Jendela Kelana Sdn. Bhd. v Salehuddin Bin Shamsuddin (WA-22NCvC-456-08/2022)

SALEHUDDIN BIN SHAMSUDDIN

SUHAILY BINTI SHAMSUDDIN

SHAHERA @ SUHAILA BINTI SHAMSUDDIN

SHAHIRUDDIN BIN SHAMSUDDIN

SUHAINI BINTI SHAMSUDDIN

SALMAH BINTI MOHD SALLEH (NO. K/P: 230123-10-5042) ..... DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN 03/04/2026 09:38:36 WA-22NCvC-456-08/2022 Kand. 186

Semasa memberi keterangan di Mahkamah ini pada 13.10.2025 dan 14.10.2025, Defendan Pertama antara lain telah merujuk kepada –

dua surat bertarikh 10.4.2017 dan 8.6.2017 yang dialamatkan kepada pihak Dewan Bandaraya Kuala Lumpur (DBKL) (rujuk muka surat 106 dan 113 Ikatan Dokumen B4) dan menyatakan bahawa penama yang menandatangani kedua-dua surat tersebut, iaitu “Aziz bin Buyong (suami)” adalah suami kepada Defendan Kedua; dan

satu surat bertarikh 4.7.2017 yang dialamatkan kepada pihak Dewan Bandaraya Kuala Lumpur (DBKL) (rujuk muka surat 117 Ikatan Dokumen B4) dan menyatakan bahawa penama yang menandatangani surat tersebut, iaitu “Aziz bin Alias (suami)” adalah suami kepada Defendan Kedua.

Dalam keterangannya, Defendan Pertama mengaku bahawa sebagai attorney kepada semua Defendan, beliau yang membuat ketiga-tiga surat bertarikh 10.4.2017, 8.6.2017 dan 4.7.2017 tersebut dan perkara ini telah disahkan oleh Defendan Kedua.

Memandangkan terdapat dua nama berbeza pada nama suami Defendan Kedua dalam surat-surat tersebut, Mahkamah ini telah meminta Defendan Kedua untuk mengemukakan salinan kad pengenalan suaminya untuk Mahkamah ini mengesahkan identiti suami Defendan Kedua.

Defendan Kedua kemudiannya telah mengemukakan salinan kad pengenalan suaminya kepada Mahkamah ini dan ia telah ditanda sebagai Lampiran “A”.

Berdasarkan semakan Mahkamah ini didapati nama suami Defendan Kedua seperti yang dicatatkan dalam Lampiran “A” tersebut ialah Abdul Aziz@Buyong bin Alias dan bukannya Aziz bin Buyong seperti yang dinyatakan oleh Defendan Pertama dalam surat-surat bertarikh 10.4.2017 dan 8.6.2017 tersebut.

Memandangkan Aziz bin Buyong bukan suami kepada Defendan Kedua, adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah ini bahawa surat-surat bertarikh 10.4.2017 dan 8.6.2017 yang ditandatangani oleh Aziz bin Buyong sebagai suami kepada Defendan Kedua tersebut adalah dokumen palsu dan tidak tulen yang direka oleh Defendan Pertama.

Selanjutnya, memandangkan Defendan Pertama –

telah memalsukan nama suami Defendan Kedua pada bahagian tandatangan surat-surat bertarikh 10.4.2017 dan 8.6.2017 tersebut;

telah menyatakan dalam keterangan bersumpahnya bahawa surat-surat bertarikh 10.4.2017 dan 8.6.2017 tersebut adalah dokumen yang betul dan benar dan bahawa Aziz bin Buyong, iaitu penandatangan surat-surat bertarikh 10.4.2017 dan 8.6.2017 tersebut, adalah suami kepada

telah merujuk dan bergantung kepada surat-surat palsu bertarikh 10.4.2017 dan 8.6.2017 tersebut semasa memberi keterangan di Mahkamah; dan

tidak mengambil sebarang usaha dan tindakan untuk memadam (expunge), menarik balik dan membatalkan surat-surat bertarikh 10.4.2017 dan 8.6.2017 tersebut daripada rekod Mahkamah sehingga ke akhir perbicaraan kes tersebut, adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah ini bahawa –

Defendan Pertama telah memperdaya Mahkamah ini untuk mempercayai bahawa surat-surat bertarikh 10.4.2017 dan 8.6.2017 tersebut adalah dokumen yang benar dan tulen; dan

Defendan Pertama telah melakukan perbuatan penghinaan Mahkamah (contemptuous act) di hadapan Mahkamah ini (contempt in the face of the court) (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “perbuatan penghinaan Mahkamah tersebut”).

Oleh itu, pada 21.11.2025, Mahkamah ini telah mengenakan pertuduhan penghinaan Mahkamah terhadap Defendan Pertama dan memberi peluang kepada Defendan Pertama untuk memberi tunjuk sebab mengapa tindakan penghinaan Mahkamah tidak boleh diambil terhadap Defendan Pertama. Pertuduhan terhadap Defendan Pertama adalah seperti yang berikut: “Bahawa kamu Salehuddin bin Shamsuddin semasa memberi keterangan di Mahkamah ini pada 13.10.2025 dan 14.10.2025 telah merujuk kepada surat-surat di Ikatan Dokumen B4 di muka surat 106 dan 113 masing-masing bertarikh 10.4.2017 dan 8.6.2017 dan telah menyatakan dalam Mahkamah ini bahawa pembuat surat-surat tersebut, iaitu Aziz bin Buyong (suami) adalah suami kepada Suhaily binti Shamsuddin, iaitu Abdul Aziz@Buyong bin Alias. Walau bagaimanapun, setelah Mahkamah ini membandingkan surat-surat tersebut dengan salinan kad pengenalan suami kepada Suhaily binti Shamsuddin seperti di Lampiran “A”, didapati pembuat surat-surat tersebut, iaitu Aziz bin Buyong bukan suami Suhaily binti Shamsuddin. Oleh itu, Mahkamah ini mendapati kamu telah memperdayakan Mahkamah ini dengan menggunakan dokumen-dokumen palsu dan tidak tulen, iaitu seperti yang terkandung dalam surat-surat tersebut. Mahkamah ini mendapati tindakan mengemukakan surat-surat palsu dan tidak tulen di Mahkamah adalah terjumlah kepada perbuatan penghinaan Mahkamah. Oleh itu, Mahkamah ini memberi peluang kepada kamu untuk memberi tunjuk sebab mengapa kamu tidak boleh dikenakan tindakan penghinaan Mahkamah yang mana sekiranya disabitkan kamu boleh dikenakan hukuman penjara, denda atau kedua-duanya.”.

Defendan Pertama faham pertuduhan tersebut dan telah mengaku salah atas pertuduhan itu. Semasa memberi tunjuk sebab –

Defendan Pertama mengaku telah membuat surat-surat bertarikh 10.4.2017 dan 8.6.2017 tersebut atas kapasitinya sebagai attorney kepada Defendan-Defendan;

Defendan Pertama mengaku telah mengguna dan meletakkan nama “Aziz bin Buyong (suami)” pada bahagian tandatangan surat-surat bertarikh 10.4.2017 dan 8.6.2017 tersebut bagi merujuk kepada suami Defendan Kedua;

Defendan Pertama mengaku telah merujuk, menggunakan dan mengemukakan surat-surat bertarikh 10.4.2017 dan 8.6.2017 tersebut sebagai keterangan semasa memberikan keterangan pada 13.10.2025 dan 14.10.2025; dan

setelah merujuk Lampiran “A” tersebut, Defendan Pertama bersetuju dan mengaku bahawa nama suami kepada Defendan Kedua ialah Abdul Aziz@Buyong bin Alias dan bukannya Aziz bin Buyong.

Memandangkan Defendan Pertama telah mengaku melakukan penghinaan Mahkamah tersebut, maka Defendan Pertama telah didapati bersalah tanpa sebarang keraguan yang munasabah dan disabitkan dengan kesalahan penghinaan Mahkamah tersebut. Dalam rayuannya, Defendan Pertama telah memohon maaf atas kesalahan tersebut dan memohon hukuman yang ringan.

Setelah mempertimbangkan fakta kes, rayuan Defendan Pertama dan prinsip undang-undang mengenai kesalahan penghinaan Mahkamah, Mahkamah ini telah mengenakan hukuman lima (5) hari penjara dan denda sebanyak RM3,000.00 tidak bayar tiga (3) bulan penjara ke atas Defendan Pertama. Pada pendapat Mahkamah ini, hukuman tersebut adalah adil, wajar dan setimpal dengan kesalahan Defendan Pertama. Alasan Mahkamah ini membuat keputusan tersebut adalah seperti yang berikut:

Defendan Pertama telah mengaku salah atas kesalahan penghinaan Mahkamah tersebut dan telah disabitkan dengan kesalahan tersebut;

permohonan maaf Defendan Pertama tersebut tidak dibuat dengan suci hati, rasa insaf dan rasa kesal kerana tiada sebarang usaha dan tindakan diambil oleh Defendan Pertama untuk memadam, menarik balik dan membatalkan surat-surat bertarikh 10.4.2017 dan 8.6.2017 tersebut daripada rekod Mahkamah sehingga ke akhir perbicaraan penuh kes tersebut dan prosiding penghinaan Mahkamah tersebut;

penghinaan Mahkamah adalah suatu kesalahan yang serius kerana perbuatan itu –

mencabar, tidak menghormati, mengabaikan dan merendahkan kewibawaan institusi kehakiman yang berfungsi untuk menegakkan keadilan dan rule of law;

(ii) merupakan campur tangan dalam pentadbiran keadilan dan kuasa Mahkamah; dan

(iii) adalah perbuatan yang tidak berintegriti yang boleh menjejaskan, menghalang dan memprejudiskan pentadbiran keadilan dan perbicaraan yang adil;

kesalahan penghinaan Mahkamah diwujudkan adalah, inter alia, untuk menjaga, melindungi, mengekalkan dan mempertahankan integriti, kemuliaan dan kewibawaan Mahkamah dan pentadbiran keadilan dan untuk menjamin perbicaraan yang adil dan saksama;

memalsukan dan mereka-reka dokumen (fabricating document) Mahkamah dengan tujuan untuk memperdaya Mahkamah dan pihak-pihak dalam sesuatu prosiding merupakan perbuatan penghinaan Mahkamah; dan

mengenai hukuman yang boleh dikenakan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi bagi kesalahan penghinaan Mahkamah, berdasarkan seksyen 13 Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964 [Akta 91] dibaca bersama subseksyen 22(2) Akta yang sama, Mahkamah Tinggi hendaklah mempunyai kuasa untuk menghukum apa-apa penghinaan terhadap dirinya dan boleh menjatuhkan apa-apa hukuman yang dibenarkan oleh undang-undang seperti hukuman penjara, denda atau kedua-duanya. Berdasarkan kes undang-undang, tempoh hukuman penjara yang dikenakan oleh Mahkamah bagi kesalahan penghinaan Mahkamah ialah antara empat belas

hari hingga dua (2) tahun.

Prinsip undang-undang di atas telahpun diputuskan dalam beberapa kes undang-undang dan antaranya adalah seperti yang berikut:

dalam kes Monatech (M) Sdn Bhd v Jasa Keramat Sdn Bhd [2002] 4 MLJ 241, Mahkamah Persekutuan melalui penghakiman yang disampaikan oleh Haidar FCJ (pada ketika itu) telah memutuskan seperti yang berikut: “It seems there has been no decision by this court, as the apex court of this country, on contempt of court other than in matters pertaining to a breach of a court order or contempt committed in the face of the court, and particularly in this case, regarding disposal of assets by a defendant when there is an application pending for a Mareva injunction before the court. … It is clear that the power to punish for contempt of court is provided in art 126 of the Federal Constitution: The Federal Court, the Court of Appeal or a High Court shall have power to punish any contempt of itself. There is a similar provision repeated in s 13 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964. There is no specific legislation on contempt of court in this country. By virtue of the above statutory provisions, it is correct, in our view, for the Court of Appeal to state: It is the common law principles that the courts of this country have been applying. Following the principle, Oswald’s Contempt of Court (3rd Ed) provides a good guide to a general definition of contempt of court, thus: To speak generally, contempt of court may be said to be constituted by any conduct that tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or disregard, or to interfere with or prejudice parties, litigants or their witnesses during litigation. What therefore is contempt of court, ‘is interference with the due administration of justice’ — per Nicholls LJ at p 923 of Attorney-General v Hislop & Anor [1991] 1 All ER 911 (CA). In view of the generality of the phrase ‘interference with the due administration of justice’, we are of the view that the categories of contempt are never closed. To that extent we respectfully endorse the statement made by Low Hop Bing J, in Chandra Sri Ram v Murray Hiebert [1997] 3 MLJ 240 at 270: The circumstances and categories of facts which may arise and which may constitute contempt of court, in a particular case, are never closed. This is the same position as in the case of negligence in which the scope for development is limitless. Contempt of court may arise from any act or form whatsoever, ranging from libel or slander emanating from any contemptuous utterance, news item, report or article, to an act of disobedience to a court order or a failure to comply with a procedural requirement established by law. Any of these acts, in varying degrees, affects the administration of justice or may impede the fair trial of sub judice matters, civil or criminal, for the time being pending in any court. The particular matrix of the individual case is of paramount importance in determining whether a particular circumstance attracts the application of the law of contempt. Hence, a positive perception of the facts is a prerequisite in deciding whether or not there is any contravention necessitating the invocation of the law of contempt.”. [Penekanan ditambah]

dalam kes MBf Holdings Bhd & Anor v Houng Hai Kong & Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 135, Anuar J (pada ketika itu) telah memutuskan bahawa – “Contempt of court is a serious offence and the court must deal with the contemnor with equal seriousness. When someone openly disobeys the court order, he commits a breach. His conduct is calculated to obstruct or had an intrinsic tendency to interfere with the course of justice and the due administration of law. … A contempt of court is basically an offence against the court and not against the judge personally and it is punishable because of the necessity of maintaining the dignity of the court. The seriousness of the offence committed by the two defendants cannot be doubted having regards to the conduct of the defendants openly disobeying the injunction and intentionally evading service of the order. No punishment would be appropriate unless the contemnor is suffered to committal. I do not think in the circumstances of the case a fine would be adequate. I have considered this case with great care and concern and it is my unpleasant task that I have to hand down the only punishment which I think appropriate in this case: First defendant First offence – encl (27): I would sentence the first defendant to two weeks’ imprisonment and RM20,000 fine or in default six months’ imprisonment with effect from today. Second offence – encl (102): I would sentence the first defendant to two weeks’ imprisonment and RM20,000 fine or in default six months’ imprisonment with effect from today.”. [Penekanan ditambah]

dalam kes Metro Giant Group Sdn Bhd v. Gala Sari Resources Sdn Bhd & Ors (No 2) [2007] 7 MLJ 52, Kang Hwee Gee J (pada ketika itu) telah memutuskan bahawa – “[10] Submission By Counsel For The Alleged Contemnor, Dato’ Dr. Cyrus Das

The gist of the complaint to support this application to cite the alleged contemnor for contempt is that they had: i) fabricated documents; and ii) fabricated document evidence in the falsified documents; and thereby obstructed the administration of justice with the intention of misleading the Honourable Court. … [26] A contempt proceedings is quasi criminal in nature and the plaintiff is obliged to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt. The plaintiff has failed to do so. … [28] With respect to the defendants’ applications encls. 214, 223, 225, 231 and 246 to set aside the leave granted to the plaintiff to initiate this contempt proceedings there is clearly no reason why they should be allowed. [29] The leave was granted on the basis that there is evidence before the court that the three letters were written at the time when the addressee M/s Cheng Poh Heng & Co. had not yet set up shop at the said premises thereby providing ample justification for me to conclude that at that stage in all probability those letters had been fabricated. The court at that stage should not be concerned with the reasons and circumstances under which those letters were written but with the question of whether those letters were forged and therefore constitutes contempt which justifies a competent hearing.”. [Penekanan ditambah]

dalam kes Arab-Malaysian Prima Realty Sdn Bhd v. Sri Kelangkota-Rakan Engineering JV Sdn Bhd & Ors [2000] 2 CLJ 632, Low Hop Bing J (pada ketika itu) telah memutuskan bahawa – “… It is evident to me that her conduct throughout the whole of the committal proceedings reflected a conduct constituting unmitigated repentance and was indeed an affront to the authority of the court. Further, in my view, an apology to be effective must be given immediately in the 3rd defendant’s affidavits filed for the hearing of the substantive notice of motion in order to show her remorse or repentance at the earliest opportunity, and not as an afterthought, subsequent to a finding of guilt and conviction against her. The apology must be made in the form of a clear, unambiguous and unqualified statement. Support for my proposition in this connection is to be found in the judgment of Dua, CJ in Brig. E.T. Sen (Retd) v. E. Narayanan & Others (Air) [1969] Delhi 201, where the learned Chief Justice said: Apology has to be offered clearly at the earliest opportunity indicative of remorse and contrition which is the essence of the purging of a contempt and it should not be offered in the hope and with the object of avoiding punishment. Apology and justification ill go together. It is therefore wrong on the part of a lawyer to contend that if the Court finds his client’s conduct as amounting to contempt of Court, then he is willing to tender an unconditional apology. The position would have been different if the 3rd defendant had tendered her clear, unambiguous and unqualified apology at the earliest opportunity when he affirmed her affidavits in reply to the plaintiff’s affidavits filed in support of the substantive notice of motion or in any event before the hearing of the application ie, the substantive notice of motion, in order to enable the court to consider the apology as an additional mitigating factor.”. [Penekanan ditambah]

dalam kes Tan Sri Datuk Nadraja a/l Ratnam v Murali a/l Subramaniam (Dato Sivakumar a/l Nadraja, intervener) [2017] MLJU 2307, Nantha Balan J (pada ketika itu) telah menjelaskan mengenai undang-undang penghinaan Mahkamah seperti yang berikut: “The law [57] I turn now to the law of contempt of Court. It is trite that an act of disobedience of an injunction is a contempt of Court as it is conduct which is intended or calculated to impede, obstruct or prejudice the administration of justice. Also, it would be an act of contempt if a deponent of an affidavit misleads the Court or is untruthful to the Court. The following cases on the law of contempt were referred to during submissions and they are now reproduced below: -

Knight and Another v Clifton and Others [1971] 2 All ER 378 (p.341):- “Contempt of court, even of the type that consists in breach of an injunction or undertaking, is something that may carry penal consequences, even loss of liberty, and the evidence required to establish it must be appropriately cogent.”

Wee Choo Keong v MBf Holdings Bhd & Anor [1993] 2 MLJ 217 (Supreme Court) (per Abdul Hamid Omar LP) [at pg. 220 to 221]:- “It is established law that a person against whom an order for court has been issued is duty bound to obey that order until it is set aside. It is not open for him to decide for himself whether the order was wrongly issued and therefore does not require obedience. His duty is one of obedience until such time as the order may be set aside and varied. Any person who fails to obey an order of court runs the risk of being held in contempt with all its attendant consequences”.

S Ashok Kandiah & Anor v. Dato’ Yalumallai @ Ramalingam s/o Muthusamy & Anor [2011] 1 CLJ 460 (Court of Appeal) [at para 13]:- “According to Vernon v. Bosley (No. 2) [1999] QB 18, CA, all litigants, whether represented or not, owe an obligation not to mislead the court. And a breach of this onerous obligation could be dealt with by imposing any of the procedural sanctions available to the court, including the setting aside of a judgment so obtained. The other sanction would be that of contempt or if the falsehood is so grave and it is contained in the evidence, then perjury would be the ultimate sanction.” [Emphasis Added]

Cheah Cheng Hoc v Public Prosecutor [1986] 1 MLJ 299 (Supreme Court) (a lawyer was sentenced to three days imprisonment for contempt of court for concealing a document appealed his case) (per Lee Hun Hoe CJ), (at p.301):- “The court has the power to punish as contempt any misuse of the court’s process, e.g., forging or altering of court documents or other deceits of the kind or deceiving the court by deliberately suppressing a fact or giving false facts. Whether the court should deal with the contempt summarily would depend upon the situation in each particular case ..... In the present case it is clear that the learned Judge was misled on an important matter, that is, the concealment of a document C.P.5 as to affect the credibility of a witness even though it did not directly relate to the issue in the action. The appellant believed that the course he took was proper in all the circumstances. He apologized if he was wrong. The learned Judge thought he was wrong. So do we..... We feel that we must leave the exercise of this awesome power to the good sense of our Judges. We will interfere when this power is misused.” [Emphasis Added]

Sharma Kumari a/p Oam Parkash v Public Prosecutor [2000] 6 MLJ 790 (with respect to the importance of affidavit evidence) (p.822):- “Any modern system of justice relies upon the evidence placed before it to make its findings of fact. It cannot be denied that a fair and just decision involves the application of law to the facts found to be proven to the requisite standard of proof. Now, the accepted way of proof is by way of placing the evidence before the court by way of oral testimony or, in civil cases, also by affidavits. Oral testimony or affidavits are taken on the basis of an oath or affirmation that the maker will tell the truth and nothing but the truth as to the facts that the maker perceived by any of his five senses. Their opinions, except the opinions of acknowledged experts, are irrelevant. Torture and interrogation cannot ensure the maker tells the truth. Indeed no reliance can be placed upon any testimony obtained by such abhorrent means. Neither can extraction and examination of the heart or brain verify if he is telling the truth. This only serves to emphasize that courts rely upon witnesses and deponents to tell the truth. The system of justice will collapse if witnesses and deponents feel free to give false evidence or testimony (see Bhandulananda Jayatilake v PP [1982] 1 MLJ 83 (FQ)). Such acts are nothing but a contempt of our peers and of the administration of justice and is wholly contrary to the public interest. The making or giving of false evidence, if proven, must therefore be dealt with, with the clear objective of deterrence, not only of that individual from repetition, but also to deter others. To wait until such offences are rampant like drugs and traffic cases before taking strict action will put the administration of justice in jeopardy. Any risk of the court acting upon false evidence is unacceptable since it results in injustice. Any system of administration of justice that tolerates false statements in affidavits risks ridicule.” [Emphasis Ours]

PB Securities Sdn Bhd v. Abdul Rashid b Mohamed [1994] 3 MLJ 168 (the Court recognized that the making of false statements in affidavits as being punishable as contempt of court) (p.173):- “Bearing in mind that Order 14 is limited to cases to which the plaintiff verily believes there is no defence and has or has caused to be deposed in the affidavit in support to that effect and the defendant knows perfectly well the plaintiffs claim has to be met, the defendant is best advised not to oppose the summons and submit to judgment bearing in mind the consequences of making a false affidavit and the laws of contempt of court in making a false statement of fact to the Judge upon which the defendant intends the Judge to rely in making a decision.” [Emphasis Added]

Jothi Impex Sdn Bhd & Anor v Yashree Store Sdn Bhd [2009] MLJU 742 (High Court) (paragraph 747):- “With due respect, the blatant lies perpetrated by the Plaintiffs in their affidavits in encl. 4 and encl. 6 are in serious contempt and they come to this court with unclean hand.” [Emphasis Added]

Affin Bank Berhad v. Tan Sri Kishu Tirathrai (No. 2) [2004] 6 AMR 407 (High Court) (p.421):- “An abuse of process of the court can never be tolerated. The courts have held in the past that the following acts of abuse of process have been held to be punishable as contempts:

where the creditor files a double process for the same debt (Higgens v. Sommerland [1614] 2 Bulst 68);

where the plaintiff serves an imitation writ to frighten the defendant (Re Banks [1845] 4 LTOS 375);

where there is a fraudulent collusion between the plaintiff and the defendant in order to defend the rights of a third party (M’Gregor v. Barrett [1848] 6 CB 262);

where the plaintiff issues execution and seizes the defendant’s goods on the same day as the defendant obtains a decree nisi to deprive the plaintiff of his costs (Pitcher v. Nokes [1848] 12 JPJo 473);

where money is paid by way of a consideration for the withdrawal of a motion to commit for contempt (R v. Newton [1903] 67 JP 453);

where the party falsely pleads infancy in order to delay the trial (Lord v. Thornton (1614) 2 Bulst 67);

where the party makes a false oath in order to obtain bail (Royson’s case (1628) Cro Car 146);

where the party who seeks the court’s exercise of discretion in a divorce proceeding makes a false statement (Apted v. Apted and Bliss [1930] P 246);

This list can never be exhaustive. And when there is an abuse of the process of the court, the court has the inherent power to act accordingly.” [Emphasis Added]

Eric Lau Man Hing v Eramara Jaya Sdn. Bhd. & Ors [2007] 2 MLJ 578 (High Court) (per T. Selventhiranathan J) (paragraph 41):- “[41] The gravity of the offence of the respondents was in failing to see that the order of the court was obeyed. There are people who flout orders of the courts as if the orders are of no consequence. The respondents, to my mind, are within such category of people. It cannot be gainsaid that the orders of the courts should be obeyed or else there will be a breakdown in the due administration of justice and there will be no respect for the law.” [Emphasis added]

William Jacks & Co. (M) Sdn. Bhd. v Chemquip (M) Sdn. Bhd. & Anor [1994] 3 MLJ 40 (High Court) (at p.49):- “Since the defendants had the benefit of counsel after the injunction was served, the injunction was still breached and because of the clear terms of the injunction, counsel for the plaintiff moved that a custodial sentence be meted out. I upheld that submission. There are just too many people who flout the orders of the High Court as if they are orders of no consequence. I am making a stand that orders of the High Court should be obeyed or else there will be a breakdown in the due administration of justice. In this case, the defendants have not only disobeyed but attempted to manipulate and circumvent the court’s order. I therefore sentence

(1), (2) and (3) above to imprisonment till they purge their contempt” [Emphasis added]

Ooi Meng Sua v Aetna Universal Insurance Sdn. Bhd. [1995] 1 AMR 467 (High Court) (at p.472):- “... if orders of the court are not obeyed, as such conduct tends to bring the authority and administration of law into disrespect or disregard and impede the course of justice. Thus, for reasons of public policy, orders of the court must be treated with respect and require faithful obedience.” [Emphasis added]

In MBf Holdings Bhd & Anor v Houng Hai Kong & Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 135 (High Court) (at p.144):- “Contempt of court is a serious offence and the court must deal with the contemnor with equal seriousness. When someone openly disobeys the court order, he commits a breach. His conduct is calculated to obstruct or had an intrinsic tendency to interfere with the course of justice and the due administration of law. An injunction is a most solemn and authoritative form of order made by the court expressly enjoining a party either to do a particular act or refrain from doing a particular act. It is the duty of those so enjoined strictly to observe the terms of the injunction. The simple and only view is that an order must be obeyed, that those who wish to get rid of that order must do so by the proper course. So long as it exists, the order must be obeyed, and obeyed to the letter. The proposition is well established that even where the order of the court required interpretation or there was any doubt as regards its scope, it was the duty of the party enjoined to get the interim injunction discharged or varied instead of committing the act proposed. A contempt of court is basically an offence against the court and not against the judge personally and it is punishable because of the necessity of maintaining the dignity of the court.” [Emphasis

Arab-Malaysian Prima Realty Sdn. Bhd. v Sri Kelangkota-Rakan Engineering JV Sdn. Bhd. & Ors. [2000] 2 CLJ 632, Low Hop Bing J (as he then was) held [at 635]:- “It is evident to me that her conduct throughout the whole of the committal proceedings reflected a conduct constituting unmitigated repentance and was indeed an affront to the authority of the court. Further, in my view, an apology to be effective must be given immediately in the 3rd defendant’s affidavits filed for the hearing of the substantive notice of motion in order to show - her remorse or repentance at the earliest opportunity, and not as an afterthought, subsequent to a finding of guilt and conviction against her. The apology must be made in the form of a clear, unambiguous and unqualified statement. Support for my proposition in this connection is to be found in the judgment of Dua, CJ in Brig. E.T. Sen (Retd) v. E. Narayanan & Others (Air) [1969] Delhi 201, where the learned Chief Justice said: Apology has to be offered clearly at the earliest opportunity indicative of remorse and contrition which is the essence of the purging of a contempt and it should not be offered in the hope and with the object of avoiding punishment. Apology and justification ill go together. It is therefore wrong on the part of a lawyer to contend that if the Court finds his client’s conduct as amounting to contempt of Court, then he is willing to tender an unconditional apology. The position would have been different if the 3rd defendant had tendered her clear, unambiguous and unqualified apology at the earliest opportunity when he affirmed her affidavits in reply to the plaintiffs affidavits filed in support of the substantive notice of motion or in any event before the hearing of the application ie, the substantive notice of motion, in order to enable the court to consider the apology as an additional mitigating factor.” [emphasis added] [Penekanan ditambah]

dalam kes Datuk Wira Khiu Fu Siang & Ors v. Foo Hiap Siong [2025] CLJU 3015, Anand Ponnudurai J telah memutuskan seperti yang berikut: “95. In my considered view, such conduct by the Defendant and CYM is unpardonable. On this issue, I find that the apology was not sincere and came way too late in the day. In my further view, the Defendant and CYM have shown no remorse, are unrepentant and unapologetic. As such, taking all matters into account, I am impelled to impose a custodial sentence. The length of such a sentence, however, is a matter of discretion, and this Court should be guided by any mitigating and aggravating factors.

In this regard, learned Counsel for the Plaintiffs referred to several cases as guidance, which reveal that the terms of imprisonment for breaching a Court Order have ranged from fourteen (14) days’ imprisonment up to even two (2) years’ imprisonment.

Having considered all matters put forth, I am of the view that a sentence of twenty-one (21) days imprisonment in relation to the Defendant for being in contempt is the appropriate and warranted punishment.”. [Penekanan ditambah]

Sehubungan dengan itu, selaras dengan Aturan 52 kaedah 6(2) KKM 2012, Mahkamah ini menyatakan bahawa –

pihak yang telah melakukan penghinaan Mahkamah tersebut ialah Salehuddin bin Shamsuddin, iaitu Defendan

penghinaan Mahkamah yang dilakukan oleh Salehuddin bin Shamsuddin tersebut ialah menyediakan, mengemukakan dan menggunakan dokumen palsu dan tidak tulen sebagai dokumen Mahkamah, iaitu surat-surat bertarikh 10.4.2017 dan 8.6.2017 tersebut; dan

hukuman yang dikenakan terhadap Salehuddin bin Shamsuddin bagi kesalahan penghinaan Mahkamah tersebut ialah lima (5) hari penjara dan denda sebanyak RM3,000.00 tidak bayar tiga (3) bulan penjara.

Berdasarkan alasan-alasan di atas, Mahkamah ini telah mendapati Defendan Pertama bersalah atas kesalahan penghinaan Mahkamah seperti mana pertuduhan tersebut dan telah mensabitkan Defendan Pertama dengan kesalahan tersebut dan mengenakan hukuman lima (5) hari penjara dan denda sebanyak RM3,000.00 tidak bayar tiga (3) bulan penjara terhadap Defendan Pertama. Bertarikh : 2 APRIL 2026 (DR. ARIK SANUSI BIN YEOP JOHARI) HAKIM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA, WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN KUALA LUMPUR (KUALA LUMPUR) Peguam bagi pihak Plaintif: Encik Mujahid bin Mohamed Hadzri (bersama Encik Mohd Muzeer bin Zainal Abidin) Tetuan Yusfarizal Aziz & Zaid Peguam Bela dan Peguam Cara 01-26, 01-27 Maxim Citylights Sentul, 25 Jalan Sentul Pasar 51000 KUALA LUMPUR Tel : 03-4032 0949/2948 Faks : 03-27224 3865 Ruj : YAZ.1.1.321.2021 E-mel : mujahid@yaz-law.com / general@yaz-law.com Defendan Pertama (mewakili diri sendiri): Encik Salehuddin bin Shamsuddin No. K/P: 530623-08-5839 Pejabat Seridesa 59/500 Batu 5, Jalan Gombak 53000 KUALA LUMPUR Tel : 012-379 0808 E-mel : salehud@hotmail.com Peguam bagi pihak Defendan Kedua: Encik Ku Amirul Faiz bin Ku Seman Tetuan Kama & Wan Peguam Bela dan Peguam Cara 1-1-1, Jalan Medan PB 1A Seksyen 9 43650 Bandar Baru Bangi SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN Tel : 03-8922 1485 /03-8923 1485 Ruj : KA/SS/JKSB/2641(L) E-mel : wan.kamawan@gmail.com Peguam bagi pihak Defendan Ketiga, Keempat dan Kelima: Cik Dolorish Sarim Tetuan Dorairaj, Low & Teh Peguam Bela dan Peguam Cara Tingkat 3, Wisma Maran No.28, Medan Pasar 50050 KUALA LUMPUR Tel : 03-2031 1136 Faks : 03-2031 0113 Ruj : 24.DS.SS.JK.159 E-mel : dlt@dlt-law.com