Commonwealth of Australia v O’Reilly (1984) 52 ALR ” [33] This Court also finds valuable guidance from Ramly J’s decision in the case of Abric Project Management & Anor v Palmshine Plaza Sdn Bhd & Anor [2007] 5 MLJ 685, wherein a contributory and a former director (Ong Say Lam) of the first respondent Company (Palmshine Plaza Sdn Bhd) had also filed an application under section 232 (1) of the Act to remove the liquidator (Lim Tian Huat) from his office and to appoint the official liquidator. In addressing this application, Ramly J has held the following: 18 “A liquidator may be removed if it can be shown that the removal would be advantageous to those interested in the assets of the company. Here however, there were no more assets left in the liquidation and therefore none could be imperilled by the continuance in office by the liquidator. Accordingly, fair play to the liquidator ought to be regarded and the liquidator be allowed to finalise the tail end of the liquidation (see para 50). “ [34] Ramly J in Abric Project Management had also re-emphasised the Court’s power to remove liquidators under section 232(1) of the Act in paragraph 14 of his judgment: “The jurisdiction of the court to remove a liquidator under s 232 of the Companies Act 1965 for ‘due cause shown’ is not to be exercised in the same way as if the power had been for the court to remove the liquidator ‘if the court shall think fit’. Some unfitness in the liquidator must be shown in order to justify his removal and the removing of him is not a matter of pure judicial discretion. That being the case the liquidator has a right to say that he is not to be removed unless due cause is shown, see in Re Sir John Moore Gold Mining Co.” [35] In relation to the Court’s power in appointing and removing the liquidators from office, the Singapore court in the case of Chua Boon Chin v JM McCormack & Ors [1979] 2 MLJ 156 has held : 19 “If the court is satisfied on the evidence before it that it is against the interest of the liquidation (all those interested in the company being liquidated), that a particular person should be made liquidator, then the court has power to remove the present liquidator and then to appoint some other person in his place.” [36] The learned author Professor Walter Woon has remarked in his book Walter Woon on Company Law Revised Third Edition (Sweet & Maxwell, Thomson Reuters) at paragraph 17.143: “A liquidator, whether appointed by the court or in a voluntary winding up, may be removed by the court on cause shown.442 Cause may be shown when there is some unfitness of the person of his personal character, or from his connection with other parties, or from the circumstances in which he is mixed up.443 Thus, for instance, if liquidator refuses to take action against miscreant directors because he is one of them444 or because they are his friends,445 impartial because of his connection with person against whom there might be pending claims, there would be cause to have him removed.446 Where it appears that the liquidator is in a position where his duty and interest conflict, the court may remove him.447” 20 [37] What is clear here is that Section 232(1) of the Act has conferred upon this Court a statutory power regarding applications to set aside any liquidator(s) who has been appointed by the Court. Therefore, when this Court is requested by any applicants to invoke this statutory power, the Applicant must demonstrate or show that the Applicant is indeed an interested party(ies) qualified to make such application be it the creditor, contributory, shareholder et cetera in which, in proving such qualification, the Applicant must prove that he has a legitimate interest in the relief sought. It is vivid that at least in the Malaysian and Singaporean chapters that, applications for removal of liquidators are open to “all those who are interested in the company” or “all those interested in the company being liquidated”. By no means at all it was limited to any classes or persons interested in the company or liquidation. [38] This Court is also of the view that the wordings of section 232(1) of the Act, section 232(1) itself did not limit or prescribe the category of persons who could seek a court order removing a liquidator. The utmost consideration the Court must consider is; whether in the interest of the liquidation, the Applicant is able to show cause that the Liquidators ought to be removed from his office. Therefore, the 21 issue of locus standi raised by the Liquidator is actually a non-issue. The question remained to be considered by this Court is, whether Kesenta is able to show any cause(s) to compel this Court to order the removal of the Liquidators. C. THE APPLICANT HAS FAILED TO SHOW ANY CAUSE TO JUSTIFY THE REMOVAL OF LIQUIDATORS Alleged Failure to maintain impartiality and independence [39] It is not in dispute that Kesenta’s main grievance against the Liquidators is the Liquidators’ refusal to grant sanction to TSE to challenge the foreclosure proceedings in the name of the Respondent. [40] The question now would be, is the Liquidators’ Refusal to give consent to TSE to oppose foreclosure proceedings commenced by UTB in respect of charged Setapak land justified? 22 [41] It is settled law that for a liquidator to decide whether or not to sanction proceedings by a creditor or director in the name of the company, one of the factors which the liquidator must consider and satisfy himself is that the action is not vexatious or merely oppressive. ( See: Aliprandi v Griffith Vintners Pty Ltd (in liq) and Another 6 ACSR 250 at 252 - the Privy Council in Lloyd-Owen at 276 - “ A judge in winding up is the custodian of the interests of every class affected by the liquidation. It is his duty… to see to it that all assets of the company are brought into the winding up. In authorising proceedings, especially if they may or will involve some drain upon the assets, he must satisfy himself as to their probable success; where… they involve no possible charge on assets, he will nevertheless be careful to see that any action taken in the company’s name under his authority is not vexatious or merely oppressive.” (See also Carpenter v Pioneer Park Pty Ltd 65 ACSR 564 at p. 571-57) [42] The learned counsel for the liquidators contended that before the liquidators have decided against granting sanction to TSE to oppose the foreclosure proceedings by UTB, the liquidators have duly performed their duties as outlined and prescribed by the law. The Liquidators contended that they have duly considered and evaluated 23 whether or not the action under the name of the Respondent is either vexations or merely oppressive. [43] This Court agrees with the contention by the learned counsel for the Liquidators that based on the documentary evidences exhibited by the Liquidators vide affidavits filed to oppose Kesenta’s application, it is sufficiently telling that the Liquidators have appropriately and lawfully denied sanction to TSE. This is because TSE has clearly failed to satisfy and conform to the requirements to justify a granting of sanction, in that, TSE has ultimately failed to prove any good defence to oppose the foreclosure proceedings. [44] The Liquidators’ refusal to grant TSE, essentially, was made on the legal advice given by Messrs Skrine & Co who is the solicitors appointed by the Liquidators. TSE in applying for sanction had attempted to raise an issue that the Respondent has good defence to oppose the foreclosure proceeding commenced by UTB. This supposed good defence is that, some investors of the Respondent who have purchased notes from numerous 24 financial institutions, claiming simple majority (from the aspect of holdings of notes) are not in favour and are not desirous of UTB proceeding with the said foreclosure proceedings. Nonetheless, Skrine has given their views on the law under the said Trust Deed, that in order to compel UTB to cease the foreclosure proceedings, an ordinary resolution is far from sufficient. Further according to Skrine, based on the said Trust Deed, UTB can be compelled to cease the foreclosure proceedings only vide a special resolution. A decision by a simple majority as claimed by TSE is far from anything that may compel TSE from ceasing the foreclosure proceedings which has already been commenced. [45] With regards to the defence raised by TSE, the Liquidators from the very outset had requested TSE to show to the Liquidators that there is a prima facie defence against the foreclosure proceedings. In furtherance to the Liquidators’ request, the Liquidators had written to TSE seeking from him inter alia a detailed opinion on the merits of the proposed defence from a legal firm of good reputation (which is not conflicted) and 25 had suggested the names of various firms of good repute. TSE then had responded to say that all those firms suggested by the Liquidators were in fact conflicted. TSE had informed the Liquidators that he intends to seek legal opinion from Messrs Brendan Siva to which the Liquidators agreed. The Liquidators had also asked the TSE’s appointed solicitors to address the Liquidators on the following points: