K-Link International Sdn Bhd v Goh See AI (WA-22NCC-644-09/2025)

GOH SEE AI (as Joint Administrator of the Estate of Goh Beng Jin, Deceased) (NRIC No.: 960128-14-5988)

JIN XUELU (as Joint Administrator of the Estate of Goh Beng Jin, Deceased and also in her personal capacity) (NRIC MyPR No.: 700124-74-5010)

YAP SO CHU (as Joint Administrator of the Estate of Goh Beng Jin, Deceased) (NRIC No.: 420301-08-5898)

GOH BENG OOI (NRIC No.: 610629-08-5215)

GOH BENG CHUN (NRIC No.: 650104-08-7257)

KHOR KAH KHENG (NRIC No.: 570303-02-6051)

CHAN YOKE FONG (NRIC No.: 640405-02-5472)

HII LEE HIE (NRIC No.: 750614-13-5712)

FUNG WAI LOON (NRIC No.: 780823-14-6159) …DEFENDANTS GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (Enclosure 157)

Enclosure 157 is the Plaintiff’s application for leave to file a further affidavit affirmed by Loo Aei Ween on 24 April 2026 in relation to the pending interlocutory applications in Enclosures 4, 14, 64, 65, and

The application is made after the exchange of affidavits and submissions, and at a stage when the Court had fixed the applications for decision. 3 2. Having considered the application, the supporting affidavit, the submissions of the parties, and the authorities cited, I dismissed the application with no order as to costs.

The Plaintiff contends that the further affidavit concerns evidence newly uncovered from its continuing investigations into the alleged breaches of fiduciary duty and misfeasance involving the Plaintiff’s funds. It is said that the documents are relevant, credible, and necessary for the determination of the pending applications.

The Plaintiff further contends that no prejudice incapable of being compensated by costs would be occasioned to the Defendants if leave is granted.

The Defendants oppose the application. In substance, they submit that the proposed affidavit is late and that the delay has not been satisfactorily explained. It was also contended that the Plaintiff is seeking to improve its evidential position after submissions have closed. As a result, the Defendants argue that they would be prejudiced by having to meet an evolving case if the further affidavit were admitted into evidence.

The Court undoubtedly has a discretion whether to permit a late further affidavit. That discretion must be exercised judicially, having regard to all the circumstances of the case.

In deciding whether to allow such evidence, the Court may consider: i. whether the material could, with reasonable diligence, have been produced earlier; ii. whether it is truly relevant and necessary; iii. whether it would materially assist the determination of the pending application; and iv. whether its late introduction would cause prejudice, delay, or disruption to the orderly conduct of proceedings.

In Lum Choon Realty Sdn Bhd v Perwira Habib Bank Malaysia Bhd [2003] 3 CLJ 791, the Court of Appeal made clear that proceedings by way of affidavit evidence must have a point of closure. Once parties have begun submissions, the evidence by way of affidavits is deemed closed, and parties must submit on the evidence already contained in the affidavits before the Court.

The same principle was applied in Sagajuta (Sabah) Sdn Bhd v Trane Malaysia Sales & Services Sdn Bhd [2013] 1 LNS 1425, where the Court of Appeal upheld the rejection of a further affidavit served after submissions had been filed. The Court emphasised that a party who seeks to file affidavit evidence out of time must properly seek leave or abridgment of time, and that late affidavit evidence filed after submissions have progressed may properly be rejected.

These authorities underscore an important procedural discipline. Litigation cannot proceed on a constantly shifting evidential footing. Affidavit evidence, especially in interlocutory applications, must close at some point so that parties may know the case they have to meet and the Court may determine the application in an orderly manner.

Applying these principles, I am not satisfied that the Plaintiff has shown sufficient basis for leave to be granted.

First, the delay has not been adequately or satisfactorily explained. The documents sought to be introduced cannot properly be said to be newly discovered in the strict sense. Learned Counsel for the Plaintiff accepted that requests for the documents had been made earlier. However, on the material before me, it is not clear when those requests were made, what steps were taken, or why the documents could not have been obtained and placed before the Court earlier.

If the documents were truly material to the pending applications, they could and should have been pursued and produced earlier. The Plaintiff cannot wait until the case is fixed for decision and then seek to supplement its evidential case.

Second, I am not persuaded that the proposed further affidavit is necessary for the fair determination of the pending applications. Its purpose, as presented, is to further support the Plaintiff’s existing allegations of dishonesty, breach of fiduciary duty and misfeasance. In substance, it seeks to reinforce or reassert the Plaintiff’s case rather than introduce evidence which could not reasonably have been produced earlier.

Third, I accept the Defendants’ submission that they would suffer prejudice if leave were granted. Prejudice in this context is not confined to irremediable financial prejudice. It includes being compelled to meet an evolving case, having to respond to fresh affidavit evidence, incurring further costs, and facing further delay in applications which have already been argued and fixed for decision. I also took into consideration that various ad interim injunctions were already in place against the Defendants. Any further delay in the expeditious disposal of the proceedings would occasion real prejudice to the Defendants.

Fourth, to allow the further affidavit at this stage would disrupt the orderly management of the proceedings. The interlocutory applications are already ripe for decision. If the affidavit is allowed, fairness would require the Defendants to be given an opportunity to respond. That would in turn invite further submissions and further delay. This is precisely the kind of procedural slippage which the principle in Lum Choon Realty and Sagajuta guards against.

The Court is not bound to admit late affidavit evidence merely because relevance is asserted. Relevance is not the sole test. The Court must also consider diligence, necessity, timing, prejudice, and the need for finality in interlocutory proceedings.

Litigation timetables must mean something. They cannot be displaced whenever a party seeks, for whatever reason, to improve or better its evidential position after the matter has reached the stage of decision.

For these reasons, I dismissed the Plaintiff’s application for leave to file the further affidavit.

In the circumstances, and as the Defendants did not file any affidavit in response and opposed the application substantially on points of law, I made no order as to costs. Dated the 30th day of June 2026 -sgd- ……………………………………………………………………… MUHAMMAD ADAM BIN ABDULLAH Judicial Commissioner (Commercial Division NCC 4) High Court of Malaya In the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia Counsel for the Plaintiff : Michael Chow Keat Thye together with Wong Zhi Khung, Yeong Wen Ling, Neoh Kai Sheng, and Law Yee Xuan (Pupil in Chambers) Messrs. Wong & Yeong Counsel for the Defendants : Lee Hoe Leong together with Kong Kai Yan for the 1st to the 5th Defendants Messrs. HL Lee & Co Angeline Low for the 6th and 7th Defendants Messrs. Lu-Yen Choi Kian You for the 8th and 9th Defendants Messrs. K.Y. Choi

Lum Choon Realty Sdn Bhd v Perwira Habib Bank Malaysia Bhd [2003] 3 CLJ 791 2. Sagajuta (Sabah) Sdn Bhd v Trane Malaysia Sales & Services Sdn