John Jayabalan A/L M. Dorairaj v the New Straits Times Press (Malaysia) Berhad (WA-12BNCC-35-12/2025)

Having heard the submissions of both parties and having considered the appeal record, the Grounds of Judgment of the LSCJ, and the written submissions, this Court dismissed the appeal with costs. These are the grounds for that decision.

For ease of reference, the parties shall be referred to as the Appellant and the Respondent. Where reference is made to their roles at trial, they shall be referred to as the Defendant and the Plaintiff respectively. B. BACKGROUND FACTS [4] The Respondent is a publisher of newspapers. The Appellant was a newspaper vendor appointed by the Respondent under a Vendor’s Agreement dated 07.06.2007. The commercial relationship between the parties continued without material interruption from 2007 until October 2019.

In or about October 2017, the Appellant was promoted to the status of Marketing Execution Partner ("MEP") for the Subang Jaya area, with responsibility for several sub-vendors operating under his account (PJ 0214/000). The appointment was evidenced by, among other documents, the Letter of Appointment as MEP dated 17.10.2017 (Exhibit P106) and the Trading Terms Changes dated 01.11.2017 (Exhibit P107).

The Respondent’s claim in the Sessions Court was for the sum of RM353,181.77, being the outstanding price of newspapers supplied to the Appellant and his sub-vendors for the period September 2017 to October 2019. The Appellant terminated the business relationship by letter dated 18.10.2019. The Writ and Statement of Claim were filed on 06.05.2021.

After a full trial, the LSCJ found that the Respondent had proved its claim on a balance of probabilities pursuant to sections 101 and 103 of the Evidence Act 1950, and entered judgment for the Respondent in the sum claimed, together with interest and costs. C. THE GROUNDS OF APPEAL [8] The Appellant’s grounds of appeal, as distilled from the Memorandum of Appeal and the written submissions, are conveniently grouped as follows:

that the LSCJ erred in finding that deliveries had been proved, in circumstances where the Respondent failed to call one Mr. Preston and the lorry drivers, attracting an adverse inference under section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950;

that there was no binding MEP Agreement between the parties, the only governing contract being the Vendor’s Agreement dated 07.06.2007;

that the Respondent was guilty of laches in delaying some two years before commencing suit;

that the LSCJ gave undue weight to computer printouts which were unsigned and only produced at trial;

that the LSCJ considered only the evidence of SP3 and SP5 and failed to consider the evidence of the Appellant’s witnesses;

that there were unexplained anomalies on the Despatch Lists — namely the inclusion of two sub-vendors (Mr. Maheswaran and Mr. Yuwaneswaran) who testified that their names ought not to appear, and the inclusion of a deceased person, Mr.

that the LSCJ failed to give weight to the Appellant’s disagreement with the unsold figures (RR Jilid C Sub-Jilid 6, p. 1553);

that the Respondent’s conduct in continuing to supply newspapers despite mounting arrears was commercially inexplicable and inconsistent with clauses 4.1 and 5.3 of the 07.06.2007 Agreement, and contravened the Sale of Goods

that no letter of demand was issued prior to the filing of the Writ. D. THE APPLICABLE STANDARD OF APPELLATE INTERVENTION [9] The threshold for appellate intervention in findings of fact made by a trial court is well-settled. In Gan Yook Chin v Lee Ing Chin @ Lee Teck Seng & Ors [2004] 4 CLJ 309, the Federal Court reaffirmed that an appellate court must not interfere with the findings of fact of the trial judge unless it can be shown that there has been "insufficient judicial appreciation of the evidence." This formulation has been reaffirmed in Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v Wendy Tan Lee Peng [2020] 12 MLJ 67 (FC) and in the authorities relied on by the Respondent: Tengku Dato’ Ibrahim Petra Tengku Indra Petra v Petra Perdana Berhad & Another Appeal [2018] 1 MLRA 263 and Tetuan Khana & Co v Saling Lau Bee Chiang & Ors [2019] MLRAU

[10] It is not enough that the appellate court might have reached a different conclusion. The Appellant must demonstrate that the LSCJ’s findings are plainly wrong, against the weight of the evidence, or vitiated by misdirection in law. It is through this lens that each ground of appeal must be examined.

Existence of a Binding Contract [11] The Appellant’s position that only the Vendor’s Agreement dated 07.06.2007 governs the parties’ dealings is, with respect, self-defeating. Whether the parties are bound by the 2007 Agreement, by the subsequent MEP arrangement, or by both, the Appellant remains contractually liable to pay for newspapers supplied. The Appellant himself admitted having signed the NSTP Vendor Appointment Proposal Form dated 09.04.2007 (Exhibit P103), the Letter of Undertaking dated 27.04.2007 (Exhibit P104), the Vendor’s Agreement dated 07.06.2007 (Exhibit P32), the Appointment Letter as MEP dated 17.10.2017 (Exhibit P106) and the Trading Terms Changes dated 01.11.2017 (Exhibit P107). [12] Even on the Appellant’s own case that no separate MEP Agreement was signed, the conduct of the parties — the continued supply, the receipt of newspapers at the drop points, the management of sub-vendors under his account, and the acceptance of the benefits of the MEP arrangement — is sufficient to bind him. This is consistent with the principles in WTK Service & Warehousing Sdn Bhd v Medan Mestika Sdn Bhd [2024] 4 MLRA 845 and Auseanlink Management Services Sdn Bhd v Teratai Sumber Sdn Bhd & Ors [2020] MLJU 718. [13] There was therefore ample basis for the LSCJ’s finding that a binding contractual relationship existed and that the Appellant was responsible for supplies made under his account, including those made to his sub-vendors. This ground of appeal fails.

(ii) Proof of Deliveries and Section 114(g) Evidence Act 1950 [14] The LSCJ found that the deliveries were established by the Despatch Lists for the period September 2017 to October 2019 (Exhibits P1 to P25 in respect of the Appellant and Exhibits P84 to P104 in respect of the sub-vendors). SP1 explained the system of delivery in PSP1 at Q&A 5 and Q&A 11, namely that supplies were made on a pre-arranged Standing Order basis to designated drop points without any requirement of physical acknowledgment of receipt. [15] The Appellant’s submission that section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 ought to have been invoked against the Respondent for not calling Mr. Preston and the lorry drivers is, with respect, misconceived. The drawing of an adverse inference under section 114(g) is not automatic: see Munusamy v Public Prosecutor [1987] 1 MLJ 492 (SC). It is displaced where the documentary evidence is sufficient to prove the fact in issue, and where reasonable efforts to procure the attendance of the witness have been made. [16] Both conditions are satisfied here. The Respondent issued subpoenas and filed an Affidavit of Non-Service. The Despatch Lists, being contemporaneous business records corroborated by the testimony of SP1, are sufficient to establish the fact of delivery. The LSCJ’s refusal to draw an adverse inference was therefore well within her judicial discretion.

(iii) The Despatch List Anomalies [17] I turn now to what is, on a generous reading of the Appellant’s case, his most substantive complaint: that two named sub-vendors (Mr. Maheswaran and Mr. Yuwaneswaran) testified at trial that their names ought not to have been included on the Despatch Lists, and that a deceased person (Mr. Basheer Rahman) was also listed. The Appellant submits that the LSCJ "side-stepped" these anomalies. [18] Having scrutinised the Grounds of Judgment, I am satisfied that the LSCJ made a finding of fact at paragraphs 29, 30, 32 and 34 of the GOJ that the deliveries were made to the Appellant and his sub-vendors in accordance with the Despatch Lists. Although the LSCJ did not deal with each specific entry on a line-by-line basis, an appellate court does not require a trial judge to do so. What is required is a sufficient judicial appreciation of the evidence taken as a whole. [19] More fundamentally, the Appellant did not, at any stage of the trial or on appeal, particularise the monetary impact of the impugned entries. He has not demonstrated that the inclusion of Mr. Maheswaran, Mr. Yuwaneswaran, or Mr. Basheer Rahman on the Despatch Lists materially affected the sum of RM353,181.77. The figure was independently corroborated by the Daily Supply & Returns reports for 2017, 2018 and 2019 (Exhibits P47, P55 and P67), the Unsolds Reports (Exhibits P26 to P30), the Monthly Statement of Supply and Unsold (Exhibit P31), the invoices (Exhibits P40(a)(b)(c) to P77(a)(b)(c)), the Monthly Statements of Accounts (Exhibits P35 to P77, P78 and P79) and the Credit Notes (Exhibits P35 to P77). [20] In the absence of any particularised challenge to the quantum, the disputed entries cannot vitiate the overall finding. This ground of appeal fails.

