There is no doubt that the plaintiff bears the legal burden to prove its claim throughout his case on the balance of probabilities. However, as Letchumanan has rightly stated in paragraph [57] that when the adverse party, i.e., the defendant raises some new matter, the burden changes sides, and it becomes his to discharge. In this Letchumanan’s case however, we noted that the issue of proving forgery did not eventually arise as the PA was held to be invalid as it has not been authenticated in accordance with section 3 of the Powers of Attorney Act 1949. Specifically, the Court held that: “[63] There is no law which says that a claim automatically succeeds if the defence fails. A claim succeeds only if a prima facie claim is made out or the cause of action is admitted, and there is no defence. For the instant claim to succeed, the validity of the impugned PA must first be proved. ‘The burden of proof under s 102 of the Evidence Enactment is upon the person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side, and accordingly the plaintiff must establish his case. If he fails to do so, it will not avail him to turn round and say that the defendant has not established his’ (Selvaduray v Chinniah [1939] 1 MLJ 253 per Terrel Ag CJ). To say that the impugned PA was valid on account of the fact that forgery was not proved was the wrong approach altogether to address the validity of the impugned PA. If the impugned PA were not valid, then the claim for specific performance must be dismissed, regardless of whether forgery was proved…As the propounder, the respondent had the initial onus of proof to show that instrument of transfer upon which he acquired title was executed by the lawful attorney of the first appellant in the exercise of powers granted by a valid power of attorney. If the respondent could not show that the impugned PA was valid, then the instrument of transfer was defective. If the instrument of transfer was defective, then it would follow that the title of the respondent was obtained by a void instrument. Title could not pass to the respondent if the instrument of transfer were not executed by the first appellant or lawful attorney. In the instant case, the respondent relied on a power of attorney, which, on its face, without the form of authentication, was not valid. The burden of proof to establish the claim was not discharged. The impugned PA had no validity. In the result, the instrument of transfer was void. … [65] Both courts below overlooked s 101 of the Evidence Act, which was the overarching provision before ss 102 and or 103 would enter the equation. ‘The elementary rule in onus is always on the plaintiff and if he discharges that onus and makes out a case which entitles him to a relief, the onus shifts to the defendant to prove those circumstances, if any, which would disentitle the plaintiff to the same’… Unless the respondent had made the first move, namely, proved validity of the impugned PA, the appellants was not foisted with any onus to make any countermove, namely, prove forgery to defeat the claim. It was entirely wrong to award game set and match, so to speak, to the respondent when the respondent, who was the plaintiff, had not even served the first ball, namely, proved validity of the impugned PA, which then and only then would require the appellants to return the ball, with proof of forgery. The respondent asserted that the SPA and the instrument of transfer were executed by Kalidas, the lawful attorney of the registered proprietor. But as the impugned PA was not valid, then, as said, the claim should have been dismissed. It was as simple as that.”