Unless otherwise provided by any written law, the originating summons shall be served on the respondent in such appeal or where the respondent is a body of persons, on the secretary, registrar or such other officer of that body of persons.” [9] The application of the above provision was considered by the Court of Appeal in Limba Jaya Timber Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Superintendent of Lans and Surveys, Limbang & Anor [2017] 9 CLJ 533, where the Court held as follows: “[16] With regards to the current O. 55A RC provisions, we are in agreement with the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants, in that, when paras. 1(1) and 5 1(4) of O. 55A are read together, it is clear that O. 55A provides for the decision – maker (other than the interested party) be made the respondent to the appeal. Paragraph 1(1) makes reference to “an appeal lies from any decision of any person or body of person” to the High Court whilst para. 1(4) provides for originating summons shall be served on the respondent in such appeal or where the respondent is a body of persons, on the secretary, registrar or such other officer of that body of persons”. It stands to reason that the decision – maker be served with the originating summons in this context since the appellant’s appeal is in regards to his decision and in the process the courts have the duty to supervise the decision-maker’s decision to ensure that he does not commit errors of law in coming to his decision ..” (emphasis added) [10] The case of Limba Jaya Timber Sdn Bhd is binding on this court by the doctrine of stare decisis. This doctrine was reiterated by the Federal Court in Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors v. Tay Chai Huat [2012] 3 CLJ 577; [2012] MLJU 60 where the court held: The doctrine of precedent, a fundamental principle of English Law, is a form of reasoning and decision-making formed by case law. Precedents not only have persuasive authority but also must be followed when similar circumstances arise. Any principle announced by a 6 higher court must be followed in later cases. In short the courts are bound within prescribed limits by prior decisions of superior courts. Judges are also obliged to obey the set-up precedents established by prior decisions. This legal principle is called stare decisis. Adherence to precedent helps to maintain a system of stable laws. Judicial precedent means the process whereby judges follow previously decided cases where the facts are of sufficient similarity. The doctrine of judicial precedent involves an application of the principle of stare decisis, i.e., to stand by the decided. In practice, this means that inferior courts are bound to apply the legal principles set down by superior courts in earlier cases. This provides consistency and predictability in the law.” (emphasis added) [11] Therefore, applying the principle in the case of Limba Jaya Timber Sdn Bhd to our present application, the GST Tribunal must be made a party to this OS, and failure to name the GST Tribunal as a party is fatal to the appeal. [12] The Appellant takes the position that the substantive law in this case is different from section 34 of the Sarawak Land Code (Cap. 81) in Limba Jaya Timber Sdn Bhd case, and therefore the said case is distinguishable from the factual matrix of this case. Added to that, the Appellant submits that the GST Tribunal is not a legal entity to be made a party, and relied on several cases, including the case of Sri 7 Devi Kanan & Ors v. Malaysian Airline System Bhd & Ors [2017] 2 CLJ 728, where the court held as follows: “[22] Both the DCA and Jabatan Imigresen are government departments, and have no separate legal personality. For this reason alone, the striking out against the fourth and sixth defendants was allowed. The action would be properly maintained against the ninth defendant, the Government of Malaysia.” [13] In the first place, this is not a suit against the GST Tribunal, but an appeal from the decision of the GST Tribunal, so the cases relied by the Appellant are not relevant. It is trite law that no suit lies against government departments as the same has no legal entity. However, the GST Tribunal here is not being sued, but its decision is being challenged by the Appellant. [14] Added to that, it must be remembered that Order 55A is a special provision to cater for all the appeals from inferior tribunals and/or decision makers under their respective legal provisions. So unless the specific tribunal and/or decision – maker is named, they are not bound by the decisions of the court. [15] In Limba Jaya Timber Sdn Bhd case, the provision on appeal is provided by section 34(6) of Cap. 81, which is pari materia with section 148 of the GST Act, and it reads: 8 “(6) Any person aggrieved by any decision of the Superintendent under this section may, within thirty days of being informed of such decision, appeal to the High Court and for the purpose of further appeal any decision of the High Court shall be deemed to be made in a civil proceeding.”(emphasis added) [16] Therefore, there is no merit in the Appellant’s contention that Lembah Jaya Sdn Bhd’s case is distinguishable as section 36(4) of Cap. 81 is different from section148 of the GST Act. In any event, the common procedure is provided by Order 55A of the ROC 2012, and the case of Lembah Jaya Sdn Bhd is directly on this provision. [17] Premised on the reasons enumerated above, I agree with the preliminary objection raised by the Respondent and the appeal is dismissed with costs. (AZIZAH BINTI HAJI NAWAWI) JUDGE HIGH COURT MALAYA (Appellate and Special Powers Division 2) KUALA LUMPUR Dated: 31th January 2019 9 For the Plaintiff : FC, Tuan Hasifulkhair Bin Mohd Jalaluddin Peguam Kanan Persekutuan Putrajaya For the Defendant : Mohd Zaharudeen Harun/ Ayub Yazid Messrs Zaharudeen Harun & Co Kuala Lumpur Cases referred: