Jr Joint Resources Holdings Sdn Bhd v Jalaludin Bin Sulaiman (JA-29NCC-765-08/2024)

These are two appeals by the Judgment Creditor (“JC”) against the decision of the Senior Assistant Registrar (“SAR”) dated 7.11.2025, whereby the SAR –

(a) allowed the Judgment Debtor’s (“JD”) application to set aside the Bankruptcy Notice dated 20.8.2024 and the Creditor’s Petition dated 23.4.2025 (Enclosure 33); and

(b) dismissed the JC’s application to amend the Creditor’s Petition (Enclosure 50).

The underlying debt arises from a judgment dated 21.8.2018 in Suits JA-22NCVC-25, 26 and 27-02/2016 for the sum of RM4,150,658.00.

Having considered the written submissions of both parties, the oral submissions made before me, and the SAR’s Grounds of Decision (Enclosure 69), I set out my findings below.

The JD raised a preliminary objection that both Notices of Appeal (Enclosures 62 and 63) were filed without the advocate’s signature. The JC responded that the Notices were digitally signed in accordance with section 62(2)(b) of the Digital Signatures Act 1997, that Order 63A rule 8 of the Rules of Court 2012 deems any signature requirement satisfied where a document is properly e-filed and that in any event the Court of Appeal in Jagdis Singh a/l Banta Singh v Outlet Rank (M) Sdn Bhd [2013] 4 MLJ 213 declined to strike out an appeal on a similar ground. Without finally determining the question, I am satisfied that no substantive prejudice arises and that the appeals are better disposed of on their merits. I therefore decline to give effect to the preliminary objection.

On an appeal from the Registrar to the Judge in Chambers, the Judge hears the matter afresh and exercises a discretion of his own, though due weight should be given to the Registrar’s decision. Where the Registrar has made findings of fact based on documentary evidence, those findings are entitled to respect unless shown to be plainly wrong. Enclosure 63 : Appeal Against Refusal Of Amendment (Enclosure 50)

It is convenient to deal with this appeal first as it is interconnected with the setting-aside application. 4 7. The JC sought to amend the Creditor’s Petition to correct two dates –

(a) the date of substituted service from 25.2.2025 to 27.2.2025; and

(b) the date of the act of bankruptcy from 4.3.2025 to 11.3.2025. The JC characterised these as typographical errors.

The JC relied on Section 93(3) of the Insolvency Act 1967 [Act 360] and Section 131 thereof, as well as Azman bin Jufri v Medtronic Australasia Pty Ltd [2015] 6 MLJ 841 and Re Liow Fong Mooi, ex p Malayan Banking Bhd [2000] 6 CLJ 63.

The JD resisted, arguing that the errors were not typographical but substantive, going to the factual foundation of the proceedings. The JD relied by analogy on the Federal Court's observation in Jayaganesan a/l Ramakrishnan v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [2019] 6 MLJ 697, where, although in a different statutory context, the Federal Court expressed scepticism about a "typo story" involving specific wrong dates that were several months removed from any plausibly mistyped reference point.

I agree with the SAR's finding. The cases cited by the JC are distinguishable on a principled basis. In Azman bin Jufri, the date amendment (from 30 May 2013 to 28 May 2013) and in Re Liow Fong Mooi, the amendment to correct the act of bankruptcy computation, both involved errors that did not affect the court's bankruptcy jurisdiction. In each case the Creditor's Petition had been filed well outside the seven-day period under Section 3(1)(i) of the Insolvency Act 1967 [Act 360] on any version of the dates. The amendment in those cases was, in substance, a correction of the record of an undisputed underlying fact. Here, by contrast, the error involves the date of substituted service itself, a foundational fact that determines when the act of bankruptcy was committed, and which is actively contested between the parties.

Furthermore, the Affidavit of Service (Enclosure 23) affirmed by Jowyn Saw on 12.3.2025 positively stated that posting was effected on 25.2.2025. The Creditor’s Petition (Enclosure 24), verified by Dato’ Sri Aminul Islam bin Abdul Nor and witnessed by Jowyn Saw, repeated this date. It was only after the JD challenged the service in Enclosure 33, producing the Taman Redang guardhouse visitor log showing no visit on 25.2.2025, that the JC filed corrective affidavits (Enclosures 41 and 42) some five months later and without leave of court.

In my judgment, the SAR was right to view this sequence with scepticism. While the Jayaganesan observation was made in a different statutory context, the underlying common-sense point applies here. Specific wrong dates of the kind appearing in Enclosure 23 are not naturally explained by mere mistyping. The correction was plainly an afterthought to remedy a substantive defect exposed by the

This distinction is reinforced by the operation of Section 131 of Act 360 itself. Section 131 of Act 360 preserves proceedings from invalidation by "formal defect or irregularity" unless substantial injustice results. However, the defect here is not merely formal. The date of service determines when the seven-day period under Section 3(1)(i) of Act 360 begins to run, which in turn determines the date of the act of bankruptcy and the court's jurisdiction. An error in these foundational facts goes to substance, not form and falls outside the curative ambit of Section 131.

Learned counsel for the JC argued that the SAR erred in disregarding the Affidavit of Service affirmed by the process server Mohd Idrus bin Kadir on 15.8.2025 (Enclosure 42). It was submitted that Enclosure 42 was filed in reply to the JD’s Affidavit in Reply (Enclosure 40), which had raised new matters and adduced additional evidence including the Taman Redang visitor log. The JC contended that Enclosure 42 confirmed that service was in fact carried out in accordance with the Order for Substituted Service.

Learned counsel for the JD responded that Enclosure 42 was only filed after the JD had raised the service irregularity and that its purpose was to rectify the deficiencies in the original Affidavit of Service. The JC's position was that Enclosure 42 contained photographic evidence demonstrating that the posting was effected at No. 11 Jalan Redang 1/4 and that the contrary entry in the guardhouse log (recording "Jalan Redang 1/5") was not determinative. While I have noted the substance of what Enclosure 42 sought to show, the SAR addressed this issue at paragraphs 4 to 6 of the Grounds of Decision, finding that both Enclosures 41 and 42 were filed without leave of court, outside the time prescribed for affidavit evidence and constituted an attempt to correct substantive factual defects after the matter had been exposed. I agree with the SAR's reasoning at paragraph 6 of the Grounds of Decision that once affidavit evidence is deemed closed and submissions have been filed, no further affidavit evidence should be admitted. The JD also raised the natural-justice point that Enclosures 41 and 42 were filed and relied upon without prior notice or service on his solicitors, which was first known to him only on reading the JC's submissions. In those circumstances I find that the SAR was not wrong to decline to place weight on Enclosure 42.

Accordingly, I find no reason to interfere with the SAR’s exercise of discretion in refusing the amendment. Enclosure 62 : Appeal Against Setting Aside (Enclosure 33)

(a) substituted service

The SAR’s primary ground for setting aside the Bankruptcy Notice and Creditor’s Petition was the defective substituted service. I have already found above that the amendment to correct the service date was properly refused. The consequence is that the Creditor’s Petition, as it stands, states the date of substituted service as 25.2.2025.

The SAR found, based on the visitor log at the Taman Redang guardhouse (Exhibit JS-5 in Enclosure 40), that the process server Mohd Idrus bin Kadir did not attend the JD’s premises on 25.2.2025. This is a finding of fact supported by documentary evidence. The JC has not shown it to be plainly wrong.

Even accepting the JC’s case that posting was done on 27.2.2025, the JD adduced evidence that the process server went to No. 11 Jalan Redang 1/5 rather than No. 11 Jalan Redang 1/4 (the JD’s address). This further undermines the efficacy of the service.

The JC relied on the Federal Court’s decision of Kamaruddin bin Mohamed v United Motor Works (M) Sdn Bhd [1982] 1 MLJ 126 for the proposition that non-compliance with one mode of substituted service does not void the entire service, particularly where the bankruptcy notice came to the JD’s knowledge. However, that case is distinguishable. In Kamaruddin, the Federal Court found that the bankruptcy notice had in fact come to the debtor’s actual knowledge, as confirmed by the debtor’s own affidavit. Here, the JD denies any knowledge of the Bankruptcy Notice until informed by his solicitors on 12.6.2025. There is no evidence of actual knowledge.

In the circumstances, I agree with the SAR that the substituted service of the Bankruptcy Notice was not properly effected, rendering the act of bankruptcy uncertain and the Creditor’s Petition unsustainable.

(b) Joint Liability

The JC argued that by virtue of Section 44(1) of the Contracts Act 1950 [Act 136] and the Federal Court decision in Lembaga Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja v. Edwin Cassian Nagappan [2021] 7 CLJ 823, the JD is liable for the full judgment sum of RM4,150,658.00 even though the judgment was entered in respect of three separate suits.

The JD countered that the three suits were never consolidated but only heard together, each with separate parties, pleadings and Sale and Purchase Agreements. The JD was the 1st Defendant only in Suit 27. The 1st Defendant in Suits 25 and 26 was Technochase Sdn Bhd. The JD argued there was no “joint promise” to engage Section 44(1) of Act 136. I observe that the JC's written submissions repeatedly describe the three suits as "consolidated". That description is inaccurate. The Court's order dated 16.02.2017 directed only that the three suits be "didengar bersama" (heard together). The suits were not consolidated as a matter of law. Each retained its own cause number, parties, pleadings and underlying Sale and Purchase Agreement. The JC's joint-liability argument rests in part on its erroneous characterisation of the procedural posture of the suits, which is a further reason why the question of the proper scope of the sealed judgment is one best resolved by the original trial court.