(iv) Computer Printouts and Section 90A of the Evidence Act 1950 [21] The Appellant’s complaint that the documents are computer printouts produced only at trial and unsigned misapprehends the statutory regime. Section 90A of the Evidence Act 1950 expressly provides that documents produced by a computer in the course of its ordinary use are admissible upon the tendering of a certificate under section 90A(2). The Certificate at Exhibit P81 was duly tendered. SP4, who is responsible for the management and daily operation of the Respondent’s computer systems, testified in PSP4 that the inputs, storage and outputs of the system cannot be altered. [22] The absence of the Appellant’s signature on the printouts is wholly immaterial. Section 90A makes no such requirement. The LSCJ was entitled to accept the printouts and to find, as she did at paragraph 57 of the GOJ, that the computer system was in good working condition in the Respondent’s daily business operations. This ground of appeal fails.

Laches and the Limitation Period [23] The plea of laches has no application where the cause of action is governed by a statutory limitation period. This is plainly stated in Halsbury’s Laws of England, Volume 16 (paragraphs 1477 and 1478), and was applied by the High Court in Manoharan Vethasalam v The New Straits Times Press (Malaysia) Berhad [2022] MLRHU 2248, a case directly involving this Respondent. [24] The Respondent’s claim is one in contract, subject to the six-year limitation period under section 6(1)(a) of the Limitation Act 1953. The claim period commences in September 2017, and the Writ was filed on 06.05.2021 — comfortably within time. The Appellant’s laches argument is legally untenable and is dismissed.

(vi) Sale of Goods Act 1957 and Commercial Implausibility [25] The Appellant submits that the Respondent’s claim contravenes the Sale of Goods Act 1957 and is commercially implausible because the Respondent, having reserved the right to cease supply under clause 4.1 of the Vendor’s Agreement, nevertheless continued to supply newspapers despite mounting arrears. [26] No specific provision of the Sale of Goods Act 1957 is identified by the Appellant. A bare invocation of a statute, without particularising the alleged breach, cannot succeed on appeal. As for the commercial argument, the Respondent’s forbearance in not exercising a contractual right to terminate or suspend supply does not extinguish its right to claim the unpaid price. The running account between the parties was at all times maintained on the basis explained by SP3 in PSP3 at Q&A 29, in which undirected payments are applied to the earliest arrears. [27] This is the orthodox legal position: see Stamford College Bhd v Seri Stamford College Sdn Bhd & Anor [2021] MLRHU 1015 and Bajaj Textiles Ltd v Gian Singh & Company Ltd [1968] 1 MLRA 557. This ground accordingly fails.

(vii) No Letter of Demand [28] The Appellant’s complaint that no letter of demand preceded the filing of the Writ is without merit. A letter of demand is not a condition precedent to a contractual claim for the price of goods supplied. The cause of action accrued upon non-payment, not upon demand. This ground fails.

(viii) Consideration of the Appellant’s Witnesses [29] The Appellant submits that the LSCJ considered only the evidence of SP3 and SP5 and failed to give due regard to his witnesses SD2, SD3 and SD4. I am unable to accept that submission. At paragraphs 41 to 50 of the GOJ, the LSCJ comprehensively considered the evidence on the accounts. Critically, the LSCJ found at paragraph 34 of the GOJ that DW4’s credibility was "much to be desired" — he was found to be an evasive witness who nevertheless admitted (i) receiving supplies at his drop point, (ii) having requested for that drop point by letter (Exhibit P105), and (iii) having placed orders with the Appellant. [30] Credibility findings are quintessentially within the province of the trial judge, who has the singular advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses. An appellate court will be exceedingly slow to interfere with such findings. This ground fails.

(ix) Payments and Reconciliation [31] The Appellant asserts that he paid fully for all newspapers sold during the claim period through Mr. Preston, and refers to receipts at pages 166 to 179A of the Record of Appeal, Jilid 1, Bahagian A & B. However, the LSCJ made a finding of fact at paragraphs 38 and 39 of the GOJ that all payments made by the Appellant — whether by direct payment, by credit note, or by deduction from the Deposit Account — had been taken into consideration and accounted for, particularly by SP3 in Exhibits P37 and P38. The LSCJ further found that the Appellant could not show any payment that had been made for which no receipt had been issued. [32] The Appellant’s pleaded case is, in substance, a bare denial. He has not, either at trial or on appeal, produced a reconciled set of accounts demonstrating that the sum of RM353,181.77 has in fact been paid. In the face of contemporaneous documents, ledgers, statements of account, credit notes, and the running account principle, a bare denial cannot prevail. [33] See Superintendent of Lands and Surveys Kuching Division v Mohamad Rambli Kawi [2014] MLRAU 275; Jardine One Solution

