Joshua Narendran Kulwant v 1. ) Deva Raj Sundram (WA-21NCvC-36-03/2022)

This is a claim by the Plaintiff, in his capacity as Administrator of the Estate of his late mother, Rachel Alcantara a/p Peter Alcantara (the Deceased), against the 1st Defendant, who was the Deceased's husband and the Plaintiff's stepfather.

The Plaintiff's case centers on allegations that the 1st Defendant fraudulently forged the signature of the Deceased on a Power of Attorney dated 11.7.2018 and subsequently used that Power of Attorney to transfer the Deceased's ½ share in the property known as 44, Lorong Setiajasa 1, Bukit Damansara, 50490 Kuala Lumpur, Grant No. 23188, Lot 48810, Mukim Kuala Lumpur (the Damansara Property) to himself.

On 15.7.2022 this Court allowed the 4th Defendant’s application to strike out the Plaintiff’s suit against it. So, the 4th Defendant is no longer a part of this proceeding.

Throughout the trial, the Plaintiff did not adduce any claims and evidence against the 2nd and the 3rd Defendant’s. Therefore, there is no determination against them. The Plaintiff’s Case [5] The Plaintiff's case, as pleaded and adduced in evidence, may be summarized as follows:

30.8.2012, 14.4.2014, and 14.7.2015. These police reports detailed domestic violence and the 1st Defendant's persistent attempts to force the Deceased to sign documents to transfer the Damansara Property to him.

On 23.6.2018, the Deceased was admitted to Hospital Kuala Lumpur and remained hospitalized continuously until 28.7.2018. During this hospitalization, she was diagnosed with meningoencephalitis, Grade II sacral sore (bedsores), ESBL Klebsiella urinary tract infection, and vascular dementia with BPSD. The Deceased was bedridden and required full nursing care. Kuala Lumpur High Court under Registration No: WA-SKW-32- 08/2018 on 15.8.2018 at 2:19 pm, approximately three hours after the Deceased's demise at 11:10 am on the same day. [6] The Plaintiff contends that:

The signature of the Deceased on the Power of Attorney was forged by the 1st Defendant

(ii) The Deceased never left Hospital Kuala Lumpur on 11.7.2018

(iii) The Deceased lacked the physical and mental capacity to execute any document on 11.7.2018

(iv) The Power of Attorney is invalid and defective

The transfer of the property was fraudulent pursuant to Section 340(2)(b) of the National Land Code 1965 The Defence [7] The 1st Defendant's defence, in brief, is as follows: Attorney was genuinely signed by the Deceased in front of Commissioner of Oaths, Samugam Vassoo. He claims that on 11.7.2018, he took the Deceased out of the hospital in a wheelchair, brought her to a restaurant in Bangsar, where she signed the Power of Attorney before the Commissioner of Oaths. Defendant had entered into a Settlement Agreement in the probate proceedings (BA-31NCvC-900-12/2018) whereby the Damansara Property was to be excluded from the list of assets of the Deceased's estate, and therefore the Plaintiff is estopped from bringing this claim. The Trial [8] The trial was conducted over two days. It laid bare the strained relationship of two men – once bound by the love they have for the Deceased, fighting for the property each claims is their rightful inheritance. [9] The Plaintiff testified about his mother's hospitalization, her medical condition, the police reports she had lodged against the 1st Defendant, and his discovery of the allegedly forged Power of Attorney. He maintained throughout his testimony that his mother could not have left the hospital on 11.7.2018 and was not in a condition to sign any documents. [10] The Plaintiff called PW2, a chemist from the Department of Chemistry Malaysia. She examined the questioned signatures on the Power of Attorney and compared them with specimen signatures. Her report noted differences in handwriting characteristics between the questioned signatures and the specimen signatures. During cross-examination, she acknowledged that signatures may vary over time and if the signatory was sick with a trembling hand, though her report documented distinct differences in the signatures examined. [11] The Plaintiff’s maternal aunt, the Deceased’s sister took the witness stand as PW3. She testified about the Deceased's relationship with the 1st Defendant, the history of domestic abuse, and the Deceased's medical condition. She confirmed the Deceased's hospitalization and her bedridden state. [12] PW4 is a specialist physician. She is a specialist in general medicine at Hospital Kuala Lumpur with 22 years of medical experience and 8 years as a specialist. She was authorized by the Director of Hospital Kuala Lumpur, Dato' Dr Harikrishna, to give evidence on behalf of the hospital. She testified that:

She was the doctor on duty who attended to the Deceased on 11.7.2018

(ii) The Deceased was diagnosed with meningoencephalitis, sacral sore (bedsores), ESBL Klebsiella urinary tract infection, and vascular dementia with BPSD

(iii) The Deceased was bedridden and unable to care for herself

(iv) There was no record of the Deceased leaving the hospital on 11.7.2018

There was no discharge record or permission given for the Deceased to leave the hospital on 11.7.2018

(vi) It was not possible for the Deceased to have been taken out of the hospital in a wheelchair on 11.7.2018 [13] The Defendant testified that he took the Deceased out of the hospital on 11.7.2018 in a wheelchair to a ‘mamak’ shop in Bangsar where she signed the Power of Attorney before Commissioner of Oaths Samugam Vassoo. However, his evidence was vague and inconsistent. Under cross-examination, he repeatedly used phrases like "would have" when describing events, admitted he could not remember details, and acknowledged that he was aware of the Deceased's medical conditions including dementia and meningoencephalitis. [14] Significantly, the 1st Defendant failed to call two critical witnesses:

Commissioner of Oaths Samugam Vassoo. Despite the entire case revolving around whether the Deceased genuinely signed the Power of Attorney before this Commissioner, the 1st Defendant did not subpoena or produce him as a witness. The 1st Defendant's counsel admitted in court that the subpoena was only served via WhatsApp and was not properly served.

(ii) Dr Kam Siao Yen. Although Dr Kam signed the medical report, the evidence established that he was not the attending physician. PW4 - Dr Marina Taufik, testified that Dr Kam merely signed the report but did not treat the Deceased. Nevertheless, the failure to call the maker of the medical report is noteworthy. Assessment of the Evidence [15] The key issues for determination are

Whether the Deceased’s signature on the Power of Attorney was forged

(ii) Whether the Deceased had the capacity to execute the Power of Attorney

(iii) Whether there was a binding Settlement Agreement

(iv) The appropriate reliefs and remedies A. The Burden and Standard of Proof [16] It is trite law that in civil cases involving allegations of fraud and forgery, the burden of proof lies on the party making the allegation, and the standard of proof is on the balance of probabilities. This principle has been definitively settled by the Federal Court in Sinnaiyah & Sons Sdn Bhd v Damai Setia Sdn Bhd [2015] 5 MLJ, where it was held that even for fraud in civil claims, the standard of proof is on the balance of probabilities, not beyond a reasonable doubt. [17] The Federal Court in Letchumanan Chettiar Alagappan @ L Allagappan v Secure Plantation Sdn Bhd [2017] 4 MLJ 697 reiterated that the onus of proof of any particular fact lies on the party who alleges it. In civil cases, the onus of proving the genuineness of a deed is cast upon the party who produces it and asserts its validity. [18] This principle was most recently affirmed by the Federal Court in Teoh Kiang Hong v Theow Say Kow @ Teoh Kiang Seng, Henry [2025] 1 MLJ 813, where the apex court clarified that when forgery is alleged, the party alleging forgery bears the onus of proving, on the balance of probabilities, that the signature was forged. [19] In the present case, the Plaintiff bears the burden of proving, on the balance of probabilities, that the Deceased's signature on the Power of Attorney dated 11.7.2018 was forged by the 1st Defendant. B. The Deceased’s Ability to Sign the Power of Attorney on 11.7.2018 [20] This is the critical issue in this case. This Court assesses the medical evidence where it finds that there is overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence that concludes the Deceased was in no state to sign the Power of Attorney on 11.7.2018. [21] In arriving at this conclusion, evidence that she was admitted to Hospital Kuala Lumpur on 23.6.2018 and remained hospitalised continuously until 28.7.2018, is regarded. The 1st Defendant admitted to this fact. [22] According to the medical report and the testimony of PW4, the Deceased was diagnosed with

