Secara alternative, satu Perintah Pelaksanaan Specifik terhadap Plaintif sebagai Pentadbir Harta Pusaka Simati melaksanakan dan menyempurnakan Perjanjian Jual Beli tersebut”. [11] On 1st January 2020, the Plaintiff passed away and Plaintiff’s widow named Kalai Chelvi obtained Letter of Administration dated 27th August 2020 for the Plaintiff’s estate. [12] Kalai Chelvi as the Administrator filed Leave Application to the Federal Court. By order dated 18th May 2022, the Federal Court made an Order that Kalai Chelvi is bound by the Court of Appeal Order dated 14th March 2019. [13] In allowing Kalai Chelvi’s application for substitution, the Federal Court ordered – “(c) Mendiang Pemohon Kalai Chelvi a/p Perumal sebagai pemohon yang mengganti sebagai wakil/Pentadbir Harta Pusaka Krishnakumar a/l Muniandi akan melaksanakan segala obligasi seperti yang diperintahkan dibawah Perintah Mahkamah Rayuan bertarikh 14th March 2019 jikalau kebenaran untuk merayu ke Mahkamah ditolak dan/atau Rayuan ditolak”. Salient points from the Respondent’s Submission [14] Enclosure 62 was filed by the Defendant because Kalai Chelvi as the representative refused to execute the Consent Application Form, Statutory Declarations and Memorandum of Transfer and to commence the transfer process as ordered by the Court of Appeal. [15] Defendant had no option, except to seek consequential order so as to give effect to the Judgments handed down by the Court of Appeal and the Federal Court. [16] Kalai Chelvi is responsible of defying Orders of Court of Appeal and Federal Court in refusing to execute the said documents. [17] Messrs Noriah Harnaik had submitted the relevant documents to Kalai Chelvi on 26th May 2023 and requested the same to be returned within 14 days. However, Kalai Chelvi failed to do so. Salient points from the Plaintiff Submission [18] Plaintiff submitted that the Court of Appeal has reversed the judgment of the High Court and held that the sale and purchase agreement entered between the plaintiff and defendant is valid. [19] According to Plaintiff, under clause 3.4 of the SPA, Ramayee was obliged to apply for consent within one year from the date of the agreement. Even though Ramayee or her estate took no steps to obtain consent from the relevant land office, Defendant did not enforce his rights under the SPA against the estate of Ramayee. [20] The Plaintiff also alleged that doctrine of res judicata is applicable to Defendant’s application. Analysis [21] The Federal Court Leave Application filed by Kalai Chelvi was dismissed on 18th January 2023. Hence, Kalai Chelvi’s obligations to comply with the Court of Appeal Order only arose on 18th January 2023. [22] The SPA is valid, binding and enforceable as affirmed by the Federal Court. [23] Therefore, the submission by the Plaintiff that the SPA can be terminated by referring to the 14th March 2019 date is misconceived. [24] This Court is of the view that the Defendant has liberty to file this application as ordered by the Court of Appeal. [25] The Plaintiff also contended that this Court has no powers to hear Enclosure 62. The right quorum according to the Plaintiff is the Court of Appeal. [26] The Federal Court in Stone World Sdn Bhd v Engareh (M) Sdn Bhd [2020] 12 MLJ 237 decided that – “[19] …. The superior Courts possess a residual inherent jurisdiction to, inter alia, clarify the terms of an order and to make ancillary Orders primarily to give effect to the decision of Judgment handed down. It is a necessary jurisdiction to enable a Court to ensure that substantive between the parties is served, so as to give effect to its primary decision, through the dispensing a procedural justice” [21] and the form in which the exercise of such inherent jurisdiction is effected is via the “liberty to apply” rule. The general principles that all Court Orders carry with them the inherent liberty to apply, although this right is often expressly reserved in relation to final Orders”. [27] Hence, this Court possesses the powers and jurisdiction to grant reliefs as sought by the Defendant in Enclosure 62. [28] With regards to the applicability of doctrine of res judicata to the consequential order application under the “liberty to apply” rule, the Federal Court in Stone World referred to Kanawagi s/o Seperumaniam v Penang Port Commission [2001] 5 MLJ 433 and stated as follows – “[34] The Court went on the examine the principle of finality and concluded that the application did not attract “the rule of res judicata” and corollary to its the rule of issue estoppel and functus officio”. Importantly the Court pointed out that the application for consequential order was neither a re-hearing nor a re-opening of the case.”