Sdn Bhd v Ainb Tech (M) Sdn Bhd [2011] 4 MLRH 910; and

Ladang Tai Tak (KT) Sdn Bhd v Suppiah Andy Thavar [1999] 5 MLJ This ground fails. F. CONCLUSION AND ORDER [34] Stripped of its rhetorical clothing, the Appellant’s appeal is, in substance, an invitation to this Court to retry the case on the documents — something this Court is neither equipped nor entitled to do. The LSCJ had the benefit of a full trial, heard the witnesses, considered the contemporaneous documents in detail, applied the correct burden of proof under sections 101 and 103 of the Evidence Act 1950, and reached findings of fact that are amply supported by the evidence. [35] The Appellant has not demonstrated that the LSCJ’s decision is plainly wrong, that it suffers from insufficient judicial appreciation of the evidence, or that it is vitiated by any misdirection in law. The threshold for appellate intervention is, accordingly, not crossed. [36] For the reasons set out above, the appeal of JOHN JEYABALAN A/L M. DORAIRAJ is hereby dismissed with costs. The decision of the Learned Sessions Court Judge dated 09.12.2025 is affirmed in its entirety. The Appellant shall pay costs to the Respondent, THE NEW STRAITS TIMES PRESS (MALAYSIA) BERHAD, in such sum as this Court shall assess, subject to the allocator. [37] The Court records that this appeal was significantly delayed. The hearing, ultimately fixed for 19.05.2026, proceeded only after two previous accommodations were judicially granted to the Appellant's counsel—for a conflicting court engagement when Appellant’s Counsel has to attend a Session Court for decision and subsequently for illness of Appellant’s counsel, conditional upon the production of a medical certificate. A further request for postponement was refused, as continued delay would prejudice the Court's administration of justice and the Respondent's position. It is further observed that the Appellant's written Submission was only filed on 18.05.2026. While illness is acknowledged, the overriding duty of counsel as an officer of the Court to prioritize the appeal's timely management was not sufficiently discharged by these actions. Dated 22hb June 2026 (MOHAMAD REDZUAN BIN IDRUS) JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER KUALA LUMPUR HIGH COURT NCC 5 WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN KUALA LUMPUR APPEARANCES For the Appellant/Defendant: Jeramal @ Ganesan s/o Muthu (J Ganesan Tajul Anuar & Co (Kuala Lumpur)) For the Respondent/Plaintiff: Leong Khai Yan & Lee Yin Yoong (S. Sothi, Leong & Partners (Kuala Lumpur))

Gan Yook Chin v Lee Ing Chin @ Lee Teck Seng & Ors [2004] 4 CLJ

Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v Wendy Tan Lee Peng [2020] 12 MLJ 67 (FC)

Tengku Dato’ Ibrahim Petra Tengku Indra Petra v Petra Perdana

Tetuan Khana & Co v Saling Lau Bee Chiang & Ors and Other Appeal; Malayan Banking Bhd (Intervener) [2019] MLRAU 51 5. WTK Service & Warehousing Sdn Bhd v Medan Mestika Sdn Bhd [2024] 4 MLRA 845 6. Auseanlink Management Services Sdn Bhd v Teratai Sumber Sdn Bhd & Ors [2020] MLJU 718 7. Munusamy v Public Prosecutor [1987] 1 MLJ 492 (SC)

Manoharan Vethasalam v The New Straits Times Press (Malaysia) Berhad [2022] MLRHU 2248 9. Stamford College Bhd v Seri Stamford College Sdn Bhd & Anor [2021] MLRHU 1015

Bajaj Textiles Ltd v Gian Singh & Company Ltd [1968] 1 MLRA 557

Superintendent of Lands and Surveys Kuching Division v Mohamad

Rambli Kawi [2014] MLRAU 275 Jardine One Solution (2001) Sdn Bhd v Ainb Tech (M) Sdn Bhd [2011] 4 MLRH 910

Ladang Tai Tak (KT) Sdn Bhd v Suppiah Andy Thavar [1999] 5 MLJ 257

Evidence Act 1950  Section 90A  Section 101  Section 103  Section 114(g)

Limitation Act 1953  Section 6(1)(a)

Sale of Goods Act 1957