Meningoencephalitis: A serious brain infection causing inflammation of the brain and surrounding membranes, characterized by confusion, reduced consciousness, seizures, and potential coma

Vascular Dementia with BPSD: A condition affecting cognitive function and behaviour

Grade II Sacral Sore (Bedsores): Indicating the deceased was bedridden and immobile

ESBL Klebsiella Urinary Tract Infection: A bacterial infection [23] PW4 testimony was clear, authoritative, and unshaken during cross-examination. She categorically stated that:

The Deceased was under her care on 11.7.2018

(ii) The Deceased never left the hospital on 11.7.2018

(iii) There was no discharge record for 11.7.2018

(iv) There was no permission given for anyone to take the Deceased out of the hospital

It was not possible for the Deceased to have been taken out in a wheelchair on 11.7.2018 [24] In her own words “Ini tidak terjadi, kerana sepanjang waktu sejak masuk ke wad sehingga discaj pada 28hb Julai, dia berada di hospital di dalam wad sepanjang masa. Kita tak benarkan keluar sehingga kita discaj.” [25] What is pertinent is the evidence of the Deceased’s physical state – PW4 testified that the Deceased was not able to walk even to the bathroom. PW4’s evidence is that "Dia sejak masuk ke wad, dia dalam keadaan terbaring. Dia tak dapat berjalan ke tandas dan sebagainya, dan dia memerlukan - … memerlukan pertolongan untuk penjagaan dirinya.” [26] In her explanation that the Defendant could not be wheeled away on a wheelchair was because “Tapi di dalam wad, dia terlantar. Dia tidak boleh duduk di wheelchair.” [27] I find PW4 to be a credible and truthful witness. She was properly authorized by the Director of Hospital Kuala Lumpur to give evidence on behalf of the hospital. Her testimony was based on her direct knowledge as the attending physician on the material date. The 1st Defendant did not challenge her authority or her testimony during cross-examination in any meaningful way. [28] The 1st Defendant himself, during cross-examination, admitted awareness of the Deceased's medical condition, specifically mentioning dementia and meningoencephalitis. This boosted the medical facts testified to by PW4. [29] The hospital records and medical report show no discharge or absence from the hospital on 11.7.2018. The Deceased remained in the ward continuously from 23.6.2018 until her discharge on 28.7.2018. This documentary evidence corroborates PW4's testimony. [30] If the Deceased had indeed been taken out of the hospital as claimed by the 1st Defendant, there would necessarily be some record or notation of such an event. The complete absence of any such record strongly militates against the 1st Defendant's version of events. [31] This Court finds the 1st Defendant's testimony regarding taking the Deceased out of the hospital to be vague, inconsistent, and wholly unconvincing. [32] The 1st Defendant claimed he lifted the Deceased from her hospital bed into a wheelchair and took her to a mamak shop in Bangsar. However, his testimony lacked credibility for several reasons. The first is that he repeatedly used conditional language such as "would have" when describing allegedly actual events, even after being corrected by this Court. This suggests uncertainty or fabrication rather than recollection of actual events. [33] Second, he could not remember basic details about this allegedly significant event, including how he transported the Deceased back to the hospital, the exact location of the mamak shop, or specific details of the wheelchair transfer. When pressed on these details, his responses were evasive. [34] Third, the physical logistics of his claimed actions are highly improbable. According to the undisputed medical evidence, the Deceased was bedridden with sacral sores, suffering from brain inflammation and dementia, and requiring full nursing care. The notion that the 1st Defendant could single-handedly lift her into a wheelchair, transport her out of the hospital without any hospital staff noticing or recording the departure, bring her to Bangsar, kept her at a mamak shop while drafting legal documents, and then return her to the hospital undetected, all during lunch hour, is highly improbable and inconsistent with the medical evidence. [35] Fourth, and most significantly, the 1st Defendant's account is directly contradicted by PW4’s categorical testimony that the Deceased never left the hospital on 11.7.2018 and that there was no record of any such departure. [36] Hence, this Court finds that the 1st Defendant has failed to provide credible evidence that he took the deceased out of the hospital on 11.7.2018. C. The Power of Attorney [37] PW2, the handwriting expert from the Department of Chemistry Malaysia, examined the questioned signatures on the Power of Attorney and compared them with specimen signatures. Her report noted "some differences" in handwriting characteristics between the questioned signatures and the specimen signatures. [38] The 1st Defendant argues that the expert's report was inconclusive and that PW2 herself acknowledged that signatures may vary over time and if the signatory was sick. [39] While it is true that the expert did not make a conclusive finding of forgery, this does not assist the 1st Defendant. As held by the Supreme Court in United Asian Bank Bhd v Tai Soon Heng Construction Sdn Bhd [1993] 1 MLJ 182, forgery is a question of