Kharen Jit Kaur A/P La Chin Singh v Nuurul 'Azmi Bin Zainal Abidin (MA-23NCvC-3-03/2025)

NUURUL `AZMI BIN ZAINAL ABIDIN [beramal sebagai Peguambela & Peguamcara secara milikan tunggal di bawah firma guaman Tetuan Nuurul 'Azmi & Rakan-rakan]

FAZNITA BINTI MOHD SALLEH (NO. K/P : 870717-03-5294) ... DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN GROUNDS OF DECISION A. INTRODUCTION [1] This action comes up for pre-trial case management on 13.07.2026, pursuant to directions given at the e-Review of 09.07.2026. The parties have settled a statement of agreed facts. They have not been able to agree on the statement of issues to be tried. The rival drafts, together with the correspondence exchanged between the solicitors, were placed before the court under cover of the Plaintiff's solicitors' letter dated 10.07.2026 (Enclosure 40), and it now falls to the court to settle the issues. [2] A disagreement of this kind arises with some regularity at case management, and it is seldom the product of any genuine dispute about what the trial must actually decide. More often it reflects uncertainty about what a statement of issues to be tried is for, from which documents it is to be drawn, and by what standard a proposed issue is to be tested. These grounds therefore first set out the framework that governs the preparation of a statement of issues under Order 34 of the Rules of Court 2012, and then apply that framework to the rival drafts in this action. B. BACKGROUND FACTS [3] The Plaintiff is an advocate and solicitor practising as the sole proprietor of Messrs Law Chambers of Kharen Jit & Associate. The First Defendant is an advocate and solicitor practising as the sole proprietor of Messrs Nuurul 'Azmi & Rakan-rakan. The Second Defendant is a former client of the Plaintiff. The narrative that follows is drawn entirely from the statement of agreed facts dated 21.03.2025 ("the Agreed Facts"), annexed as Lampiran A to Enclosure 40. [4] On 19.12.2023 the Second Defendant appointed the Plaintiff to act for her in a road accident claim involving vehicles bearing registration numbers MDR 5869 and JWA 2574. The Plaintiff accepted the appointment without any getting-up fee or advance payment, and herself advanced the expenses of the intended action. [5] On 06.08.2024, at 11.11 in the morning, the Plaintiff filed the claim in the Sessions Court (1) at Melaka as Suit No. MA-B53KJ-18-08/2024 ("the RTA action"). The interest of the defendant in the RTA action was handled by MSIG Insurance (Malaysia) Bhd ("MSIG"). [6] On 07.08.2024 the First Defendant, on the instructions of the Second Defendant, issued to MSIG a notice of the change of the Second Defendant's solicitors from the Plaintiff to the First Defendant. MSIG wrote to the First Defendant on 08.08.2024, and that letter called for an answer. [7] In answer to MSIG's letter of 08.08.2024, the First Defendant, on the instructions of the Second Defendant, issued a letter dated 26.09.2024 to MSIG ("the Letter"). Paragraphs 9.1 and 9.2 of the Agreed Facts record that the Letter contained the following statements: "As of recent dealings with Law Chambers of Kharen Jit & Associate, our client's previous legal representation has breached the Legal Profession (Practice & Etiquette) Rules 1978, therefore we are writing to reiterate that we are the legal representation of Ms. Faznita binti Mohd Salleh (NRIC No.: 870717-03- 5294).” "In the police report attached herewith, our client has detailed her deep dissatisfaction with the legal service of Law Chambers of Kharen Jit & Associate and therefore decided a legitimate change of legal representation to our goodselves. We hope for your goodselves to be well informed with the status quo." [8] Enclosed with the Letter were, first, a copy of a police report bearing Report No. MALIM/004054/24 dated 06.08.2024 made by the Second Defendant, and secondly, a copy of the Plaintiff's letter to the First Defendant dated 07.08.2024, in which the Plaintiff objected to the takeover of the RTA action until her disbursements and legal fees of RM200,000.00 had been paid in full, and gave notice that in default of payment within seven days she would proceed to recover directly from the client. [9] The Plaintiff, through her solicitors, Messrs Law Chambers of Maya Khalid, issued a notice of demand dated 25.11.2024 to the First Defendant. This writ followed. The Plaintiff sues both Defendants in defamation upon the Letter. It is common ground on the rival drafts before the court that the Defendants resist the claim on the footing, among others, that the Letter is not defamatory of the Plaintiff, that it was published on an occasion of qualified privilege, and that its contents are justified. C. THE RIVAL POSITIONS [10] The Plaintiff's proposed statement of issues (Lampiran B) frames four principal issues: first, whether the Letter contains statements defamatory of the Plaintiff, with sub-issues 1.1 to 1.4; secondly, whether the Letter is protected by qualified privilege, with sub-issues 2.1 and 2.2; thirdly, whether the defence of justification applies to the contents of the Letter, with sub-issues 3.1 to 3.3; and fourthly, whether the Plaintiff is entitled to the reliefs sought, with sub-issues 4.1 and 4.2. [11] By their responsive proposal transmitted by e-mail on 25.05.2026 and reproduced as Lampiran C, the Defendants struck out four items from the Plaintiff's draft: (i) the opening words of sub-issue 1.1, "sewaktu perwakilan Defendan-2 oleh Plaintiff" that is, the words confining the alleged breaches of the Legal Profession (Practice and Etiquette) Rules 1978 to the currency of the Plaintiff's retainer; (ii) sub-issue 1.2, which asks whether the Second Defendant terminated the Plaintiff's retainer by reason of the breaches alleged; (iii) sub-issue 2.1, which asks whether the First Defendant's representation of the Second Defendant is conclusive ("muktamad"); and (iv) sub-issue 3.1, which repeats sub-issue 1.2 under the head of justification. The remainder of the Plaintiff's draft was accepted. [12] By e-mail dated 05.06.2026 (Lampiran D), the Plaintiff's solicitors sought the Defendants' explanation for the amendments to sub-issues 1.1, 1.2 and 3.1, on the ground that those issues are drawn directly from the contents of the Letter, which contents stand agreed at paragraphs 9.1 and 9.2 of the Agreed Facts. No explanation resolving the impasse is recorded, and the deletion of sub-issue 2.1 was not itself the subject of the Plaintiff's request. The disagreement therefore comes to the court unresolved. D. GOVERNING LAW AND FRAMEWORK The Function of the Statement of Issues [13] Order 34 rule 1(1)(b) of the Rules of Court 2012 empowers the court to give such directions as to the future course of the action "as appear best adapted to secure the just, expeditious and economical disposal thereof". At a pre-trial case management directed under rule 2(1), rule 2(2) permits the court to consider any matter towards that same end, including, at subparagraph (j), the filing of a statement of agreed facts and, at subparagraph (k), the filing of a statement of issues to be tried. Rule 7 obliges the court to endeavour to secure that the parties make all admissions and agreements as to the conduct of the proceedings which ought reasonably to be made by them, and permits the court to record any refusal to do so with a view to a special order as to costs at the trial. [14] The two documents contemplated by rule 2(2)(j) and (k) operate as complements. The statement of agreed facts removes matters from contention; the statement of issues defines what remains. Once settled, the statement of issues performs several functions at once: it fixes the ambit of the evidence, so that witness statements are confined to matters genuinely in dispute; it disciplines the preparation of the bundles; it supplies the yardstick against which objections to relevance are measured at trial; it structures the closing submissions and, ultimately, the judgment; and it enables the court, where appropriate, to direct under Order 33 rule 2 that a discrete question or issue be tried before the others, with the consequence provided by Order 33 rule 5 that a decision which substantially disposes of the cause may bring it to an end. Order 33 rule 2 itself confirms that the court "may give directions as to the manner in which the question or issue shall be stated" the manner of statement is therefore not a matter of style alone, but of the court's supervision. [15] It is equally important to be clear about what the statement of issues is not. It is not a pleading, and it cannot amend, enlarge or supplant the pleadings. A proposed issue which finds no foundation in the pleadings must be struck from the list, however attractive it may seem; conversely, the settlement of the list does not confer on any party a cause of action or defence that was never pleaded. The statement is an instrument of case management: authoritative as to the focus of the trial, but never a source of substantive rights. [16] A statement of issues is drawn from three sources, and in this order. The first and controlling source is the pleadings. Order 18 rule 7(1) requires every pleading to contain, and contain only, a summary statement of the material facts relied on, and not the evidence by which those facts are to be proved. An issue of fact arises where a material allegation in one pleading is traversed by the opposite party in accordance with Order 18 rule 13, or is the subject of a joinder of issue, express or implied, under Order 18 rule 14. The exercise is therefore one of reading the statement of claim against the defence, and the defence against any reply: every material allegation denied or not admitted is a candidate issue; every allegation admitted is not. [17] The second source is the statement of agreed facts, whose function is subtractive. Whatever the parties have agreed there has ceased to be in issue, whatever the pleadings may earlier have put in contest. It follows that the two documents must be prepared together, and the statement of issues read against the agreed facts before it is finalised: a question whose answer is already supplied by an agreed fact has no business appearing in the list. [18] The third source is the law itself: the elements of each cause of action sued upon and of each defence pleaded. These supply the grid upon which the surviving factual disputes are arranged. In an action for defamation, the elements of the claim are that the words were published by the defendant, that they refer to the plaintiff, and that they are defamatory; the pleaded defences here, on the material before the court, justification and qualified privilege then raise their own constituent questions, including, in the case of qualified privilege, the further question of express malice; and the reliefs claimed raise the questions of injury and quantum. The issues should march through that sequence. [19] Three things are not sources. Witness statements are not, because they come after the issues are settled and are shaped by them, not the reverse. Correspondence between solicitors is not, save insofar as a letter is itself the subject matter of the action. And the submissions or aspirations of counsel about how the evidence will unfold are not. Issues drafted from these materials tend to be evidential or argumentative in character, and both are objectionable for the reasons that follow. The Method of Preparation [20] Reduced to its essentials, the preparation of a statement of issues is a mechanical exercise in eight steps, undertaken with the pleadings and the statement of agreed facts at hand:

Read the statement of claim and list, paragraph by paragraph, every material allegation it makes;

Mark against each allegation the response it received in the defence - admitted, denied, or not admitted - and do the same for the affirmative allegations in the defence as against any reply, bearing in mind that under Order 18 rule 14 there is at the close of pleadings an implied joinder of issue on the pleading last served;

Strike from the list every allegation that stands admitted on the pleadings or is covered by the statement of agreed facts. What survives is the raw material of the issues;

Arrange what survives under three heads and in this order: the elements of the cause of action; each pleaded defence in turn; and the reliefs claimed;

Frame each surviving dispute as a single, neutral question beginning "whether", which states the conclusion the court must reach and not the evidence by which that conclusion is to be established;

Before any question is admitted to the list, test it twice: does its answer, one way or the other, change the outcome of the claim, of a defence, or of the relief; and is it a question the court will have to answer in its judgment. If the answer to either is no, the question comes out;

State each issue so that it shows, on its face, which party must prove it: an issue arising on a pleaded defence asks whether the defendant establishes that defence, not whether the plaintiff disproves it. Where an issue needs to be answered only if an earlier issue is answered in a particular way, say so in the issue itself for example, "if the answer to Issue 1 is in the affirmative, whether ..." so that the order in which the issues are to be taken appears from the list; and

Treat the completed statement as a document that must continue to mirror the true state of the contest: where there is a counterclaim, the exercise is repeated for it; and where the pleadings are subsequently amended, or further facts are agreed, the statement is revisited and refiled accordingly. [21] An exercise conducted in this way yields a short document. In an ordinary defamation action the principal issues will rarely exceed four or five; in most writ actions of whatever kind the completed statement should sit comfortably within a page or two. Undue length is almost always a symptom that evidence, agreed facts or argument have found their way into the list, and is itself a reason to revisit it. The Characteristics of a Properly Framed Issue [22] Tested against the purpose the statement serves, a properly framed issue displays the following characteristics:

it is material: its answer, one way or the other, affects the outcome of the claim, of a pleaded defence, or of the relief. If the answer either way would change nothing, it is not an issue;

it is genuinely in dispute on the pleadings and the record. An admitted or agreed fact is never an issue;

it is ultimate, not evidential: it states the conclusion of fact or law that the court must reach in its judgment the factum probandum and not the intermediate proofs by which that conclusion will be established;

it is neutrally framed: it embeds no contested premise, carries no argumentative gloss, and does no advocacy by adjective or qualification;

it is single and answerable: one proposition of fact or law, or of mixed fact and law, capable of a definite answer;

it is logically ordered: the elements of the claim first, then each pleaded defence in turn, then relief and quantum, with sub-issues nested under the head to which they truly belong; and

it is economical: the same question is asked once, and the list as a whole is a working instrument, not a second round of pleadings. Matters to Be Avoided [23] The failings that recur in practice are the mirror image of those characteristics, and they are most usefully stated as a series of prohibitions. In preparing a statement of issues:

do not restate an agreed or admitted fact as an issue. A question whose answer already stands on the record decides nothing, occupies trial time, and invites confusion. Sub-issues 1.4 and 3.3 in the present drafts; dealt with at paragraphs [34] and [35] below, are an illustration;

do not frame evidence as an issue. Whether a particular letter was sent, whether a witness will say a particular thing, or whether a particular document exists are proofs, not issues; the issue is the conclusion those proofs are tendered to establish;

do not embed a contested premise, date, qualification or characterisation into the framing of a question. An issue that assumes the very thing one side must prove is advocacy, not case management, and it converts the statement of issues into a further arena of contest;

do not ask the same question twice under different heads. Each question is asked once, under the head element, defence, or relief - to which it truly belongs;

do not propose an issue that has no foundation in the pleadings. The statement of issues cannot introduce an unpleaded claim or defence, and any such issue will be struck from the list;

do not fragment a single question into a cascade of sub-issues. Sub-issues are justified only where the principal question genuinely resolves into distinct components, as the particulars of a plea of justification do;

do not employ conclusory or undefined terms - expressions which themselves require definition before any evidence can be measured against them. An issue must be capable of an answer, not merely of an argument;

do not draft from witness statements, correspondence or submissions. The issues are drawn from the pleadings, the statement of agreed facts and the elements of the pleaded causes and defences, and from nothing else;

do not stop at liability. Where damages are claimed, the list should carry the trial through to judgment, including the questions of injury and quantum; and

do not adopt the opposite party's draft, or record agreement upon a joint draft, without testing every item against the pleadings and the agreed facts. As the present case shows, a defect upon which both parties are agreed remains a defect, and the court will remove it of its own motion. [24] Where the parties cannot agree, the court settles the issues itself, in the exercise of the powers conferred by Order 34 rule 1(1) and rule 2(2)(k), read with Order 33 rule 2. That exercise is neither the mechanical adoption of one party's draft nor a splitting of the difference. The court applies the standards set out above to the pleadings and the agreed facts, and frames the list accordingly. A party whose refusal to make an agreement that ought reasonably to have been made has occasioned the exercise may, under Order 34 rule 7, find that refusal reflected in costs. E. ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION The Structure of the Rival Drafts [25] Before turning to the four disputed deletions, a structural defect common to both drafts must be addressed, because its correction resolves much of the disagreement. Issue 1 in both drafts asks whether the Letter contains statements defamatory of the Plaintiff. That is a proper opening issue. The publication of the Letter to MSIG, its authorship by the First Defendant on the instructions of the Second Defendant, and its contents are all agreed facts; and since it is likewise agreed that the Plaintiff practises as the sole proprietor of the firm named in the Letter, and neither draft raises any issue of identification, the Letter's reference to the Plaintiff is not in contest. The first live question at trial is therefore whether the words, in their natural and ordinary meaning, are defamatory of the Plaintiff a question answered objectively, by reference to the words themselves, and one on which the truth or falsity of the words has no bearing. Yet the Plaintiff's draft places beneath Issue 1, as sub-issues 1.1 to 1.3, the very questions of truth: whether the Plaintiff breached the Legal Profession (Practice and Etiquette) Rules 1978 in the three respects particularised, whether the Second Defendant terminated the retainer by reason of those breaches, and whether she was gravely dissatisfied with the Plaintiff's services. (The Defendants' draft, while striking sub-issue 1.2, retains sub-issues 1.1, as amended, and 1.3 in the same position.) Truth is no ingredient of the question whether words are defamatory; it is the substance of the defence of justification, which both drafts separately raise as Issue 3 with the result that, in the Plaintiff's draft, sub-issues 1.2 to 1.4 reappear, word for word, as sub-issues 3.1 to 3.3, and, in the Defendants' draft, sub-issues 1.3 and 1.4 reappear as sub-issues 3.2 and 3.3. Duplication of that kind is precisely what a statement of issues exists to eliminate. The truth-related questions belong under justification, and under justification alone. Once they are relocated there, and asked once, a good part of the parties' quarrel falls away of its own accord. [27] The Plaintiff's draft of sub-issue 1.1 asks whether, "during the Second Defendant's representation by the Plaintiff", the Plaintiff breached the 1978 Rules. The Defendants deleted the temporal words, leaving the question of breach at large. The Plaintiff protests that her framing follows the Letter itself. Neither draft is adopted. [28] A plea of justification must meet the sting of the words as published; it is neither wider nor narrower than that sting. The sting of paragraph 9.1 of the Letter is that the Plaintiff, in and about her representation of the Second Defendant - the "previous legal representation" of which the Letter speaks - breached the 1978 Rules. The three particulars which both parties accept as defining that allegation, namely the filing of the RTA action without authority, the disturbance of the Second Defendant at Hospital Melaka, and the Plaintiff's alleged direct financial interest in the case, themselves anchor the inquiry to identified conduct. The temporal reach of each particular is then a matter for the evidence and for submission; it is not to be foreclosed either way by the framing of the issue. Where the parties dispute a qualification, the issue should not embed the qualification of either side: it should be moored to the words complained of, and the parties left to their proofs. The issue will accordingly be framed as whether the Plaintiff breached the 1978 Rules as alleged in the Letter, in the three respects particularised. [29] Sub-issues 1.2 and 3.1 ask, in identical terms, whether the Second Defendant terminated the Plaintiff's retainer by reason of the breaches of the 1978 Rules alleged. The Defendants struck out both, while retaining the companion question whether the Second Defendant was gravely dissatisfied with the Plaintiff's services (sub-issues 1.3 and 3.2). The deletion cannot stand. [30] Paragraph 9.2 of the Letter does not merely assert dissatisfaction; it asserts that the Second Defendant, having detailed her deep dissatisfaction, "therefore decided a legitimate change of legal representation". Read with paragraph 9.1, the sting is composite: not simply that the Plaintiff breached the Rules and that the client was dissatisfied, but that the change of solicitors was the legitimate consequence of that breach and dissatisfaction. If justification is to be made good, it must be made good to the breadth of that sting. Whether the Second Defendant in truth terminated the retainer by reason of the matters alleged is therefore a material question, and it is plainly in dispute: the record - including the Plaintiff's letter of 07.08.2024, recorded at paragraph 10.2 of the Agreed Facts, asserting unpaid fees and disbursements of RM200,000.00 as the backdrop to the change - shows that the parties advance competing accounts of why the retainer ended. It would be incongruous to retain the dissatisfaction limb of paragraph 9.2 as an issue while excising its causal limb; the two halves of the sentence stand or fall together. The question is restored - but it is asked once, under justification, and in a form that captures both the alleged breaches and the alleged dissatisfaction as the asserted reasons for the termination. The Deletion of Sub-Issue 2.1 [31] Sub-issue 2.1 asked whether the First Defendant's representation of the Second Defendant is conclusive ("muktamad"). The Defendants deleted it, and the deletion is upheld, though it must be said that no reasons for it appear on the record. [32] The sub-issue fails the test of materiality. Qualified privilege attaches to the occasion of publication: it turns on the reciprocity of duty or interest between the maker and the recipient of the statement at the time the statement is made, and, where the occasion is established, on the presence or absence of express malice. Whether the First Defendant's retainer was in some sense "conclusive" decides none of that. A client is at liberty to change her solicitors; a solicitor who has been instructed and who answers an insurer's inquiry concerning the change of representation communicates, if at all, under the reciprocity just described. The status of the retainer is at most a circumstance of the occasion - an evidential matter - and not an ultimate question. The sub-issue is, besides, conclusory in form: "muktamad" invites argument about its own meaning before any evidence can be measured against it. It answers nothing that Issue 2 does not already answer, and it is removed. The Restatement of Sub-Issue 2.2 [33] Sub-issue 2.2 asks whether "the exceptions to qualified privilege apply". Both parties retained it, but as framed it offends the requirement of a single, answerable proposition, because it does not say which exception is meant. The recognised answer to an occasion of qualified privilege is express malice, and it is by that name that the question should be put. The issue is restated accordingly: whether, if the occasion was privileged, the privilege is defeated by express malice on the part of the Defendants or either of them. Sub-Issues 1.4 and 3.3 [34] Sub-issues 1.4 and 3.3 ask, in identical terms, whether the Plaintiff issued a notice of demand against the Second Defendant. Both parties retained them; the court removes them of its own motion, and the point deserves a word, because it illustrates that a list agreed between the parties is not for that reason alone a proper list. [35] Insofar as the sub-issue is directed at the notice of demand of 25.11.2024, that notice - issued to the First Defendant - is an agreed fact, recorded in the final paragraph of the Agreed Facts, and an agreed fact is never an issue. Insofar as it is directed at some other demand made upon the Second Defendant, it states, at its highest, a fact of evidentiary significance: a step along the way to the ultimate questions of justification or malice, not an ultimate question in its own right. On either footing it does not belong in the list, and it is removed. Issue 4 and Its Sub-Issues [36] Issue 4, together with sub-issues 4.1 and 4.2 - whether the Plaintiff is entitled to the reliefs sought, whether her reputation and credibility have been injured, and whether she has suffered actual loss - is retained in substance. A further sub-issue on the quantum of damages is added, since a statement of issues should carry the trial through to judgment and not stop at the threshold of liability. The Issues Settled for Trial [37] Pursuant to Order 34 rule 1(1) and rule 2(2)(k), read with Order 33 rule 2, of the Rules of Court 2012, the issues to be tried in this action are settled as follows:

Whether the statements contained in the letter dated 26.09.2024 issued by the First Defendant, on the instructions of the Second Defendant, to MSIG Insurance (Malaysia) Bhd, as set out at paragraphs 9.1 and 9.2 of the Statement of Agreed Facts, are, in their natural and ordinary meaning, defamatory of the Plaintiff.

If the answer to Issue 1 is in the affirmative, whether the Defendants establish the defence of justification, namely:

1 whether the Plaintiff breached the Legal Profession (Practice and Etiquette) Rules 1978 as alleged in the said letter, in that:

the Plaintiff filed Suit No. MA-B53KJ-18 08/2024 without the authority of the Second Defendant;

the Plaintiff's representative disturbed the Second Defendant while she was attending a treatment appointment at Hospital Melaka; and

the Plaintiff had a direct financial interest in the Second Defendant's case; and

2 whether the Second Defendant terminated the Plaintiff's retainer by reason of the matters in Issue 2.1 and/or her dissatisfaction with the Plaintiff's services.

Whether the said letter was published on an occasion of qualified privilege; and, if so, whether the privilege is defeated by express malice on the part of the Defendants or either of them.

Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to the reliefs claimed, and in particular:

1 whether the Plaintiff's reputation and credibility have been injured;

2 whether the Plaintiff has suffered actual loss; and

3 the quantum of damages, if any. [38] For the avoidance of doubt, nothing in the list settled above amends or enlarges the pleadings, and the parties remain bound by their pleadings at trial. Because the publication of the letter of 26.09.2024, its authorship and its contents are agreed, and its reference to the Plaintiff the Plaintiff being, on the Agreed Facts, the sole proprietor of the firm named in it is not in contest, none of those matters is in issue, and the trial will open at the question of defamatory meaning. F. CONCLUSION [39] The following directions are made. The Plaintiff shall file the statement of issues to be tried in the terms settled at paragraph [37] within seven days of 13.07.2026. The witness statements to be exchanged pursuant to the directions to be given at case management shall be confined to the issues as settled. The remaining pre-trial directions under Order 34 rule 2(2), including as to bundles, witness lists and trial dates, will be given at the case management of 13.07.2026. [40] As both drafts were defective in part - the Plaintiff's in structure and duplication, the Defendants' in the excision of a material question - no special order under Order 34 rule 7 is warranted. The costs of and occasioned by the settlement of the issues shall be costs in the cause. Dated 13 July 2026 (YA Dato' Sri Raja Segaran A/L/S. Krishnan) (Judicial Commisioner) High Court Of Malaya Malacca High Court (MELAKA) Lawyer For Plaintiff : Puan Halimayazahara binti Khalid Tetuan Law Chambers Of Maya Khalid Peguambela dan Peguamcara No. 20-3, Tingkat 3, Jalan Perniagaan Jelatang, Pusat Perniagaan Jelatang, 78000 Alor Gajah, Melaka. Lawyer For Defendants : Encik Andre Wee Heng Leong Tetuan T.G. Koh & Song Peguambela dan Peguamcara No. 22A, Jalan Malinja, Taman Malinja, Bukit Baru, 75150 Melaka.