Kenwingston Sdn. Bhd. v Ingca Sdn. Bhd. (WA-12BC-6-06/2024)

This appeal (“Appeal”) arises from the decision of the learned Sessions Court Judge dated 5.6.2024, which allowed the Plaintiff/Respondent’s claim against the Defendant/Appellant for the sum of RM847,484.12, together with interest and costs. For ease of reference, the parties shall be referred to as they were in the Sessions Court.

I heard the Appeal on 3.9.2025 and having considered the pleadings together with the oral and documentary evidence in the Appeal Record and the written and oral submissions of both parties, I find that the central issue in dispute concerns the application of Section 71 of the Contracts Act 1950 (“the Act”). For the reasons set out below, on 3.10.2025, I allowed the Defendant’s appeal against the decision of the learned Sessions Court Judge.

The Plaintiff, being dissatisfied with this Court’s decision, has exercised its right to appeal. These are my full grounds of judgment.

The Defendant was appointed as the principal subcontractor (“Principal Sub-Contractor”) by the main contractor, Pembinaan Sama Murni Sdn. Bhd. (“the Main Contractor”), which in turn was appointed by Aset Kayamas Sdn. Bhd. (“the Developer/Project Owner”) to carry out the main building works for the development of 2,598 apartment units, together with car parks and other facilities for 3 civil servants under the 1MALAYSIA – PPA1M project in Bukit Jalil, Kuala Lumpur (“the Project”).

By a Letter of Acceptance dated 3.3.2016 (the “Sub-Contract”), the Defendant engaged Jaya Kian Seng Sdn. Bhd. (“JKS”) as the sub-contractor (“Sub-Contractor”) responsible for plumbing works and services. JKS, in turn, engaged the Plaintiff as a sub-subcontractor (“Sub-Subcontractor”) to supply and install 8 fiberglass-reinforced plastic (“FRP”) water tanks (“FRP Water Tanks”) together with various other miscellaneous goods from the Plaintiff required for the installation works of the FRP Water Tanks.

Accordingly, the sequence of the contractual relationships between the parties is as follows: Aset Kayamas ➔Pembinaan Sama Murni ➔ Defendant➔JKS➔Plaintiff (Developer/Project Owner➔Main Contractor➔ Principal Sub-Contractor ➔ Sub-Contractor ➔ Sub-Subcontractor)

The pleaded case of the Plaintiff in the Sessions Court was that, pursuant to several purchase orders issued by JKS to the Plaintiff for the supply and installation of FRP Water Tanks for the Project, the Plaintiff supplied and installed the FRP Water Tanks by October 2017 and issued 4 invoices to JKS totalling RM1,197,484.12. The Plaintiff further alleged that JKS withdrew as nominated subcontractor to the Defendant with effect from 15.11.2017.

The Plaintiff claimed that JKS’s final claim against the Defendant amounted to RM2,143,326.15 (“JKS’s Final Claim”), which, the Plaintiff alleged, included amounts due for the supply and 4 installation of the FRP Water Tanks and asserted that although JKS demanded payment of its alleged Final Claim by letters dated 27.11.2017 and 29.6.2018, the Defendant did not pay. JKS was subsequently wound up on 6.7.2018.

The Plaintiff commenced this action against the Defendant in November 2020, relying, inter alia, on the contention that the Defendant — as the party that awarded the Sub-Contract to JKS — knew that the supply and installation of FRP Water Tanks formed part of JKS’s obligations. The Plaintiff further relied on a letter from the Defendant to the Plaintiff dated 29.9.2017, in which the Defendant confirmed that the FRP Water Tanks were to be delivered by the Plaintiff between 10–11.10.2017 and installed on or before 21.10.2017. The Plaintiff contends this demonstrates that the Plaintiff carried out the works under the Defendant's direction.

The Plaintiff also points to a cheque for RM350,000.00 issued by the Defendant in favour of the Plaintiff, which the Plaintiff says indicates that the Defendant acted as the paymaster and that a direct relationship existed between them.

The Plaintiff further pleaded that the supply and installation of the FRP Water Tanks by the Plaintiff benefitted the Defendant as the Main Contractor under the Sub-Contract.

The Plaintiff relied on a letter dated 9.1.2017 from JKS to the Defendant (which the Plaintiff says it received from JKS around 9 January 2018), in which JKS purportedly requested that the Defendant pay the balance sum of RM847,484.12 (the “Plaintiff’s 5 Claim”) on the basis that JKS’s Final Claim encompassed the works performed by the Plaintiff.

Based on the foregoing facts, the Plaintiff’s solicitors issued a letter of demand dated 15.3.2018 to the Defendant claiming the Plaintiff’s sum of RM847,484.12.

The Plaintiff contends that, on these facts, it is entitled to recover the claimed sum from the Defendant on the principles of quantum meruit and unjust enrichment as codified in Section 71 of the Act.

The Defendant denied the Plaintiff’s claims and put the Plaintiff to strict proof. The Defendant maintained that all dealings regarding the supply and installation of the FRP Water Tanks were between JKS and the Plaintiff, that there was no privity of contract between the Defendant and the Plaintiff, and that the letter dated 29.9.2017 was issued only to confirm the outcome of a meeting held between representatives of the Plaintiff, JKS, and the Developer/Project Owner and of the Plaintiff’s obligations to the delivery schedule of the FRP Water Tanks. Finally, the Defendant says that their solicitors have responded to the Plaintiff’s solicitors’ letter of 15.3.2018 vide letter dated 29.3.2018.

After a full trial conducted over 3 separate days during which 3 witnesses testified, the Sessions Court found in favour of the Plaintiff on the basis that the Plaintiff had completed the works for the Project and was entitled to compensation on a quantum meruit basis under Section 71 of the Act. 6 [17] The Defendant appealed, arguing that the learned Sessions Court Judge erred in law and in fact. This Court’s task is confined to determining whether the Sessions Court Judge’s application of Section 71 of the Act was correct. C. APPELLATE INTERVENTION

This Court is cognizant of the appellate intervention principle as espoused by the Federal Court’s case of Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v. Wendy Tan Lee Peng, Administrator Of The Estates Of Tan Ewe Kwang, Deceased & Ors [2020] 10 CLJ 1, where the apex court held: “[78] Hence following this court’s ruling in Tengku Dato’ Ibrahim Petra bin Tengku Indra Petra an appellate court should not interfere with the factual findings of a trial judge unless it was satisfied that the decision of the trial judge was ‘plainly wrong’ where in arriving at the decision it could not reasonably be explained or justified and so was one which no reasonable judge could have reached. If the decision did not fall within any of the aforesaid category, it is irrelevant, even if the appellate court thinks that with whatever degree of certainty, it considered that it would have reached a different conclusion from the trial judge.”

Consequently, given that the Learned Sessions Court Judge allowed the Plaintiff's claim against the Defendant, based on the above decision, it is necessary to examine whether the findings of the learned Sessions Court Judge, grounded on the oral and contemporaneous documentary evidence, were reasonably made. 7 [20] This approach to evaluation is elucidated in the Federal Court decision in Tindok Besar Estate Sdn Bhd v. Tinjar Co [1979] 1 MLJ 120, per Chang Min Tat FJ: "For myself, I rely on the acts and deeds of a witness which are contemporaneous with the event and to draw the reasonable inferences from them than to believe his subsequent recollection or version of it, particularly if he is a witness with a purpose of his own to serve and if it did not account for the statements in his documents and writings. Judicial perception of the evidence requires that the oral evidence be critically tested against whole of the other evidence and the circumstances of the case." D. DEFENDANT’S MEMORANDUM OF APPEAL

Via the Memorandum of Appeal, the Defendant has advanced 5 grounds of Appeal that the learned Sessions Court Judge erred in law and fact by failing to duly consider the following matters in allowing the Plaintiff's claim: a) The absence of any contractual relationship or agreement between the Defendant and the Plaintiff; b) The Defendant did not owe any monies to, and had in fact made full payment to, JKS, the Sub-Contractor to the Plaintiff; c) The Plaintiff's failure to provide proof, including filing a proof of debt form following the winding-up of JKS, evidencing that the sum of RM847,484.12 was lawfully due and payable by JKS to the Plaintiff; d) The inapplicability of the principle of Quantum Meruit or Section 71 of the Act, as the works performed by the Plaintiff 8 were for the benefit of the Developer/Project Owner and/or the Main Contractor rather than the Defendant, who acted solely as the Principal Sub-Contractor for the Project; and e) The Defendant did not unjustly enrich itself.

At the hearing of this Appeal, both parties essentially concentrated on the core arguments pertaining to the application of Section 71 of the Act.

Hence, the entire Appeal turns on the proper application of Section 71 of the Act, which states as follows: “Where a person lawfully does anything for another person, or delivers anything to him, not intending to do so gratuitously, and such other person enjoys the benefit thereof, the latter is bound to make compensation to the former in respect of, or to restore, the thing so done or delivered.”

The jurisprudence, notably from the Privy Council decision in Siow Wong Fatt v Susur Rotan Mining [1967] 1 MLJ 211, establishes that four conditions must be cumulatively satisfied: a) The act must be lawful. b) It must be done for another person. c) It must not be intended to be done gratuitously. d) The other person must enjoy the benefit of the act. 9 [25] Crucially, as affirmed in Tanjung Teras Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Malaysia [2015] 9 CLJ 1002, liability under Section 71 is not based on contract but on the equitable principle of restitution to prevent unjust enrichment. Her Ladyship Lim Yee Lan JCA, delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Tanjung Teras (supra) explained the basis of a claim behind Section 71 of the Act: “[31] Section 71 is the statutory embodiment of the common law principle of quantum meruit, which provides for a just compensation as the measure of the work done as opposed to contractual damages (see: Siow Wong Fatt, Craven-Ellis v. Cannons Ltd [1936] 2 KB 403, Delpuri-Harl Corp JV Sdn Bhd v. Perbadanan Kemajuan Negeri Selangor [2014] 1 LNS 1075; Spatial Ventures Sdn Bhd v. Twintech Holdings Sdn Bhd [2013] 1 LNS 729; [2014] 8 MLJ 14).

Liability under s. 71 is not based on any existing contract between the parties. Rather it is based on the equitable principle of conscionable conduct and restitution to prevent unjust enrichment by one party at the expense of another party (see: Ramkrishna Shankarrao v. Rangoobai and anr AIR [1959] Bom 519; [1958] 60 BOMLR 459, Abu Mohammed v. Mohammed Kunju Lebba [1995] DMC 316 and Pallonjee Eduljee and Sons v. the Lonavala City Municipality AIR [1937] Bom 417; [1937] 39 BOMLR 835). …. [38] In light of the decided authorities cited above on the juristic basis behind s. 71 of our Contracts Act, it is thus clear that the learned SFC’s submission that there is no obligation on the part of the plaintiff to pay the defendant for the superstructure work 10 done because there was no privity of contract between the parties does not hold any water.”

The learned Sessions Court Judge found that all 4 prerequisites of Section 71 as established in Siow Wong Fatt (supra) were met. This Court, as an appellate court, will not lightly interfere with findings of fact unless they are “plainly wrong where in arriving at the decision it could not reasonably be explained or justified and so was one which no reasonable judge could have reached”(Ng Hoo Kui (supra)).

The Defendant's appeal was advanced on several grounds, which can be consolidated into four main submissions for a comprehensive analysis.

The Defendant contended that the learned Sessions Court Judge erred by imposing liability despite the absence of any contractual relationship or privity between the Defendant and the Plaintiff. The contractual chain was clear: the Plaintiff contracted with JKS, and JKS contracted with the Defendant. The Plaintiff's remedy, if any, lay against JKS or its liquidator. 11 Plaintiff's Counter-Argument:

The Plaintiff conceded the lack of a direct contract but argued that this is precisely the scenario Section 71 was designed to address. Relying on Kraas Solutions Sdn Bhd v Konsesi Kota Permatamas Sdn Bhd [2018] 9 CLJ 26, the Plaintiff argued that Section 71 is meant to facilitate recovery against a party with whom there is no contract but who has received a benefit. To insist on privity of contract would render Section 71 meaningless.

This ground of appeal fails for the following reasons: The Defendant's argument conflates a claim in contract with a claim in restitution. The foundational principle established in Tanjung Teras (supra) is that "Liability under s. 71 is not based on any existing contract between the parties." The learned Sessions Court Judge was correct to focus on the substance of the enrichment and benefit rather than the formalities of the contractual relationship. The absence of privity is not a bar to a claim under Section 71: it is a prerequisite for its invocation.

The Defendant placed heavy reliance on the Plaintiff's own conduct, specifically: 12 a) A Letter of Demand was sent to the Developer/Project Owner, which, named Aset Kayamas, as the "Project Principal," was the party liable for the debt. b) Testimony from the Plaintiff's director (“SP1”) and correspondence indicating that the "Main Contractor" was responsible for payment. c) The Defendant argued that the Plaintiff was "blowing hot and cold" and that, based on its own admissions, the proper parties to sue were the Developer/Project Owner or the Main Contractor, not the Defendant as Principal Sub-Contractor.

The Plaintiff clarified that its communications with Aset Kayamas were attempts to resolve the dispute after the Defendant had denied liability. Furthermore, the Plaintiff's director (“SP1”) consistently testified that he believed the Defendant was the "main contractor" for the project in a practical sense, as it was the entity that paid the deposit, compiled documentation for the Occupancy Certificate (“OC”), and was the direct beneficiary. The case of Mega Mayang M & E Sdn Bhd v Utama Lodge Sdn Bhd [2018] MLJU 1323) was cited, where similar "direct payment" arrangements and benefits to the developer led to a successful Section 71 claim, irrespective of privity.

This ground of appeal is not persuasive. While the Plaintiff's initial attempts to seek payment from other parties might indicate 13 commercial uncertainty, they do not, by themselves, constitute a legal estoppel. The testimony of SP1, when read as a whole, demonstrates that he identified the Defendant as the entity that received the direct benefit and initiated the payment relationship. The learned Judge was entitled to accept this evidence. The question under Section 71 is not “who initially promised to pay?” but “who ultimately enjoyed the benefit?”. The evidence showed that the installation of the tanks assisted the Defendant in obtaining the OC and receiving full payment from the Main Contractor and/or the Developer.

This was the Defendant's most compelling ground. The Defendant adduced uncontroverted evidence, including a Final Certificate from the project consultant and proof of payments, demonstrating that it had paid JKS RM7,826,499.39 against a certified value of RM7,892,508.09, and had levied back-charges of RM139,226.87. This showed that the Defendant had, in fact, overpaid JKS for the works, which included the value of the Plaintiff's FRP Water Tanks.

The Defendant relied on Bauer Malaysia Sdn Bhd v Hundred Vision Construction Sdn Bhd and anor [2020] 1 LNS 442, where the High Court declined to invoke Section 71 against the 2nd Defendant (bring the employer) because the employer had already fully paid the main contractor. The court held: "[102] The Court is not inclined to invoke section 71 of the Contracts Act 1950 in the name of doing substantial justice, having satisfied itself that D2 as the employer had in all probabilities paid D1, its main contractor. This is not a case where the employer D1 had been shown to have injustly enriched itself. If at all there is anyone that had been unjustly enriched it is D1.”

The Plaintiff argued that the payments between the Defendant and JKS were "immaterial and irrelevant" to its claim. Citing Mega Mayang (supra), the Plaintiff contended that where a claim is based on quantum meruit, set-offs and payments between the main contractor and sub-contractor do not extinguish the obligation to the innocent party who provided the benefit. The Plaintiff emphasized that it was the direct paymaster (having received RM350,000 directly from the Defendant) and claimed that JKS had specifically directed the Defendant to pay the Plaintiff directly for the outstanding sum.

Having considered the evidence and submissions, I find the Defendant’s argument under this issue to be overwhelmingly supported by contemporaneous documents, notes of proceedings pertaining to the witnesses’ testimony, and authoritative legal principles. The Defendant’s position—that no unjust enrichment could have arisen because it had fully and even excessively paid 15 JKS for all certified works, inclusive of the Plaintiff’s FRP Water Tanks—is strongly borne out by the record.

The Final Certificate dated 30.11.2017, issued by Jurutera Perunding WTA Sdn Bhd, certified the total value of JKS’s works at RM7,892,508.09. This certificate, together with the progress payment certificate and the listing of invoices issued by JKS(Record of Appeal Vol. 3, PDF-pp. 70–71) lists the mechanical and plumbing works performed by JKS. This, in turn, refers to the Progress Payment Certificate (CWSP 19 (Fasa 1 & 2)) dated 30.10.2017(Record of Appeal Vol. 2, PDF-p.102) and the breakdown showing the details of the 8 FPR Water Tanks (Record of Appeal Vol. 2, PDF-pp. 108,110,118& 120,) supplied by the Plaintiff. [39] Concurrently, the Defendant paid JKS a total of RM7,826,499.39, a figure expressly acknowledged by JKS in its CIPAA computation sheet (Record of Appeal Vol. 2, p. 131). [40] The Defendant also raised back charges amounting to RM139,226.87 via invoices dated 26.9.2017, which JKS’s director (“SP2”) confirmed on oath to bear SP2’s signature (Record of Appeal Vol. 3, pp. 239–240). [41] These three categories of documents—the Final Certificate, proof of payment, and back charges—when read together, establish that the Defendant paid RM7,965,726.26, thereby exceeding the certified value of the works done by JKS (RM7,892,508.09). 16 [42] To impose liability on the Defendant to pay the Plaintiff in these circumstances would amount to compelling double payment for the same component of works. The Plaintiff’s 8 FRP Water Tanks formed part of the certified work value, and the Defendant has fully discharged that certified value. Section 71 of the Act is a codification of an equitable remedy, and this court considering the specific purpose of the said Section, cannot order restitution where the supposed “benefit” has already been paid for in full. [43] This was made clear in Bauer (supra), where the High Court refused to invoke section 71 after finding that the employer (2nd Defendant) has made full payment to the main contractor. His Lordship Lee Swee Seng J (as his Lordship was then) articulated a crucial safeguard which applies squarely here: “[108] The Court must guard against granting a claim in quantum meruit under our section 71 of the Contracts Act 1950 under the guise of doing substantial justice when parties have carefully thought of and provided for the allocation of risks under the respective main contracts and subcontracts where the rights and remedies of the parties affected can be pursued to its final end. Otherwise the Court runs the risk of being accused of rewriting the bargain of the parties.” [44] This factual scenario is aligns with Bauer (supra): the Defendant, like the employer in Bauer (supra), demonstrated that it fully paid the intermediary contractor i.e. JKS. To require the Defendant to pay again would offend the principle against duplication of payment, lying at the core of unjust enrichment. 17 [45] The evidential matrix is further strengthened by JKS’s own conduct. In the abandoned CIPAA proceedings, JKS affirmed it received RM7,826,499.39—without alleging that any sum remained outstanding for the FRP Water Tanks. This internal acknowledgment undermines any assertion that the Defendant still owed monies relating to the Plaintiff’s tanks. Further, JKS’s alleged claim that the Defendant owed JKS RM2,143,326.15 remained an allegation which was disputed by the Defendant as the Defendant has maintained that they have paid to JKS in full the amount certified for payment by the Project’s Consultant and disputes JKS’s claim. [46] Additionally, SP2 conceded during trial that Jurutera Perunding WTA Sdn Bhd was the party responsible for certifying mechanical and plumbing works of JKS, confirming the legitimacy and finality of the Final Certificate relied upon by the Defendant. This affirmation strengthens the conclusion that all work—including the FRP Water Tanks—was fully valued and fully paid. [47] The Plaintiff contends that these payments are “irrelevant”. This misconceives the proper inquiry under Section 71: the central question is whether the Defendant was enriched. On the evidence, it was not. [48] The recent High Court decision in Konsesi Kotapermatamas Sdn Bhd v Tegas Broadcast & Multimedia Sdn Bhd & Anor [2025] 4 CLJ 761 provides further authoritative support for the Defendant’s position. In that case, his Lordship, Ong Chee Kwan J (as his Lordship was then) rejected a downstream supplier’s attempt to invoke Section 71 against an upstream employer where the 18 employer had contracted only with a main contractor, holding that, inter alia: a) Section 71 cannot be invoked where the alleged “benefit” arises through a chain of contracts, and the work was not done for the defendant; b) A supplier must show that it performed the work “for” the defendant, consistent with Siow Wong Fatt(supra), which the High Court affirmed as binding; c) Where the employer is already subject to claims by its main contractor for the very same works, compelling payment to a downstream supplier would unjustly require double payment, and d) Policy considerations preclude elevating unsecured subcontractor creditors above their contractual debtor. [49] I am of the view that these principles apply a fortiori here, where: • the Plaintiff is a Sub-Subcontractor, • the Defendant contracted only with JKS, • the work was plainly done for JKS, not for the Defendant, • the Defendant is already shown to have paid in full to JKS, and • the Plaintiff seeks, in effect, to leapfrog its contractual debtor and recover directly from the Defendant. [50] The High Court in Kotapermatamas(supra) expressly emphasised that s. 71 requires proof that the claimant performed the work for the defendant, and that the defendant must have received the benefit directly from the claimant. The Court held: 19 “In order for the supplier to bring itself within s. 71… it must show that it had done the works for the appellant. On the facts, this had not been shown at all.” (paras 30–33).” [51] The same deficiency exists here: the Plaintiff did not perform its works for the Defendant, but for JKS under their sub-subcontract. [52] Kotapermatamas (supra) further underscores that compelling a defendant to pay a downstream supplier despite having already paid the upstream contractor risks double liability, which is inherently unjust and incompatible with the equitable foundation of Section 71. His Lordship stated: “It may result in the appellant having to pay twice for the same goods. This will be unjust.” (para 41) This reasoning is wholly consistent with the Defendant’s argument and applies with full force on the facts of this Appeal. [53] Importantly, Kotapermatamas (supra) also highlights the policy consequences of allowing downstream suppliers to bypass the insolvency hierarchy and claim directly against employers or principal contractors. The court cautioned that doing so would effectively transform unsecured creditors into preference creditors, contrary to insolvency policy. That concern arises here as well, given that the Plaintiff seeks to shift the consequences of JKS’s financial difficulties onto the Defendant. [54] In my judgment, the learned Sessions Court Judge erred in failing to appreciate the cumulative effect of the documentary and oral evidence demonstrating full payment by the Defendant. The learned 20 Sessions Court Judge’s omission amounts to an insufficient judicial appreciation of material evidence, thus satisfying the “plainly wrong” threshold for appellate intervention under Ng Hoo Kui (supra). [55] When the learned Sessions Court Judge heard and decided the suit, the decision in Kotapermatamas (supra) was not yet available. By the time this Appeal was heard, however, that decision had been reported. The Defendant’s position is therefore further fortified by the legal requirements clarified in Kotapermatamas (supra), namely: that without proof of enrichment, Section 71 cannot be invoked; and further, that where the Plaintiff has not performed the work for the Defendant, the application of Section 71 is expressly excluded. [56] It also bears reiteration that, as held in Bauer (supra) and reaffirmed in Kotapermatamas (supra), Section 71 is not a mechanism for reallocating commercial risk or rewriting contractual arrangements. The Plaintiff assumed the risk of contracting with JKS; its remedy lies in that contractual chain, not outside it. The Defendant, having discharged all payments certified under its contract with JKS, cannot be made to shoulder JKS’s liabilities. [57] In the circumstances, I find that the Defendant was not enriched— let alone unjustly enriched—within the meaning of Section 71 of the Contracts Act 1950. This ground of appeal is therefore made out. SUBMISSION 4: Failure to Prove JKS's Debt and the Plaintiff's Underlying Claim 21 Defendant's Argument:

The Defendant submitted that the Plaintiff failed to prove the foundational debt that JKS legally owed the Plaintiff the sum claimed. There was no evidence that the Plaintiff had filed a Proof of Debt with JKS's liquidator or obtained a judgment against JKS.

The Plaintiff argued this was a "non-issue". The director of JKS (“SP2”) explicitly admitted under oath that the debt to the Plaintiff was valid and outstanding. A claim under Section 71 is a direct claim against the beneficiary for restitution; it is not a derivative claim that depends on first proving an unrecoverable debt against the immediate contracting party.

This ground of appeal fails on its own merits, but is rendered moot. The Plaintiff is correct that a claim under Section 71 is independent. The admission by JKS's director (“SP2”) was sufficient for the Sessions Court to find that the Plaintiff did not intend to act gratuitously.

However, given the Court's finding on Submission 3, the validity of the underlying debt from JKS to the Plaintiff becomes academic to the claim against the Defendant. The Defendant's liability under Section 71 is extinguished not because the debt is invalid, but 22 because the Defendant, having already paid for the benefit, is not unjustly enriched.

For the foregoing reasons, particularly in relation to my findings about Submission 3, this Court finds that the learned Sessions Court Judge erred in law and in fact in invoking Section 71 of the Contracts Act 1950 against the Defendant. The Defendant successfully demonstrated that it had provided full consideration for the works, including theFRP Water Tanks supplied by the Plaintiff. Consequently, the Defendant was not unjustly enriched at the Plaintiff's expense. To compel payment would be to sanction an inequitable double payment.

The Appeal is therefore allowed. The order of the Sessions Court dated 5.6.2024 is hereby set aside, and the Plaintiff’s claim is dismissed. Costs of this Appeal and of the proceedings below are awarded to the Defendant, subject to allocatur. 3rd October 2025 sgd. RAJES RAGHAVJI JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER HIGH COURT CONSTRUCTION COURT 1 KUALA LUMPUR 23 COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLANT/PLAINTIFF: Yap Yoon Jan (Messrs Wendy & Partners) COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT: Omar Kutty Abdul Aziz (Messrs Kuah, Lim, Chin & Ooi)