fact for the trial court to determine after considering the credibility of witnesses and any expert evidence. The trial judge is not entitled to abdicate his function by allowing the expert to determine the question. [40] Moreover, as stated in Dr Shanmuganathan v Periasamy S/O Sithambaram Pillai [1997] 3 MLJ 61, expert opinion evidence is admissible and need not be corroborated. The expert's testimony about the differences in the signatures, when considered together with all the other evidence, contributes to the overall picture of the case. [41] The significance of the handwriting evidence lies not in any conclusive finding of forgery by the expert, but in the documented differences in the signatures, which must be evaluated in the context of all the evidence. Given that the Deceased was suffering from meningoencephalitis and vascular dementia, which would have affected her motor control and cognitive function, and given that PW4 testified the Deceased never left the hospital, the differences in the signatures take on greater significance. [42] While PW2's report did not conclusively find forgery, the documented differences in signatures, when evaluated cumulatively with the medical evidence and the 1st Defendant's failure to call material witness(es), contribute significantly to the finding of forgery. See Aik Ming [43] The attestation clause on the Power of Attorney reveals a fundamental defect that cannot be overlooked. The attestation by Commissioner of Oaths Samugam Vassoo states: "for according to information given to me by trust-worthy and respectable persons, namely Deva Raj Sundram (Nric 610802-08-5519) of which information I verily believe,} the true signature of Deva Raj Sundram". [44] This attestation clause is fatally flawed. A Commissioner of Oaths attesting to a Power of Attorney must attest that he witnessed the donor's signature (in this case, Rachel Alcantara – the Deceased), not the donee's signature. The entire purpose of the Commissioner of Oaths’ attestation is to verify that the donor appeared before him and signed the document. [45] Instead, the attestation clause explicitly states that the Commissioner of Oaths witnessed "the true signature of Deva Raj Sundram" - the donee, not the donor. This is a fundamental defect that renders the attestation meaningless for its intended purpose of verifying the deceased's signature. [46] Moreover, the attestation clause states that the Commissioner of Oaths acted "according to information given to me by trust-worthy and respectable persons, namely Deva Raj Sundram". This indicates that the Commissioner of Oaths did not personally witness the Deceased signing, but relied on information provided by the 1st Defendant himself - the very person who benefited from the Power of Attorney. [47] A proper attestation should unequivocally state that the Commissioner of Oaths witnessed the donor (the Deceased) signing the document in his presence. The failure to do so raises serious questions about whether the Deceased ever appeared before the Commissioner of Oaths at all. [48] The 1st Defendant's failure to call the Commissioner of Oaths as a witness is fatal to his case. The entire defence rests on the proposition that the Deceased appeared before the Commissioner of Oaths and signed the Power of Attorney in his presence. The Commissioner of Oaths is the only independent witness who could have corroborated the 1st Defendant's version of events. [49] During the trial, the 1st Defendant's counsel admitted that attempts to subpoena the Commissioner of Oaths were inadequate, stating that service was only attempted via WhatsApp. No affidavit of service was filed, and no proper service was effected. [50] Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 provides that this Court may presume that evidence which could be and is not produced would, if produced, be unfavourable to the person who withholds it. The principle of adverse inference for failure to call material witnesses is well-established. In Jaafar Bin Shaari & Anor v Tan Lip Eng & Anor [1997] 3 MLJ 693, the Supreme Court held that an adverse inference ought to be drawn for the failure to call important witnesses when the circumstances appropriately call for such an adverse inference. [51] In the present case, the circumstances overwhelmingly call for an adverse inference to be drawn against the 1st Defendant. The Commissioner of Oaths is not merely a material witness - he is the only witness who could have independently verified whether the Deceased appeared before him and signed the Power of Attorney. His absence from the witness box is highly significant. [52] This Court draws an adverse inference against the 1st Defendant for his failure to call a Commissioner of Oaths. This Court finds that if the Commissioner of Oaths had been called to testify, his evidence would have been unfavourable to the 1st Defendant and would have confirmed that the Deceased never appeared before him. [53] An additional circumstantial fact that supports the Plaintiff's case is that the Power of Attorney was registered at the Kuala Lumpur High Court at 2:19pm on 15.8.2018, approximately three hours after the Deceased passed away at 11:10am on the same day. [54] During cross-examination, the Plaintiff could not recall when he informed the 1st Defendant of the Deceased's death. While this does not conclusively prove that the 1st Defendant