This quotation is valid for 24 hours only; and 13. This quotation is subject to change without notice.” [23] The Quotation is subjected to confirmation of order by the Defendant with the approved shop drawings and letter of credit (LC) where 30% deposit is to be made upon confirmation. This Court finds that based on the Purchase Order issued by the Defendant on the same day, stating with the payment terms of 60 days, differ from the payment terms as per Appendix 1 of the Quotation. [24] The terms of Appendix 1 is part of the Quotation where it is clearly stated, “should be read in conjunction with this quotation” (page 162 of Appeal Record). The language of clause 4 is simply the terms where the delivery is 3 months from confirmation of order by the Defendant together 16 with the approved shop drawings and “Received LC whichever is later”. This Court viewed that the Defendant is required to fulfil clause 4 for the delivery to be allowed. [25] Accordingly, the payment term is firstly, 30% deposit upon confirmation of order following clause 5, to be fulfilled. It is pertinent to note that based on clauses 4 and 5 of the Quotation, prior to the payment of the deposit, there must be confirmation of order communicated by the Defendantin order for the booking of copper to be executed (page 53 of Appeal Record). [26] This Court evaluated the Quotation and the Purchase Order tested with the oral testimony of the Plaintiff’s witnesses. The Plaintiff’s witness, SP1, testified in examination-in-chief that the proof of Defendant’s acceptance is by the Defendant’s issuance of Purchase Order to the Plaintiff (page 45 of Appeal Record). SP1 also testified during examination-in-chief, that the Goods were not made available as the Defendant could not fulfil the terms of payment for the deposit as stated in the Quotation (page 46 of Appeal Record) and based on that the Defendant dealt directly with the Plaintiff (page 47 of Appeal Record). [27] However during the cross-examination of SP1, it was affirmed that there was no deposit of 30% by the Defendant and there was no LC from the Defendant (page 52 of Appeal Record). In fact, SP1 also stated that the Goods were supplied to the Plaintiff and not to the Defendant as the Plaintiff had informed Translite that the Defendant could not fulfil the terms of payment deposit and the Goods was delivered to the Plaintiff after 17 Plaintiff made payment of 30% deposit to Translite (page 53 of Appeal Record). [28] The Court viewed that the Defendant’s counsel challenged SP1 during cross-examination,questioning on the status of the Quotation where the drawings were not finalised and therefore the Quotation has yet to be finalised, to which SP1 answered in the affirmative (page 55 of Appeal Record). [29] The Plaintiff’s other witness, SP2 testified during examination-in-chief, affirming that the Defendant was unable to agree to the payment terms of Translite (page 63 of Appeal Recod). SP2 also testified that Translite disagree to Defendant’s request for a revised terms of the Quotation (page 65 of Appeal Record). This Court finds thatSP2 had testified that the acceptance made by the Defendant is by way of 2nd Quotation of 25.5.2012 (page 64 of Appeal Record). [30] An ‘acceptance’ is defined under section 2(b) of Contracts Act 1950: “When the person to whom the proposal is made signifies his assent thereto, the proposal is said to be accepted: a proposal when accepted, becomes a promise.” Section 7 of Contracts Act 1950 clearly provides that for an acceptance to be valid, it must be absolute and unqualified and be expressed in some usual and reasonable manner and it must be communicated. 18 [31] Based on section 2 and 7 of Contracts Act 1950, it is of this Court’s view that as the terms of a formation contract is provided for but parties did not conformed to, there can be no contract concluded between the parties. This Court finds that there was no confirmation of acceptance by the Defendant according to the Quotation as spelt out in clauses 4 and 5 of the Quotation. This Court viewed that the respond by the Defendant with the payment terms of 60 days is a counter-offer by the Defendant. This accords with section 7(a) of Contracts Act 1950 which requires acceptance to be “absolute and unqualified”. [32] The High Court case of Mahabuilders Bhd v Hotel Rasa Sayang Sdn Bhd [2014] 10 MLJ 593 had considered whether there was valid acceptance when the offeree in accepting the offer, had added new terms to the draft sale and purchase agreement and it was held that by introducing new terms, the offeree was making a counter-offer thereby reversing its role from being an offer to that of an offeror. The non-payment of the deposit by Defendant had been testified by Plaintiff’s own witnesses, SP1 and SP2 who is the Director of Sales of the Plaintiff (page 62 of Appeal Record). [33] This Court viewed that where a different payment terms are stated by the Defendant that would be a counter-offer by the Defendant. The fact remains that the terms of payment proposed by the Defendant was not accepted by Translite which proves to show that there was no acceptance of the Quotation by the Defendant. 19 [34] Clearly there was no consensus ad idemas the certainty of terms to a contract had not been agreed following section 7 of Contracts Act 1950and in support of this view, the Courtrefers to the authority attributed by the Defendant’s counsel, The Ka Wah Bank Ltd v Nadinusa Sdn Bhd & Anor [1998] 2 CLJ 486 and Philip Bell Booth & Anor v Navaratnam Navayanan [2017] 3 MLRA 231. [35] The Plaintiff’s witness testified that the acceptance made by Defendant was made orally by the Defendant’s employee, one Mr. Lim and Mr. Ali. There was no reference to such communication between Plaintiff and Mr. Lim and/or Mr. Ali in any of the correspondences. It was testified that the Plaintiff was dealing with Mr. Ali and Mr. Lim (page 58 of Appeal Record). It is the Plaintiff’s assertion that the acceptance was by the Defendant through Mr. Ali and Mr. Lim. This Court viewed that the principle of adverse inference under section 114(g) of Evidence Act 1950 should be invoked against the Plaintiff for failing to call Mr. Ali and Mr. Lim to testify, to throw some light on the alleged contract made between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. [36] There was no explanation as to the acceptance method testified by Plaintiff where the specifications and payment terms still differ even after the issuance of the 2nd Quotation. The Defendant’s payment terms is 60 days where the Quotation speaks of 30% deposit and LC and the 2nd Quotation stated 60 days post-dated cheque. In fact, the Plaintiff agreed that there was a slight difference between the specification, quantity and payment terms of the 2nd Quotation from the Quotation first offered to the Defendant (pages 65-66 of Appeal Record). 20 [37] In relation to the advancement of RM500,000.00, the fact is clear that it was never part of the terms of the Quotation nor in the 2nd Quotation (pages 75 - 76 of Appeal Record). Based on the oral evidence of Plaintiff’s witnesses, the Quotation and 2nd Quotation, it can be confirmed that such advancement was an arrangement between the Plaintiff and Translite (page 55 and page 75 of Appeal Record). None of the dealings and letters between the Plaintiff and Translite were copied to the Defendant or informed the Defendant (pages 87-89 of Appeal Record). [38] This court also made a finding that the advance payment of RM500,00.00 could not be established as there was no proof that the Plaintiff actually purchased the Goods from Translite as testified by Plaintiff’s witness. Further, this Court finds that there is discrepancy between the testimonies of the Plaintiff’s witnesses, SP1 and SP2 as to the purpose of the advancement where SP1 testified that it is for deposit payment and SP2 testified that it is for deposit and part payment of the Goods (pages 55, 74 - 75 of Appeal Record). [39] This Court rely on the Federal Court case of Pernas Trading Sdn Bhd v Persatuan Peladang Bakti Melaka [1979] 1 LNS 65 where oral evidence that contradicts, vary or add to or from the terms of any contract which has been reduced in writing is not admissible. The law is stipulated under section 92 of Evidence Act 1950: “92. Exclusion of evidence of oral agreement When the terms of any such contract, grant or other disposition of property, or any matter required by law to be reduced to the 21 form of a document, have been proved according to section 91, no evidence of any oral agreement or statement shall be admitted as between the parties to any such instrument or their representative in interest for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to, or subtracting from its terms ….” [40] It is trite law that the party who asserts must prove. This suit was brought by the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff bears the burden to prove on the balance of probability following section 101 of Evidence Act 1950 and this Court also rely on the authority attributed by the Defendant’s counsel, the case of Hong Yik Trading v Liziz Plantation Sdn Bhd [2017] 4 MLRA 89. This Court also rely on the Federal Court’s case of Letchumannan Chettiar Alagappan@ L Allagappan (as executor to SL Alameloo Achi alias Sona Lena Alamelo Acho, deceased) & Anor v Secure Plantation Sdn Bhd [2017] 4 MLJ 697which also deliberated on the burden of proof and the onus or evidential burden that keeps shifting between parties. [41] Upon reading the Appeal Record, the written submissions and having heard both counsels, this Court holds the view that based on balance of probabilities, the Plaintiff could not adduce evidence that there was an acceptance by the Defendant to the Quotation. Hence, the Plaintiff could not prove that a contract was formed. This Court also holds the view that the 2nd Quotation could not be a contract as there was no proof of agreed revised terms by both parties. [42] This Court evaluated the Quotation, the Defendant’s Purchase Order, the 2nd Quotation and the correspondence between Plaintiff and the 22 Defendant and this Court is also of the view that the evidence shows that the 2nd Quotation provides different specifications, quantity and terms and conditions from the Quotation and there was no shred of evidence adduced by the Plaintiff to prove that the Defendant had agreed to the terms of the 2nd Quotation. Essentially, a contract cannot be held as performed,when the subject matter of the contract have yet to be agreed and finalized by parties before delivery. [43] In view of the non-formation of contract between the Defendant and the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff is not entitled to the storage charges. In addition, there was no proof to show that the Goods weresold and delivered to the Plaintiff’s warehouse. The documents produced to support Plaintiff’s assertion which are at pages 171, 172 and Bankers Acceptance at page 173 of Appeal Record are doubtful as they did not bear the Defendant’s name which could not prove that the Goods were indeed sent and paid on behalf of the Defendant. [44] The said documents are further corroborated by the Plaintiff’s own witness, SP2’s oral evidence that Defendant’s name is not included (page 75 of Appeal Record) and SP2 also admitted that there were no charges imposed by Translite and the Plaintiff did not forked out any money for the storage charges (page 76 -77 of Appeal Record). [45] In view of the Court’s finding of facts, there is clearly a misdirection of fact and law by the Session Judge which requires this Court’s intervention to put things right and correct the decision of the lower court: Gan Yook Chin (P) & Anor v Lee Ing Chin @ Lee Teck Seng 23 [2005] 2 MLJ1. I could not resist to state that the oral evidence of the Plaintiff’s witnesses tested with the contemporaneous documents, did not support the Plaintiffs testimonies and hence did not support Plaintiff’s pleaded case. Based on the foregoing, I allow the appeal with costs and reverse the Session Judge’s decision. Dated: 28 May 2018 (ZALITA BINTI ZAIDAN) Judicial Commissioner Shah Alam High Court 24 PEGUAMCARA PERAYU / DEFENDAN GODFREY D’CRUZ Tetuan Godfrey D’Cruz& Co. Unit 721, 7th Floor, Lobby 6 Blok A, DamansaraIntan No. 1, Jalan SS 20/27 47400 Petaling Jaya Selangor Darul Ehsan [Ref: 1.17.LD.067.KLS/LIM] Tel: 03-7710 5062 / 3 Faks: 03-7710 5069 PEGUAMCARA RESPONDEN / PLAINTIF JOLYN CH’NG Tetuan Lee Ong & Partners 29-1, Jalan 20/14 Taman Paramount 46300 Petaling Jaya Selangor Darul Ehsan [Ref: 1001-12341/2/CKT/AT/RN/sl] Tel: 03-7877 9395 / 03-7877 9397Faks: 03-7877 9289