Kbc Management Corporation v Susur Saujana Sdn Bhd (BA-12BNCvC-53-09/2025)

This appeal arose from the decision of the learned Sessions Court Judge, Puan Fatimah Binti Zahari, delivered after a full trial on 22.8.2025 in Shah Alam Sessions Court Civil Suit No. BA-A52NCvC-254-05/2021, whereby the Plaintiff’s claim against the Defendant was dismissed with costs of RM10,000.00.

Being dissatisfied with the said decision, the Plaintiff filed the present appeal via Notice of Appeal dated 2.9.2025 against the entirety of the learned Sessions Court Judge’s decision.

For consistency and ease of reference, this Court shall continue to refer to the parties in the same manner as they were referred to before the Sessions Court, namely:

KBC Management Corporation as “the Plaintiff”; and

Susur Saujana Sdn. Bhd. as “the Defendant”.

The appeal concerns the interpretation and application of sections 60(4) and 61(4) of the Strata Management Act 2013 (“SMA 2013”), in particular whether the Defendant, as the present registered proprietor of the Office Unit, could be held liable for arrears of maintenance charges, sinking fund contributions and related charges said to have accumulated during the ownership of previous proprietors dating back to 1999.

The Plaintiff maintained that the learned Sessions Court Judge had erred in dismissing the claim and had adopted an unduly narrow interpretation of the expression “successor-in-title” appearing in sections 60(4) and 61(4) SMA 2013. The Defendant, meanwhile, contended that the learned Sessions Court Judge had correctly interpreted the statutory provisions and properly evaluated the evidence adduced during the trial.

The Defendant further relied upon the appellate principles laid down in Gan Yook Chin & Anor v Lee Ing Chin & Ors [2005] 2 MLJ 1, Azman bin Mahmood & Anor v SJ Securities Sdn Bhd [2012] 6 MLJ 1 and Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v Wendy Tan Lee Peng & Ors [2020] 12 MLJ 67 in submitting that there was no proper basis for appellate interference with the findings of the learned Sessions Court Judge.

The dispute before this Court therefore extends beyond a mere claim for unpaid maintenance charges. The appeal raises questions concerning the meaning of “successor-in-title” under the SMA 2013, the extent of liability attaching to successive proprietors of strata parcels, and the evidential burden resting upon a management corporation seeking recovery of substantial arrears accumulated over many years.

The Plaintiff is the Management Corporation (“MC”) of Kelana Business Centre, Kelana Jaya. The evidence before the Court showed that the Plaintiff took over the management and maintenance of Kelana Business Centre from the Joint Management Body (“JMB”) sometime in 2011 pursuant to the statutory framework under the SMA 2013.

The dispute concerns an office unit described as parcel no. ES7-03, Level 7, Block B, Kelana Business Centre together with four accessory parcels (“the Office Unit”).

The ownership history of the Office Unit was largely undisputed. The evidence showed that the Office Unit was originally owned by Faeiz Corporation from approximately 1999 until 2017. Following default in repayment obligations to its financier, the Office Unit was sold via public auction pursuant to a Proclamation of Sale dated 16.5.2017, where Urus Untung Sdn. Bhd. (“Urus Untung”) emerged as the successful bidder.

Thereafter, by way of a Sale and Purchase Agreement dated 5.9.2019 (“the SPA”), Urus Untung sold the Office Unit to the Defendant for a purchase price of RM1,300,000.00. The Defendant subsequently became the registered proprietor on 10.8.2020.

The chronology of ownership may therefore be summarised as follows:

Faeiz Corporation — original proprietor (1999–2017);

Urus Untung — purchaser via auction / immediate successor proprietor (2017–2020); and

Defendant — purchaser from Urus Untung / current registered proprietor (2020 onwards).

The Plaintiff’s claim before the Sessions Court was for RM284,166.41 said to comprise arrears of maintenance charges, service charges, sinking fund contributions, interest and related charges allegedly accrued in relation to the Office Unit over many years.

The Plaintiff’s own documents showed that the claim was accumulated across different periods of ownership involving different proprietors over time. The breakdown relied upon by the Plaintiff was broadly as follows: Proprietor Period Claimed Outstanding Faeiz Corporation (under JMB) 1999–2011 RM157,535.12 Faeiz Corporation (under MC) 2011–2017 approximately RM61,694.72 Urus Untung 2017–2020 RM50,174.07 Defendant 2020 onwards RM14,783.22

It was therefore evident that the greater part of the Plaintiff’s claim related not to the Defendant’s own period of ownership, but to arrears allegedly incurred during the ownership of earlier proprietors, particularly Faeiz Corporation.

The Plaintiff’s case before the Sessions Court was premised on the contention that the Defendant, as the present registered proprietor, was legally responsible for all outstanding charges relating to the Office Unit by virtue of sections 60(4) and 61(4) SMA 2013 as “successor-in-title”.

The Plaintiff further relied upon clause 14 of the SPA between Urus Untung and the Defendant in contending that the Defendant had assumed liability for all outstanding charges relating to the Office Unit.

Before this Court, the Plaintiff argued that the expression “successor-in-title” under sections 60(4) and 61(4) SMA 2013 should be interpreted broadly so as to include all successive proprietors of the parcel, including the Defendant as the current registered proprietor.

The Plaintiff further relied upon section 4(3) of the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 and authorities such as Kwan Hung Cheong & Anor v Zung Zang Trading Sdn Bhd [2018] 4 MLJ 773 and Zung Zang Trading Sdn Bhd v Kwan Hung Cheong & Anor [2021] 4 MLJ 86 in support of the proposition that words in the singular may include the plural where the statutory context permits such interpretation.

The Plaintiff also relied heavily upon the Court of Appeal decision in Brightvite Sdn Bhd v Pantai Towers Management Corp [2018] 5 MLJ 634 and the High Court decision in Megamore Contract Sdn Bhd v Taman Harbor Trade Center Management Corporation [2018] 1 LNS 2152 in arguing that the purpose of the statutory provisions was to enable management corporations to recover outstanding maintenance charges from current proprietors so that the burden would not ultimately fall upon other parcel owners.

The Defendant resisted the claim on several grounds.

First, the Defendant maintained that it was not the immediate successor-in-title of Faeiz Corporation within the meaning of sections 60(4) and 61(4) SMA 2013 because Urus Untung was the immediate successor proprietor following the auction sale in 2017.

Secondly, the Defendant contended that the Plaintiff had sued the wrong party, having failed to proceed either against Faeiz Corporation or against Urus Untung despite the latter being the immediate successor proprietor after the auction sale.

Thirdly, the Defendant disputed the reliability and accuracy of the Plaintiff’s Statements of Account and contended that the Plaintiff failed to produce supporting documents such as invoices, bills and contemporaneous records necessary to substantiate the alleged outstanding sums.

Fourthly, the Defendant argued that the Plaintiff had delayed for many years before attempting recovery against the Defendant as current proprietor after recovery against the earlier proprietors had become impracticable.

The Defendant also relied upon the earlier interlocutory appellate findings made by Muniandy Kannyappan J in related proceedings arising from the same dispute, wherein His Lordship observed that pursuant to section 60(4) SMA 2013, the claim for outstanding charges ought to be pursued against Faeiz Corporation and thereafter Urus Untung, and not against the Defendant.

The Defendant further relied upon Majlis Agama Islam Negeri Pulau Pinang v Abdul Latiff bin Hassan [2017] MLJU 2044 for the proposition that specific findings made by a superior court remain binding unless overturned or expunged.

After hearing oral testimony from witnesses, considering the documentary evidence and evaluating the submissions of parties, the learned Sessions Court Judge dismissed the Plaintiff’s claim in its entirety with costs.

The Grounds of Judgment prepared by the learned Sessions Court Judge disclosed several principal findings.

Among others, the learned Sessions Court Judge found that:

the Defendant had no sufficient statutory nexus with the debt allegedly incurred by Faeiz Corporation;

the phrase “successor-in-title” under sections 60(4) and 61(4) SMA 2013 referred only to the immediate successor proprietor;

the Plaintiff failed to justify why no action had been taken against Faeiz Corporation or Urus Untung;

clause 14 of the SPA did not render the Defendant liable for historical arrears;

and the Plaintiff failed to prove the alleged outstanding charges through proper documentary proof.

The learned Sessions Court Judge further found that the Plaintiff’s documentary evidence was insufficient to establish the alleged outstanding sums, particularly in the absence of supporting invoices, bills and foundational records corresponding to the Statements of Account relied upon by the Plaintiff.

Dissatisfied with those findings, the Plaintiff advanced several grounds of appeal before this Court through the Memorandum of Appeal dated 2.10.2025.

The Plaintiff essentially contended that the learned Sessions Court Judge had:

erred in law in construing the phrase “successor-in-title” narrowly;

failed to properly appreciate the legislative intention behind sections 60(4) and 61(4) SMA 2013;

wrongly relied upon the earlier interlocutory appellate findings of Muniandy Kannyappan J;

failed to appreciate the effect of clause 14 of the SPA;

and wrongly concluded that the Plaintiff failed to prove the outstanding charges.

The Defendant, meanwhile, urged this Court to affirm the decision of the learned Sessions Court Judge and maintained that the impugned findings were supported by both the evidence and the applicable law, and did not warrant appellate interference. ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION, APPLICABLE APPELLATE

Having considered the Memorandum of Appeal, the respective written submissions of parties, the oral submissions advanced before this Court, the Notes of Proceedings, the documentary evidence contained in the Record of Appeal as well as the Grounds of Judgment of the learned Sessions Court Judge, this Court found that the appeal substantially turns on the following issues.

First, whether the learned Sessions Court Judge had erred in law in interpreting the expression “successor-in-title” under sections 60(4) and 61(4) of the Strata Management Act 2013 (“SMA 2013”) as referring only to the immediate successor proprietor, namely Urus Untung, and not extending further to the Defendant as a subsequent purchaser and current registered proprietor of the Office Unit.

Secondly, whether the learned Sessions Court Judge had erred in relying upon and following the earlier findings made by Muniandy Kannyappan J in the related interlocutory appellate proceedings arising from the same dispute, particularly the findings concerning the meaning and effect of sections 60(4) and 61(4) SMA 2013.

Thirdly, whether the learned Sessions Court Judge had correctly concluded that the Plaintiff failed to prove the alleged outstanding charges amounting to RM284,166.41, particularly in light of the absence of supporting primary documents such as invoices, bills and contemporaneous records underlying the Statements of Account relied upon by the Plaintiff.

Fourthly, whether clause 14 of the Sale and Purchase Agreement dated 5.9.2019 between Urus Untung and the Defendant imposed contractual liability upon the Defendant to settle historical arrears allegedly incurred by previous proprietors.

The principal question before this Court is therefore whether the decision reached by the learned Sessions Court Judge was plainly wrong in law or against the weight of evidence so as to warrant appellate interference.

It is trite that an appellate court does not lightly interfere with findings made by a trial court after a full trial, particularly findings involving the evaluation of oral testimony, assessment of credibility, appreciation of documentary evidence and factual inferences drawn from the totality of the evidence adduced.

The governing principles are well settled in Gan Yook Chin (P) & Anor v Lee Ing Chin @ Lee Teck Seng & Ors [2005] 2 MLJ 1, where the Federal Court explained that the role of an appellate court is not to rehear the matter afresh merely because another conclusion may also be possible on the evidence.

The Federal Court in Gan Yook Chin stated: “In short, the Court of Appeal is only concerned with whether the trial court had arrived at the correct conclusion on the basis of the established facts and the law.”

The Federal Court further emphasised that appellate interference is warranted only where:

the trial judge failed to judicially appreciate the evidence;

material evidence was overlooked;

wrong principles of law were applied;

or the decision was plainly wrong or against the weight of evidence.

The same approach was reiterated in Azman bin Mahmood & Anor v SJ Securities Sdn Bhd [2012] 6 MLJ 1 and Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v Wendy Tan Lee Peng [2020] 12 MLJ 67, both relied upon by the Defendant in resisting the appeal.

This Court therefore approached the present appeal bearing firmly in mind the limited role of an appellate court and the caution repeatedly emphasised by the superior courts against unwarranted appellate interference with findings of fact made after trial.

The appellate restraint principle assumes particular importance in the present appeal because the learned Sessions Court Judge had the advantage of hearing the witnesses directly, observing their demeanour, evaluating the documentary evidence and considering the competing factual positions advanced by both parties after a full trial.

Accordingly, unless it can be shown that the learned Sessions Court Judge had acted upon wrong principles, overlooked material evidence or arrived at findings plainly unsupported by the evidence, this Court ought not to interfere merely because another conclusion may also be open. C. Statutory Framework Under the Strata Management Act 2013

The dispute before this Court centres principally upon the interpretation of sections 60(4) and 61(4) of the SMA 2013.

The Plaintiff relied heavily upon section 52 SMA 2013, which imposes liability upon proprietors to pay charges and sinking fund contributions to the management corporation.

Section 52(1) SMA 2013 provides: “Each proprietor shall pay the Charges, and contribution to the sinking fund, to the management corporation for the maintenance and management of the subdivided building or land and the common property in a development area.”

The Plaintiff further relied upon section 60(4) SMA 2013, which states: “Any Charges imposed under subsection (3) in respect of a parcel shall be due and payable on the passing of a resolution to that effect by the management corporation and in accordance with the terms of that resolution, and may be recovered in the manner set out in section 78 from the proprietor of, or his successor-in-title to, the parcel...”

A similarly worded provision appears in section 61(4) SMA 2013 concerning sinking fund contributions.

The Plaintiff’s position before this Court was that the expression “successor-in-title” should be interpreted broadly to include all successive proprietors of the parcel, including the Defendant as the present registered proprietor.

The Plaintiff further relied upon section 4(3) of the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967, which provides that words in the singular include the plural.

In support of such interpretation, the Plaintiff relied upon Kwan Hung Cheong & Anor v Zung Zang Trading Sdn Bhd [2018] 4 MLJ 773 and Zung Zang Trading Sdn Bhd v Kwan Hung Cheong & Anor [2021] 4 MLJ 86.

The Plaintiff also relied upon the purposive interpretation approach articulated in Perantara Properties Sdn Bhd v JMC-Kelana Square & Anor Appeal [2016] 5 CLJ 367 and contended that the legislative purpose behind sections 60(4) and 61(4) SMA 2013 was to ensure that management corporations are able to recover outstanding maintenance charges from current proprietors so that the burden would not ultimately fall upon other parcel owners.

The Plaintiff also relied substantially upon the Court of Appeal decision in Brightvite Sdn Bhd v Pantai Towers Management Corp [2019] 2 CLJ 439 and the High Court decision in Megamore Contract Sdn Bhd v Taman Harbor Trade Center Management Corporation [2018] 1 LNS 2152 in contending that liability for maintenance charges may extend to current proprietors notwithstanding that the arrears were incurred during earlier periods of ownership.

The Defendant, however, maintained that sections 60(4) and 61(4) SMA 2013 contemplated only the immediate successor proprietor and not an indefinite chain of successive owners extending perpetually into the future.

The Defendant also argued that the specific statutory wording under the SMA 2013 prevailed over the general provisions of the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 pursuant to the principle of generalia specialibus non derogant.

In support of this proposition, the Defendant relied upon Lau Keen Fai v Lim Ban Kay @ Lim Chiam Boon & Anor [2012] 2 MLJ 8.

The Defendant further relied upon Tebin bin Mostapa v Hulba-Danyal bin Balia & Anor [2020] 4 MLJ 721 for the proposition that the words used in a statute best declare Parliament’s intention and where the statutory language is clear, the Court must give effect to it according to its plain meaning.

Parties also differed sharply on the legal effect of the earlier findings made by Muniandy Kannyappan J in related appellate proceedings involving summary judgment.

The Defendant maintained that the specific findings made by Muniandy Kannyappan J remained binding unless set aside or expunged. In support, the Defendant relied upon Majlis Agama Islam Negeri Pulau Pinang v Abdul Latiff bin Hassan [2017] MLJU 2044 for the proposition that specific findings made by a superior court remain binding until overturned.

The Plaintiff, however, argued that the earlier proceedings concerned summary judgment only and therefore could not conclusively determine the issues after a full trial on the merits.

The Court shall now proceed to consider the competing arguments advanced by parties in light of the statutory provisions, the authorities cited and the evidence adduced before the Sessions Court.

Having considered the entirety of the evidence and submissions advanced before this Court, this Court found no basis warranting appellate interference with the learned Sessions Court Judge’s interpretation of sections 60(4) and 61(4) of the Strata Management Act 2013 (“SMA 2013”).

The Plaintiff’s appeal rested substantially upon the contention that the Defendant, as the present registered proprietor of the Office Unit, was liable for all outstanding maintenance charges, sinking fund contributions and related charges accumulated by previous proprietors by reason of the phrase “successor-in-title” appearing in sections 60(4) and 61(4) SMA 2013.

The Plaintiff argued that the phrase “successor-in-title” ought to be interpreted broadly and purposively so as to include all successive proprietors of the parcel, including the Defendant as the current registered proprietor.

In advancing that argument, the Plaintiff relied upon section 4(3) of the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967, which provides that words in the singular include the plural. The Plaintiff further relied upon authorities such as Kwan Hung Cheong & Anor v Zung Zang Trading Sdn Bhd [2018] 4 MLJ 773 and Zung Zang Trading Sdn Bhd v Kwan Hung Cheong & Anor [2021] 4 MLJ 86 in support of the proposition that singular expressions may include the plural where the statutory context permits such interpretation.

The Plaintiff also relied heavily upon the Court of Appeal decision in Brightvite Sdn Bhd v Pantai Towers Management Corp [2018] 5 MLJ 634 and the High Court decision in Megamore Contract Sdn Bhd v Taman Harbor Trade Center Management Corporation [2018] 1 LNS 2152 in contending that the legislative purpose behind sections 60(4) and 61(4) SMA 2013 was to permit recovery against current proprietors so as to prevent other parcel owners from bearing the burden of unpaid maintenance charges.

With respect, this Court was unable to agree with the Plaintiff’s contention.

In the judgment of this Court, the learned Sessions Court Judge was entirely justified in concluding that the statutory phrase “successor-in-title” under sections 60(4) and 61(4) SMA 2013 referred to the immediate successor proprietor and did not extend indefinitely to every subsequent proprietor down an unlimited chain of ownership.

The starting point must necessarily be the wording chosen by Parliament itself. Section 60(4) SMA 2013 provides that charges may be recovered from: “the proprietor of, or his successor-in-title to, the parcel...”

Similarly, section 61(4) adopts the same singular formulation in relation to sinking fund contributions.

The learned Sessions Court Judge attached significance to Parliament’s deliberate use of the singular phrase “successor-in-title” in sections 60(4) and 61(4), while elsewhere in the SMA 2013 Parliament expressly employed plural terminology such as “successors-in-title” in other provisions.

In the view of this Court, the learned Sessions Court Judge cannot be faulted for adopting such an approach. It is a settled principle of statutory interpretation that where Parliament employs different language in different provisions within the same statute, the Court must presume that such distinction was deliberate and intended to convey different meanings.

In this regard, the Defendant correctly relied upon the Federal Court decision in Tebin bin Mostapa v Hulba-Danyal bin Balia [2020] 4 MLJ 721 where the Federal Court reiterated that the words used in a statute best declare Parliament’s intention and where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, effect must be given to it according to its plain meaning.

The learned Sessions Court Judge was therefore entitled to attach weight to the precise wording employed by Parliament. More importantly, the interpretation adopted by the learned Sessions Court Judge was supported by the Court of Appeal decision in Brightvite Sdn Bhd v Pantai Towers Management Corp [2018]

The Defendant relied upon the following passage in Brightvite: “the section envisages that the debt may be recovered from two ‘parties’ as it were, namely the existing proprietor or the proprietor’s successor in title.”

In the judgment of this Court, the learned Sessions Court Judge was entitled to conclude that the reasoning in Brightvite did not support a perpetual extension of liability to all future proprietors without limit.

Had Parliament intended such continuing and indefinite liability to attach to every subsequent purchaser regardless of remoteness from the original debt, Parliament could easily have said so expressly. Parliament did not do so.

Instead, the statutory structure under sections 60(4) and 61(4) SMA 2013 contemplates recovery from:

the proprietor who incurred the debt; or

the proprietor’s successor-in-title.

In the present case, the evidence clearly established that Urus Untung was the immediate successor proprietor following the acquisition of the Office Unit through public auction in 2017.

The Defendant only acquired the Office Unit later in 2019 pursuant to the SPA with Urus Untung and became registered proprietor in 2020.The chronology of ownership therefore strongly supported the earned Sessions Court Judge’s conclusion that Urus Untung — and not the Defendant — constituted the relevant “successor-in-title” contemplated under sections 60(4) and 61(4) SMA 2013 in relation to liabilities allegedly incurred by Faeiz Corporation.

This Court also found merit in the learned Sessions Court Judge’s concern that an unlimited interpretation of “successor-in-title” would lead to unreasonable and inequitable consequences.

If the Plaintiff’s interpretation were accepted, management corporations would effectively possess unrestricted discretion to pursue any subsequent proprietor many years or even decades after the original debt arose, regardless of intervening transactions, passage of time or the failure to proceed against the actual defaulting proprietor.

Such an interpretation would expose downstream purchasers to substantial historical liabilities accumulated long before their ownership, even where opportunities for recovery against earlier proprietors had not been pursued. In the judgment of this Court, the learned Sessions Court Judge was entitled to regard such a result as inconsistent with fairness and commercial certainty.

The Plaintiff’s reliance on section 4(3) of the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 also did not materially assist the appeal.

As correctly submitted by the Defendant, the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant is applicable. The Defendant relied upon Lau Keen Fai v Lim Ban Kay @ Lim Chiam Boon & Anor [2012] 2 MLJ 8 in support of this proposition.

Where Parliament has enacted a specific statutory framework governing recovery of maintenance charges and sinking fund contributions under the SMA 2013, the specific statutory wording cannot simply be expanded by general interpretive provisions in a manner inconsistent with the structure and language of the legislation itself.

This Court was therefore satisfied that the learned Sessions Court Judge committed no error in rejecting the Plaintiff’s expansive interpretation of the phrase “successor-in-title”.

The Plaintiff next contended that the learned Sessions Court Judge erred in relying upon the earlier findings made by Muniandy Kannyappan J in related interlocutory proceedings involving summary judgment.

The Plaintiff argued that the earlier proceedings merely concerned the existence of triable issues and therefore ought not to have influenced the ultimate determination after a full trial.

Again, this Court was unable to agree.

The learned Sessions Court Judge did not simply adopt the earlier interlocutory findings without independent consideration. Rather, the learned Sessions Court Judge considered those findings as part of the overall legal context surrounding the dispute, particularly where the earlier High Court decision had already examined the same statutory provisions and the same chronology of ownership involving the same parties and parcel.

More importantly, the Defendant correctly distinguished between:

reliance upon the existence of the earlier decision itself; and

reliance upon the specific findings made therein.

The earlier High Court findings included the following express observation: “the claim for outstanding charges... cannot be pursued against the defendant, but FCB or UUSB...”

The learned Sessions Court Judge was entitled to consider such findings, particularly given that the Court of Appeal subsequently dismissed the appeal against Muniandy Kannyappan J’s decision.

The Defendant further relied upon Majlis Agama Islam Negeri Pulau Pinang v Abdul Latiff bin Hassan [2017] MLJU 2044 for the proposition that specific findings made by a superior court remain binding unless expunged or overturned.

In any event, even leaving aside the earlier interlocutory findings altogether, this Court was independently satisfied that the learned Sessions Court Judge’s conclusions were sustainable on the evidence and law before the Court.

The present appellate decision does not rest solely upon the earlier interlocutory proceedings. The conclusions reached by the learned Sessions Court Judge were independently supported by:

the statutory wording;

the chronology of ownership;

the reasoning in Brightvite; and

the evidential deficiencies surrounding the Plaintiff’s claim.

This Court therefore found no appellate error in the learned Sessions Court Judge’s treatment of the earlier findings made by Muniandy Kannyappan J.

Even assuming for the sake of argument that the Plaintiff’s interpretation of sections 60(4) and 61(4) SMA 2013 was sustainable, the appeal nevertheless encountered another significant evidential difficulty.

The learned Sessions Court Judge found that the Plaintiff failed to satisfactorily prove the alleged outstanding charges amounting to

Having reviewed the evidence, this Court found no basis to disturb that conclusion. The Plaintiff’s claim involved alleged arrears stretching back to approximately 1999. The claim spanned multiple proprietors, different management entities and numerous years of alleged charges, interest and related sums.

Yet the Plaintiff’s primary reliance was essentially on Statements of Account and Debtor Aging Reports. The Defendant consistently challenged the reliability and accuracy of those accounts throughout the proceedings.

The learned Sessions Court Judge specifically found that:

the Statements of Account reflected inconsistencies;

certain charges appeared irregular;

supporting documents such as invoices and bills were not produced; and

no satisfactory explanation was given for the absence of such records.

The Defendant repeatedly requested supporting documents from the Plaintiff, yet the evidence showed that such documents were not furnished.

In the judgment of this Court, the learned Sessions Court Judge was fully justified in treating this omission seriously. A claim exceeding RM284,000 spanning more than two decades cannot simply rest upon internally generated account statements without adequate documentary substantiation, particularly where the claim itself is vigorously disputed.

The burden remained squarely upon the Plaintiff under sections 101 to 103 of the Evidence Act 1950. In this regard, the Defendant relied upon Aik Ming (M) Sdn Bhd v Chang Ching Chuen [1995] 2 MLJ 770 and Chip Lam Seng Enterprise Bhd v Euphoria Technologies Sdn Bhd & Anor [2017] 10 MLJ 796 in relation to the burden of proof resting upon the party asserting the claim.

The Plaintiff’s failure to adduce supporting invoices, notices, bills and foundational records corresponding to the alleged charges materially weakened the evidential foundation of the claim.

The learned Sessions Court Judge, having heard the witnesses and evaluated the documentary evidence firsthand, was entitled to conclude that the Plaintiff failed to discharge that burden.

This Court found no misdirection or plainly erroneous evaluation of evidence that would justify appellate interference.

Having considered the appeal in its entirety, this Court was satisfied that the Plaintiff failed to demonstrate any basis warranting appellate intervention.

The learned Sessions Court Judge:

correctly appreciated the chronology of ownership;

properly considered the statutory framework;

carefully evaluated the evidential shortcomings in the Plaintiff’s claim; and

arrived at findings which were reasonably open on the evidence before the Court.

This was not a case where the learned Sessions Court Judge ignored material evidence, misunderstood the law or arrived at findings plainly against the weight of evidence.

On the contrary, the Grounds of Judgment disclosed a careful evaluation of both factual and legal issues arising in the dispute. The Plaintiff’s appeal essentially invited this Court to re-evaluate the evidence afresh and substitute a different interpretation and conclusion merely because another view might also be possible.

That, however, is not the function of an appellate court. Applying the principles in Gan Yook Chin & Anor v Lee Ing Chin & Ors [2005] 2 MLJ 1, Azman bin Mahmood & Anor v SJ Securities Sdn Bhd [2012] 6 MLJ 1 and Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v Wendy Tan Lee Peng & Ors [2020] 12 MLJ 67, this Court was not persuaded that the learned Sessions Court Judge had acted upon wrong principles, overlooked material evidence or arrived at conclusions plainly unsustainable on the evidence.

Accordingly, this Court found no reason to disturb the decision of the learned Sessions Court Judge.

The appeal was therefore dismissed with costs of RM5,000 to the Defendant (Respondent). Dated 28 May 2025 -sgd-ANITA BINTI HARUN JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER HIGH COURT OF MALAYA SHAH ALAM SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN To the parties’ solicitors: For the Appellant : Tan Leng (Messrs T.J. Chin & Co.) For the Respondent : Prabhkirat Singh (Messrs Mohana Krishnan)