Kerjaya Prospek (M) Sdn Bhd v Plp Electrical Engineering Sdn Bhd (WA-24C-193-12/2025)

WA-24C-193-12/2025 Kand. 26 12/06/2026 10:15:09 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY OF WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA (CONSTRUCTION DIVISION) ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO.: WA-24C-193-12/2025 In the matter of an Adjudication between PLP Electrical Engineering Sdn. Bhd. (Claimant) and Kerjaya Prospek (M) Sdn. Bhd. (Respondent) And In the matter of an Adjudication Decision by Karen Ng Yueh Ying dated 2.10.2025 And In the matter of Section 15 (b) and (d) and Section 16(1)(a) and (b) of the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 (CIPAA); And In the matter of Order 5, Order 7, Order 28, Order 69(A) Rule 2, Rule 3, Rule 4 and Order 92 Rule 4 of the Rules of Court 2012 BETWEEN KERJAYA PROSPEK (M) SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 352407-U) ...PLAINTIFF AND PLP ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 453327-T) ...DEFENDANT (HEARD TOGETHER WITH) IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORIES, MALAYSIA ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO.: WA-24C-191-12/2025 In the Matter of the Enforcement of an Adjudication Decision dated 02.10.2025 by Ms. Karen Ng Yueh Ying under the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 ("CIPAA") And In the Matter of Order 5, Order 7, Order 28, Order 69A and/or Order 92, rule 4 of the Rules of Court 2012 And In the Matter of Section 28 of CIPAA BETWEEN PLP ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 453327-T) ...PLAINTIFF AND KERJAYA PROSPEK (M) SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 352407-U) ...DEFENDANT GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT A. INTRODUCTION

1. These proceedings concern two Originating Summonses heard together by this Court. OS 193 was filed by Kerjaya Prospek (M) Sdn Bhd ("Kerjaya") seeking to set aside the Adjudication Decision under Section 15(b) and (d) of CIPAA and to stay its enforcement pending arbitration ("Setting Aside/Stay Application").

2. OS 191 was filed by PLP Electrical Engineering Sdn Bhd ("PLP") to enforce the Adjudication Decision dated 2.10.2025 ("the Adjudication Decision") as a judgment of the Court pursuant to Section 28 of the CIPAA ("Enforcement Application").

3. The Adjudication Decision was delivered by the learned Adjudicator, Ms. Karen Ng Yueh Ying ("Adjudicator"), directing Kerjaya to pay PLP an adjudicated sum of RM515,575.05, together with interest at 5% per annum from the date of the Adjudication Decision until full payment, and adjudication costs of RM35,000.00("Adjudication Sum").

4. The Court heard OS 193 first — setting aside, then stay — and OS 191 last. This sequencing is logical: if the Adjudication Decision is set aside, there is nothing to stay or enforce; only if neither setting aside nor stay is warranted does enforcement arise as a matter of course.

5. The two applications, though procedurally distinct, are substantively intertwined within the framework of CIPAA, which seeks to balance the need for speedy interim cashflow relief in the construction industry against the preservation of parties' substantive rights to have disputes finally resolved in arbitration. B. DECISION

6. Having considered carefully the cause papers and submissions filed, I am not satisfied that Kerjaya has met the high threshold required to set aside the Adjudication Decision under Section 15(b) and (d) of CIPAA. Accordingly, the Setting Aside Application is dismissed. The Stay Application is likewise dismissed. Conversely, the Enforcement Application is allowed.

7. Kerjaya has lodged appeals against my decision in respect of both OS. These constitute my full reasons for the decision. C. MATERIAL BACKGROUND FACTS

8. By way of a Letter of Award dated 4.1.2019 ("LOA"), Kerjaya appointed PLP as its Nominated Sub-Contractor for electrical installation works ("Works") in a project known as "Cadangan Untuk Mendirikan 3 Blok Kondominium (552 Unit) Di Atas Lot 11784 (Lot Lama PT 2808), Mukim 13, Daerah Timur Laut, Jalan Sultan Azlan Shah, Pulau Pinang" ("the Project"). The parties also executed the Agreement and Conditions of PAM Sub-Contract 2006 ("PAM Contract"). The LOA and PAM Contract are collectively referred to as "the Sub-Contract".

9. The payment mechanism under the Sub-Contract provided that PLP would submit monthly progress claims to the M&E Consultant and Quantity Surveyor for valuation. The M&E Consultant would then issue payment recommendations to the Architect, who would incorporate these as part of overall payment certification to Kerjaya. The Employer would issue cheques to Kerjaya in PLP's name for the certified sums, which Kerjaya would in turn pass on to PLP.

10. Payment disputes arose when Kerjaya failed and/or refused to make payment to PLP despite the M&E Consultant having issued payment recommendations ELECT-64 dated 12.9.2024 and ELECT-65 dated 12.11.2024, in respect of PLP's Interim Payment Application No. 64 dated 30.8.2024 ("IPA No. 64") and its Final Claim dated 30.9.2024 ("Final Claim"). Kerjaya's stated reason for non-payment was its failure to receive payment from the Employer. This "pay-when-paid" mechanism is a conditional payment arrangement void under Section 35 of CIPAA.

11. On 2.5.2025, PLP served a Payment Claim on Kerjaya seeking payment of an outstanding certified sum of RM498,846.46 together with late payment interest of RM16,728.59, comprising: (a) RM29,851.05 under IPA No. 64; (b) RM18,952.80 under the Final Claim; (c) RM70,805.74 for under-certification in the Final Claim; (d) RM269,095.46 being the 2nd moiety of the retention sum for Tower 1; and (e) RM110,141.41 being the 1st moiety of the retention sum for Tower 2. It is noteworthy that Kerjaya did not serve any Payment Response to the Payment Claim.

12. On 20.5.2025, PLP issued a Notice of Adjudication commencing adjudication proceedings. During the adjudication, Kerjaya served its Adjudication Response raising a cross-claim for indemnity against PLP in the sum of RM3,300,500.00 premised on liquidated ascertained damages ("LAD") imposed by the Employer for alleged delays to the Project caused by PLP. This cross-claim was advanced under Clause 21(vi) of the LOA and Clauses 3.2 and 3.3 of the PAM Sub-Contract 2006.

13. On 2.10.2025, the Adjudicator delivered the Adjudication Decision in favour of PLP, directing Kerjaya to pay the Adjudication Sum. Kerjaya's cross-claim for indemnity was dismissed on the ground, among others, that Kerjaya had not complied with the contractual requirements for exercising a setoff under Clause 26.13 of the PAM Sub-Contract.

14. Following the Adjudication Decision, Kerjaya issued a Notice of Arbitration dated 26.9.2025 commencing arbitration proceedings against PLP ("the Arbitration"). Dissatisfied with the Adjudication Decision, Kerjaya filed OS 193 seeking to set it aside and/or stay it. PLP filed OS 191 to enforce it. D. ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION

15. The issues that arise for determination by this Court are as follows:

(ii) the Adjudicator acted in excess of jurisdiction by awarding the 2nd moiety of the retention sum notwithstanding the non-issuance of a Certificate of Making Good Defects ("CMGD"); and

(iii) there was a denial of natural justice in the manner the Adjudicator dealt with Kerjaya's cross-claim for indemnity;

16. Kerjaya submits that the Adjudicator exceeded her jurisdiction in awarding PLP late payment interest of RM16,728.59. Kerjaya advances two limbs. First, late payment interest does not constitute "payment" within Section 4 of CIPAA, which limits claims to "work done" and/or "services rendered", and is therefore outside the Adjudicator's jurisdiction.

17. Second, Section 36(4) of CIPAA stipulates that the due date for payment is 30 calendar days from the receipt of the invoice. Since PLP failed to issue any invoice, no due date for payment could lawfully arise under that provision.

18. In its Reply Submission, Kerjaya advances a sharper argument, drawing a critical distinction between an adjudicator's powers under Section 25 and her jurisdiction under Section 27. Kerjaya submits that Section 25 powers may only be exercised within the boundaries of jurisdiction and cannot be used to bypass mandatory statutory provisions.

19. Critically, Kerjaya introduces a Section 35/Section 36 interaction argument: PLP itself invoked Section 35 of CIPAA to void the contractual "pay-when-paid" clause, thereby triggering the statutory default payment mechanism under Section 36.

20. Having invoked that default mechanism, PLP cannot then ignore the express statutory prerequisite of Section 36(4) the mandatory receipt of an invoice. Kerjaya also notes that PLP Electrical Engineering Sdn Bhd v Kerjaya Prospek (M) Sdn Bhd [2025] CLJU 2547 is currently on appeal and does not represent settled law. PLP's Position

21. PLP submits that its claim for late payment interest is not a standalone claim for damages but a consequential claim arising directly from Kerjaya's delay in making payment for PLP's Works.

22. PLP argues that the term "invoice" in Section 36(4) is undefined in CIPAA and ought to be construed broadly and purposively consistent with the Court of Appeal's approach in Pali PTP Sdn Bhd v Bond M&E Sdn Bhd & Another Appeal [2023] 9 CLJ 740.

23. PLP's calculation was based on the M&E Consultant's certifications (ELECT-64 and ELECT-65) as the functional equivalent of invoices. PLP also submits that Kerjaya was actively preventing PLP from issuing formal invoices by withholding the Architect's payment certificates. Court's Analysis

24. There is an important distinction between an adjudicator's jurisdiction (the subject matter the Adjudicator may deal with under Section 27 of CIPAA, confined to the four corners of the Payment Claim and Payment Response) and her powers (the broad statutory powers under Section 25, which may only be exercised within that jurisdiction and cannot override mandatory statutory provisions). This distinction was affirmed by the Federal Court in Anas Construction Sdn Bhd v JKP Sdn Bhd [2024] 2 MLJ 543. With this in mind, I turn to Kerjaya's argument.

25. I accept the premise that Section 25 powers cannot override mandatory statutory provisions. However, Kerjaya's Section 35/Section 36 interaction argument ultimately fails on its own terms. The argument assumes that Section 36(4) requires a formal invoice, strictly understood, as a mandatory jurisdictional gateway before any interest can lawfully accrue. That assumption is not borne out by the statutory language or the authorities.

26. The term "invoice" is not defined in CIPAA. In Zana Bina Bhd v Cosmic Master Development Sdn Bhd [2017] MLJU 146, Lee Swee Seng J (now FCJ) found nothing objectionable in the due date for payment being calculated from the date of an interim certificate valuation, treating it as an "invoice" within Section 36(4).

27. The academic commentary confirms that an invoice under Section 36(4) "can be in any form including a progress payment claim, valuation of interim claim issued by the project consultant or a statement of account submitted by a contractor, so long as it can reasonably be understood to be a request or demand for payment of the work done or services rendered" (Construction Adjudication in Malaysia (3rd Edition), Lam Wai Loon and Ivan YF Loo).

28. The purposive approach adopted by the Court of Appeal in Pali PTP Sdn Bhd v Bond M&E Sdn Bhd [2023] 9 CLJ 740 reinforces this reading. Construing "invoice" narrowly to require a formal document would enable a paying party to frustrate CIPAA's cashflow objectives by the simple expedient of withholding certification. In the present case, PLP was unable to issue formal invoices precisely because Kerjaya controlled and withheld the certification process.

29. To hold that PLP is thereby disentitled from claiming late payment interest would allow Kerjaya to benefit from its own wrong. That cannot be right. See also Section 17A of the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967.

30. Accordingly, PLP's calculation of late payment interest based on ELECT-64 and ELECT-65 complied with Section 36(4) of CIPAA as properly construed. The Adjudicator exercised her powers under Section 25(n) within jurisdiction. There was no bypass of Section 36(4) rather, Section 36(4) was applied using the functionally equivalent documents that PLP was in a position to issue. This ground is hereby dismissed.

31. For completeness, even if this Court were to find (which it does not) that the Adjudicator erred in awarding the late payment interest of RM16,728.59, that would not warrant setting aside the entire Adjudication Decision. The interest component is severable under Section 28(2) of CIPAA, and no such error is found. F. GROUND 2: ALLEGED JURISDICTIONAL EXCESS — 2ND MOIETY OF RETENTION SUM (CMGD) Kerjaya's Position

32. Kerjaya submits that the Adjudicator exceeded her jurisdiction by awarding PLP the 2nd moiety of the retention sum of RM269,095.46. Under Clause 26.6 of the PAM Sub-Contract 2006, the Sub-Contractor's entitlement to the 2nd moiety is expressly contingent upon the issuance of the Certificate of Making Good Defects ("CMGD") under the Main Contract. That precondition has not been fulfilled.

33. In its Reply Submission, Kerjaya introduces a factually specific and important point. This case is distinguishable from Dama Design & Build Sdn Bhd v Universiti Pendidikan Sultan Idris (UPSI) [2017] CLJU 638 because the Architect did not merely fail to issue the CMGD passively.

34. On 25.10.2024, the Architect expressly evaluated the works and actively refused to issue the CMGD on the basis that several outstanding defects remained unresolved, including defects in PLP's own work.

35. The condition precedent was, Kerjaya submits, deliberately not satisfied by reason of PLP's own conduct in failing to remediate its works during the Defects Liability Period ("DLP"). This active, reasoned refusal is said to be a material factual distinction from Dama Design(supra). PLP's Position

36. PLP submits that the Adjudicator was empowered under Sections 25(m) and (n) of CIPAA to decide on entitlement notwithstanding the absence of a CMGD. PLP distinguishes Kerjaya's reliance on Orion Choice Sdn Bhd v Bellajade Sdn Bhd [2023] 5 MLJ 437 and Perkasa Jauhari Sdn Bhd v YS Chong Enterprise Sdn Bhd [2020] MLJU 1540 on the basis that neither case involves a CIPAA adjudication, and the specific statutory powers under Section 25(n) available to adjudicators had no application in those cases.

37. PLP reiterates the principle from Bina Puri Construction Sdn Bhd v Hing Nyit Enterprise Sdn Bhd [2015] 8 CLJ 728 that absence of certification cannot deprive the unpaid party of access to the adjudication process. Court's Analysis

38. I address directly the new factual point raised in Kerjaya's Reply Submission. The Architect's active refusal to issue the CMGD on 25.10.2024, with stated reasons, is factually distinguishable from the scenario in Dama Design & Build, where certification had simply not been obtained. I accept that this is a meaningful factual difference. However, it does not change the legal analysis.

39. Sections 25(m) and (n) of CIPAA expressly empower the Adjudicator to "review and revise any certificate issued or to be issued" and to "decide or declare on any matter notwithstanding no certificate has been issued in respect of the matter." The breadth of these provisions extends precisely to cases where certification has been actively refused as well as cases where it has been passively withheld. An Architect's written refusal gives the Adjudicator material to evaluate, not a barrier to her jurisdiction.

40. The question the Adjudicator had to answer was not merely whether the Architect refused the CMGD,but whether the refusal was justified. This requires an examination of whether the alleged defects in PLP's work were substantiated by the evidence. The Adjudicator made a factual and legal finding that they were not.

41. This Court is not empowered to re-examine those factual findings. It bears emphasis that Kerjaya itself wrote to the Architect on 17.10.2024 requesting the issuance of the CMGD consistent with a recognition that the DLP had lapsed and CMGD certification was expected to follow.

42. The Architect's subsequent refusal on 25.10.2024 was a refusal the Adjudicator was entitled to evaluate and did evaluate. Her finding that the refusal was not justified is a merits finding properly ventilated in arbitration. It does not constitute a jurisdictional excess.

43. Kerjaya's reliance on Orion Choice(supra) and Perkasa Jauhari(supra) is misplaced. Both cases involve general contract law principles arising outside a CIPAA adjudication, and neither grapples with the specific statutory powers conferred on adjudicators under Section 25(n).

44. The legal landscape within a CIPAA adjudication is governed by a distinct statutory framework, and general contractual authorities on condition precedents must yield to it. This ground therefore fails. G. GROUND 3: ALLEGED BREACH OF NATURAL JUSTICE FAILURE TO CONSIDER KERJAYA'S CROSS-CLAIM FOR INDEMNITY Kerjaya's Position

45. Kerjaya submits that the Adjudicator committed a material breach of natural justice by failing to adjudicate its actual pleaded cause of action. Kerjaya's cross-claim was based solely on its right to indemnity under Clause 21(vi) of the LOA and Clauses 3.2 and 3.3 of the PAM Sub-Contract 2006.

46. These indemnity provisions impose an independent obligation on PLP to indemnify Kerjaya for losses arising from PLP's acts or omissions, and they do not contain any requirement for the issuance of a Certificate of Non-Completion ("CNC") or compliance with notice timelines.

47. Kerjaya argues that the Adjudicator dismissed the indemnity cross-claim by applying procedural requirements applicable to a claim for LAD — specifically, the absence of a CNC under Clause 16.1 and the notice requirement under Clause 22.6(a).

48. The right to indemnity and the right to claim LAD are distinct and independent causes of action, as established in Malayan Banking Bhd v Basarudin bin Ahmad Khan [2007] 1 MLJ 613 and confirmed in Choongcons (Penang) Sdn Bhd v MS Elevators Engineering Sdn Bhd [2023] 1 MLJ 505.

49. By conflating the two, the Adjudicator decided the cross-claim on a basis neither party had pleaded and which Kerjaya had no opportunity to address.

50. In its Reply Submission, Kerjaya further distinguishes TSR Bina Sdn Bhd v Syarikat Pembenaan Yeoh Tiong Lay Sdn Bhd [2024] 5 CLJ 402: in TSR Bina(supra), the "new issues" in the Reply were responses to points already raised in the Response.

51. Here, by contrast, the Adjudicator applied an entirely different legal framework (LAD requirements) to an indemnity claim, which was a new legal tangent going well beyond any response to the pleaded cross-claim. PLP's Position

52. PLP reproduces in its Reply Submission the actual text of paragraphs 88 and 89 of the Adjudication Decision, which is material: "88. The Respondent submits that premised on the matters stated in paragraphs 27 to 35 of the Adjudication Response and further pursuant to the contract between the Claimant and the Respondent (clause 21(vi) of LOA and clause 3.2 and 3.3 of PAM NSC 2006), the Claimant shall indemnify and save harmless the Respondent for a total sum of RM3,300,500.00.

89. I have considered the Respondent's right to set-off any monies due to the Claimant under clause 21(vi) of LOA and clause 3.2 and 3.3 of PAM NSC 2006. I find that the Respondent is not entitled to exercise its right of set-off under the Sub-Contract on the following grounds..."

53. PLP submits that Clauses 16.1 and 22 were expressly raised in its Adjudication Reply as a contractual response to Kerjaya's cross-claim. The Adjudicator's reliance on them was not conjured from thin air. PLP also reiterates that the Adjudicator had an independent basis for dismissing the cross-claim: noncompliance with Clause 26.13, which governs the procedural prerequisites for exercising any set-off under the Sub-Contract. Court's Analysis

54. Not every procedural irregularity amounts to a breach of natural justice. The breach must be material it must have realistically affected the outcome.

55. A material breach occurs when the adjudicator fails to bring to the attention of the parties a point which is decisive or of considerable potential importance and which they ought to be given an opportunity to comment upon: Econpile (M) Sdn Bhd v IRDK Ventures Sdn Bhd [2017] 7 MLJ 732, as affirmed in JKP Sdn Bhd v Anas Construction Sdn Bhd & Another Appeal [2022] 10 CLJ 528.

56. The reproduction of paragraphs 88 and 89 of the Adjudication Decision is analytically illuminating. A careful reading of paragraph 89 reveals that the Adjudicator did not dismiss the substantive existence of Kerjaya's indemnity right.

57. She expressly acknowledged the cross-claim as one for indemnity under Clause 21(vi) of the LOA and Clauses 3.2 and 3.3 of the PAM NSC 2006. What the Adjudicator dismissed was Kerjaya's attempt to exercise a set-off of that indemnity claim against PLP's adjudicated sums. The framing is significant: "/ find that the Respondent is not entitled to exercise its right of set-off under the Sub-Contract..." This is a finding about the exercise of set-off, not a rejection of the indemnity claim on its merits.

58. This distinction resolves the principal thrust of Kerjaya's natural justice complaint. Clause 26.13 of the PAM Sub-Contract governs the exercise of set-off by the Contractor, requiring: (a) complete details of the set-off assessment; and (b) written notice at least 28 days before any deduction.

59. These requirements are not specific to LAD claims they are general procedural prerequisites applicable to any exercise of set-off under the Sub-Contract, including a set-off premised on an indemnity claim.

60. Kerjaya has not argued, in either its main submission or its Reply Submission, that Clause 26.13 is inapplicable to an indemnity-based set-off. This concession is fatal to its position on this ground.

61. I accept that the Adjudicator's additional application of CNC (Clause 16.1) and notice (Clause 22.6(a)) requirements to the indemnity cross-claim may have been analytically imprecise.

62. Kerjaya's argument that these are LAD-specific requirements has merit as a proposition of contract law, supported by Malayan Banking(supra) and Choongcons(supra). The arbitral tribunal may well take a different view.

63. However, the test under Section 15(b) of CIPAA is not whether the Adjudicator's legal analysis was correct, but whether there was a material denial of natural justice one that realistically affected the outcome.

64. The Clause 26.13 set-off finding stands as an independent, unchallenged basis for dismissing the cross-claim. Even fully accepting Kerjaya's argument on the CNC and notice points, the Adjudicator's conclusion would necessarily have been the same. The alleged breach is therefore not material to the outcome.

65. There is a further point. Clauses 16.1 and 22 were expressly raised by PLP in its Adjudication Reply as a contractual response to Kerjaya's cross-claim. The Adjudicator adopted PLP's position. This does not constitute going off on a frolic a frolic occurs when an adjudicator introduces a new basis not argued by either party.

66. As the Court of Appeal held in TSR Bina(supra): "We do not consider that, in this light, it may correctly be said that there has been a denial of natural justice, even if the adjudication reply refers to the documents or raise submission not particularly addressed in the adjudication response." For these cumulative reasons, this ground fails. H. APPLICATION FOR STAY PENDING ARBITRATION a. Kerjaya Applied the Wrong Legal Test

67. Before addressing the merits of the Stay Application, I must address a threshold problem with Kerjaya's stay submissions. Kerjaya's main submission on stay is structured substantially around the "special circumstances" test the framework applicable to stay of execution under the Rules of Court, which calls for proof of exceptional or unusual circumstances, balance of convenience, and risk of non-recovery.

68. This is the wrong test for a stay application under Section 16 of CIPAA. The Federal Court in Econpile (M) Sdn Bhd v ASM Development (KL) Sdn Bhd [2024] 5 CLJ 16 confirmed definitively that the applicable test under Section 16 of CIPAA is, and is only: (i) whether there are clear and unequivocal errors in the adjudication decision; or (ii) whether a stay is necessary to meet the justice of the individual case.

69. The Federal Court unequivocally rejected importing the general "special circumstances" framework into CIPAA stay applications.

70. Kerjaya's arguments on "severe financial disparity", the size of its cross-claim in arbitration relative to the adjudicated sum, and the alleged risk of non-recovery - while potentially relevant under a "special circumstances" analysis - do not constitute the correct legal test under Section 16 of CIPAA. I decline to evaluate the Stay Application on those grounds. b. Impact of the Pending Arbitration

71. The existence of the Arbitration commenced by Kerjaya is a threshold condition for invoking Section 16(1)(b) of CIPAA. It does not make the granting of a stay mandatory.

72. As held in Teguh Wiramas Sdn Bhd v Thien Seng Chan Sdn Bhd and Another Application [2017] MLJU 633: "The fact that there is a pending arbitration...involving the same issues that had been decided by the Adjudicator does not mean that there should invariably be a stay of the Adjudication Decision. The fact of a litigation having been afoot is just a threshold condition and not determinative of a stay order."

73. Furthermore, CIPAA does not prevent concurrent adjudication and arbitration proceedings. Granting a stay solely on the basis that Kerjaya has commenced an Arbitration which Kerjaya itself initiated after the Adjudication Decision would strip the adjudication process of all utility and undermine the fundamental cashflow purpose of CIPAA. c. Whether There Exist Clear and Unequivocal Errors / Justice of the Case

74. As I have found at Grounds 1 to 3, none of Kerjaya's challenges discloses any jurisdictional excess or breach of natural justice. The s.35/s.36 interaction argument is analytically creative but does not disclose a jurisdictional error given the broad purposive reading of "invoice" under Section 36(4). The active Architect refusal on Ground 2 does not affect the Adjudicator's statutory power to evaluate it. Ground 3 raised an interesting indemnity/LAD distinction, but the Clause 26.13 finding remained unchallenged. The sum of these matters falls far short of the demanding "clear and unequivocal error" standard.

75. I am not persuaded that the justice of this case requires a stay. The Adjudication was properly conducted, the Decision was reasoned, and PLP has been kept out of its adjudicated sum since 2.10.2025. Kerjaya's right to fully ventilate all its arguments including the indemnity/LAD distinction and all disputed factual matters remains intact in the Arbitration that it has itself commenced.

76. Accordingly, the application for a stay under Section 16(1)(b) of CIPAA is refused. I. ENFORCEMENT UNDER SECTION 28 OF CIPAA

77. PLP has satisfied the prerequisites for enforcement under Section 28 of CIPAA. There is a valid Adjudication Decision in PLP's favour. It is not in dispute that Kerjaya has not paid the adjudicated sum. The Setting Aside/Stay Application has been dismissed, and there is no final decision from an arbitrator or court on the payment claim.

78. This is in line with the binding authority of the Court of Appeal in Inai Kiara Sdn Bhd v Puteri Nusantara Sdn Bhd [2019] 2 MLJ 362, which held that all that the applicant needs to do is to satisfy the High Court that there is an adjudication decision rendered in the applicant's favour, that there has been nonpayment of the adjudicated sum by the date specified, and that there is no prohibition to the grant of the order sought.

79. Once these matters are established, the adjudication decision has not been set aside or stayed, and there is no final decision on the payment claim, the order to enforce ought to be granted.

80. All prerequisites are established. My discretionary power under Section 28 of CIPAA is accordingly exercised in favour of PLP. The Adjudication Decision is enforced as a judgment of the Court. J. CONCLUSION

81. For the reasons set out above: