K E E v N E E (WA-33-32-01/2025)

with regard to Enclosure 9, whether the Respondent was obligated to pay spousal/ child maintenance; and S/N 0bpy57oUyESHLrnjn0BPow 6 September 2025 ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 3

with regard to Enclosure 11, whether the Petitioner should have sole guardianship and sole custody of the Children; and whether the Respondent should be granted only supervised access to the Children. The Court had to also decide whether it was necessary to issue a prohibition order restraining the Respondent from physically approaching the Petitioner or from being in the same room or residence with her. [7] At the conclusion of the hearing of the Applications, the Court made the following orders. No spousal maintenance was awarded. However, the Respondent was directed to pay a monthly sum of MYR1,500 for each child, in addition to bearing the costs of their health, education, and other related expenses. [8] Both Parties were conferred joint guardianship over the Children. Custody, care and control, however, were vested solely in the Petitioner, with the Respondent being granted structured but unsupervised access to the Children. In light of these arrangements, the Court declined to grant the Petitioner’s application for a prohibition order against the Respondent. Contentions, evaluation, and findings Whether the Respondent was obligated to pay spousal maintenance [9] At the outset, it was pertinent to note that the Petitioner had not, in fact, applied for child maintenance. Her application in Enclosure 9 was specifically for spousal maintenance only. However, during the hearing, the arguments advanced were directed instead towards child maintenance, and not spousal maintenance. S/N 0bpy57oUyESHLrnjn0BPow 6 September 2025 ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 4 [10] I must emphasise that such a course of action risks confusing both the Court and opposing counsel, as all applications must clearly correspond to the relief sought, and submissions must tally accordingly. [11] Accordingly, I dismissed Enclosure 9 on the basis that there was no justification to grant spousal maintenance at this interim stage, particularly as the Petitioner had failed to satisfy the “means and needs” test. Furthermore, Counsel for the Petitioner had, during the hearing of these applications, agreed that he would be seeking only child maintenance on behalf of the Petitioner. [12] Although the Respondent had no obligation to provide spousal maintenance to the Petitioner, he was legally required to pay child maintenance. This duty is well-established under sections 92 and 93 of the Law Reform (Marriage & Divorce) Act 1976 (“Law Reform (Marriage & Divorce) Act”), which clearly outline a parent's responsibility to support their child. The provisions read: Section 92 - Duty to maintain children Except where an agreement or order of court otherwise provides, it shall be the duty of a parent to maintain or contribute to the maintenance of his or her children, whether they are in his or her custody or the custody of any other person, either by providing them with such accommodation, clothing, food and education as may be reasonable having regard to his or her means and station in life or by paying the cost thereof. ….. Section 93 - Power for court to order maintenance for children

The court may at any time order a man to pay maintenance for the benefit of his child-

if he has refused or neglected reasonably to provide for the child; S/N 0bpy57oUyESHLrnjn0BPow 6 September 2025 ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 5

if he has deserted his wife and the child is in her charge;

during the pendency of any matrimonial proceedings; or

when making or subsequent to the making of an order placing the child in the custody of any other person [Emphasis added.] [13] Although child maintenance had not been expressly sought in Enclosure 9, whether by oversight or inadvertence, the Petitioner, in her submission, sought from the Respondent a sum of SGD3,000 (approximately MYR10,000) per month as maintenance for the two Children. [14] At the outset, I must emphasise that there was no justification for the Petitioner to frame her claim in Singapore dollars. The fact that the Respondent was employed in Singapore did not entitle the Petitioner to demand maintenance in foreign currency. Claims for child maintenance must be premised on the reasonable needs of the Children and expressed in the local currency where the proceedings are instituted. To allow otherwise would introduce unnecessary complications and distort the principle that child maintenance is based on actual needs rather than on the earning capacity or place of work of the paying parent. [15] In any event, upon a closer review of the particulars presented by the Petitioner, it became apparent that many of the claims put forward were excessive and extended well beyond what could reasonably be regarded as necessary for the Children’s sustenance, care, and overall welfare. S/N 0bpy57oUyESHLrnjn0BPow 6 September 2025 ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 6 [16] While it is beyond dispute that parents are under a statutory obligation to provide for their Children, such an obligation cannot be stretched to justify inflated or extravagant demands that lack any evidential basis of necessity. This is especially so in circumstances where the other parent is already bearing the entirety of the financial responsibility. [17] Having carefully scrutinised the affidavit evidence and taking into account the Children’s reasonable needs, I ordered the Respondent to pay monthly child maintenance in the sum of MYR1,500 for each child. This sum, in my judgment, was fair, reasonable, and sufficient to cover the Children’s sustenance and day-to-day living expenses, without burdening the Respondent with obligations that were disproportionate to the actual requirements of the Children. [18] In addition, I directed that the Respondent shall bear the full costs of the Children’s education and medical needs. [19] At this juncture, it was necessary for me to underscore an important consideration. The Respondent had already been directed to bear the full extent of the Children’s expenses. In such circumstances, it did not lie in the Petitioner’s mouth to complain, particularly when, in fairness, she was relieved of her own legal obligation to contribute towards the Children’s maintenance. It must be emphasised that under section 93 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act, the duty to maintain a child rests not solely on one parent but is imposed jointly on both father and mother, in proportion to their respective means and circumstances. Section 93(2) of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act reads: S/N 0bpy57oUyESHLrnjn0BPow 6 September 2025 ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 7 Section 93 – Power of court to order maintenance for children …

The court shall have the corresponding power to order a woman to pay or contribute towards the maintenance of her child where it is satisfied that having regard to her means it is reasonable so to order. [Emphasis added.] [20] Thus, strictly speaking, the Petitioner was equally bound by law to make financial provision for the Children. Nevertheless, having regard to the overall circumstances of this case, I exercised discretion to allow the Respondent to shoulder the full financial responsibility. This, in effect, amounted to a concession in the Petitioner’s favour, and it would, therefore, be inequitable for her to put forward further complaints or demands which were excessive or unwarranted. [21] Given that the Respondent was made solely responsible for all expenses of the Children, the discretion to make decisions regarding the Children’s education and healthcare would necessarily rest with him. This allocation of responsibility would ensure both clarity and fairness, as the Petitioner could not expect the Respondent to fund the entirety of these major expenses while simultaneously retaining unilateral control over such decisions. [22] In sum, the effect of this Court’s order was that the Respondent would bear sole responsibility for the Children’s financial upkeep. While the Petitioner’s initial claim was excessive and improperly framed, the Court had intervened to recalibrate the maintenance structure in a way that was both fair and proportionate. In doing so, the Court ensured that the Children’s essential needs, such as S/N 0bpy57oUyESHLrnjn0BPow 6 September 2025 ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 8 education, healthcare, and daily living expenses, would be adequately provided for, while at the same time preventing the imposition of undue or unrealistic financial burdens on the Respondent. Whether Petitioner should have sole guardianship and sole custody of the Children [23] The Petitioner applied for sole guardianship and sole custody of the Children. In contrast, the Respondent pressed for joint guardianship and joint custody, contending that the Petitioner had been uncooperative in the co-parenting arrangement and had, in fact, intentionally created difficulties for him. [24] At this stage, it was imperative to emphasise that the Children are entitled to maintain an ongoing and meaningful relationship with both parents. While I was of the view that custody, care and control should remain with the Petitioner pursuant to section 88(3) of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act, this did not render one parent superior to the other. The nature of a child’s relationship with his or her father differs from that with the mother, but such differences do not diminish the importance of either bond. A father’s rights and role in relation to his child are not, and should not be regarded as, subordinate to those of the mother. [25] Reference was made also to section 5 of the Guardianship of Infants Act 1961 ("Guardianship of Infants Act"), which reads: Section 5 - Equality of parental rights

In relation to the custody or upbringing of an infant or the administration of any property belonging to or held in trust for an infant or the application of the income of any such property, a mother shall S/N 0bpy57oUyESHLrnjn0BPow 6 September 2025 ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 9 have the same rights and authority as the law allows to a father, and the rights and authority of mother and father shall be equal.

The mother of an infant shall have the like powers of applying to the Court in respect of any matter affecting the infant as are possessed by the father. [Emphasis added.] [26] Pursuant to section 3 (Duties of guardian of person) of the Guardianship of Infants Act, both parents have equal responsibilities for the Children's support, health, and education. The correlation to the Parties' responsibilities is the right of the Children, in this case, the right to bond with both parents. [27] It must be borne in mind that the provisions of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act were conceived and enacted at a time when the roles of father and mother were rigidly demarcated. In that era, most women were homemakers, tasked primarily with managing the household and raising the children, while fathers were regarded chiefly as financial providers. A generation has since passed, and with it, these traditional roles have undergone significant transformation. Cultural norms have shifted, and the role of the father can no longer be regarded as secondary. The modern father–child relationship has become more nuanced, multidimensional, and integral to the child’s upbringing and overall development. [28] Hence, not all fathers should be painted with the same brush, as there are some who take a more active role in raising children, whilst others undeniably sit back and leave their children to be raised by their wives and domestic help. I, therefore, found no compelling S/N 0bpy57oUyESHLrnjn0BPow 6 September 2025 ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 10 justification to deny the Respondent joint guardianship of the Children. [29] Furthermore, since the Respondent was obligated to contribute financially to the Child's maintenance, covering all essential aspects of their upbringing, including education, healthcare, and daily expenses, it was only fair and reasonable that he also had a voice in decisions that would shape the Children's future. Parental responsibilities extend beyond financial support; they encompass active participation in key matters such as schooling, medical care, and overall well-being. [30] Indeed, I observed that although the Respondent harboured doubts as to whether he was in fact the biological father of the Children, and had even considered the possibility of rebutting paternity, he nevertheless did not resist or shirk his responsibility to provide for the Children financially. Despite this, the Petitioner persisted in opposing the Respondent’s right to joint guardianship of the Children, a stance which I found to be both unfair and inequitable. [31] As part of having joint guardianship, neither party may unilaterally change the Children's permanent residence without the express consent of the other. This would safeguard and ensure stability in the Children's living arrangements and prevent unnecessary disruptions to the Children's well-being. Parties must likewise ensure that the Children attend school regularly and take all necessary steps to secure the continuity of their education. S/N 0bpy57oUyESHLrnjn0BPow 6 September 2025 ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 11 Whether Respondent should have only supervised access to the Children [32] The Petitioner contended that she was a victim of abuse and violence at the hands of the Respondent. On this basis, she argued that any access the Respondent had to the Children must be supervised to ensure their safety and well-being. [33] In response, the Respondent denied all allegations. He instead asserted that the Applications were filed in bad faith, or mala fide, claiming it was a retaliatory tactic because he had refused to agree to the Petitioner’s proposed terms for a broader settlement. [34] To further challenge the Petitioner’s credibility, the Respondent raised doubts about his paternity of the Children, accusing the Petitioner of having an extramarital relationship with her former husband. Notably, the Respondent stated he had continued to provide financial support for the Children despite these uncertainties. [35] In my view, since both Parties' allegations were based solely on sworn affidavit evidence only, it was impossible to make a definitive finding of fact on either claim. The Court could not adjudicate a "he said, she said" scenario without additional evidence, as the burden of proof rests with the party making the allegation. [36] As such, based on the cases of Diana Clarice Chan Chiing Hwa v. Tiong Chiong Hoo [2002] 1 CLJ 721, [2002] 2 MLJ 97, [2002] 2 AMR 1527 and Gan Koo Kea v. Gan Shiow Lih [2003] 4 CLJ 539; [2003] 4 MLJ 770, [2003] 6 AMR 459, in light of conflicting accounts that have not been subjected to the rigorous processes of cross-examination and re-examination, which would occur in a full trial with S/N 0bpy57oUyESHLrnjn0BPow 6 September 2025 ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 12 viva voce evidence, the Court's duty was to disregard the disputed facts. Instead, the Court was obligated to base its decision solely on the undisputed facts. [37] This crucial aspect of civil litigation practice has been eloquently summarised by Lord Templeman for the Privy Council in Tay Bok Choon v Tahansan Sdn Bhd [1987] CLJ Rep 24, [1987] MLRA 68, [1987] 1 MLJ 433, in the following words: At the end of the day the judge must decide the petition on the evidence before him. If allegations are made in affidavits by the petitioner and those allegations are credibly denied by the respondent's affidavits, then in the absence of oral evidence or cross examination, the judge must ignore the disputed allegations. The judge must then decide the fate of the petition by consideration of the undisputed facts. [Emphasis added.] [38] It must also be borne in mind that the law proceeds on the principle that a parent’s access to a child should not be restricted unless there is clear and convincing evidence that such access would be detrimental to the child’s welfare. Supervised access, in particular, is generally not conducive to fostering a healthy parent–child relationship, as the constant presence of the other estranged spouse may unduly interfere with the natural process of bonding between the non-custodial parent and the child. [39] Consequently, I concluded that there was insufficient evidence to warrant the severe restriction of denying the Respondent unsupervised access to the Children. [40] The Petitioner was granted sole custody, care, and control of the Children, making her their primary caregiver and decision-maker for S/N 0bpy57oUyESHLrnjn0BPow 6 September 2025 ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 13 day-to-day matters. She was also entrusted with retaining the Children's identification documents, a practical safeguard against potential international removal. [41] The Respondent, however, was entitled to structured unsupervised access to the Children. To minimise conflict, the Respondent was responsible for transporting the Children to and from visits and must inform the Petitioner in advance if he was unable to do so. This structured access aimed to provide the Children with stability while preserving their relationship with the Respondent in a managed framework: a) Alternate Weekend Access – Unsupervised, and overnight physical access every alternate weekend, from Friday at 7pm until Sunday at 7pm b) Public Holidays access - Unsupervised, and overnight physical access every alternate public holiday, from 7pm on the eve of the holiday until 7pm on the holiday itself (or the last day of the holiday if it extends beyond one day). c) Chinese New Year access - Chinese New Year access will be divided into two blocks: i. The first block spans from 9 am on the eve of Chinese New Year to 9 pm on the fourth day of Chinese New Year; ii. The second block spans from 9 am on the fifth day of Chinese New Year to 9 pm on the ninth day of Chinese New Year. S/N 0bpy57oUyESHLrnjn0BPow 6 September 2025 ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 14 In 2026, the Respondent will have access during the first block, and the Parties will alternate these blocks annually; d) School Holidays - Unsupervised, and overnight physical access during the first half of the holidays if the school holidays are more than one week, beginning on Friday at 7pm and ending on the last Sunday of that half at 7pm. e) Overseas Holidays - Both Parties are required to provide a minimum of seven days' advance notice before taking the Child on an overseas trip, accompanied by a detailed itinerary outlining travel dates, destinations and accommodation arrangement. Upon receiving such notice, the Petitioner must promptly surrender the necessary travel documents to the Respondent to facilitate the Children's travel. Additionally, any overseas travel must be strictly limited to the designated access period of the traveling parent and must not infringe upon or overlap with the other Party's scheduled access time. This would ensure that both parents retain their rightful and uninterrupted time with the Children, maintaining a fair and balanced co-parenting arrangement. Whether Petitioner should be granted prohibition order against the Respondent from approaching her [42] In Enclosure 11, the Petitioner applied for a prohibition order to restrain the Respondent from physically approaching her, or from being in the same room or residence as her. [43] Having considered the application, I declined to grant the prohibition order at this juncture