knew of the death before registering the Power of Attorney, the timing is suspicious and adds to the cumulative weight of evidence against the 1st Defendant. [55] A person acting in good faith, having lawfully obtained a valid Power of Attorney, would not typically rush to register it within hours of the donor's death. The haste with which the Power of Attorney was registered suggests an awareness of its questionable validity and a desire to formalize it before questions could be raised. D. Deceased’s Relationship with the 1st Defendant [56] There is evidence of some semblance of a fractured relationship between the Deceased and the 1st Defendant. The Deceased had lodged five police reports between 2010 and 2015, documenting a pattern of conduct by the 1st Defendant: • 29.11.2010: The 1st Defendant forced the Deceased to sign a will and transfer all her property to him • 24.7.2012: Domestic abuse and threats to chase the Deceased out of the property • 30.8.2012: Being chased out of the property • 14.4.2014: Abusive behaviour • 14.7.2015: The 1st Defendant was trying to force the Deceased to sign documents relating to the property and threatening her [57] The admissibility of similar fact evidence in civil cases is governed by Section 15 of the Evidence Act 1950, which provides that when there is a question whether an act was accidental or intentional, the fact that the act formed part of a series of similar occurrences is relevant. [58] As held by the Court of Appeal in Mahmood Bin Ooyub v Li Chee Loong and Another [2020] 6 MLJ 755, citing Mood Music Publishing Co Ltd v De Wolfe Publishing Ltd [1976] Ch 119 from the English Court of Appeal: "In civil cases the courts will admit evidence of similar facts if it is logically probative, that is, if it is logically relevant in determining the matter which is in issue: provided that it is not oppressive or unfair to the other side and also that the other side has fair notice of it and is able to deal with it." [59] The police reports establish a clear pattern of the 1st Defendant attempting to force/compel the Deceased to transfer property to him over many years. This pattern is logically relevant in determining whether the alleged signature on the Power of Attorney dated 11.7.2018 was genuine or forged. [60] The similarities are striking. The 1st Defendant had been trying to obtain the property since 2010 through various means including threats, abuse, and attempts to make the Deceased sign documents. When those attempts failed, a Power of Attorney suddenly materializes in 2018 when the Deceased was hospitalized, seriously ill, bedridden, and unable to resist or even be aware of her surroundings. [61] The 1st Defendant did not challenge the contents of any of these police reports, nor did he lodge any counter-reports disputing the deceased's allegations when he became aware of them through the Writ and Statement of Claim filed and served on him by the Plaintiff. His silence in the face of these serious allegations is telling. [62] This Court finds that the police reports constitute admissible similar fact evidence that is logically probative of the 1st Defendant's intent and pattern of conduct regarding the Damansara Property. This evidence supports the inference that the 1st Defendant forged the Deceased's signature on the Power of Attorney when the opportunity presented itself during her final hospitalization. E. The Settlement Agreement [63] The 1st Defendant pleads that the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant entered into a Settlement Agreement in the probate proceedings whereby the Damansara Property was to be excluded from the estate, and therefore the Plaintiff is estopped from bringing this claim. [64] During cross-examination, the 1st Defendant was asked directly whether he signed a settlement agreement with the Plaintiff as signatory. He answered in the negative. This admission is fatal to the defence of settlement and estoppel. [65] The Plaintiff was referred to a letter dated 21.3.2019 from his then-solicitors Messrs. NK Mila to the 2nd Defendant (the law firm). The Plaintiff confirmed that he instructed that the letter be sent. However, the Plaintiff explained that he never agreed to relinquish his rights to his mother's ½ share, but rather was proposing terms for settlement that were never formalized. [66] A settlement agreement requires mutual agreement and, typically, formal execution. The 1st Defendant himself admitted there was no signed settlement agreement between the parties. At best, some discussions and proposals were never finalized. [67] Even assuming discussions occurred, no concluded agreement was established. The 1st Defendant's own admission that no signed settlement agreement existed is fatal to this defence [68] Moreover, even if there had been a settlement, such a settlement would be voidable if procured through fraud. As held by the Court of Appeal in Puncak Alam Housing Sdn Bhd v Menta Construction Sdn Bhd & Anor [2014] 1 MLJ 287, a settlement agreement cannot be used to shield fraudulent conduct. If the Power of Attorney was indeed forged, any settlement discussions premised on its validity would be tainted by that fraud. [69] This Court finds that there was no binding Settlement Agreement between the parties, and even if there were negotiations toward settlement, the Plaintiff is not estopped from pursuing this claim given the fundamental allegation of forgery and fraud. F. Lack of Consideration [70] Other matters taken into account by this Court includes Section 6 of the Powers of Attorney Act 1949 provides that a Power of Attorney can only be irrevocable if it is given "for valuable consideration" and is expressly stated to be irrevocable in the instrument. [71] The Power of Attorney in question does not state that it is irrevocable. During cross-examination, the 1st Defendant was specifically asked about valuable consideration and confirmed that there was no consideration stated in the Power of Attorney. The 1st Defendant attempted to argue that "love and affection" between husband and wife constitutes valuable consideration. However, the Power of Attorney makes no mention of love and affection as consideration. [72] The transfer form (14A) refers to "balasan kasih sayang" (love and affection), but this appears in a document prepared by the 1st Defendant after the purported execution of the Power of Attorney, not in the Power of Attorney itself. [73] Even if love and affection could constitute consideration in appropriate circumstances, there is cogent and undisputed evidence before this Court that not only did love and affection not exist between the Deceased and the 1st Defendant at the material time, but that the 1st Defendant had completely abandoned the Deceased when she became medically incapacitated. [74] The Deceased was forced to leave the Damansara Property due to the 1st Defendant's abuse. PW1 testified that the 1st Defendant "chased her out of the Damansara house" and that "she was told to get out of the house over several occasions." She lived alone in rented apartments, struggling with severe health problems. [75] When the Deceased became seriously ill and required nursing care, it was PW1 (her son) who arranged and paid for her placement in nursing homes, first at St. Mary's and then at Mentalink. The 1st Defendant contributed nothing financially. [76] PW1 testified unequivocally: "Defendant did not pay a single cent towards her medication, towards her hospitalisation nor her upkeep nor her rental and everything else subsequently even past the funeral." This evidence was not challenged by the 1st Defendant. [77] When the Deceased was in the nursing home, the 1st Defendant never visited her. When the care at Mentalink proved inadequate, PW1 had to rescue his mother to take her to hospital. PW1 personally arranged for the Deceased's daily needs, including paying an eatery on a weekly basis to provide her food, taking her to the pharmacy for medications, and ensuring she had everything she needed. The 1st Defendant provided none of this care or support. [78] The most revealing aspect is when the Deceased was admitted to Hospital Kuala Lumpur from 23.6.2018 to 28.7.2018 - a period of more than one month during which she was gravely ill with meningoencephalitis, dementia, and bedsores - the 1st Defendant had not visited her. [79] Even at the Deceased's funeral, the 1st Defendant attended only the memorial service but did not attend the cremation at Cheras Crematorium, showing a lack of respect even in death, or rather the love and affection. [80] This is not a picture of love and affection. This is a picture of complete abandonment. The 1st Defendant left his gravely ill wife to fend for herself, forced her out of the marital home, contributed nothing to her care, never visited her during her final illness, and allowed her son to bear the entire burden - financial and emotional - of caring for her. [81] The evidence reveals a significant contradiction. The 1st Defendant claims "love and affection" justified the Power of Attorney, yet he showed no love or affection when the Deceased desperately needed care. He was absent during her suffering but suddenly appeared with a Power of Attorney - purportedly executed while she lay bedridden in hospital on 11.7.2018, a date when PW4 testified categorically that the Deceased never left the hospital. [82] The police reports document years of abuse, threats, and coercion from 2010 to 2015. PW3 testified about the Deceased being in an abusive relationship with the 1st Defendant. PW1 described his mother as suffering from what "would be called as a Stockholm syndrome where that she would leave and then she will be coaxed or persuaded to come back and things will be back to normal for a while. And then again, the abuse starts all over again." [83] When considered against the totality of the evidence - the history of abuse documented in police reports, the pattern of domestic violence, the 1st Defendant's complete abandonment of the deceased during her final illness, his failure to contribute financially or emotionally to her care, and his absence from her hospital bedside during her month-long final hospitalization - the claim that this Power of Attorney was executed out of "love and affection" is not merely unsupported by the evidence. It is contradicted by every fact in this case. [84] This Court finds that the Power of Attorney lacks the necessary valuable consideration to be irrevocable under Section 6 of the Powers of Attorney Act 1949. More fundamentally, this Court finds that there was no love and affection between the Deceased and the 1st Defendant that could constitute consideration. [85] The police reports are admissible under Section 15 of the Evidence Act 1950 as similar fact evidence, being logically probative of the 1st Defendant's intent and pattern of conduct. The relationship was characterized by abuse, coercion, abandonment, and neglect - the antithesis of love and affection. Conclusion [86] Having carefully considered all the evidence, both oral and documentary, and having assessed the credibility of the witnesses, This Court is satisfied that the Plaintiff has proven, on the balance of probabilities, that the Deceased's signature on the Power of Attorney dated 11.7.2018 was forged by the 1st Defendant. [87] This Court’s findings are based on the cumulative considerations of the evidence iterated above. Each of these factors, standing alone, would raise serious doubts about the genuineness of the Power of Attorney. Taken together cumulatively, they establish forgery on the balance of probabilities. [88] The principle established in Teoh Kiang Hong v Theow Say Kow @ Teoh Kiang Seng, Henry (supra) is instructive. The Federal Court emphasized that the burden of proving forgery lies with the party alleging it, and that burden must be discharged on the balance of probabilities. However, once a prima facie case is established, the evidential burden shifts to the party asserting the document's validity. [89] In the present case, this Court finds that the Plaintiff has established a prima facie case of forgery. The evidential burden then shifted to the 1st Defendant to prove that the Deceased did indeed sign the Power of Attorney. The 1st Defendant has comprehensively failed to discharge that burden. His evidence was unconvincing, he failed to call crucial witnesses, and his version of events is contradicted by credible medical evidence. [90] In summary, this Court makes the following findings of fact: Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant that would estop the Plaintiff from bringing this claim. Property to the 1st Defendant was fraudulent and illegal. Section 340 National Land Code 1965 [91] Section 340(2)(b) of the National Land Code 1965 (NLC) provides: "The title of any person under a registry title to land or to any interest in land which has been obtained by forgery or fraud has been obtained from a person purporting to be the proprietor but who in fact had no title to the land or interest shall be void as against any person deprived of any land or interest through the forgery, fraud or misdescription." [92] Section 340(3) NLC empowers this Court to declare void any instrument or dealing obtained through fraud or forgery and to make such consequential orders as it thinks fit to give effect to its declaration. [93] Here, the Power of Attorney was obtained through forgery. The subsequent transfer of the Deceased's ½ share in the Damansara Property to the 1st Defendant, being based on the forged Power of Attorney, was fraudulently obtained. This falls squarely within Section 340(2)(b). [94] The Plaintiff, as Administrator of the Deceased's estate and as beneficiary under the Deceased's will, has been deprived of the deceased's ½ share in the Damansara Property through the 1st Defendant's forgery and fraud. [95] Pursuant to Section 340(3) NLC, this Court has the power to declare the Power of Attorney and the subsequent transfer void, and to make consequential orders to restore the property to the estate. [96] The Plaintiff has proven that the 1st Defendant fraudulently transferred the Deceased's property and has been in possession and control of the Damansara Property since January 2019. The Plaintiff has further established that the Damansara Property has been rented out for RM5,000 per month to a Mr Collin Benedict Lourdes. The Plaintiff conservatively claims rental of RM3,000 per month from 9.7.2019 (the date of transfer) until full payment and settlement. [97] Exemplary damages are appropriate in cases where the conduct of the wrongdoer has been outrageous, involving malice, fraud, cruelty, or insolence. As stated in the authorities cited, the purpose of exemplary damages is to punish the wrongdoer. See Bell v The Midland Railway Company [1861] 1 B & S 850; 121 ER 978. [98] This Court rules that the 1st Defendant's conduct warrants exemplary damages. He forged his dying wife's signature while she lay bedridden and suffering in the hospital. He then rushed to register the forged document within hours of her death. His conduct displayed fraud, cruelty, and a calculated scheme to deprive the deceased's son of his inheritance. The police reports establish that this was the culmination of years of abuse and attempts to coerce the deceased into transferring her property. [99] The 1st Defendant's conduct involves fraud, calculated deception, and cruelty towards a vulnerable, bedridden person. This egregious conduct, involving forgery during the Deceased's final hospitalization followed by immediate registration after her death, warrants punishment through exemplary damages. [100] The Plaintiff claims exemplary damages assessed at 20% of the rental collected, amounting to RM42,000.00. This is a reasonable and modest claim given the egregious nature of the 1st Defendant's conduct. This Court allows this claim for exemplary damages. See Lembaga Kemajuan Tanah Persekutuan (Felda) & Anor v Awang Soh Bin Mamat & Ors [2009] 4 MLJ 610. [101] Judgment is accordingly entered in favour of the Plaintiff against the 1st Defendant. This Court’s Orders [102] The following are the orders of this Court:

It is hereby declared that the Power of Attorney dated 11.7.2018, registered at the High Court of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur under Registration No: WA-SKW-32-08/2018 on 15.8.2018, is invalid, null, and void.

(ii) It is hereby declared that the transfer of ownership of the ½ share in the property known as 44, Lorong Setiajasa 1, Bukit Damansara, 50490 Kuala Lumpur, Grant No. 23188, Lot 48810, Mukim Kuala Lumpur, from Rachel Alcantara a/p Peter Alcantara (the Deceased) to the 1st Defendant (vide Form 14A) is invalid, null, and void.

(iii) The Registrar of the High Court of Kuala Lumpur is hereby ordered and directed to sign the transfer of ownership form (Form 14A) for the ½ share in the said property from the name of the 1st Defendant back to the Estate of Rachel Alcantara a/p Peter Alcantara or as the Plaintiff, being the Administrator, directs.

(iv) The 1st Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff the sum of RM3,000.00 per month as rental value of the Damansara Property from 9.7.2019 until the date of transfer back to the estate is completed.

The 1st Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff exemplary damages in the sum of RM42,000.00.

(vi) Interest at the rate of 5% per annum on the rental sum (Order 4 above) from 9.7.2019 until full settlement.

(vii) The 1st Defendant shall pay the Plaintiff's costs of this civil suit in the sum of RM50,000, subject to allocator.

(viii) Liberty is given to the Plaintiff to apply for further directions or consequential orders as may be necessary to give effect to this judgment. DATED 27 OCTOBER 2025 ROZ MAWAR ROZAIN JUDGE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA KUALA LUMPUR For the Plaintiff: Vijay Edward Kumar Thangaraju & Co. (Kuala Lumpur) For the 1st Defendant: R.Thayakugan together Leong Zheng Yang Othman Hashim & Co. (Kuala Lumpur)