(b) whether the filing of a single notice of appeal against the High Court’s decision on eight separate interlocutory applications complied with the RCOA. [29] The Federal Court answered the first question in the affirmative. Deepak Jaikishan’s appeal was allowed. The decision of the High Court in striking out the appellants’ claim was reinstated and reaffirmed. [30] On the second question, the judgment of the Federal Court through his Lordship Zulkefli Ahmad Makinudin (then CJ (Malaya)) relevant to this application is reproduced below: “[15] We shall now deal with the second question of law posed before us. The second question of law is whether the filing of a single notice of appeal in respect of a decision on eight separate and distinct interlocutory applications is in compliance with the procedural rules as set out under the RCA 1994. [16] As alluded to, the eight defendant and all the other defendants in this case filed separate application for the striking out the plaintiffs’ statement of claim at the High Court. The plaintiffs, having appealed against the decision of the High Court in allowing these applications, filed only a single notice of appeal against the decision of the learned judge of the High Court. [17] It is to be noted that r 5(3) of the RCA 1994 pertaining to civil appeal to the Court of Appeal provides that a Notice of Appeal shall substantially be in Form I in the First Schedule. The word ‘shall’ denotes that it is mandatory for the parties to Civil Appeal no. W-02(W)-2061-10/2017 13 comply with the provision under the said rule. We are of the view that the plaintiffs should have filed separate notices of appeal against the decision of the High Court in allowing the defendants separate applications to strike out the plaintiffs’ statement of claim. [18] On this issue of the plaintiffs having to file a separate notice of appeal, useful reference can be made to the case of A Santamil Selvi a/p Alau Malay @ Anna Malay & Ors v Dato’ Seri Mohd Najid bin Tun Abdul Razak & Ors [2015] 4 MLJ 583; [2015] 4 CLJ 1016. This is the very case where the Court of Appeal had heard the application by way of notice of motion of all the other eight defendants to strike out the plaintiffs’ notice of appeal against the decision of the High Court of our current case. The Court of Appeal amongst others had made the following observations: [13] It is, therefore, a statutory requirement that the notice of appeal must be in the prescribed Form 1. We agree with learned counsel for the first and second respondent that the RCOA envisages two situations: one where a dissatisfied party appeals against one decision and second, where a dissatisfied party appeals against more than one decision. To that, we must add that it includes also a situation where a dissatisfied party appeals against part only of the decision of decisions given. [14] In our view, where the appeal is against one decision involving a single respondent or involving more than one respondent in a joint action, it will be in order for the appellant to state in a single notice of appeal that he is appealing against ‘the whole of the said decision’. But where the appeal is against more than one decision arising from the separate interlocutory application made by different parties to the action, it is incumbent on the appellant to set out the details of the decisions in the notice of appeal. [15] In the present case, since more than one decision was given by the High Court in favour of nine different applicants arising from eight separate and distinct applications, it was imperative for the appellants to set out the details of each and Civil Appeal no. W-02(W)-2061-10/2017 14 every one of the decisions that they were appealing against. We do not think it was sufficient for the appellants to state in general terms in a single notice of appeal that their appeal was against the ‘whole of the said decision’ (in the singular) without specifying the particulars of the decisions appeal against. [19] We are in agreement with the above views expressed by the Court of Appeal. The main purpose of r 5(3) of the RCA 1994 is to allow the opposing parties to be able to answer their case respectively. The learned High Court judge had, in her grounds of judgment, explained in detail her decision in allowing the striking out application of each party in that separate interlocutory applications. The plaintiffs were in a position to identify the relevant points in the said judgment that they are dissatisfied with and thereafter filed a separate notice of appeal against all the defendants setting out the details of the decisions in the notice of appeal. [20] It is also to be noted that each of the defendant in the High Court had filed eight separate applications to strike out the plaintiffs’ statement of claim. All eight applications had different grounds in support of the respective application, different filing dates and even different counsels. The learned High Court judge delivered a single judgment encompassing all of the eight applications. It is our judgment by way of procedural rules there were eight separate orders made by the learned High Court judge. We would therefore answer the second question posed before us in the negative.”. [31] We are mindful of the fact that in the case of A Santamil Selvi (supra), leading to the case of Deepak Jaikishan (supra), there were eight separate applications by eight different respondents whilst in the present case, there was only one interlocutory application and a main trial involving the same appellant and the same respondent. Civil Appeal no. W-02(W)-2061-10/2017 15 [32] Nevertheless, in our view, the principle to be distilled from the decision of the Federal Court in Deepak Jaikishan (supra), is not so much about the number of applications or the number of parties but whether there was a distinct and separate application resulting in a distinct and separate order by the court. If there was a distinct and separate application and a distinct and separate order of the court, then there ought to be a separate notice of appeal filed in respect of the separate and distinct order appealed against. [33] In the instant case, there is no dispute that there were two separate orders issued by the court, namely an order in respect of the main trial where judgment was entered in favour of the respondent and another order in respect of the dismissal of the appellant’s interlocutory application to amend the defence. Hence, we find that this application falls squarely within the principle enunciated by the Federal Court in Deepak Jaikishan (supra), which we are bound to follow. [34] The fact that Deepak Jaikishan’s case concerns more than one respondent is thus irrelevant and cannot be the basis to distinguish the instant case from Deepak Jaikishan (supra). As we understand it, the decision of the Federal Court on the question of law in Deepak Jaikishan binds us and it is trite that we cannot disregard the doctrine of stare decisis. [35] As for the second ground of the respondent’s application, having perused the notice of appeal, we find that there is in fact some ambiguity as to whether the appellant is also appealing against the dismissal of the application to amend the statement of defence. We say so because whilst the notice of appeal states that the appellant is not satisfied with the whole Civil Appeal no. W-02(W)-2061-10/2017 16 decision of the learned judge dated 29.9.2017, it makes no mention that the appellant wishes to appeal against the dismissal of enclosure 129. What has been stated is that the appellant wishes to appeal against the whole decision allowing the respondent’s claim. This is explicit in the wordings of the notice of appeal: “Perayu/Defendan … tidak berpuashati dengan keseluruhan keputusan … pada 29haribulan September 2017, termasuk (tetapi tidak terhad) kepada Kandungan 129 (permohonan defendan untuk meminda “Pembelaan Terpinda Semula”…) dengan ini merayu kepada Mahkamah Rayuan terhadap keseluruhan keputusan tersebut di mana tuntutan plaintif telah dibenarkan dengan: 1) Gantirugi pampasan sebanyak RM 150,000.00 … 2) Faedah ke atas jumlah Penghakiman pada kadar 4% setahun … 3) Faedah ke atas jumlah Penghakiman pada kadar 5% setahun … 4) Kos tindakan ini …” (our emphasis). [36] The particulars on the dismissal of the application to amend is conspicuously absent in the notice of appeal as being the decision appealed against, as opposed to the main trial where the appellant had set out the particulars of the judgment appealed against. We therefore disagree with learned counsel for the appellant that the notice of appeal had set out the details and the particulars of the decisions appealed against, which quite obviously does not include the dismissal of the amendment application. Civil Appeal no. W-02(W)-2061-10/2017 17 [37] In the circumstances, we are unable to conclude that the respondent’s objection that the notice of appeal is ambiguous and uncertain as to whether the appellant is appealing against the dismissal of enclosure 129 as well, is devoid of merit. Neither could we conclude that the respondent’s confusion as to whether the notice of appeal encompass the appeal against the dismissal of the application to amend, is an imaginary confusion. [38] By way of comparison, the notice of appeal in A Santamil Selvi (supra) states that the plaintiffs “appeals against the whole of the said decision granting the Order-in-Terms of all the Defendants’ applications to strike out the Plaintiffs’ claims…”. The notice of appeal was certain that the appeal was against the granting of all of the defendants’ applications to strike out. Yet, this Court was of the view, which view was endorsed by the Federal Court in Deepak Jaikishan (supra), that the notice of appeal was bad in law due to the plaintiffs’ failure to file separate notices of appeal and to set out the details of each and every one of the decisions that they were appealing against. Conclusion [39] On the above considerations, we unanimously allow the respondent’s application. The notice of appeal is consequently struck out. Dated: 1st March 2018 Signed (TENGKU MAIMUN BINTI TUAN MAT) Judge Court of Appeal Civil Appeal no. W-02(W)-2061-10/2017 18 Counsel/Solicitors: For the Appellant : Tan Sri Muhammad Shafee Abdullah (Sarah Abishegam with him) Messrs. Shafee & Co. For the Respondent : R Sivarasa (Leela Jesusathasan with him) Messrs. Leela J.