for several reasons. First, the allegations S/N 0bpy57oUyESHLrnjn0BPow 6 September 2025 ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 15 forming the basis of the application were themselves disputed facts, as noted earlier. It would not be appropriate, at this interlocutory stage, to make a determination that effectively accepts one party’s version of events over the other without the benefit of a full trial. [44] Secondly, the Petitioner sought to substantiate her claim by tendering police reports which she alleged documented incidents of domestic violence. While such reports were adduced for the Court’s consideration, they remain allegations until properly tested through cross-examination and other evidentiary safeguards. [45] With regard to the police reports lodged by the Petitioner, reference was made to section 157 of the Evidence Act 1950 ("the Evidence Act"), which reads: Section 157 - Former statements of witness may be proved to corroborate later testimony as to same fact In order to corroborate the testimony of a witness, any former statement made by him whether written or verbal, on oath, or in ordinary conversation, relating to the same fact at or about the time when the fact took place, or before any authority legally competent to investigate the fact, may be proved. [Emphasis added.] [46] Although the Evidence Act allows for the admissibility of a police report and for its maker to rely on it, the weight of a police report is generally low for the following reasons. [47] First and foremost, it was made unilaterally, that is, the Petitioner dictated her narrative to the police, stating her version of the events. There was no cross-examination or contemporaneous testing of truth when the police reports were lodged. S/N 0bpy57oUyESHLrnjn0BPow 6 September 2025 ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 16 [48] Secondly, the contents of the police report were self-serving and self-serving statements are generally not corroborative of the maker’s statements as they are not independent. [49] Thirdly, it is not uncommon for a party to lodge police reports primarily for the purpose of creating a paper trail to bolster their version of events in subsequent litigation. In the present case, I harboured such concerns in relation to the narrative advanced by the Petitioner. [50] Accordingly, I placed minimal weight on the police report, as it was inadequate to corroborate the Petitioner’s allegations of physical abuse. [51] I also found that the prohibition order sought by the Petitioner would not be practical in the circumstances. This is because the Respondent had already been granted joint guardianship over the Children, together with structured access arrangements. By virtue of joint guardianship, the Respondent was entitled to participate in making major decisions concerning the Children’s welfare, particularly in relation to their education, health, and overall upbringing. The evidence also showed that the Respondent was the primary financial provider, bearing the costs of the Children’s education, healthcare, and other essential expenses. [52] Granting a prohibition order that entirely restrains the Respondent from being in the same residence or proximity to the Petitioner would inevitably impede the exercise of co-parenting responsibilities and undermine the very access rights earlier conferred upon him. Such an order would create unnecessary friction in the practical S/N 0bpy57oUyESHLrnjn0BPow 6 September 2025 ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 17 arrangements for the Children and could operate to their detriment, as it would hinder both parents from jointly addressing matters directly affecting the Children’s welfare. In light of this, I was of the view that the prohibition order was incompatible with the principle of co-parenting and therefore not suitable in the present case. Conclusion [53] Following a complete evaluation of the evidence and the Parties' arguments, the Court ordered the Respondent to pay a monthly sum of MYR1,500 for each child, in addition to bearing the costs of their health, education, and other related expenses. The Parties were granted joint guardianship of the Children. Custody, care, and control were vested solely in the Petitioner, while the Respondent was accorded structured unsupervised access rights to the Children. Date: 6 September 2025 SIGNED …………………………………………. (EVROL MARIETTE PETERS) Judge High Court, Kuala Lumpur S/N 0bpy57oUyESHLrnjn0BPow 6 September 2025 ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 18 Counsel: For the Petitioner – PY Tia; Messrs Tia & Sufyan For the Respondent – Indran K Naidu & Ms J. Annapurani; Messrs Indran K, C Jacob & Associates S/N 0bpy57oUyESHLrnjn0BPow