the award is an award on agreed terms under s 32. [28] The learned counsel for Kebabangan argued that the duty to give reasons is not part of natural justice and that a failure to provide reasons is merely an error of law. The ratio in CVV, the Singapore case relied on by the learned counsel for Kebabangan, is that the inadequate provision of reasons and explanations is, at the very most, a mere error of law. In short, an allegation of the same, on its own, is incapable of sustaining a challenge against the entirety of an award. [29] In our view, the failure of the Tribunal is more than mere failing to provide adequate reasons and explanations. It is beyond that. As alluded to earlier, the Final Award, even taken at its highest, does not inform the parties of the basis in which the Tribunal arrived at its decision with respect to the quantification of Claim 1. At the risk of being repetitive, the Award does not explain how did the Tribunal reach the sum of RM17,241,178.02, being the component sub-claims and whether Kebabangan has proven its loss for the purpose of assessment and quantification of the same amount. This is even more so considering Kebabangan’s expert itself stood on record in assessing Kebabangan’s claim at a much lower amount in the sum of RM14,162,655. [30] Make no mistake. It is trite that a tribunal, just like a court, is not bound to accept expert evidence. However, if an expert opinion is accepted or rejected, a tribunal must give a cogent reason for doing so; see United Asian Bank Bhd v Tai Soon Heng Construction Sdn Bhd [1993] 1 MLJ 182 SC. In the instant appeal, the arbitral Tribunal did not assign any reason, let alone a cogent one, in awarding a sum much higher than the assessment made by Kebabangan’s own expert witness. [31] In our considered view, such a departure, without assigning any reasons thereto, is more than a mere error of law. It goes beyond that. It comes within the ambit of Art 34(3) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and s 33(3) of the AA. A challenge on the award can, therefore, be sustained. Conclusion [32] The Federal Court in Jan De Nul (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor v Vincent Tan Chee Yioun & Anor [2019] 2 MLJ 413 FC made it clear that s 37(2)(b)(ii) of the AA specifically categorises a breach of the rules of natural justice which occurred in connection with the making of an arbitral award as being in conflict with the public policy of Malaysia. If established, as in the instant appeal, it can be a ground to set aside an arbitral award. [33] We therefore agree with the findings of the learned Judge that: