Kgfc (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd. v Lee Choon Peng (JA-29NCC-689-10/2023)

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1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI JOHOR BAHRU DALAM NEGERI JOHOR DARUL TAKZIM, MALAYSIA DALAM PERKARA KEBANKRAPAN NO JA-29NCC-689-10/2023 PER : LEE CHOON PENG … PENGHUTANG PENGHAKIMAN EX-PARTE : KGFC (MALAYSIA) SDN BHD … PEMIUTANG PENGHAKIMAN ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Pengenalan

Lampiran

Lampiran 11 tersebut telah dibicarakan di hadapan Mahkamah ini pada 23.4.2024. Pada tarikh perbicaraan tersebut, semakan Mahkamah ini mendapati JD adalah seorang penjamin bukan sosial. Maka, Mahkamah telah menggunakan budi bicara menurut seksyen 6(3) Akta Insolvensi 1967 (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “Akta Tersebut”) untuk tidak mengeluarkan Perintah Kebankrapan terhadap JD. Malah, Mahkamah telah membuat penemuan seperti berikut:- “Mahkamah dapati pernytaaan tuntutan dalam permintaan untuk mengeluarkan notis kebankrapan menyatakan JD sebagai penjamin kepada syarikat Chequers Hotel Sdn Bhd dan menandatangani jaminan bertarikh 19.9.2019. Walaupun peguam JC berhujah bahawa penghakiman adalah penghakiman persetujuan, Mahkamah tidak melihat sebarang kekecualian dinyatakan dalam seksyen 5(3)(b) Akta Insolvensi 1967 berkenaan bentuk penghakiman dimasukkan. Maka, mahkamah menangguhkan kes ke tarikh baru secara e-review untuk peguam menyatakan pendirian dan mengemukakan nas. Namun, mahkamah juga dapati JC juga boleh menarik balik CP dan memfailkan semula CP setelah mendapat kebenaran mahkamah memandangkan [tempoh pemfailan CP dari tarikh] AOB [luput] pada akhir Disember 2023” 5. Mahkamah dapati penemuan Mahkamah bahawa JC boleh menarik balik Petisyen Pemiutang dan setelah mendapat kebenaran boleh memfailkan semula Petisyen Pemiutang dalam fail yang sama memandangkan tempoh 6 bulan untuk pemfailan Petisyen Pemiutang dari tarikh perbuatan kebankrapan masih belum luput, adalah konsisten dengan keputusan Mahkamah Atasan yang diputuskan selepas itu. Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Mahkamah Persekutuan Abdul Rashid Bin Mohamad Isa v PTT International Trading Pte Ltd [2024] MLJU 1518 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “[10] Put in this perspective, it is apparent that to require a judgment creditor to embark on the whole process of initiating bankruptcy proceedings afresh, by reason of a typographical or inadvertent error does not serve the purpose and intent of the Act, but conversely, results in considerable delay and expense and more significantly dissipation of the judgment debtor’s estate, leaving little to no recourse for other creditors. For this reason, each case ought to be perused with care and caution to ascertain whether the error in the Creditor’s Petition is substantive, going to the root of the act of bankruptcy or to the viability of the creditor’s petition, or on the other hand an error that is capable of remedy by reason that it is de minimis and/or inadvertent, and causes no substantive prejudice to the judgment debtor… [14] Finally, section 6(7) of the Insolvency Act stipulates that a Creditor’s Petition cannot be withdrawn without the leave of the Court. This fortifies our rationale that a Creditor’s Petition can be withdrawn without the entire proceedings necessarily coming to an end. The bankruptcy jurisdiction of the High Court accords wide powers to impose any condition on withdrawal, including liberty to file afresh” 6. Setelah itu, JC telah memutuskan untuk memfailkan Saman Dalam Kamar dalam lampiran 23 untuk memohon kebenaran Mahkamah untuk memulakan tindakan kebankrapan terhadap JD pada 10.5.2024 tanpa menarik balik Petisyen Pemiutang terlebih dahulu sebagaimana disarankan Mahkamah. Pada 13.5.2024, JD telah memfailkan Notis Perlantikan Peguamcara dalam lampiran 26 dan membantah permohonan JC tersebut yang menjadi subjek pertikaian di hadapan Mahkamah. Analisis dan keputusan 7. JD berhujah bahawa seksyen 5(3)(b) Akta Tersebut secara spesifik dan nyata memperuntukkan bahawa kebenaran Mahkamah perlu diperolehi oleh JC terlebih dahulu sebelum memulakan tindakan kebankrapan terhadap mana-mana JD yang merupakan penjamin bukan sosial. JD berhujah bahawa pemfailan Saman Dalam Kamar dalam lampiran 23 pada tahap ini adalah tidak berasas, bersifat pemikiran terkemudian dan salah apabila prosiding kebankrapan telahpun dimulakan oleh JC tanpa kebenaran Mahkamah. 8. Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah merujuk kepada seksyen 5(3) Akta Tersebut yang memperuntukkan bahawa:- “(3) A petitioning creditor shall not be entitled to commence any bankruptcy action- (a) against a social guarantor; and (b) against a guarantor other than a social guarantor unless the petitioning creditor has obtained leave from the court.” 9. Akta Tersebut juga mentaksirkan “social guarantor” dalam seksyen 2 seperti berikut:- “"social guarantor" means a person who provides, not for the purpose of making profit, the following guarantees: (a) a guarantee for a loan, scholarship or grant for educational or research purposes; (b) a guarantee for a hire-purchase transaction of a vehicle for personal or non-business use; and (c) a guarantee for a housing loan transaction solely for personal dwelling” 10. Penelitian Mahkamah kepada pliding yang dilampirkan dalam Permintaan untuk Mengeluarkan Notis Kebankrapan (Lampiran 1) dengan jelas menunjukkan bahawa JD adalah seorang penjamin bukan sosial. 11. Mahkamah merujuk kepada hansard Parlimen berkenaan pindaan kepada Akta Insolvensi 1967 pada 29.3.2017 di mana Menteri dalam membentangkan pindaan kepada Akta Insolvensi 1967 telah menyatakan seperti berikut:- “Kerajaan amat prihatin isu-isu kebankrapan terutama di mana mereka diisytiharkan bankrap disebabkan mereka menjadi penjamin kepada peminjam yang gagal menjelaskan pinjaman. Golongan ini tidak sepatutnya dipertanggungjawabkan sepenuhnya tanpa tindakan terhadap peminjam prinsipal terlebih dahulu untuk menjelaskan pinjaman yang diambil… …Kerajaan telah mempertimbangkan lapan perubahan dasar untuk meminda Akta Kebankrapan 1967 seperti berikut: (i) tindakan kebankrapan tidak boleh diambil terhadap penjamin sosial. Walau bagaimanapun penjamin bukan sosial boleh dibankrapkan setelah mahkamah berpuas hati dengan tindakan-tindakan yang dibuat oleh pihak pemiutang;…” 12. Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada huraian kepada Rang Undang-undang untuk meminda Akta Kebankrapan 1967 (D.R. 21/2016) yang memperuntukkan seperti berikut:- “11. Fasal 12 bertujuan untuk meminda seksyen 5 Akta 360 untuk menaikkan nilai minimum hutang bagi pemfailan petisyen kebankrapan daripada tiga puluh ribu ringgit kepada lima puluh ribu ringgit. Fasal ini selanjutnya memperuntukkan bahawa pemiutang tidak boleh memulakan prosiding kebankrapan terhadap penjamin sosial. Berhubung dengan penjamin selain penjamin sosial, pemiutang tidak boleh MEMULAKAN prosiding kebankrapan melainkan jika pemiutang itu telah mendapat keizinan mahkamah.” 13. Dalam menjelaskan kesan pindaan kepada seksyen 5 Akta Tersebut, Mahkamah dalam kes Rusli Ab Ghani; Ex-Parte: CIMB Bank Berhad [2018] 1 LNS 1528; [2018] MLRHU 1180 memutuskan bahawa:- “[11] Subsections 5(3), (4), (5), (6) and (7) are new provisions which were inserted vide Act A1534 and came into force on 6.10.2017 and at the same time the Rules were introduced replacing the Bankruptcy Rules 1969. Prior to these amendments a petition creditor had to prove that he had exhausted all avenues to recover debts owed to him by the debtor before he could commence a bankruptcy petition against a social guarantor. However, with effect from 6.10.2017 a social guarantor is absolutely protected and cannot be made a bankrupt. That protection is now accorded to other guarantors who were not protected before the amendment… This case is still good law as the current Act gives absolute protection to social guarantor and the then safeguard is now accorded to other guarantors who were not protected under the old legislation. This simply means that a judgment creditor must ensure that all modes of execution and enforcement have been exhausted against the debtor who is the borrower before he can go against the guarantor. Once that is shown then leave will be granted by the court for the judgment creditor to commence bankruptcy petition against the guarantor.” 14. Berdasarkan nas-nas di atas, seseorang JC perlu mendapatkan kebenaran Mahkamah terlebih dahulu untuk memulakan tindakan kebankrapan terhadap mana-mana JD yang merupakan penjamin (bukan sosial). Dalam hal ini, adalah penting untuk menentukan tafsiran permulaan (commencement) tindakan kebankrapan. 15. Sebagaimana dihujahkan oleh peguam JD, Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Liew Hon Kong v Bank Pertanian Malaysia Bhd [2022] 1 MLJ 836; [2021] 9 CLJ 82; [2021] 6 MLRA 641; [2021] AMEJ 1158 mentaksirkan permulaan tindakan kebankrapan, seperti berikut:- “[61] Whilst we accept that bankruptcy proceedings is a two staged process, we do not accept the argument that the BN was issued "administratively" and therefore merely "kickstarts" the process… [68] Rather, as was rightly submitted by counsel for the JC, the moment an application is made for the issuance of the BN, the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court is invoked and the jurisdiction continues until the very end, ie, beyond the AO and RO… [71] Next, in so far as the two-staged process ie, BN followed by CP is concerned, this merely means that there are two steps to be taken. But they are nevertheless steps within a single legal proceeding, namely, as in this case, within BC4238… In our view, bankruptcy proceedings commenced upon the issuance of the BN, and such proceedings are to be treated as "pending" for purposes of s. 60 of the Bankruptcy (Amendment) Act 2017.” 16. Berdasarkan kes tersebut, JD berhujah bahawa tindakan kebankrapan bermula sebaik sahaja Notis Kebankrapan telah difailkan. Dalam hal ini, menurut kes Mahkamah Tinggi Per: Lim Sue Beng v AmBank (M) Berhad & Ors [2022] MLJU 3147; [2022] 1 LNS 2822, berdasarkan tafisran Mahkamah Rayuan tersebut dalam kes Liew Hon Kong (supra), seseorang JC perlu mendapatkan kebenaran Mahkamah terlebih dahulu sebelum memfailkan Notis Kebankrapan terhadap seseorang JD yang merupakan penjamin. Dalam menjelaskan perkara ini, Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “[17] Based on Liew Hon Kong (supra) and a literal reading of section 5(3) of the Insolvency Act 1967 wherein: 17.1 the said express words "unless the petitioning creditor has obtained leave from the court" appears, I hold that the same is clear and unambiguous to mean that the JC has to apply for leave first from the Court before the said BN can be issued; and 17.2 the words "to commence any bankruptcy action" in the said section is to be treated as referring to the BN as the BN is the initiation of a bankruptcy action / proceedings as the Bankruptcy Court's jurisdiction is invoked [18] In this respect, I find that the Federal Court case of Hong Leong Bank Berhad v. Khairulnizam bin Jamaludin [2016] 7 CLJ 335; [2016] 4 MLJ 302 relied on by learned counsel for the Judgment Creditor (JC) is not applicable to the facts before me as that case was decided pre the Insolvency Act 1967. …[20] In the circumstances, the BN is in my decision pre maturely issued. I also hold that the prayer in paragraph (a) of Enclosure 12 filed by the JC ie, for leave to commence the bankruptcy proceedings against the JD, which is the subject of the appeal in Enclosure 46, is retrospective in nature as the said application was only made almost 7 months after the said BN was issued. This, in my view, is prejudicial to the JD and against the spirit of Section 5(3) of the Insolvency Act 1965 ie, the protection of guarantors and appears to be an afterthought.” 17. Sekiranya diteliti, keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi tersebut adalah tidak senada dengan kes Mahkamah Rayuan Hong Leong Bank Berhad v Ong Moon Huat & Another Appeal [2018] MLJU 1576; [2018] 1 LNS 1612; [2018] MLRAU 504 yang memutuskan bahawa JC berhak untuk memfailkan permohonan kebenaran memulakan tindakan kebankrapan tersebut sehingga sebelum Petisyen Pemiutang difailkan. Dalam menjelaskan prinsip tersebut, Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan bahawa:- “[15] For these reasons we are of the view that on a proper reading of Khairulnizam which is wholly relevant coupled with section 5(3)(b) as well as Rule 97 it is open to a judgment creditor to file an application for leave to proceed against a guarantor either upon the issuance of the bankruptcy notice, or even prior to that, up to and immediately PRIOR TO THE FILING OF A CREDITOR'S PETITION. This gives leeway to the judgment creditor to obtain such leave as it deems fit in the circumstances of a particular case. This will in no way prejudice the judgment debtor/guarantor who is protected by the legislation which requires such leave to be obtained as a prerequisite to the grant of receiving and adjudication orders.” 18. Perlu diperhatikan bahawa keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi dalam kes Lim Sue Beng (supra) telah diterbalikkan Mahkamah Rayuan sebagaimana dilaporkan dalam AMBANK (M) BERHAD & YANG LAIN lwn. LIM SUE BENG [2023] CLJU(O) 22 [CA] seperti berikut:- “KORAM: AZIZAH BINTI HAJI NAWAWI, HMR MARIANA BINTI HAJI YAHYA, HMR LIM CHONG FONG, HMR PADA 25 SEPTEMBER 2023 DALAM MAHKAMAH TERBUKA MELALUI PLATFORM SIDANG VIDEO SECARA ZOOM PENGHAKIMAN (Lampiran 1) RAYUAN INI ditetapkan untuk pendengaran pada hari ini dalam kehadiran Lua Ai Siew (AiliAlef Hamima binti Aznan bersamanya), peguam bagi pihak perayu-perayu dan Jasneeta Bhullar (Norazmi bin Norazman dan Ahmad Fadziy bin Abdul Gani bersamanya), peguam bagi pihak responden DAN SETELAH MEMBACA Rekod-Rekod Rayuan dan kesemuanya yang difailkan di sini DAN SETELAH MENDENGAR hujahan pihak-pihak yang tersebut MAKA ADALAH DENGAN SEBULAT SUARA INI DIPERINTAHKAN bahawa:- a) Rayuan perayu-perayu dibenarkan dengan kos global sebanyak RM20,000.00 kepada perayu-perayu untuk rayuan ini, Rayuan Sivil No. W-03(IM)(NCC)-96- 10/2022 dan Rayuan Sivil No. W-03(IM)(NCC)-97-10/2022, tertakluk kepada fi alokatur dibayar dalam rayuan ini; dan b) Kebenaran dengan ini diberikan berkenaan perenggan (a) dalam Saman Dalam Kamar bertarikh 23.07.2021 (Lampiran 12). Bertarikh: 25 SEPTEMBER 2023” 19. Mahkamah tidak terlepas pandang bahawa sesuatu Perintah tanpa sebarang alasan penghakiman pada kebiasaan tidak mengikat Mahkamah ini. Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Thanesh Rao Moorthy v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri & Ors [2022] MLJU 1584; [2022] CLJU 1529 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “[11] Learned counsel for the applicant referred this court to the recent cases decided by the Federal Court Izham bin Muhammad [HC 223/10/2021 (B)] and Cheng Eng Ang [HC 256-11/2021 (B)]. At the point of time, there were no grounds available. When there are no grounds available, this court is not bound to follow the decision. In the case of Vishnu Telagan v. Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [2019] 9 CLJ 177:- [40] The respondents argue that the Federal Court there had heard a similar argument on this point and refused the detainee a writ of habeas corpus. As at the date of our decision in this appeal, no written grounds had been delivered in respect of that case and so we are therefore unable to glean any reasons why such a decision was made. Therefore, we did not see how the said judgment lent any support to the respondent's case. Surely, in arriving at our decision, we had to consider and apply the law according to the facts and circumstances of this case." [12] Hence, founded on the case of Vishu Telagan (supra) this court is no bound by the decision of the apex court if not grounds of the decision is available. Based on that principle, this court is of the view it is not bound to the decisions offered by learned counsel for the applicant from the Bar. 20. Namun, dengan kewujudan perintah Mahkamah Rayuan tersebut, Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa Mahkamah Rayuan telah membuat keputusan yang konsisten dengan kes Ong Moon Huat (supra) bahawa seseorang Pemiutang Penghakiman boleh memfailkan permohonan untuk memohon kebenaran Mahkamah untuk membawa tindakan terhadap penjamin bukan sosial pada bila-bila masa sebelum sahaja pemfailan Petisyen Pemiutang. 21. Salah satu rasional untuk keputusan-keputusan tersebut adalah disebabkan oleh masalah praktikal yang dihadapai peguam dalam memfailkan permohonan memohon kebenaran tersebut tanpa intitulment, yang pada kebiasaanya akan wujud dengan pemfailan Notis Kebankrapan di Mahkamah. Dalam menjelaskan isu ini, Mahkamah dalam kes Ong Moon Huat (supra) memutuskan bahawa:- “In other words there is nothing to prevent a judgment creditor from obtaining leave at a point in time prior to the commission of an act of bankruptcy i.e. soon after the issuance of the bankruptcy notice or with the application for the issuance of a bankruptcy notice. The practical difficulty is that there will be no cause papers with an intitulement to enable the judgment creditor to file a summons in chambers and affidavit in support until the bankruptcy notice is issued. Therefore most solicitors, as a matter of practice may wish to obtain leave as a matter of prudence at this juncture, rather than wait for the act of bankruptcy to be committed. This is because it leaves a very narrow window of time for the application for leave to be filed and heard…” 22. Namun, dalam kes di hadapan Mahkamah, permohonan untuk kebenaran tersebut difailkan selepas Petisyen Pemiutang difailkan di Mahkamah dan tanpa Petisyen Pemiutang tersebut ditarik balik. Maka, permohonan JC tersebut adalah bertentangan dengan nas undang-undang yang dibincangkan di atas. Tertutama, Mahkamah dalam kes Ong Moon Huat (supra) menekankan keperluan untuk menyatakan tarikh kebenaran memulakan tindakan kebankrapan terhadap penjamin telah diperolehi dalam Petisyen Pemiutang yang bakal difailkan seperti berikut:- “On the contrary the Federal Court is extending time for the obtaining of leave of court to proceed against a social guarantor up to the point in time when a creditor's petition is filed, at which point it is necessary to stipulate that leave of court has been obtained” 23. Mahkamah tidak terlepas pandang berkenaan hujahan JC berkenaan kelewatan / sikap endah tak endah JD dalam melantik peguam dan mencabar permohonan kebenaran mahupun keseluruhan prosiding kebankrapan ini. Namun, undang-undang adalah mantap bahawa keperluan mandatori undang-undang tidak boleh diatasi (waived) atas alasan ketiadaan bantahan oleh JD mahupun kelewatan membuat bantahan oleh JD. Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Mahkamah Persekutuan Chase Perdana Bhd v. Md Afendi Hamdan [2009] 6 MLJ 783; [2009] 6 CLJ 501; [2009] 2 MLRA 514 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “[18] The law on this is quite established. Once it is enacted by legislation that parties are required to comply with any provision, parties must comply with such provision. It is not for any person to waive legislative requirements by an agreement unless the legislation allows it to be done. Legislation enacts laws which in its opinion are for the benefit of the public. It is not for the courts, or anybody for that matter, to say that it need not be followed. This was clearly expressed in Surajmull Nargoremull v. Triton Insurance Company Limited at p. 128 where Lord Sumner held as follows:- No Court can enforce as valid that which competent enactments have declared shall not be valid, nor is obedience to such an enactment a thing from which a Court can be dispensed by the consent of the parties, or by a failure to plead or to argue the point at the outset: Nixon v. Albion Marine Insurance Co…” 24. Atas alasan ini sendiri Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa permohonan JC wajar ditolak. Namun, bagi kesempurnaan Mahkamah masih akan mengkaji merit permohonan JC. 25. Dalam hal ini, sebagaimana dihujahkan JD, penelitian kertas-kertas kausa yang difailkan JC menunjukkan JC telah gagal mendemonstrasi bahawa JC telah mengambil tindakan pelaksanaan terhadap Chequers Hotel Sdn Bhd yang merupakan Penghutang Utama, sebelum memulakan tindakan kebankrapan terhadap JD selaku penjamin. Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah merujuk kepada seksyen 5(4) Akta Tersebut yang memperuntukkan bahawa:- “(4) Before granting leave referred to in paragraph (3)(b), the court shall satisfy itself that the petitioning creditor has exhausted all modes of execution and enforcement to recover debts owed to him by the debtor.” 26. Dalam mentaksirkan peruntukan ini, Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Ong Moon Huat (supra) memutuskan bahawa:- “[3] A purposive construction of the section as a whole discloses that the section seeks to introduce protection for the guarantor against whom bankruptcy proceedings are to be brought. The protection comes in the form of ensuring that enforcement has been exhausted in respect of the principal debtor prior to proceeding against the guarantor. It is to remedy the mischief of judgment creditors proceeding against the guarantors directly in bankruptcy rather than executing and enforcing against the principal debtor. We are borne out in our conclusion by section 5(6) of the Insolvency Act 1967 that provides: "...For the purposes of subsection (4), modes of execution and enforcement include seizure and sale, judgment debtor summons, garnishment and bankruptcy or winding up proceedings against the borrower." [4] It follows therefore that in construing section 5(4) regard must be given to section 5(6). And section 5(6) provides that the modes of execution and enforcement that must be exhausted include seizure and sale, judgment debtor summons, garnishment and bankruptcy against the borrower…” 27. Maka, sekiranya pun Mahkamah boleh mendengar permohonan JC yang difailkan selepas pemfailan Petisyen Pemiutang di Mahkamah, JC masih tidak memuaskan hati Mahkamah berkenaan keperluan seksyen 5(4) Akta Tersebut iaitu JC telah mengambil tindakan pelaksanaan terhadap penghutang utama sebelum memulakan tindakan terhadap penjamin. 28. Maka, permohonan JC juga wajar ditolak kerana tidak membuktikan merit sebagaimana dikehendaki menurut undang-undang. Kesimpulan: 29. Berdasarkan alasan-alasan yang dinyatakan di atas, Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa permohonan JC dalam lampiran 23 wajar ditolak dengan kos RM1,000.00 dibayar JC kepada JD tertakluk kepada pembayaran fi alokatur. Dengan demikian, Mahkamah juga membatalkan tindakan kebankrapan ini dan deposit adalah dikembalikan kepada JC setelah menolak sebarang kos Ketua Pengarah Insolvensi (sekiranya ada). Bertarikh: 24 September 2024 Disediakan oleh, Pihak-pihak: …………………………………. ARUN A/L NOVAL DASS Timbalan Pendaftar Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya Johor Bahru 1. Tetuan Soh Hayati & Co Peguambela & Peguamcara Peguam Pemiutang Penghakiman No.109A, Batu 3 ¼, Jalan Kelang Lama, 58000 Kuala Lumpur (Ruj: Liti09722/20/CCT/FI) … Encik K C Ng Menyebut Bagi pihak peguam JC 2. Tetuan Pang Yong Tong & Co Peguambela & Peguamcara Peguam Penghutang Penghakiman No.67A, Jalan Indah 15/2, Taman Bukit Indah, 79100 Nusajaya, Johor (Ruj: L-272/24/D) … Encik Y T Pang Kes-kes yang dirujuk: 1. Abdul Rashid Bin Mohamad Isa v PTT International Trading Pte Ltd [2024] MLJU 1518 2. Rusli Ab Ghani; Ex-Parte: CIMB Bank Berhad [2018] 1 LNS 1528; [2018] 3. MLRHU 1180 Liew Hon Kong v Bank Pertanian Malaysia Bhd [2022] 1 MLJ 836; [2021] 9 CLJ 82; [2021] 6 MLRA 641; [2021] AMEJ 1158 4. Per: Lim Sue Beng v AmBank (M) Berhad & Ors [2022] MLJU 3147; [2022] 1 5. LNS 2822 Hong Leong Bank Berhad v Ong Moon Huat & Another Appeal [2018] MLJU 1576; [2018] 1 LNS 1612; [2018] MLRAU 504 6. AMBANK (M) BERHAD & YANG LAIN lwn. LIM SUE BENG [2023] CLJU(O) 22 [CA] 7. Thanesh Rao Moorthy v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri & Ors [2022] MLJU 1584; [2022] CLJU 1529 8. Chase Perdana Bhd v. Md Afendi Hamdan [2009] 6 MLJ 783; [2009] 6 CLJ 501; [2009] 2 MLRA 514