant was required to pursue the administrative procedure prescribed by ss 141A and 142 of the National Land Code before invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under s 145 and, if not, whether the commencement of these proceedings amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. [24] In my judgment, that contention cannot be accepted. The circumstances in which the Court's jurisdiction arises under s 145(1)(a) substantially correspond with those giving rise to the administrative procedure under s 141A. Both provisions apply where a co-proprietor will neither join in nor consent to the making of an application for partition. The Code therefore provides both an administrative mechanism and a judicial mechanism to address the same practical difficulty, namely the inability to obtain the unanimous participation or consent of all the co-proprietors. Section 145 empowers the Court, upon the application of any co-proprietor, to exercise its jurisdiction whenever the statutory conditions are satisfied. It contains no requirement, express or implied, that an application under ss 141A and 142 must first be made or exhausted before the Court's jurisdiction may be invoked. Had Parliament intended to impose such a precondition, it could readily have said so. It did not. The contention that the Applicant was obliged first to invoke the administrative procedure must therefore fail. Likewise, the absence of the consent contemplated by s 141(1)(a) does not preclude relief under s 145. On the contrary, the absence of such consent is the very circumstance that engages the Court's jurisdiction under s 145(1)(a). [25] This construction of s 145 is consistent with the authorities. In Young Yean Chin & Ors v Quek Yak Kang & Ors [2016] 6 CLJ 860, the Court of Appeal recognised that s 145 confers upon the Court a discretionary jurisdiction to order partition, or to make such other order as it considers just, for the purpose of enabling a co-proprietorship to be terminated where one or more co-proprietors refuse to join in or consent to an application for partition. Likewise, in KMS S Kumarappan Chettiar v Ramasy s/o S Chokalingam [2007] 7 MLJ 682, the High Court treated the refusal of a co-proprietor to join in or consent to an application for partition as sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction under s 145, including the deeming power contained in s 145(2)(a). Neither decision suggests that the Court's jurisdiction under s 145 is contingent upon the prior exhaustion of the administrative procedure prescribed under ss 141A and 142. [26] A question of standing nevertheless arises because the Applicant holds only an undivided four-fifteenth share in the land. In S Subramaniam & Ors v Inderjit Kaur d/o Karnail Singh & Anor [1997] 3 MLJ 366, upon which the First, Second and Fourth Respondents placed particular reliance in their reply submissions, the High Court held that s 145(1)(a) is directed to the co-proprietor holding the minority share, who may invoke the Court's jurisdiction where the consent of another co-proprietor to an application for partition is withheld, whereas a co-proprietor holding the majority interest must pursue the administrative procedure under ss 141A and 142, with recourse to the Court only by way of appeal under s 418. A broader view was taken in Ku Yan bte Ku Abdullah v Ku Idris bin Ku Ahmad & Ors [1991] 3 MLJ 439 and Datin Sohaila binti Adorn v Einstein Tay [2016] 1 LNS 522, where it was held that a majority co-proprietor is likewise entitled to invoke s 145. It is unnecessary in the present case to resolve that divergence. On either approach, a minority co-proprietor in the Applicant's position is entitled to apply under s 145(1)(a). Indeed, on the reasoning in S Subramaniam, he is the very co-proprietor for whose benefit paragraph (a) was enacted. That conclusion is also consistent with the language of s 145(1), which confers the right to apply upon "any of the co-proprietors". [27] It follows that the absence of a prior application to the Land Administrator in Form 9B under s 142, and the absence of the notice and enquiry contemplated by s 142(3) and (4), do not render the present application premature. Section 145 imposes no such precondition upon a minority co-proprietor seeking to invoke the Court's jurisdiction under s 145(1)(a). On the reasoning in S Subramaniam & Ors v Inderjit Kaur d/o Karnail Singh & Anor [1997] 3 MLJ 366, the requirement of first pursuing the administrative procedure applies only to a majority co-proprietor and not to a minority co-proprietor such as the Applicant. The objection that the application is premature must therefore be rejected. [28] That said, the concerns raised regarding the statutory procedure are not without significance. They are more appropriately understood, not as going to the existence of the Court's jurisdiction under s 145, but to the nature and limits of that jurisdiction and, in particular, to the extent to which the Court may make orders affecting matters otherwise entrusted by the National Land Code to the land administration authorities. It is to that question that I now turn. [29] Section 145(1) confers upon the Court a broad discretionary jurisdiction, where the statutory conditions are satisfied, to "make such order as it may think just for the purpose of enabling the co-proprietorship to be terminated", subject to and in accordance with the law relating to civil procedure. Section 145(2), without prejudice to the generality of that power, identifies three forms of relief which the Court may grant: a deeming order under para (a), an order directing the transfer of an undivided share under para (b), and an order for the sale of the land under para (c). [30] Although the jurisdiction conferred by s 145 is expressed in broad terms, it is nevertheless directed to a specific statutory purpose, namely facilitating the termination of a co-proprietorship. The section forms part of the broader statutory scheme governing partition under Chapter 2 of Part Nine of the National Land Code and must therefore be construed harmoniously with the remaining provisions of that Chapter. This is reflected in s 145(2)(a), which contemplates that the Court may deem an application for partition to have been made by all the co-proprietors "for the purposes of this Chapter". The extent to which the Court may itself determine the manner of partition, dispense with statutory requirements governing administrative approval, or direct the issuance of separate titles must therefore be considered in the light of the scheme of the Code as a whole. [31] The relief sought in the present application illustrates the limits of the jurisdiction conferred by s 145. The Applicant does not seek merely an order facilitating the statutory process of partition. Rather, he asks the Court to order that the land be partitioned in accordance with Proposed Survey Plan No. 103- 2024-(D), to dispense with the surrender of land for a road reserve, to dispense with the consent of the deceased Sixth Respondent, and to direct the issue of an individual document of title in respect of Plot 1. Those prayers require consideration of whether the Court's jurisdiction under s 145 extends beyond facilitating the termination of the co-proprietorship to the exercise of functions which the Code otherwise entrusts to the land administration authorities. [32] In my judgment, it does not. The National Land Code draws a clear distinction between the judicial function of facilitating the termination of a co-proprietorship and the administrative function of approving and implementing a partition. Section 141(3) vests in the State Director or, as the case may be, the Land Administrator the discretion to waive the access requirement prescribed by s 136(1)(h) in the case of agricultural land. Likewise, by virtue of s 143A, the approval of the partition of agricultural land of the present size lies with the State Authority. The requirement under s 141(1)(b) that the proposed portions correspond, as nearly as may be, to the respective undivided shares likewise falls to be considered in the approval process. Nor does s 417 enlarge the Court's substantive jurisdiction. That provision enables the Court to give directions to the Registrar or Land Administrator for the purpose of giving effect to an order lawfully made under the Code; it does not authorise the Court to dispense with statutory requirements or to assume functions which the Code reserves to the competent land authorities. [33] The concerns raised by the Seventh Respondent are, in this respect, well founded. The difficulty is therefore not one of jurisdiction but of the limits of the Court's powers under s 145. Although the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the present application, the relief sought would require it to exercise statutory functions which the Code entrusts to the land administration authorities. The application cannot therefore succeed in the form in which it has been brought. [34] It remains to consider whether the application may properly be treated as one for a deeming order under s 145(2)(a) and, if so, whether such relief can be granted on the evidence before the Court. In my judgment, it cannot. [35] The first difficulty concerns the requirement for equitable adjustment contemplated by s 145(2)(a). A deeming order may only be made "subject to the making between the co-proprietors of such payments as the Court may consider equitable having regard to the comparative values of the individual portions". In the present case, the First Respondent asserts that Plot 1 occupies the more advantageous and valuable part of the land, that it contains houses, business premises and livestock structures occupied or used by the Respondents, and that no compensation has been proposed. The Applicant disputes those assertions but places no valuation evidence before the Court from which the comparative values of the proposed portions may be determined. There is therefore a genuine dispute of fact concerning both the value of, and occupation upon, the proposed plots. In the absence of evidence enabling the Court to determine the comparative values of the proposed portions and any equitable payment that may be required, the discretion under s 145(2)(a) cannot properly be exercised. Those disputed questions are not suitable for determination on affidavit evidence in an originating summons. It is true that an application of this nature is determined on affidavit and documentary evidence and that a co-proprietor who challenges a proposed partition may ordinarily be expected to substantiate that challenge by evidence of a similar character, including, where appropriate, an alternative survey plan prepared by a licensed surveyor: Ishak bin Said v Bashah bt Abdul Rahim [2022] MLJU 1921. It is equally true that a partition prepared by a licensed surveyor which faithfully reflects the registered shares and the conditions endorsed on the title will not ordinarily occasion injustice: Tong Ah Kau @ Tong Fong Yam v Tong Faung On [2015] MLJU 1984. Those principles, however, do not relieve the Applicant of the burden of establishing that the proposed partition is one which the Court may properly facilitate under s 145. Where the affidavit evidence discloses a genuine dispute concerning the comparative value of, and occupation upon, the proposed portions, that dispute is not resolved merely because no alternative survey plan has been produced. [37] Secondly, the evidence does not establish that the proposed partition satisfies the proportionality required by the National Land Code. Sections 140(1) and 141(1)(b) require each proposed portion to correspond, as nearly as may be, to the respective undivided share of the co-proprietor concerned. Although the proposed survey plan divides the land into three plots, neither the plan nor the affidavit evidence demonstrates that the areas allocated under the proposal correspond to the respective registered shares of the co-proprietors. The Court is therefore not satisfied that a deeming order in the terms sought would operate consistently with the statutory scheme governing partition. Thirdly, any partition of the present land remains subject to the approval of the State Authority. As the land is agricultural and measures less than two-fifths of a hectare, ss 140(3), 142(5) and 143A require that approval to be obtained from the State Authority. A deeming order under s 145(2)(a) does not dispense with that statutory requirement. Its effect is to enable an application for partition to proceed under the National Land Code for consideration by the competent land authority. It would not entitle the Applicant to the immediate issue of an individual document of title. Furthermore, the land remains subject to the express condition "Untuk Kebun Sahaja", whereas the affidavit evidence discloses the existence of residential and commercial structures on part of the land. The implications of that evidence for the approval of any proposed partition are matters falling within the statutory responsibilities of the land administration authorities and not for determination in these proceedings. [39] A further difficulty concerns the position of the Sixth Respondent. It is common ground that she is deceased and that no personal representative of her estate has been appointed or joined as a party to these proceedings. The Applicant himself recognises that position, having addressed his pre-action correspondence to the persons believed to be her heirs. Although one of the prayers seeks an order dispensing with the consent of the deceased registered proprietor, the Court is not persuaded that it would be appropriate, in the absence of a duly constituted personal representative, to make an order affecting the proprietary interest of the deceased co-proprietor. Service of the originating process at the deceased's former address cannot substitute for representation of her estate. Finally, the overall circumstances of the case do not favour the exercise of the Court's discretion under s 145. The remaining co-proprietors collectively hold the majority interest in the land. The affidavit evidence discloses that dwellings, business premises and livestock structures are situated on the proposed Plot 1, and no proposal has been advanced for any equitable payment or other adjustment to reflect the comparative values of the proposed portions. Those matters weigh against the making of a deeming order under s 145(2)(a). As for the alternative forms of relief contemplated by s 145(2)(b) and (c), namely the transfer of an undivided share or the sale of the land, they are not sought in the present application and, in any event, could not appropriately be considered in the absence of representation of the deceased Sixth Respondent's estate. [41] The amended proposed survey plan exhibited to the Applicant's Reply Affidavit does not affect this conclusion. Its purpose is to address the issue of access by incorporating a proposed road reserve. Whether the proposed road reserve satisfies the requirements of s 136(1)(h) and the approval provisions under Chapter 2 of Part Nine of the National Land Code is a matter falling within the statutory jurisdiction of the competent land authority. In light of the conclusions already reached, it is neither necessary nor appropriate for this Court to express any view on the adequacy of the proposed road reserve or its compliance with the statutory requirements. E. CONCLUSION [42] For the foregoing reasons, the answers to the issues identified at the outset are these. First, the Court has jurisdiction under s 145 of the National Land Code to entertain an application by a co-proprietor to terminate a co-proprietorship notwithstanding the administrative procedure prescribed under ss 141A and 142, and the commencement of the present proceedings does not constitute an abuse of the process of the Court. Secondly, the jurisdiction conferred by s 145 is facilitative in nature and does not empower the Court to assume the statutory functions of approving a partition, dispensing with the statutory requirements governing such approval, or directing the issuance of an individual document of title. Thirdly, even if the application were treated as one for a deeming order under s 145(2)(a), the Court is not satisfied, on the present evidential record, that such relief ought to be granted, having regard to the unresolved issues concerning comparative value, occupation and proportionality, the statutory approval required from the State Authority, and the absence of representation of the deceased Sixth Respondent's estate. [43] The Originating Summons is therefore dismissed. That conclusion should not be understood as denying the Applicant's entitlement, as a co-proprietor, to seek the termination of the co-proprietorship by lawful means. It reflects only the limits of the jurisdiction conferred by s 145 and the evidential deficiencies in the present application. Nothing in this judgment precludes the Applicant from pursuing such further steps as may be available under the National Land Code, whether through the statutory administrative procedure or by a properly constituted application supported by the necessary evidence and with due representation of the deceased co-proprietor's estate. F. ORDERS OF THE COURT [44] For the foregoing reasons, I make the following orders: