Kehzen Engineering Sdn Bhd v Setia Precast Sdn Bhd (WA-22C-90-12/2023)

The Defendant in the present action has on 2.9.2025 filed an application (“Enclosure 345”) pursuant to Order 57 Rule 1 of the ROC 2012 and/or inherent jurisdiction of this Court to transfer above suit (“Suit”) to the KL High Court Construction Court 2 (“Transfer Application”). Effectively, the Transfer Application was an application to recuse me from hearing the above Suit on the grounds of “real danger of bias.” 2 Background facts

On 29.11.2024, as part of pre-trial case management, the Suit has been fixed for full trial for 10 days i.e. from 17 to 21.11.2025 & from 24 to 28.11.2025 wherein the current status is that, a total 13 to 14 witnesses (including 5 expert witnesses) have been slated to be called to give evidence during the trial.

On or about 18.8.2025, vide telephone conversation, the Plaintiff’s solicitors had made the initial 2 disclosures to the Defendant’s solicitors, i.e. a) the Plaintiff’s solicitors’ senior associate, Ms. Kresha Paskeran was a senior associate of my former firm, Messrs. Rajes Hisham Rahim & Gopal (“Former Firm”) some 2 years ago and b) the managing partner of the Plaintiff’s solicitors, Mr. Benjamin Dawson (“Mr. Dawson”) had provided a character testimony letter to Bar Council as part of the Judicial Appointments Commission(“JAC”)’s vetting process for my application as a Judicial Commissioner(“JC”) late last year (“Disclosure 1& 2”).

I was posted to the Kuala Lumpur High Court Construction Court 1 on 18.8.2025 and the above Suit was fixed before me on 26.8.2025 for the hearing of 2 interlocutory applications filed by the Plaintiff i.e. Encl. 317 for discovery and Encl. 322 for re-re-amendment of the Statement of Claim. Further the matter was also fixed for case management for further directions of the court pending the impending trial. 3 [5] Based on the above Disclosure 1 & 2, when the matter came before me on 26.8.2025, the Defendant's Solicitors orally sought the Court’s direction if I am willing to transfer the hearing of the Suit to the Construction Court 2 (“CC2”) on the basis that the Defendant’s contention that there appears to be “a real danger of bias”, or Defendant is required to put in formal application for my recusal.

I made my position known to the parties that past professional relationships alone is insufficient for automatic recusal and only cases where there appears immediate family/close relatives connection between the Judge/JC warrant mandatory recusal. I also informed the parties of the court’s concern given the Suit has already been fixed for 10-days trial as stated above and that Justice Tuan Azlan bin Sulaiman's diary for CC2 would equally be packed with trial dates and next available dates potentially in July 2026.

Further I also made it known to the parties that I am confident with my ability to be professional and remain impartial and being able to decide the Suit based on the issues at hand and will not be bias towards any one party. In any event, I informed the Defendant’s solicitors that a formal application is required and that this Court cannot grant informal oral transfer request.

I gave directions to the parties on the filing of affidavits and submissions and had fixed the matter to be heard on 18.9.2025. On the same date i.e. 26.8.2025, I had informed the parties that in view of the impending Transfer Application, Encls. 317 & 322 would be stayed and not reviewed by the Court until the disposal of the Transfer Application. 4 [9] Prior to the filing of the Defendant’s Transfer Application, the Plaintiff's solicitors vide letter dated 29.8.2025 emailed to the Defendant’s solicitors, confirmed the telephone conversation on 18.8.2025 regarding the 1 &2 Disclosure and also disclosed to the Defendant’s Solicitors that Mr. Dawson appeared as Counsel for a matter in 2022, instructed by my Former Firm, where I was a partner of the firm at the material time(“3rd Disclosure”) (1 & 2 Disclosure and 3rd Disclosure are collectively referred to as “Disclosures”).

The relevant cause papers for Encl. 345 are as follow:- i. the Affidavit In Support of Chan Tah Seong affirmed on 2.9.2025 - Encl. 346 (“Defendant's Affidavit”); ii. the Affidavit In Opposition of Khow Chye Beng affirmed on 8.9.2025 - Encl. 351 (“Plaintiff’s Affidavit”); Upon the hearing of Transfer Application on 18.9.2025, I fixed the matter for the decision on 26.9.2025.

On 26.9.2025, I delivered my broad grounds wherein I dismissed the Transfer Application with no orders as to costs. Aggrieved by my decision, the Defendant has filed an appeal on 8.10.2025 to the Court of Appeal. Following are my full grounds pursuant to the Defendant’s Appeal. 5 Defendant’s case for transfer/recusal (Encl. 345)

Based on the Defendant’s Affidavit and submission filed, the Transfer Application was grounded on: a) the above Disclosure would lead to a real danger of bias on my part as a JC that I might unfairly regard with favour, or disfavour, the case of the Defendant to the issue or matter under my consideration. b) My purported association with the Plaintiff’s counsel might give rise to the appearance of impropriety, of unfairness or bias hence it I should disqualify myself and not leave the matter dependent upon whether or not the parties raise objections, and c) the Suit would be fairly tried in CC2 in the interests of justice as there were no potential conflicts of interest disclosed in relation to Justice Azlan bin Sulaiman as the CC2 Judge despite the fact Justice Azlan has tried to mediate the Suit previously.

The Plaintiff’s objections to the said Transfer Application as stated in the Plaintiff’s Affidavit were premised upon the following: a) The relationship between Ms. Paskaren and myself due to past employment is historical and it is unrelated to the Suit. b) Mr. Dawson’s previous appearance as Counsel for my former Firm, is similarly historical, and it is unconnected to the present dispute between the parties and c) The mere fact that Mr. Dawson had provided a testimonial of good character to Bar Council in relation to my application as a JC without more, does not suggest any improper influence or bias in the adjudication of the Suit. 6 [14] The Plaintiff’s solicitors further submitted that “a judge appointed from the Bar or legal service will, by virtue of their professional background, be acquainted with members of the legal fraternity. Hence such familiarity, friendship, or prior employment associations do not, per se, constitute disqualifying factors warranting recusal.

It is also the Plaintiff’s solicitors’ submission that, the Defendant has failed to show, in the Defendant’s Affidavit, any financial interest, direct involvement or personal connection - whether through counsel or litigant, that could reasonably compromise my impartiality as the presiding JC.

In respect of the Defendant’s contention as stated in the Defendant’s Affidavit that the Suit would be fairly tried in CC2, the Plaintiff strictly denied the Defendant’s contention on the basis that if the recusal were permitted on the basis as suggested by the Defendant then it would set a precedent that effectively bar all counsels from Messrs. Benjamin Dawson from appearing before me, regardless of the absence of any actual or perceived conflict or impropriety.

The Plaintiff also averred in their Affidavit that such basis of transfer to CC2 would undermine the presumption of judicial impartiality and result in undue delay in the prosecution of the Plaintiff’s claim. Further, given the scheduling constraints of CC2, it is highly improbable that equivalent trial dates can be accommodated on such short notice, thereby prejudicing the Plaintiff’s right to timely adjudication. 7 Transfer Application pursuant to Order 57 Rule 1 of Rule of Court 2012 (“ROC”)

Based the Encl. 345 and the Affidavits filed by the respective parties, I will first address whether the Transfer Application for my recusal itself is an appropriate application to be considered by this Court pursuant to Order 57 Rule 1 of ROC.

Upon my review of authorities on the Transfer Application, I came across the decision of Justice Ong Chee Wan (as his Lordship then was) in the case of Koh Heng Jin Holdings Sdn Bhd & Anor v Lee Quan Yoong & Anor [2022] 1 LNS 504, wherein Lordship dealt with the issue of jurisdiction for his Lordship’s commercial court to order a transfer a suit to another Court within the same Division and within the same High Court in Kuala Lumpur as opposed to a transfer from one branch of the High Court to another branch of the High Court. His Lordship’s attention was brought to the passage in Kerajaan Negeri Kelantan v. Petroleum Nasional Berhad & Anor [2011] 6 CLJ 649 (“Petronas Case”) where the Court of Appeal held: “[14] It is abundantly clear to us that Item 12 is inapplicable where, eg, as in the instant appeal, there was no transfer of proceedings from one High Court to another High Court as defined in s. 3 above. If at all there was any “transfer” of proceedings, at most, it was a transfer of the plaintiff’s action from one division i.e., the commercial division to another division, the civil division. As a matter of fact, the movement of the plaintiff’s action was effected by the managing judge pursuant to the PD, merely from the commercial division to the 8 civil division, while the court remained unchanged i.e., the High Court in Malaya at Kuala Lumpur. That being the case, the plaintiff’s contention based on item 12 cannot be sustained.”

His Lordship stated that the said Petronas Case, the COA expressly held that item 12 of the Schedule to Section 25(2) of the CJA 1964 on the powers of the High Court to transfer does not apply to the transfer from one Division of a branch of the High Court to another High Court within the same Division of the same branch.

Hence his Lordship held that his Lordship was bound by the Petronas Case and further held that his Lordship’s Court has no jurisdiction to transfer the suit to another High Court within the same Division of the High Court at Kuala Lumpur under Order 57 of the ROC.

Further , I also refer to the case of Hisham Bin Halim v. Maya Binti Ahmad Fuaad & 4 others [2022] 1 LNS 2596 wherein it involved the case where the Applicant filed a notice of application to move the court, Kuala Lumpur BKK 1 to transfer the judicial review suit from BKK1 (“JR 1”) to K. Lumpur BKK 2(“JR 2”), inter alia , on the ground that based on the grounds of judgment of Justice Dato’ Ahmad Kamal Md Shahid (as his Lordship then was) for the Stay Application (Enclosure 53), appears to prejudge the merits of the substantive issues in JR 1 so as to necessitate a transfer of proceedings on the basis of bias.

His Lordship in dismissing the Applicant’s application held that the principles governing the exercise of power to transfer proceedings 9 are set out in Order 57 of the ROC wherein, the burden is cast upon the applicant to satisfy the court that the proceedings ought to be so transferred on grounds of convenience, appropriateness and fair trial. His Lordship further held that the threshold for an application for the recusal of a judge is different from the applicable threshold to transfer proceedings. The test applicable in an application for the recusal of a judge is that of the “real danger of bias” test. Hence the test applicable to the transfer of proceedings, is vastly different from the test of the ‘real danger of bias’.

Hence, His Lordship held that “Given the disparity in the nature and weight in the applicable test for an application for the transfer of proceedings as compared to that for an application to recuse a judge, I am of the view that it is entirely inappropriate to conflate the two under the Notice of Application in Enclosure 172. The Applicant should have made an application for recusal under the appropriate provisions of the law and guided by the appropriate test rather than making an application for recusal by collateral application.”

Based of the above 2 authorities and given that this Court is equally bound by the Petronas Case, I am constraint to hear the Defendant’s Transfer Application under Order 57 Rule 1 ROC.

Since the Defendant in the said Transfer Application has also referred to Order 92 Rule 4 of ROC , in the interest of justice, I will now consider the Defendant’s application for my recusal under the inherent jurisdiction of this court (see Federal Court’s decision in 10 Ann Joo Steel Bhd v Pengarah Tanah & Galian Negeri Pulau Pinang & Anor [2019] 9 CLJ 153).

In respect of the applicable legal test for recusal i.e. 'real danger of bias' in Malaysia, the same has been laid down in the Federal Court’s cases of Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang v. Syarikat Bekerjasama-sama Serbaguna Sungai Gelugor Dengan Tanggungan [1999] 3 CLJ 65 (“MPPP Case”) and reiterated in 3 FC cases. i.e Mohamad Ezam bin Mohd Nor & Ors v Ketua Polis Negara [2001] 2 MLJ 481,Dato' Tan Heng Chew v. Tan Kim Hor & Another Appeal [2006] 1 CLJ 577; [2006] 2 MLJ 293 and in Public Prosecutor v Tengku Adnan bin Tengku Mansor [2020] 5 MLJ 220.

The Federal Court in MPPP Case at pp 69-70 adopted the concept of ‘real danger of bias’ test as explained by Lord Goff in R v Gough [1993] AC 646 at page 670 as follows: “Accordingly, having ascertained the relevant circumstances, the court should ask itself whether, having regard to those circumstances, there was a real danger of bias on the part of the relevant member of the tribunal in question, in the sense that he might unfairly regard '(or have unfairly regarded) with favour, or disfavour, the case of a party to the issue under consideration by him.” 11 [29] Further the Federal Court also stated that it is also important to note that the question of bias has to be answered by considering all the facts not merely by reference to the view of the hypothetical reasonable man (R v Gough, per Lord Goff, at p 670D-E), and that having given careful consideration to the matter, it preferred the test of apparent bias given in R v Gough ('the real danger of bias' test) as this will avoid setting aside of judgment upon some “insubstantial grounds and the flimsiest pretexts of bias”.

I also refer to the authority cited by the Plaintiff i.e. Glomac Resources Sdn. Bhd. v Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan [2016] 9 MLJ 584 (“Glomac Case”) where Justice Nantha Balan ((as his Lordship then was) observed the following:

The recusal application in its present form has wide implications and ramifications to the administration of justice in this country. It raises an obvious practical problem and is one that affects or impacts upon members of Judiciary regardless of whether they are appointed from the practising Bar or from the legal and judicial services.

The basis upon which the recusal is sought, if taken to its logical conclusion, would mean that judges should not hear matters where counsel or the federal counsel/senior federal counsel appearing before them were at one time their colleague, whether from the same law firm or from the Attorney General’s chambers.

In this regard, it is interesting to note that the Judiciary in England and Wales does not view past association as an 12 impediment to a judge’s ability to discharge his or her duty impartially and this is expressed quite clearly in Part 7.2.4 of the Chapter on ‘personal relationships and perceived bias’ in the Guide to Judicial Conduct 2013 published by the Judiciary of England and Wales where it states that:

7.2.4 Friendship or past professional association with counsel or solicitor acting for a party is not generally to be regarded as a sufficient reason for disqualification. [31] Based on the factual matrix, his Lordship, Justice Nantha Balan then applied the the ‘real danger of bias’ test and held : “[29] But, if the implicit suggestion by the first defendant is that counsel who are friends of the judge should not appear in a matter where the judge is presiding, then I must register my utmost deprecation to such a suggestion as it implies that the judge will not be able to hear a matter fairly merely because counsel for one of the parties happens to be a friend. In this regard, it is imperative for me to emphasise in no uncertain terms that judges are only beholden to their constitutional oath of office and are guided by the judges code of ethics and lastly by their own conscience and moral compass. They are not beholden to their friends. Hence, if counsel appearing before any judge harbours an expectation or hope that rulings will be in his favour because of a friendship, then he is a friend not worth having and in any event, it will be misplaced hope on the part of the friend, as judges in discharging their constitutional duties, are blind and impervious to any underlying friendship or past association as partners or colleagues or acquaintances from legal practice. [30] As for a judge’s familiarity with counsel appearing before him, it is obvious enough that the position of the judge who is appointed from the Bar or from the legal and judicial services is such that due to their previous professional background, they may know one or the other or both counsel. In some cases the judge may know counsel very well and they could be friends. But as I have stated earlier, friendship per se, is not necessarily a disqualifying factor.” [32] I also refer to the English Court of Appeal case of Locabail (UK) Ltd v Bayfield Properties Ltd [2000] 2 WLR 870 (CA) (“Locabail Case”) which was referred in the above Glomac Case and several other reported cases wherein it was held : “(25) It would be dangerous and futile to attempt to define or list the factors which may or may not give rise to a real danger of bias. Everything will depend on the facts, which may include the nature of the issue to be decided. We cannot, however, conceive of circumstances in which an objection could be soundly based on the religion, ethnic or national origin, gender, age, class, means or sexual orientation of the judge. Nor, at any rate ordinarily, could an objection be soundly based on the judge’s social or educational or service or employment background or history, nor that of any member of the judge’s family; or previous political associations……..; or membership of social or sporting or charitable bodies………..or previous receipt of instructions to act for or against any party, solicitor or advocate engaged in a case before him; or membership of the same Inn, circuit, local Law Society or chambers (KFTCIC v Icori Estero SpA (Court of Appeal of Paris, June 28, 1991, International Arbitration Report Vol 6 # 8 8/91)). By contrast, a real danger of bias might well be thought to arise if there were personal friendship or animosity between the judge and any member of the public involved in the case; or if the judge were closely acquainted with any member of the public involved in the case, particularly if the credibility of that individual could be significant in the decision of the case; [33] Another relevant case which was referred in the Glomac Case was the case Michael Chow Keat Thye v Suruhanjaya Sekuriti Malaysia & Anor [2013] 10 CLJ 505 (“Micheal Chow Case”), which, his Lordship, Justice Nantha Balan was of view that the decision of Micheal Chow Case’s is instructive on the issue of recusal. [34] His Lordship in the Glomac Case stated that the Michael Chow Case was “a case where a shareholder applied for judicial review with respect to a ruling that was made by Suruhanjaya Sekuriti Malaysia. The presiding judge in that case was Abang Iskandar J (as he then was) and he was previously employed by Suruhanjaya Sekuriti Malaysia as its head of enforcement/prosecution. But he declined to recuse himself in circumstances where an objection was taken that he had not declared that he was at one time employed by Suruhanjaya Sekuriti Malaysia. The decision of the learned judge in that case to refuse a recusal was upheld by the Court of Appeal. [35] His Lordship then quoted from a passage in the judgment of the High Court in the Micheal Chow Case which referred to the Locabail Case and held as follows: “To my mind from that Locabail’s case, it is clear that past associations including a mere past history of employment is never sufficient as valid ground to premise an objection founded on a real danger of bias on the part of the judge. In addition to that past association, there must be a clear nexus between the judge and the circumstances surrounding the making of the impugned decision before a duty to disclose arises for him to appraise the parties before him of his role in the impugned decision. In this case presently before this court, it was not only remote, there was no inkling, neither was there an iota of evidence, to even form any basis upon which any form of relationship could possibly be conjured between the judge and the first respondent of a nature which would render it capable of being construed as one that had posed a real danger of bias on the part of the judge such that his capacity to hear this case wholly untenable and such that he must recuse himself accordingly. The fact of the matter is that, in my considered view, there is nothing in the whole scheme of things pertaining to this case, which would have obligated the judge to disclose to the parties of the fact that he was at one point of time in his career in the employment of the first respondent. Application Of The Law To The Facts Of The Instant Case [36] Hence applying the above applicable legal principle regarding cases, the core question is "whether, having regard to the facts and circumstances, is there a real danger of bias on my part, in the sense that I might unfairly regard (or have unfairly regarded) with favour, or disfavour, the case of the Defendant? Acknowledgment and Examination of Disclosures: [37] Based on the Plaintiff’s Affidavit, I take note that the Plaintiff's Solicitors has made timely and transparent Disclosures regarding my past professional associations with Mr. Dawson and Ms. Kresha. I would then apply the "real danger of bias" test to the Disclosures as below. [38] Nature of Associations: The professional associations cited are characterised as "historical”, and unrelated to the present dispute. Ms. Kresha was a senior associate of my Former Firm and she attended to litigation matters with all the partners of the Former Firm and was not directly under me. She had no management role in the Former Firm and left the firm more than 2 years ago. [39] My relationship with Mr. Dawson was purely a professional one as a practitioner 3 years senior than me in practice at the material time. Prior to my appointment as a JC, I was in active practice for 34 years. As part of the legal fraternity at the material time, it is common for senior members of the Bar such Mr. Dawson and myself to engage each other in respect general interaction pertaining to legal matters from time to time. Such associations do not, without more, lead to real danger of bias years later if a member of the Bar is appointed as a JC. [40] There is no suggestions of any links between myself and the Parties in the suit before me. There is no direct and current connection to the substantive issues before me in the present case. [41] As pointed out by His Lordship, Justice Nantha Balan in the Glomac Case, such basis upon which the recusal is sought, ‘if taken to its logical conclusion, would mean that judges should not hear matters where counsel or the federal counsel/senior federal counsel appearing before them were at one time their colleague, whether from the same law firm or from the Attorney General’s chambers.” This would also be extended to former judges who resumed practice after their retirement. [42] Testimonial of Good Character: The testimonial by Mr. Dawson was provided to the Bar Council (in his personal capacity as a senior member of the Malaysian Bar of some 37 years of standing) at my request upon receiving such request from the Bar Council to provide 2 testimonials from senior members of the Bar as part of a vetting process by JAC for judicial appointments. It was provided to BC prior to JAC shortlisting me and another 17 candidates for the formal interview and written test in January 2025. Certainly, it was not in the context of influencing any specific legal proceedings. [43] Based on the Defendant’s Affidavit and submission, it would appear to me that the basis of real danger of bias in respect of Mr. Dawson providing the letter to Bar Council is that I might favour the Plaintiff out of gratitude for Mr. Dawson’s testimonial of good character in support of my appointment. If this is the basis of the Defendant’s contention that as a JC I would disregard my judicial oath and act partially on account of a testimonial letter provided by a member of a Bar , then I must disappoint the Defendant that such “leap of faith” falls short of the legal threshold for recusal. [44] One-off Engagement: The single instance of Mr. Dawson appearing as counsel some 3.5 years ago in responding to an appeal in the Court of Appeal for a matter (which has no bearing or connection to the present suit) at my former firm where I was a partner is a purely a professional interaction, but its isolated nature and the time elapsed diminish any potential for it to create a real danger of bias in the current proceeding. [45] Absence of Other Compromising Factors: As per the Defendant’s Affidavit, apart from the fact that I am unable to detect any evidence that might provide a clue of the real danger of bias, I also find that the Defendant has not presented any evidence of "financial interest, personal involvement, or familial relationship – whether through counsel or litigant, that could reasonably compromise my impartiality in hearing the Suit. [46] Uphold Judicial Impartiality and Duty to Sit: I refer to the Plaintiff’s Affidavit which I have alluded above and I agree with the Plaintiff’s position that if the recusal is to be permitted based on the Defendant’s contention, the logical conclusion would be that all counsels from Messrs. Benjamin Dawson would be barred from appearing before me in Construction Court 1 notwithstanding the absence of any actual or perceived conflict or impropriety on my part with the law firm. I am of the view that such situation would undermine the presumption of judicial impartiality not to mention the administration of justice would be disrupted in particular in the construction court in Kuala Lumpur. [47] I am mindful of the caution spelt out by the Court of Appeal in Wong Kie Chie & Ors v. Kathryn Ma Wai Fong [2017] 3 MLJ 350 against the practice of judge-shopping via recusal. Whilst it is important that justice must be seen to be done, judges must also discharge their duties to sit and do not accede too readily to suggestions of appearance of bias. I also be mindful of the duty to sit, unless proper grounds for recusal exist, as highlighted in Mohamad Ezam Mohd Nor referred above. [48] I would reiterate the principle that judges are presumed to act impartially and that prior professional relationships from the Bar or legal services are not, in themselves, disqualifying factors. [49] Judicial Oath: I took my judicial oath as a Judicial Commissioner on 13.8.2025. As held in PP v. Tengku Adnan Tengku Mansor [2020] case referred above, Nallini Pathmanathan FCJ (as her Ladyship then was) had reiterated that a judge takes the judicial oath of office, which requires adherence to the Federal Constitution. A judge is, therefore, beholden to the oath he takes pursuant to article 124 of the Federal Constitution, read together with the Sixth Schedule of the same, that is, to ‘discharge the duties of that office to the best of his ability’. I therefore hold the judicial oath is the foundational cornerstone of my appointment as a JC and would be uphold at all times. [50] In respect of the authorities referred by Defendant’s solicitors in its submissions in respect of the recusal application. In the cases of Dato’ Seri Ir. Hj. Mohammad Nizar v Dato Dr Zamry bin Abd Kadir [2009] 1 LNS 1827 and Dato’ Dr Joseph Evavelly v Dato’ Hilmi Mohd Nor & Ors [2011] 3 CLJ 294, I am of the view the factual matrix of these cases are distinguishable from the present case . in the said 2 decisions, the learned Judges in the respective cases ultimately decided that given the circumstances of the respective matters before the court, justice would be best served with their recusal. In the case of AWG Group Ltd & anor v Morrison & anor [2006] 1 WLR 1163, the appellate court took the view that the close relationship between the presiding judge and one of the witnesses should have amounted to an automatic recusal on the part of the judge. Conclusion [51] Based on the application of the "real danger of bias" test to the specific facts presented in the parties’ respective Affidavits, I would conclude that the circumstances disclosed do not meet the legal threshold required to establish a real danger of bias. [52] The associations are either historical or professional in nature and do not demonstrate a likelihood of unfair favor or disfavor in the present case. [53] Therefore, I dismiss Enclosure 345 , the Defendant’s application for transfer and to recuse myself from hearing this present Suit, as there is no basis to conclude that a fair-minded and informed observer would apprehend a real danger of bias. I make no orders as to costs. Dated 26th September 2025 sgd. RAJES RAGHAVJI JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER HIGH COURT CONSTRUCTION COURT 1 KUALA LUMPUR COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFF: Koh San Tee, Kevin Prakash, Tan Hui Ru and Tan Sze Ting (Messrs Benjamin Dawson) COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANT: Agesh Krishendra Jayaratnam, Nezwan Helmy Hamzah (Messrs Zul Rafique & Partners)