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1 DI DALAM MAHKAMAH MAJISTRET DI IPOH DALAM NEGERI PERAK NO. KES: AA-83-393-04/2020 ANTARA PENDAKWA RAYA LAWAN KENGKATHRAN A/L V. AKAMPRAM DI HADAPAN MAJISTRET SITI NORA BINTI SHARIF ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN (Di akhir kes Pendakwaan)
AA-83-393-04/2020
Magistrates Court of Malaysia23 May 2025
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“ortal **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 question is can they be convicted of the offence of section 302 read with section 34 of the Penal Code? My answer to the question is in the negative.' We are confident in the view we have just expressed because we”
“ts of two or more inferences, one of which is in the accused's favour, then it is the duty of the court to draw the inference that is favourable to the accused. See, Tai Chai Keh v. Public Prosecutor [1948] CLJU 122; [1948] 1 LNS 122; [1948-49] MLJ Supp 105; Public Prosecutor v. Kasmin bin Soeb [1974] CLJU 116; [1974]”
“(iv) after defence is called, the accused elects to give evidence, then go through the steps set out in Mat v. Public Prosecutor [1963] 1 LNS 82; [1963] MLJ 263."”
“5.2. Mahkamah ini juga merujuk kes Tan Teck Yam v. PP [1967] CLJU 186; [1967] 1 LNS 186: For an offence under section 186 of the Penal Code the prosecution has to prove the following: (1) that there was obstructing of a public servant,”
“e court to draw the inference that is favourable to the accused. See, Tai Chai Keh v. Public Prosecutor [1948] CLJU 122; [1948] 1 LNS 122; [1948-49] MLJ Supp 105; Public Prosecutor v. Kasmin bin Soeb [1974] CLJU 116; [1974] 1 LNS 116; [1974] 1 MLJ 230. If the court, upon a maximum evaluation of the evidence placed befo”
“used elects to remain silent, as he is perfectly entitled to do, am I prepared to convict him on the evidence now before me? See, Dato' Mokhtar bin Hashim & Anor v. Public Prosecutor [1983] 2 CLJ 10; [1983] CLJ 101 (Rep); [1983] 2 MLJ 232. If the answer to that question is in the affirmative, then the defence must be c”
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1 DI DALAM MAHKAMAH MAJISTRET DI IPOH DALAM NEGERI PERAK NO. KES: AA-83-393-04/2020 ANTARA PENDAKWA RAYA LAWAN KENGKATHRAN A/L V. AKAMPRAM DI HADAPAN MAJISTRET SITI NORA BINTI SHARIF ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN (Di akhir kes Pendakwaan)
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PENDAHULUAN Tertuduh-tertuduh telah dituduh melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah dua (2) pertuduhan. Pertuduhan terhadap Tertuduh-tertuduh adalah seperti yang berikut: “Pertuduhan Pertama Bahasa kamu pada 16/4/2020 jam lebih kurang 2115hrs, bertempat di hadapan Flat Buntong Harmoni, Jalan SG. Pari dalam Daerah Kinta, di dalam Negeri Perak telah menggalang pegawai polis Kishornath a/l Kupusamy, KPT: G/21930 iaitu seorang penjawat awam dalam melakukakan kerja-kerja jawatannya. Oleh yang demikian, kamu telah melakukan satu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah Seksyen 186 Kanun Keseksaan. Pertuduhan Kedua Bahasa kamu pada 16/4/2020 jam lebih kurang 2115hrs, bertempat di hadapan Flat Buntong Harmoni, Jalan Sg. Pari dalam Daerah Kinta, di dalam Negeri Perak telah di dapati bergerak dari satu tempat yang lain iaitu dari No.65 Persiaran Sg Pari Timur 9, Taman Mas Falim, 30200 Ipoh ke suatu tempat yang lain iaitu ke hadapan Flat Buntong, Jalan Sg. Pari di dalam kawasan tempat jangkitan. Oleh yang demikian, kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah Peraturan 3(1) Peraturan-Peraturan Pencegahan dan Pengawalan Penyakit Berjangkit.
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2.1 Pihak pendakwaan dalam kes ini telah memanggil seramai enam orang saksi pendakwaan (“SP”) untuk memberi keterangan: SP1 : Insp G21930 Kishornath a/l Kupusamy (Pengadu) SP2 : Sjn RF127095 Azmi bin Mahmood (Anggota Tangkapan) SP3 : L/Kpl 208886 Nik Zamri bin Ismail (Jurugambar) SP4 : Insp G24774 Nurul Shafinaz binti Haji Saud (Pegawai Penyiasat)
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2.2 Eksibit telah dikemukakan oleh Pendakwaan semasa perbicaraan. Eksibit-eksibit tersebut adalah seperti berikut:- Bil. Eksibit Tandaan 1. 2 Keping Gambar Tempat Kejadian P1 2. Repot Polis Kg. Bharu 803/20
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Borang serah menyerah
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Repot Polis Kg. Bharu 804/20
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Salinan Sijil Perakuan Seksyen 90A Akta Keterangan
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Sampul CD P8(a)
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CD P8(b)
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Rajah Kasar Tempat Kejadian
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2.3 Manakala dokumen yang dikemukakan melalui pihak pembelaan adalah berikut:- Bil. Eksibit Tandaan 1. 8 Keping gambar kecederaan IDD5 (a-(h)
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Laporan Perubatan Bertarikh 27/10/2022 D6 3. Repot Polis Kg. Bharu 992/20
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2.4 Berdasarkan keterangan saksi-saksi pendakwaan di hadapan mahkamah, fakta kes telah menunjukkan keterangan bahawa pada 16/4/2020 jam lebih kurang 2115hrs, semasa pengadu Insp G21930 Kishornath a/l Kupusamy (SP1) Bersama anggota tas force Balai Polis Kg. Bharu terdiri daripada Sjn RF RF127095 Azmi bin Mahmood (SP2), Kpl RF RF174000 dan Kpl RF175839 menjalan tugas rindaan perintah kawalan pergerakan Ops Covid 19, di Kawasan pentadbiran Balai Polis Kg. Bharu Ipoh, dengan berpakaian preman vest polis semasa SP1 bersama anggota membuat snap check di Jalan Sg. Pari di bawah lampu jalan berhadpan Flat Buntong Harmoni telah mengarahkan sebuah m/kar jenis Mercedes no. pendaftaran RN4100 untuk berhenti bagi tujuan pemeriksaan tetapi m/kar tersebut terus memecut laju melalui Jalan Sg. Pari dan hampir merempuh SP1 bersama anggota. Mereka terus mengejar m/kar tersebut dan pemandu m/kar tersebut dapat ditahan di persimpangan masuk pintu gerbang ke Kawasan Kacang Putih.
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2.5 Seterusnya SP1 memperkenalkan diri sebagai pegawai kanan polis dengan menunjukkan kad kuasa kepada pemandu 1(L) (I) iaitu Tertuduh. Apabila meminta pengenalam diri Tertuduh enggan memberi kerjasa dan bertindak agresif dan SP1 bersama anggota terpaksa menggunakan kekerana yang minima utuk membuat tangkapan. Tertuduh Berjaya ditangkap tanpa sebarang kecederaan. Kemudian Tertuduh di bawa balik ke IPD Ipoh untuk Tindakan lanjut sepertimana
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2.6 Kes di siasat oleh Insp. Nurul Shafinaz binti Haji Saud (SP4) dan tertuduh di dapati telah menggalang seorang penjawat awam dalam melakukan kerja-kerja jawatannya. Tertuduh juga telah di dapatai telah bergerak dari satu tempat ke satu tempat yang lain iaitu dari No. 65 Persiaran Sg. Pari Timur 9, taman Mas Falim, 30200 Ipoh ke suatu tempat yang lain iaitu ke hadapan Flat Buntong, jalan Sungai Pari, di dalam Kawasan tempat jangkitan dan telah melanggar peraturan-peraturan pencegahan dan pengawalan penyakit berjangkit 2020.
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3.1 Seksyen 173(f) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah (“KTJ”) telah memperuntukkan berkenaan tugas mahkamah di akhir kes pihak pendakwaan (at the close of prosecution). Mahkamah hendaklah memutuskan sama ada pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya untuk mengemukakan suatu kes prima facie terhadap Tertuduh atas pertuduhan terhadapnya atau tidak sebelum membuat apa-apa keputusan untuk memanggil Tertuduh membela diri atas pertuduhan terhadapnya atau melepaskan dan membebaskan Tertuduh tanpa memanggil Tertuduh untuk membela diri.
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3.2 Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Public Prosecutor v. Mohd Radzi Abu Bakar [2006] 1 CLJ 457 telah menggariskan panduan kepada Mahkamah bekenaan tugas mahkamah di akhir kes pendakwaan di mana Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was) telah menyatakan seperti yang berikut: "8. For the guidance of the courts below, we summarise as follows the steps that should be taken by a trial court at the close of the prosecution's case:
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the close of the prosecution's case, subject the evidence led by the prosecution in its totality to a maximum evaluation. Carefully scrutinise the credibility of each of the prosecution's witnesses. Take into account all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence. If the evidence admits of two or more inferences, then draw the inference that is most favourable to the accused;
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(ii) ask yourself the question: If I now call upon the accused to make his defence and he elects to remain silent am I prepared to convict him on the evidence now before me? If the answer to that question is 'Yes', then a prima facie case has been made out and the defence should be called. If the answer is 'No' then, a prima facie case has not been made out and the accused should be acquitted;
III
(iii) after the defence is called, the accused elects to remain silent, then convict;
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(iv) after defence is called, the accused elects to give evidence, then go through the steps set out in Mat v. Public Prosecutor [1963] 1 LNS 82; [1963] MLJ 263."
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3.3 Perkataan prima facie tidak ditakrifkan di bawah KTJ. Walau bagaimanapun, Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Balacahandran v. PP [2005] 1 CLJ 85 [2005] 1 AMR 321; [2005] 2 MLJ 301 telah menghuraikan berkenaan ujian prima facie sepertimana yang berikut: ...The test at the close of the case for the prosecution would therefore be: Is the evidence sufficient to convict the accused if he elects to remain silent? If the answer is in the affirmative then a prima facie case has been made out. This must, as of necessity, require a consideration of the existence of any reasonable doubt in the case for the prosecution. If there is any such doubt there can be no prima facie case.
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3.4 Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Looi Kow Chai v. Public Prosecutor [2003] 1 CLJ 734 [2003] 2 MLJ 65; [2003] 2 AMR 89 telah menghuraikan berkenaan ujian untuk menentukan sama ada prima facie telah dibuktikan atau tidak seperti yang berikut: "In our respectful view, the correct test to be applied in determining whether a prima facie case has been made out under s. 180 of the CPC (and this would apply to a trial under s. 173 of the CPC ) is that as encapsulated in the judgment of Hashim Yeop Sani FJ (as he then was) in Dato' Mokhtar bin Hashim & Anor v. Public Prosecutor [1983] CLJ Rep 101; [1983] 2 CLJ 10; [1983] 2 MLJ 232 at p 270: 'To summarize, it would therefore appear that having regard to the prosecution evidence adduced so far, a prima facie case has not been established against Nordin Johan and Aziz Abdullah, the second accused and the fourth accused which, failing their rebuttal, would warrant their conviction. In other words if they elect to remain silent now (which I hold they are perfectly entitled to do even though they are being tried under the Emergency Regulations) the question is can they be convicted of the offence of section 302 read with section 34 of the Penal Code? My answer to the question is in the negative.' We are confident in the view we have just expressed because we find nothing in the amended s. 180(1) of the CPC that has taken away the right of an accused person to remain silent at the close of the prosecution case. Further we find nothing in the legislative intention of Parliament as expressed in the language employed by it to show that there should be a dual exercise by a judge under s. 180 when an accused elects to remain silent as happened in Pavone v. Public Prosecutor [1985] 1 LNS 99; [1984] 1 MLJ 77. In other words, we are unable to discover anything in the language of the recently formulated s. 180 that requires a judge sitting alone first to make a minimum evaluation and then when the accused elects to remain silent to make a maximum evaluation in deciding whether to convict or not at the close of the prosecution case. It therefore follows that there is only one exercise that a judge sitting alone under s. 180 of the CPC has to undertake at the close of the prosecution case. He must subject the prosecution evidence to maximum evaluation and to ask himself the question: if I decide to call upon the accused to enter his defence and he elects to remain silent, am I prepared to convict him on the totality of the evidence contained in the prosecution case? If the answer is in the negative then no prima facie case has been made out and the accused would be entitled to an acquittal."
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4.1 Berdasarkan fakta yang dikemukakan oleh pihak pendakwaan, isu di hadapan Mahkamah adalah seperti yang berikut:
a
Pertuduhan di bawah sek.186 Kanun Keseksaan – • sama ada dengan sengaja Tertuduh telah menggalang penjawat awam • Galangan tersebut dibuat ketika penjawa awam sedang menjalankan fungsi awamnya; • Akibat halangan itu, penjawat awam tidak dapat melakukan fungsi awamnya.
b
Pertuduhan di bawah Peraturan 3(1) Peraturan-Peraturan Pencegahan dan Pengawalan Penyakit Berjangkit (Langkah-Langkah di Dalam Kawasan Tempat Jangkitan (No.3) 2020. • Samada Tertuduh telah bergerak dari satu tempat ke suatu tempat lain di dalam kawasan jangkitan • Samada Tertuduh bergerak ke suatu tempat lain bukan bagi maksud di bawah subperaturan (2) • Samada terdapat sebarang kebenaran untuk Terttduh bergerak ke suatu tempat lain
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5.1. Sama sama ada dengan sengaja Tertuduh telah menggalang penjawat awam. Bagi kesalahan di bawah s. 186 Kanun Keseksaan, pihak pendakwaan perlu membuktikan kewujudan mens rea pada OKT iaitu galangan tersebut dilakukan dengan sengaja. Merujuk Ratanlal & Dhirajlal's "Law of Crimes" 28th edn, vol. 1 di perenggan 15 ms. yang menyatakan: “Mens rea - In order to constitute an offence under this section, the obstruction must be 'wilful'. It is, therefore, not enough to prove obstruction by the accused to a public servant but it must also be proved that the intention was encompassed with some sort of hostility towards such public servant.
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5.2. Mahkamah ini juga merujuk kes Tan Teck Yam v. PP [1967] CLJU 186; [1967] 1 LNS 186: For an offence under section 186 of the Penal Code the prosecution has to prove the following: (1) that there was obstructing of a public servant,
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that the public servant was at that time discharging this public function, and (3) that the person obstructing did so voluntarily. It is in my view clear that to obstruct under s. 186 of the Penal Code i s to do an act which makes it more difficult for a public servant to carry out his duties. I take that definition of "obstruction" from the case of Hinchliffe v. Sheldon. It is therefore quite clear that the appellant was making it more difficult for the chief assistant district officer to discharge his public function and that the said officer was at that time involved in discharging his public functions. The only remaining element of the alleged offence is whether the obstruction was voluntary that brings me to s. 39 of the Penal Code which defines "voluntarily" as, A person is said to cause an effect "voluntarily" when he causes it by means whereby, he intended to cause it, or by means which, at the time of employing those means, he knew or had reason to believe to be likely to cause it. The definition of the term "voluntarily" bears resemblance to the definition of "willfully" current in the English law. (See Ratanlal & Dhirajlal's Law of Crimes, 21st edn. P. 82). In Rice v. Connolly, Lord Parker, CJ said: 'Wilful' in this context in my judgment means not only 'intention' but also connotes something which is done without lawful excuse.
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5.3. Seksyen 39 Kanun Keseksaan mendefinisikan "dengan sengaja" sebagai: “Seseorang adalah dikata menyebabkan suatu kejadian "dengan sengaja" apabila ia menyebabkan kejadian itu dengan jalan yang ia telah bermaksud hendak menyebabkannya, atau dengan jalan yang pada masa menggunakan jalan itu, ia ketahui atau ada sebab mempercayai mungkin menyebabkan kejadian itu.”
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5.4. Di dalam kes ini, sememangnya jelas terdapat galangan dilakukan oleh Tertuduh kepada SP1 serta pasukan yang memakali vest polis pantulan cahaya, yang mengarahkan untuk Tertuduh memberhentikan keretanya namun Tertuduh terus memecut laju dan dikatakan cuba merempuh SP1 dan pasukan. Namun, persoalan yang perlu di jawab adalah adakah perbuatan OKT pada ketika itu adalah bermaksud untuk menggalang penjawat awam dari menjalankan tugasnya atau OKT ada sebab untuk mempercayai bahawa perbuatannya boleh menyebabkan suatu galangan terhadap penjawat awam yang menjalankan tugas
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5.5. SP1 dan pasukannya di dalam keadaan berpakaian polis pantulan cahaya dan sedang membuat “snap check” di bawah tiang lampu di hadapan Flat Harmoni. Balai Polis Kampung Bharu juga dikatakan mendirikan satu Sekatan Jalan Raya (SJR) di hadapan gerbang Kacang Putih, di mana dikatakan terdapat papan tanda dan lampu berkelip biru.
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5.6. Tertuduh kemudian telah di tahan pada mulanya tidak mahu membuka pintu kereta apabila di suruh, kemudian ditarik keluar oleh pasukan tangkapan, dan semasa tangkapan dikatakan Tertuduh di dalam keadaan tidak stabil dan berbau dipercayai mabuk.
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5.7. SP1 memaklumkan telah memberikan amaran yang secukupnya kepada Tertuduh untuk memberhentikan keretanya dan keluar dari kenderaan tersebut. Tertuduh enggan beri Kerjasama, dan SP1 dan pasukan terpaksa mengeluarkan tertuduh menggunakan kekerasan yang minima.
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5.8. Mahkamah berpandangan keterangan tersebut agak bercanggah dengan pertuduhan asal terhadap tertuduh, ini kerana pertuduhan dengan jelas menyatakan tempat tangkapan adalah di hadapan Flat Buntong Harmoni, tetapi dari kenyataan saksi pendakwaan jelas sekali tempat tangkapan bukan di hadapan Flat Buntong Harmoni tetapi di antara jarak Flat Buntong Harmoni dan juga Gerbang Kacang Putih yang mana SJR di dirikan.
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5.9. Jadi adakah tindakan Tertuduh ini satu tindakan “dengan sengaja” menggalang penjawat awam, sedangkan SJR di didirikan di kawasan Gerbang kacang Putih dan bukan di hadapan Flat Buntong Harmoni tersebut. Ini kerana jarak antara 2 tempat tersebut melebihi 100meter dan tempat “snap check” pertama hanya di katakan di buat di bawah lampu jalan dan tiada keadaan yang bersesuaian (proper) atau selamat untuk kenderaan berhenti pada jam 2115 tersebut berbanding kawasan di mana SJR dijalankan.
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5.10. Mahkamah berpandangan tindakan Tertuduh untuk tidak memberhentikan kenderaan beliau semasa di arahkan oleh SP1 dan pasukannya bukanlah suatu tindakan “disengajakan”, ia adalah satu tindakan refleks seseorang untuk memberhentikan kenderaan di kawasan yang lebih selamat dan memastikan keadaan benar-benar selamat untuk keluar.
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5.11. Manakala bagi pertuduhan kedua di bawah Peraturan 3(1) Peraturan-Peraturan Pencegahan dan Pengawalan Penyakit Berjangkit (Langkah-Langkah di dalam Kawasan Tempat Jangkitan) yang mana Tertuduh telah didapati bergerak dari satu tempat ke tempat lain, di dalam kawasan tempat jangkitan.
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5.12. Adakah Tertuduh telah bergerak dari satu tempat ke tempat lain, di dalam kawasan tempat jangkitan. Pembelaan tidak menolak bahawa Tertuduh telah bergeak dari satu tempat ke tempat lain, di dalam kawasan tempat jangkitan. Persoalannya adakah pergerakan tersebut dibenarkan? Sekiranya benar Tertuduh terlibat di dalam agihan barangan keperluan, adakah sebarang permohonan kebenaran keluar di buat? Adakah Tertuduh bergerak sekitar 8pagi sehingga 8 malam (pada waktu pergerakan dibenarkan)?
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5.13. Pada 16 April 2020 adalah di mana PKPD berlansung di mana semua pergerakan adalah tidak dibenarkan sama sekali, semua premis ditutup dengan beberapa pengecualian iaitu “essential service” iaitu seperti mereka yang terlibat di bahagian Keselamatan dan Pertahanan, Komunikasi dan Internet, Makanan, Air, tenaga, perbankan, kesihatan, lojistik. Perkara ini jelas di nyatakan di dalam soalan lazim (FAQ) mengenai Perintah Kawalan Pergerakan Tahap 2 Majlis Keselamatan Negara. Perkara ini adalah seperti suatu pengetahuan umum dan saya percaya mahkamah tidak perlu mempertikaikan dan mengambil maklum keadaan waktu tersebut melainkan tertuduh ada sebarang alasan yang kukuh untuk melakukan sebaliknya.
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5.14. Memandangkan Tertuduh dengan sengaja keluar pada waktu dan Tarikh tersebut tanpa sebarang permohonan surat kebenaran dengan jelan Tertuduh telah pun melanggar Peraturan 3(1) Peraturan-Peraturan Pencegahan dan Pengawalan Penyakit Berjangkit (Langkah-Langkah di dalam Kawasan Tempat Jangkitan).
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5.15. Sama Ada Kes Prima Facie Berjaya Dibuktikan Mahkamah ini merujuk kes Mahkamah Persekutuan PP v. Mohd Radzi Abu Bakar [2006] 1 CLJ 457: After the amendments to ss. 173(f) and 180 of the CPC, the statutory test has been altered. What is required of a Subordinate Court and the High Court under the amended sections is to call for the defence when it is satisfied that a prima facie case has been made out at the close of the prosecution case. This requires the court to undertake a maximum evaluation of the prosecution evidence when deciding whether to call on the accused to enter upon his or her defence. It involves an assessment of the credibility of the witnesses called by the prosecution and the drawing of inferences admitted by the prosecution evidence. Thus, if the prosecution evidence admits of two or more inferences, one of which is in the accused's favour, then it is the duty of the court to draw the inference that is favourable to the accused. See, Tai Chai Keh v. Public Prosecutor [1948] CLJU 122; [1948] 1 LNS 122; [1948-49] MLJ Supp 105; Public Prosecutor v. Kasmin bin Soeb [1974] CLJU 116; [1974] 1 LNS 116; [1974] 1 MLJ 230. If the court, upon a maximum evaluation of the evidence placed before it at the close of the prosecution case, comes to the conclusion that a prima facie case has not been made out, it should acquit the accused. If, on the other hand, the court after conducting a maximum evaluation of the evidence comes to the conclusion that a prima facie case has been made out, it must call for the defence. If the accused then elects to remain silent, the court must proceed to convict him. It is not open to the court to then re-assess the evidence and to determine whether the prosecution had established its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The absence of any evidence from the accused that casts a reasonable doubt on the prosecution's case renders the prima facie case one that is established beyond a reasonable doubt. Put shortly, what the trial court is obliged to do under ss. 173(f) and 180 of the CPC is to ask itself the question: If the accused elects to remain silent, as he is perfectly entitled to do, am I prepared to convict him on the evidence now before me? See, Dato' Mokhtar bin Hashim & Anor v. Public Prosecutor [1983] 2 CLJ 10; [1983] CLJ 101 (Rep); [1983] 2 MLJ 232. If the answer to that question is in the affirmative, then the defence must be called. And if the accused remains silent, he must be convicted. If the answer is in the negative, then the accused must be acquitted.
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6.1 Berdasarkan penilaian keterangan secara maksimum terhadap kesemua saksi-saksi pendakwaan, mahkamah berpendapat bahawa pihak pendakwaan telah gagal untuk mengemukakan keterangan yang kukuh untuk membuktikan setiap intipati pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 186 Kanun Keseksaan yang mana pihak pendakwaan telah gagal untuk membuktikan elemen bagi pertuduhan berkenaan, adalah tidak selamat untuk memanggil Tertuduh membela diri atas pertuduhan tersebut.
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6.2 Walau bagaimanapun, Pendakwaan berjaya membuktikan elemen di bawah Peraturan 3(1) Peraturan-Peraturan Pencegahan dan Pengawalan Penyakit Berjangkit (Langkah-Langkah di dalam Kawasan Tempat Jangkitan).
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6.3 Oleh yang demi Tertuduh perlu di panggil untuk membela diri di bawah Peraturan 3(1) Peraturan-Peraturan Pencegahan dan Pengawalan Penyakit Berjangkit (Langkah-Langkah di dalam Kawasan Tempat Jangkitan). Bertarikh 10/11/2025 Siti Nora binti Sharif
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