I find that this issue involves a genuine question as to the scope and interpretation of the sealed judgment vis-à-vis the Nota Prosiding dated 21.8.2018. The SAR noted (at paragraph 21 of the Grounds of Decision) that while the JC’s position on joint liability had merit, the matter was better resolved by the original trial judge, as the Bankruptcy Court should not go behind the judgment.

I agree with the SAR's approach. This issue does not need to be finally determined in these proceedings, given that the appeals are to be dismissed on the service ground. I would, however, make three observations.

First, the JD's position is not merely that the scope of joint liability is unclear, but that the Nota Prosiding dated 21.8.2018 records the original trial judge as having ordered the Defendan Pertama in Suit 25 (Technochase Sdn Bhd) to pay the judgment sum, while the personal claim against the JD was, on his case, dismissed. If that reading of the Nota Prosiding is correct, the discrepancy goes not merely to the scope of liability but to whether the JD is, on the underlying record, liable at all. That is a matter the original court is better placed to determine, and it is not appropriate for the Bankruptcy Court to resolve.

Secondly, the JD relied on Sumathy a/p Subramaniam v Subramaniam a/l Gunasegaran and another appeal [2017] 6 MLJ 753 for the proposition that the court cannot insert the feature of "joint and several" liability into a judgment where the original judgment did not so provide. The principle in Sumathy a/p Subraman was not displaced by Lembaga Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja in respect of judgments that fall outside any statutory regime imposing such liability. Lembaga Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja itself arose against a clear statutory backdrop, namely section 46 of the Employees Provident Fund Act 1991 [Act 452], which expressly imposes joint and several liability on company directors. That statutory feature is absent here, where the underlying obligations arise from three separate Sale and Purchase Agreements between different parties to which different defendants were party. Whether section 44(1) of Act 136 produces the same outcome on these facts, in the face of a judgment that may not have so provided, is not a settled question and is one that the original trial court is better placed to determine.

Thirdly, although the Bankruptcy Court will not ordinarily go behind a judgment. [See : Sovereign General Insurance Sdn Bhd v Koh Tian Bee [1988] 1 MLJ 304], it is well recognised that bankruptcy is not a process for the enforcement of debts that are bona fide disputed on substantial grounds. Given that I have already found the petition fails on service, it is unnecessary to determine whether that exception is engaged here. I leave the point open, subject only to the observation that the discrepancy on the record is one of substance and is properly a matter for the original court.

(c) Finality of the Judgment

On the question of whether the judgment is "final" for the purposes of Section 3(1)(i) of Act 360, I accept the JC's submission that a judgment remains final in form notwithstanding a pending amendment application, in accordance with Re Aisha Zainab Mahmud-Fairbairn; ex p Ian Benjamin Fraser & Ors [1999] 1 MLJ 644 and Bozson v Altrincham Urban District Council [1903] 1 KB 547 - the Bozson test. A pending amendment does not operate as a stay. The question of finality, however, is distinct from the question discussed at paragraph 25 above, namely whether the judgment, properly construed, imposes liability on this JD for the full sum claimed. The latter is a matter of construction and scope, on which there is a genuine dispute requiring clarification by the original court. In any event, neither question assists the JC, as the appeals fail on the service issue.

(d) Rule 90(1) of the Insolvency Rules 2017

Given my findings above, it is unnecessary to make a definitive ruling on the alleged non-compliance with Rule 90(1) of the Insolvency Rules 2017. I note that the JC defended the point on two principal grounds. First, that the Deputy Registrar's issue of the Bankruptcy Notice attracts the presumption of regularity under Illustration (e) of Section 114 of the Evidence Act 1950 [Act 56]. Second, that Rule 90(1) of the Insolvency Rules 2017 is directory in nature, citing Re Tan Ah Poi : ex p Multi-Purpose Finance Bhd [1999] 2 MLJ 555. Without deciding the point, I observe only that the JD's challenge is not without substance, given that the JC relied on a judgment encompassing three suits but produced the originating documents for Suit 27 alone. The point can be revisited if necessary in any future proceedings.

For the reasons stated above –

(a) The appeal in Enclosure 63 (against the refusal of the amendment application) is dismissed;

(b) The appeal in Enclosure 62 (against the setting aside of the Bankruptcy Notice and Creditor’s Petition) is dismissed;

(c) The SAR’s order setting aside the Bankruptcy Notice dated 20.8.2024 and the Creditor’s Petition dated 23.4.2025 is affirmed; and

(d) Costs of RM10,000.00 for both enclosures to the JD, subject to the allocatur fees. Dated : 16 April 2026 -signed-YA Dr Noradura binti Hamzah Judicial Commissioner High Court Civil 2 Johor Bahru Solicitor for the Judgment Debtor : : Ardelliza Izmaryanti binti Shafie Messrs. Hanif Hassan & Co. Solicitor for the Judgment Creditor : : Shanmuga a/l A. Kanesalingam Messrs. Kanesalingam & Co.