(d) gagal untuk mengambil kira ekshibit “TYH-6” di mana Plaintif telah menuntut RM460,000.00 (“The Loan”) daripada Defendan di mana Puan Hakim memutuskan RM120,000.00 sahaja adalah untuk “tontine” manakala jumlah RM340,000.00 adalah hutang yang perlu dibayar oleh Defendan kepada Plaintif tanpa mengambil kira hutang tersebut kemungkinan besar adalah merupakan pinjaman berfaedah tinggi. [11] Based on these grounds, the summary judgment is not suitable for this case and there are merits in the Defendant’s defence. The decisions of this Court [12] On 20-5-2022 this Court dismissed the Defendant’s appeal, and the brief judgment is as follows: “Mahkamah ini telah meneliti alasan untuk mengemukakan rayuan di mana Perayu menyatakan bahawa Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen (HMS) khilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila membenarkan permohonan Responden. Dapatan HMS bahawa Responden layak mendapat penghakiman terus/muktamad tanpa perlu melalui perbicaraan penuh adalah khilaf. Perayu menyatakan bahawa pembelaannya adalah bermerit dan terdapat isu untuk dibicarakan melalui perbicaraan penuh. S/N OYxToUUG0Wcze//nvvqqg Mahkamah berpuas hati dan mendapati keputusan HMS adalah mengikut lunas undang-undang. Isu fakta mengenai keberhutangan Perayu kepada Responden telah diperincikan dalam keterangan melalui afidavit serta dokumen relevan. Dapatan HMS bahawa isu yang dibangkitkan tidak perlu dihuraikan melalui keterangan saksi pihak-pihak dalam perbicaraan penuh di hadapan HMS adalah betul. Keterangan Perayu telah disangkal oleh Responden. Plaintif (Responden) mempunyai beban pembuktian bagi tuntutannya dan Defendan (Perayu) ada beban bukti untuk membuktikan pembelaannya. Peruntukan A. 14 k. 1 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 membenarkan suatu penghakiman terus/muktamad tanpa perlu meneliti keseluruhan keterangan melalui suatu perbicaraan penuh. Pada peringkat ini juga, keputusan HMS untuk melupuskan tuntutan melalui penghakiman terus di bawah Aturan 14 kaedah 1 adalah sesuatu yang adil dan HMS tidak khilaf. Dengan ini, Mahkamah ini memutuskan untuk menolak rayuan Perayu dengan kos sebanyak RM5,000.00 tertakluk kepada fi alokatur. Keputusan HMS dikekalkan.”. S/N OYxToUUG0Wcze//nvvqqg Principles of Appellate Intervention [13] The law regulating appellate intervention especially in matters that are fact sensitive are trite in that the appellate Court must be satisfied that the findings are clearly wrong and cannot be justified on the available evidence (see: case of Tan Sri Khoo Teck Puat & Anor v. Plenitude Holdings Sdn Bhd [1993] 2 CLJ 146). [14] Foremost on my mind are the two tests, namely, “plainly wrong” test and “insufficient judicial appreciation of evidence” test for appellate interference in a subordinate Court’s finding. In respect of the two tests, the Court of Appeal held as follows in Lee Ing Chin @ Lee Teck Seng & Ors v. Gan Yook Chin & Anor [2003] 2 MLJ 97 at 98-99− “(2) Generally, an appellate Court will not intervene unless the trial Court was shown to be plainly wrong in arriving at its decision or where there had been no or insufficient judicial appreciation of the evidence. Judicial appreciation of evidence meant that a judge who was required to adjudicate upon a dispute must arrive at his decision on an issue of fact or rejecting the whole or any part of the evidence placed before him. He must, when deciding whether to accept or to reject the evidence of a witness, test it against relevant criteria. Thus, he must take into account the presence or absence of any motive that a witness may have in giving his evidence. Where contemporaneous documents existed, he must test the oral evidence of a witness against these. He must also test the evidence of a S/N OYxToUUG0Wcze//nvvqqg particular witness against these. He must also test the evidence of a witness against the probabilities of the case. The principle central to appellate interference is that the decision arrived at by a trial court without judicial appreciation of the evidence may be set aside on appeal.”. [15] The Court of Appeal has reiterated in Ong Leong Ciou & Anor v. Keller (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors And Another Appeal [2019] 3 MLRA 322 at 329 that – “[125] We are mindful of the limited role of the appellate court in relation to the findings of facts made by the court of first instance. The general principle is that the conclusion of a trial judge is a finding of fact on the oral evidence based on the demean our and credibility of the witness before him or her. Generally, such finding ought not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is plainly wrong. It would not be sufficient to warrant an appellate interference merely because the appellate court entertains doubt whether such finding is right.”. [16] In the more recent case of Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v. Wendy Tan Lee Peng, Administrator of the Estates of Tan Ewe Kwang, Deceased & Anor [2020] 10 CLJ 1, after having looked at the various cases relating to the extent of intervention of an appellate Court, the Federal Court concluded that – S/N OYxToUUG0Wcze//nvvqqg “... an appellate Court should not interfere with factual findings of a trial judge unless it was satisfied that the decision of the trial Judge was plainly wrong or one that no reasonable Judge could have reached. If it is not, the fact that the appellate Court may have reached a different conclusion on the facts, is irrelevant.”. [17] The test is set out in the Supreme Court decision of National Company For Foreign Trade v Kayu Raya Sdn Bhd [1984] 2 MLJ 300, where it was said: “We think it appropriate to remind ourselves once again that in every application under Order 14, the first considerations are (a) whether the case comes within the order and (b) whether the plaintiff has satisfied the preliminary requirements for proceeding under Order 14. For the purpose of an application under Order 14, the preliminary requirements are-