K Shin Development Sdn Bhd v 1. ) Metro Eldercare Sdn Bhd (WA-A52-184-12/2023)

DAN METRO ELDERCARE SDN BHD (No. Syarikat : 201801028789 (1290815-P) …DEFENDAN PERTAMA

NICHOLAS FERNANDEZ (NO. K/P: 671103-10-5313) ...DEFENDAN KEDUA ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN (Pengetepian Penghakiman Persetujuan) PENGENALAN [1] Melalui Notis Permohonan, Defendan–Defendan memohon untuk mengetepikan Penghakiman Persetujuan bertarikh 07.07.2025 di bawah Aturan 42 Kaedah 13 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dan Aturan 92 Kaedah 4 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 untuk Perintah dan/atau relif-relif yang berikut:- S/N xVqwa4Fi80mDr8z5Q54jQQ a) Defendan – Defendan diberi kebenaran untuk membuat Permohonan ini; b) Bahawa Penghakiman Persetujuan yang direkodkan terhadap Defendan bertarikh 07.07.2025 diketepikan dan dibatalkan; c) Kos permohonan ini menjadi kos dalam kausa; [2] Pada 25.11.2025 saya telah menolak Permohonan Defendan Pertama untuk mengetepikan Penghakiman Persetujuan bertarikh 07.07.2025 dengan kos sebanyak RM3,000. ALASAN-ALASAN PERMOHONAN MENGENEPIKAN PENGHAKIMAN PERSETUJUAN [3] Di dalam menyokong permohonan ini defendan telah mengemukakan beberapa alasan seperti dinyatakan di bawah ini, iaitu :

Penghakiman Persetujuan bertarikh 07.07.2025 telah direkodkan tanpa pengetahuan dan kebenaran Pemegang Saham dan pengarah-pengarah serta tanpa kehadiran dan peguam cara Defendan di Mahkamah pada tarikh tersebut.

Pemegang Saham Defendan berada di luar negara pada tarikh 07.07.2025 tersebut dan tidak dimaklumkan mengenai tarikh pendengaran atau diserahkan sebarang draf Penghakiman Persetujuan untuk semakan atau persetujuan terlebih dahulu.

Terma-terma dalam Penghakiman Persetujuan termasuk kewajipan membayar sewa pendahuluan untuk tahun 2026 dan menandatangani Personal Guarantee & Indemnity tidak pernah dibincangkan atau dipersetujui, serta bercanggah dengan persefahaman mediasi terdahulu bahawa pembaikan premis hendaklah disempurnakan terlebih dahulu oleh Plaintif.

Penghakiman Persetujuan tersebut direkodkan tanpa penjelasan mengenai kesan undang-undang terma-terma tersebut kepada Pemegang Saham S/N xVqwa4Fi80mDr8z5Q54jQQ dan Pengarah-Pengarah Syarikat, serta tanpa persetujuan termaklum mereka.

Tindakan merekodkan Penghakiman Persetujuan dalam ketiadaan pihak yang sepatutnya dan tanpa kebenaran jelas adalah bercanggah dengan prinsip keadilan asasi (Natural Justice) dan merupakan kecacatan prosedur yang serius.

Penghakiman Persetujuan bertarikh 07.07.2025 tersebut telah mengakibatkan ketidakadilan nyata kepada Pemohon dan oleh itu wajar diketepikan oleh Mahkamah.

Wujudnya unsur “Mistake, Fraud dan Conspiracy to Injure” di dalam Penghakiman Persetujuan yang tidak pernah diarahkan atau dibenarkan. KEDUDUKAN UNDANG-UNDANG [4] Undang-undang adalah mantap bahawa penghakiman persetujuan tidak boleh diketepikan sewenang-wenangnya. Bila kedua-dua pihak telah bersetuju untuk merekodkan penghakiman, maka mereka akan terikat dengannya. Di dalam kes Abdul Razak Sheikh Mahmood & Ors v. Amanah Raya Bhd & Ors & Another Appeal [2018] 5 CLJ 273, Mahkamah Rayuan menyatakan seperti berikut:: "[20] The law on setting aside consent judgment is more than settled and it is this. A consent judgment is only recorded when the respective litigants had agreed in writing as to how to resolve a legal suit. Once the consent judgment had been perfected, the parties are bound by it and the court is duty-bound to enforce the agreed terms of the same. The court also cannot vary any of the agreed terms unless with the mutual consent of the parties. Hence, one can say that the court is functus officio or in other words, the court is bereft of jurisdiction to entertain any request to set aside such judgment." [5] Dalam keadaan tertentu penghakiman persetujuan boleh diketepikan. Saya merujuk kepada kes Mahkamah Tinggi NOOR HANAN MOHAMED DAUD v. ANIALINA MOHAMMAD SANI [2023] CLJU 383 [2023] 1 LNS 383 yang mengesahkan keputusan Mahkamah Sesyen di dalam mengetepikan penghakiman persetujuan kerana pihak yang mewakili defendan tidak S/N xVqwa4Fi80mDr8z5Q54jQQ mempunyai kuasa untuk bertindak sedemikian memandangkan mereka tidak dilantik oleh defendan untuk mewakilinya. Dinyatakan di dalam kes Noor Hanan seperti berikut: [10] Dealing first with this issue, the Federal Court in Badiaddin b Mohd Mahidin v. Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd [1998] 2 CLJ 75; [1998] 1 MLJ 393 and the Court of Appeal in MacQuire (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd v. HSBC Bank Malaysia Bhd [2007] 6 CLJ 176; [2007] 7 MLJ 139 had the occasion to decide on the issue whether a court is barred from setting aside its own orders on the basis that the court is functus officio when an order of that court has been perfected. In Badiaddin, Sri Ram FC J expressed the following: - If, as held by that court, there is no power in a court to set aside its orders, though made in contravention of the express provisions of a statute, then, I must fold my arms in abject submission, allow the orders to stand and let the illegality persist. But I do not perceive the law to intend such a result. It is true, as a general rule, that orders of a court of unlimited jurisdiction may not be impugned on the ground that they are void in the sense that they may be ignored or disobeyed... It is one thing to say that an order of a court of unlimited jurisdiction must be obeyed until it is set aside. It is quite a different thing to say that a court of unlimited jurisdiction may make orders in breach of written law. Isaacs v. Robertson is certainly not authority for the latter proposition. I take it to be well settled that even courts of unlimited jurisdiction have no authority to act in contravention of written law. Of course, so long as an order of a court of unlimited jurisdiction stands, irregular though it may be, it must be respected. But where an order of such a court is made in breach of statute, it is made without jurisdiction and may therefore be declared void and set aside in proceedings brought for that purpose. It is then entirely open to the court, upon the illegality being clearly shown, to grant a declaration to the effect that the order is invalid and to have it set aside. It is wrong to assume that such an order may only be corrected on appeal. [11] In MacQuire (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd the Court of Appeal held: We are of the view that principles enunciated in the above three authorities do buttress the plaintiff's contention that the court is not functus officio even though a default judgment has been perfected. However, these three authorities have also reaffirmed that the jurisdiction to set aside such a judgment is not to be exercised as a matter of course, like day following night, but may be exercised in limited circumstances only eg, where there is:-

breach of the rules of natural justice;

lack of jurisdiction; S/N xVqwa4Fi80mDr8z5Q54jQQ

illegality ie contravention of a substantive statutory provision;

serious defect; or

fraud. [12] Focusing now on the question whether the Learned SC Judge was functus officio in this case because the Consent Judgment had already been perfected, the matter would, in this Court's view, be dependent on whether the Consent Judgment was entered in breach of any of the conditions set out in MacQuire (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd. After reading the affidavits of parties filed the Application proceedings and the Grounds of Judgment by the Learned SC Judge, this Court finds no cause to disagree with the finding that Ain Sakina had no authority from the Defendant to represent her and neither was the appointment made by Hasim based on any express authority or power granted by the Defendant to either her father, Sani or to Hasim himself. [13] In Lagenda Kencana Sdn Bhd v. Peter's Holdings Sdn Bhd [2012] 3 CLJ 824; [2012] 4 MLJ 855 the issue of consensus ad idem of parties in entering a consent judgment was discussed. The Court of Appeal held:- [13] The consent order in effect is an agreement between the appellant and the respondents, not between their counsel or solicitors. Generally the consent of the parties are expressed and communicated through their respective solicitors, duly appointed to represent them. If there are clear indication that the consent order was recorded without the authority or knowledge of the parties or any one of them (as in the present case) then, as an agreement, there is no consensus ad idem and the validity of the said consent order can always be challenged and the consent order can ultimately be set aside, particularly where the effect of which, if not set aside, would cause grave injustice to the party in question. ... [20] Again, the Federal Court in KhawPoh Chhuan's case had also ruled that 'even if lack of consent was unknown to the other side, the court has the power to interfere with such consent order where grave injustice would be could by allowing the consent order to remain'. ANALISA DAN DAPATAN [6] Semasa pengurusan kes pada 29.03.2024, Mahkamah menetapkan tarikh bicara penuh kes ini pada 07.07.2025 hingga 09.07.2025. [7] Sebelum bicara bermula, kedua-dua pihak cuba menyelesaikan kes melalui dua sesi mediasi pada 20.06.2025 dan 30.06.2025, namun gagal mencapai sebarang persetujuan. S/N xVqwa4Fi80mDr8z5Q54jQQ [8] Pada hari Ahad, 06.07.2025, peguam Plaintif menerima surat daripada peguam asal Defendan Pertama iaitu Tetuan Messr Sculy (Tetuan MS) yang mengandungi cadangan untuk menyelesaikan seluruh kes ini. [9] Setelah bersetuju dengan cadangan tersebut, peguam Plaintif menghubungi Tetuan MS pada pagi 07.07.2025 untuk memaklumkan persetujuan mereka. Peguam Plaintif juga menyatakan akan mewakili Tetuan MS (sebutan bagi pihak) untuk merekodkan penghakiman persetujuan di Mahkamah, dan Tetuan MS tidak membantah perkara itu. [10] Peguam Plaintif menyediakan draf Penghakiman Persetujuan dan menyerahkannya kepada Tetuan MS serta peguam lain. Ini selaras dengan arahan Mahkamah supaya draf yang diluluskan difailkan selewat-lewatnya pada 08.07.2025. [11] Pada 08.07.2025, Tetuan MS menghubungi peguam Plaintif untuk meminta agar nama salah seorang pengarah Defendan Pertama dikeluarkan daripada senarai penjamin. Selain itu, tiada sebarang pindaan lain yang diminta oleh Defendan Pertama. [12] Setelah pindaan di buat, draf terbaru dihantar semula kepada semua pihak pada hari yang sama. Namun, Tetuan MS masih tidak memulangkan draf yang telah diluluskan itu. [13] Oleh itu, pada 09.07.2025, peguam Plaintif meminta Mahkamah melanjutkan tempoh sehingga 10.07.2025 untuk memfailkan draf tersebut. Permohonan ini dibenarkan oleh Mahkamah. [14] Pada 10.07.2025, memandangkan Tetuan MS masih belum memberi kelulusan, peguam Plaintif terus memfailkan draf tersebut untuk kelulusan Mahkamah. [15] Mahkamah kemudiannya memeteraikan Penghakiman Persetujuan tersebut secara rasmi. [16] Pada 14.07.2025, Tetuan MS telah memfailkan permohonan untuk menarik diri sebagai peguam cara Defendan Pertama. Pada 28.07.2025, Mahkamah S/N xVqwa4Fi80mDr8z5Q54jQQ membenarkan permohonan Tetuan MS untuk menarik diri sebagai peguam Defendan Pertama. [17] Pada 16.07.2025, peguam Plaintif menyerahkan salinan Penghakiman Persetujuan yang sudah termeterai kepada semua peguam yang terlibat. [18]