Kinding Maju Sdn Bhd v 1. ) Ching Kim Chow (AA-22NCvC-89-11/2022)

CHING KIM CHOW

CHONG YAN CHIN

MOK YAKE FOO

PUOH LYE HAI @ POH KOOI KHOON

POH SIN LOON

SING MOK HA @ MOK HA SING

WONG MEI YING (P)

WOO KONG WAH

WONG MIN (IDENTIFICATION NO.: 530610-08-5207) 14/08/2025 15:20:40

ORANG-ORANG YANG TIDAK DIKENALI YANG MENDUDUKI DI TANAH YANG DIPEGANG DIBAWAH PAJAKAN MUKIM 37497, ;OT 550658 (DAHULUNYA DIKENALI SEBAGAI H.S.(M) 23318 PT 286270, PAJAKAN MUKIM 37498, LOT 550659 (DAHULUNYA DIKENALI SEBAGAI H.S.(M) 23319 PT 286271), PAJAKAN MUKIM 37499, LOT 550660 (DAHULUNYA DIKENALI SEBAGAI H.S.(M) 23320 PT 286272), PAJAKAN MUKIM 37500, LOT 550661 (DAHULUNYA DIKENALI SEBAGAI H.S.(M) 23321 PT 286273) DAN KESEMUANYA DI MUKIM HULU KINTA, DAERAH KINTA, NEGERI PERAK. …RESPONDEN-RESPONDEN JUDGMENT

This case concerns the dispute over five pieces of land ("the Lands"), claimed by the Plaintiff, who asserts ownership by virtue of being the registered proprietor of the Lands. The Plaintiff seeks vacant possession of the Lands, which are currently occupied by the Defendants for farming activities.

The Plaintiff contends that the Defendants are unlawfully occupying the Lands and have failed to establish any legal right, license, permission, or consent to enter and remain on the Lands.

The Defendants resist the Plaintiff’s claim on several grounds, including a challenge to the validity of the Plaintiff's title. The Defendants contend that the Plaintiff’s title is invalid, unlawful, and void, and that the Plaintiff lacks the necessary locus standi to institute these proceedings. The Defendants base their contention on alleged procedural irregularities in the alienation of the Lands from the State Authority to the Plaintiff.

Having meticulously considered the pleadings, the documentary evidence adduced by both parties, and the oral testimonies of the witnesses, as well as the comprehensive submissions of learned counsel for the Plaintiff and the Defendants, this Court is now seized with the responsibility of determining the rights and liabilities of the parties. For the reasons hereinafter appearing, this Court is of the view that the Plaintiff’s claim must succeed.

The Plaintiff, Kinding Maju Sdn Bhd, is a private limited company with its registered office at No. 6, Jalan Chew Sin On, 31650 Ipoh, Perak, and its business address at No. 136, Jalan Tambun, 31400 Ipoh, Perak. The Plaintiff claims to be the registered proprietor of the following five (5) pieces of land, all located in Mukim Hulu Kinta, Daerah Kinta, Negeri Perak, which are the subject matter of this dispute: a) Pajakan Mukim 37497, Lot 550658 (dahulunya dikenali sebagai H.S.(M) 23318 PT 286270); b) Pajakan Mukim 37498, Lot 550659 (dahulunya dikenali sebagai H.S.(M) 23319 PT 286271); c) Pajakan Mukim 37499, Lot 550660 (dahulunya dikenali sebagai H.S.(M) 23320 PT 286272); d) Pajakan Mukim 37500, Lot 550661 (dahulunya dikenali sebagai H.S.(M) 23318 PT 286270); e) Pajakan Mukim 37501, Lot 550662 (dahulunya dikenali sebagai H.S.(M) 23318 PT 286270).

The Defendants are individuals who have occupied and are currently occupying the said Lands for farming activities. It is an undisputed fact that the Lands were State Lands at all material times before their alienation to the Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff's case is straightforward. As the registered proprietor, it claims ownership and is thus entitled to vacant possession of the Lands. The Plaintiff asserts that the Defendants have been illegally occupying the Lands and have failed to prove the existence of any license, permission, or consent for their occupation.

The Defendants deny the Plaintiff’s claim and have put forward a defence based on the following contentions:

That their predecessors had been occupying the Lands since the 1930s, during the British colonial period;

(ii) That they and their predecessors have invested significant efforts, money, and savings to develop the Lands for agricultural purposes, and the Lands have since become a main source of food supply for the country;

(iii) That previous officers from the Pejabat Daerah dan Tanah Ipoh ("PTG Ipoh") visited the Lands in the 1980s, encouraged the Defendants to participate in the Projek Persayuran Hulu Kinta, and gave them assurances that the Lands would be leased to them, although no further news was received from the Government;

(iv) That they have made several attempts to apply for a lease of the Lands since the 1980s, but their applications were either rejected or not replied to.

The Defendants further challenge the validity of the Final Titles for the Lands on the basis that:

The Plaintiff was aware, or ought to have been aware, of the Defendants' long-standing occupation and investment in developing the Lands; and

(ii) The sudden alienation of the Lands to the Plaintiff is therefore suspicious and tainted with bad faith, especially since the Plaintiff’s nature of business is not agriculture-relevant.

In essence, the core of the dispute revolves around the legality and validity of the alienation process that led to the Plaintiff becoming the registered proprietor, and the effect of the Defendants' historical occupation on the Plaintiff's title and right to possession.

After a careful review of the parties' respective positions, the central issues that require this Court's determination may be crystallised into four main questions, which this Court will address in a logical and systematic order. These issues are:

Whether the Plaintiff is the lawful registered proprietor of the Lands, with indefeasibility of title under the NLC;

(ii) Whether the process of alienation of the Lands to the Plaintiff was lawful and in compliance with the relevant laws and procedures under the NLC and the Perak Land Rules;

(iii) Whether the Defendants have a legitimate right to remain on the Lands; and

(iv) Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to vacant possession of the Lands and other reliefs sought.

The Plaintiff had also raised the preliminary issue concerning the sufficiency of the Defendants' pleadings. The Plaintiff contends that the Defendants’ pleadings fail to specifically allege the vitiating factors required to challenge the indefeasibility of title under Section 340 of the NLC. This Court must first address this issue before delving into the substantive matters. PRELIMINARY ISSUE : SUFFICIENCY OF THE DEFENDANTS’

The first and foremost issue for this Court to determine is the adequacy of the Defendants' pleadings. The Plaintiff’s learned counsel has forcefully argued that the Defendants' challenge to the Plaintiff’s title is a mere afterthought, as the Defendants have failed to properly plead the vitiating factors required to invalidate the Plaintiff’s title under Section 340(2) or (3) of the NLC.

The Plaintiff’s position is that the Defendants' plea, as contained in their Statement of Defence, is too vague and general to be considered a proper challenge to the indefeasibility of the Plaintiff’s title. The specific pleading in question, as pleaded by the Defendants, states that the application for the transfer of the Property made by the Plaintiff suddenly and the approval of the application is highly suspicious and has mala fide intent.

It is a fundamental principle of our adversarial system of justice that parties are bound by their pleadings. The purpose of pleadings is to define the issues in dispute and to give the opposing party fair notice of the case they have to meet. This principle is not a mere technicality but a cornerstone of fairness and due process. Order 18 Rule 7 of the Rules of Court 2012 mandates that every pleading must contain a statement of the material facts relied upon, but not the evidence by which those facts are to be proved. As Lord Diplock wisely observed in G. v. G. [1985] 1 WLR 647, "pleadings are intended to give a fair and full notice of the case the other side has to meet, and to avoid any possibility of surprise."

It must be emphasised here that the court is not entitled to decide the case on a matter not pleaded and the trial must be confined to the pleadings (see Yew Wan Leong v. Lai Kok Chye [1990] 1 CLJ 1113; [1990] 1 CLJ (Rep) 330; Asia Hotel Sdn Bhd v. Malayan Insurance (M) Sdn Bhd [1992] 2 CLJ 1185).

It is also an established principle that it is not the function of the court to build a case for the litigants, inconsistent with the pleadings. The Supreme Court in Yew Wan Leong v. Lai Kok Chye [supra] held as follows: “In disposing of a suit or matter involving a disputed question of fact, it is not proper for the Court to displace the case made by a party in its pleadings and give effect to an entirely new case which the party had not made out in its own pleadings. The trial of a suit should be confined to pleas on which the parties are at variance.”

In RHB Bank Bhd v. Kwan Chew Holdings Sdn Bhd [2010] 1 CLJ 665 the Federal Court held as follows: “[35] On this, we would like to add that it is not the duty of the court to invent or create a cause of action or a defence under the guise of doing justice for the parties lest it be accused of being biased towards one against the other. The parties should know best as to what they want and it is not for the court to pursue a cavalier approach to solving their dispute by inventing or creating cause or causes of action which were not pleaded in the first place. Such activism by the court must be discouraged otherwise the court would be accused of making laws rather than applying them to a given set of facts.”

In the context of land law, where a registered title enjoys the protection of indefeasibility, this principle takes on an even greater significance. A party seeking to challenge the indefeasibility of a registered title must not only plead the relevant vitiating factors but must also provide particulars of the alleged fraud, misrepresentation, or illegality. This is a long-standing and well-established requirement.

The Court of Appeal in Tan Ying Hong v Tan Sian San & Ors [2010] 2 MLJ 1 held that to displace a registered proprietor's title, the challenger must establish one of the vitiating factors under Section 340(2) of the NLC. These factors, such as "fraud or misrepresentation to which the person or body, or any agent of the person or body, was a party," must be specifically pleaded and proven.

Applying this principle to the present case, the Defendants’ pleading that the application was "highly suspicious and has mala fide intent" is, in the considered view of this Court, patently insufficient. It is a general and sweeping statement that falls far short of the requirements for pleading fraud or illegality. The Defendants have not identified what constitutes the mala fide intent, who the parties to this intent were, or how this intent resulted in the unlawful acquisition of the title. The pleading lacks the necessary particulars to give the Plaintiff fair notice of the case it was expected to defend.

Learned counsel for the Defendants submitted that the pleading was sufficient to at least open the door to a full investigation of the matter. This argument, however, is a dangerous precedent to set. To allow such a vague and unparticularized plea would be to subvert the established principles of pleadings and would effectively allow any party to challenge a registered title with a mere assertion of suspicion, thereby undermining the certainty and finality that the NLC seeks to provide.

This Court finds that the Defendants' pleadings were fundamentally flawed and did not meet the rigorous standards required to challenge a registered title on the grounds of illegality, unlawfulness, or fraud. The Defendants have failed to lay the necessary foundation in their pleadings to build their case. Therefore, their challenge to the indefeasibility of the Plaintiff’s title, as presented, is legally untenable.

However, the Courts have also recognized that procedural rules must not operate as an impediment to substantive justice. Notwithstanding the insufficiency of the pleadings, and in the interest of justice and to ensure a thorough and complete adjudication of the dispute, this Court will proceed to consider the merits of the Defendants' arguments as if they had been properly pleaded. This is a precautionary step to address all facets of the dispute and to leave no stone unturned, but it does not, in any way, diminish the finding that the pleadings were inadequate.

Whether the Plaintiff is the lawful registered proprietor of the

The Plaintiff asserts that it is the lawful registered proprietor of the Lands based on the issuance of Final Titles under its name on 15 September 2020. The principle of indefeasibility of title under Section 340(1) of the National Land Code 1965 ("NLC") is the foundation of this claim. The Plaintiff argues that its registration is valid and conclusive, as no fraud or illegality has been proven.

The Defendants, however, challenge the lawfulness of the Plaintiff’s title, validity and lawfulness of the alienation of the Lands to the Plaintiff. The Defendants have mounted a two-pronged attack: firstly, they argue that the Plaintiff did not comply with the prescribed application procedure under the Perak Land Rules; and secondly, they contend that the approval for the alienation was given by the wrong authority, namely the Menteri Besar, and not the State Authority as required by the NLC.

Indefeasibility of title is a central tenet of Malaysian land law, granting security and certainty to registered proprietors. Section 340(1) of the NLC provides: “The title or interest of any person or body for the time being registered as proprietor of any land shall be indefeasible unless otherwise provided under this section.”

This principle ensures that a registered titleholder’s ownership is protected from challenges, subject to the exceptions provided under Section 340(2) and (3) of the NLC, which include fraud, forgery, or misrepresentation. The Federal Court in Adorna Properties Sdn Bhd v Boonsom Boonyanit [2001] 1 MLJ 241 affirmed that indefeasibility applies to bona fide registered proprietors unless they have participated in or had knowledge of any fraud or illegality.

The Plaintiff argues that as the registered proprietor, it enjoys the presumption of indefeasibility, and the Defendants bear the burden of proving that its title is invalid.

The Plaintiff has tendered comprehensive evidence to substantiate its ownership claim. The key documents include:

Approval letters from the State Authority (PTG) dated 14 April 2020 and 16 June 2020 approving the alienation of the Lands;

(ii) The Final Titles issued under its name on 15 September 2020; and

(iii) Payment receipts for land premiums and administrative fees as required under the Perak Land Rules.

The Plaintiff’s evidence demonstrates compliance with the procedural requirements for alienation, as detailed in Section 76 of the NLC and the Perak Land Rules. While the Defendants allege procedural irregularities, no evidence has been produced to show that the Plaintiff failed to adhere to the substantive requirements of the law.

The Plaintiff further relies on the testimony of SD1, a senior officer of the Land Office, who confirmed that the alienation of the Lands was processed in accordance with established procedures and that the Plaintiff fulfilled all necessary conditions for the issuance of Final Titles.

The Defendants argue that the Plaintiff’s title is not indefeasible due to irregularities in the alienation process. Specifically, the Defendants allege:

The Plaintiff’s initial application was not made using the prescribed form under Jadual 1 of the Perak Land Rules;

(ii) The alienation was approved without proper compliance with the procedural requirements under the NLC; and

(iii) The Plaintiff’s title was obtained in bad faith, as the Defendants were long-standing occupants of the Lands.

It is trite law that the NLC and its subsidiary legislation, such as the State Land Rules, lay down the legal framework for the administration of land in Malaysia. The purpose of these rules is to ensure a systematic and orderly process for the alienation of State land. Rule 2(1) of the Perak Land Rules explicitly provides that an application for State land shall be made in Jadual 1 (Schedule 1). The Defendants’ witness (SD1) also testified that the only two modes of application are under Jadual 1 or a direct application to the Pejabat Tanah dan Galian (PTG), but then conceded there is no provision in the Rules for the latter.

However, the Plaintiff's evidence, which was corroborated and not seriously challenged, revealed a different and more nuanced set of circumstances. The Plaintiff’s witness (PW1) testified that while the initial communication was a letter to the Menteri Besar, this letter was subsequently submitted to the PTG. More importantly, the Plaintiff adduced evidence to show that following the initial approval letter, it was explicitly instructed to file the Jadual 1 form, which it did, along with making the necessary payments to the District Land Office.

It is thus in my considered opinion that even if the Plaintiff’s application for alienation was initially irregular, the evidence demonstrates that the Plaintiff subsequently complied with all requirements. The issuance of Final Titles by the Land Office reflects that the State Authority was satisfied with the Plaintiff’s compliance.

This Court is further of the considered opinion that the Defendants' argument on this point is overly rigid and gives undue weight to form over substance. While procedural rules are important, they are not always to be interpreted in a vacuum. The objective of the rules is to facilitate a process, not to create an insurmountable technical hurdle. The key question is whether the statutory purpose of the rule has been satisfied. The purpose of Jadual 1 is to capture the necessary information for the State Authority to consider an application for land. The Plaintiff’s subsequent filing of the Jadual 1 form and the processing of their application by the PTG demonstrates that the procedural requirements were ultimately met to the satisfaction of the relevant State organs. The fact that the process was not initiated by the formal Jadual 1 form but was rectified at a later stage upon the instruction of the State Authority's representative suggests, at most, a procedural irregularity that was subsequently cured, and not a fundamental flaw that would render the entire process null and void.

The State Authority, through its representative, the PTG, processed the application, instructed the Plaintiff to file the Jadual 1, and ultimately issued the titles. It would be entirely inconsistent for the Defendants, as third parties, to now successfully challenge the alienation on this basis. The State Authority itself is estopped from denying the validity of the process.

Mere allegations of irregularity are insufficient to defeat the indefeasibility of title. A challenger must produce clear and cogent evidence of fraud, forgery, or illegality. While procedural compliance is essential for the validity of land transactions, the courts have consistently held that minor irregularities do not invalidate a registered title. The alleged procedural irregularities must be material and must affect the substantive validity of the title to warrant a challenge under Section 340 of the NLC.

Therefore, this Court finds that the Plaintiff's procedural compliance was sufficient, and the initial application by way of a letter to the Menteri Besar does not, on its own, invalidate the subsequent alienation of the Lands.

The Defendants further argued that the Menteri Besar has no power to approve an application for State land, as this power is exclusively vested in the State Authority under Section 76 of the NLC. They submitted that the Menteri Besar’s act of approval was ultra vires and, consequently, void.

To properly address this argument, one must first turn to the definitive provisions of the NLC. Section 76 of the NLC is the enabling provision that confers upon the State Authority the power to alienate State land. It provides that the "State Authority may alienate State land...". Section 5 of the NLC, the interpretation section, defines "State Authority" as: “the Ruler or Governor of the State, as the case may be, acting on the advice of the State Executive Council.”

This definition is of paramount importance. It makes it unequivocally clear that the State Authority is not a single individual, but rather the Ruler or Governor of the State acting on the collective advice of the State Executive Council ("Exco"). The Exco, in turn, is a constitutional body responsible for advising the Ruler on matters of state governance, and its meetings are presided over by the Menteri Besar, who is the head of the State Government.

It is a well-established principle of administrative law and constitutional practice that the decisions of the Exco are the decisions of the State Authority. The Menteri Besar, as the chairman of the Exco, is the official who announces and communicates these decisions. The approval letters dated 14 April 2020 and 16 June 2020, which were issued by the PTG, unequivocally state that the approval was granted by the State Authority, as represented by the Menteri Besar. The fact that the Plaintiff's initial letter was addressed to the Menteri Besar, and that the approval was "announced" by him, is in complete congruence with the established constitutional and administrative practices of State administration. The Menteri Besar, in this context, was not acting as an individual with an independent power to alienate land, but as the official mouthpiece for the State Authority’s decision.

The Defendants' argument that the Menteri Besar acted ultra vires is therefore without legal foundation. An act is ultra vires if it is performed without the necessary legal power or authority. Here, the power to alienate State land is given to the State Authority, and the decision to alienate was made by the Exco, of which the Menteri Besar is the head. The Menteri Besar’s communication of that decision is not an independent exercise of power, but the execution of a power properly vested in the State Authority.

The Defendants' argument that the Menteri Besar acted ultra vires is therefore without legal foundation. An act is ultra vires if it is performed without the necessary legal power or authority. Here, the power to alienate State land is given to the State Authority, and the decision to alienate was made by the Exco, of which the Menteri Besar is the head. The Menteri Besar’s communication of that decision is not an independent exercise of power, but the execution of a power properly vested in the State Authority.

In light of the above, this Court finds that the approval for the alienation of the Lands to the Plaintiff was made in full compliance with Section 76 of the NLC and was a lawful exercise of the State Authority’s power. The Defendants' argument to the contrary is misconceived and must be rejected.

The Defendants further contend that the Plaintiff acted in bad faith by obtaining title to the Lands despite knowing of their occupation. However, bad faith must be proven by credible evidence of dishonest intent or improper conduct. In the absence of such evidence, the presumption of good faith underpins the registered proprietor’s title.

The Plaintiff, in this case, has demonstrated that it followed the prescribed procedures for alienation and had no direct dealings with the Defendants. There is no evidence to suggest that the Plaintiff was aware of or complicit in any irregularities during the alienation process.

Based on the evidence and the applicable legal principles, this Court finds as follows:

The Plaintiff is the lawful registered proprietor of the Lands, as evidenced by the Final Titles issued under its name;

(ii) The principle of indefeasibility under Section 340(1) of the NLC applies to protect the Plaintiff’s title, and the Defendants have failed to adduce evidence of fraud, illegality, or bad faith to defeat this presumption;

(iii) The Defendants’ allegations of procedural irregularity are unfounded and do not undermine the validity of the Plaintiff’s title.

Accordingly, I hold that the Plaintiff’s registration as the proprietor of the Lands is valid and lawful, and the Plaintiff is entitled to the protections afforded by the principle of indefeasibility.

(iii) WHETHER THE DEFENDANTS HAVE PROVEN THE EXISTENCE OF LICENSE, PERMISSION, AND/OR CONSENT TO OCCUPY THE LANDS

The Defendants assert that they are entitled to occupy the Lands due to implied or express permission granted by the State Authority or its agents. The Defendants further claim they have been farming on the Lands for a substantial period, and such occupation constitutes a form of tacit consent or legitimate expectation that they would eventually be allowed to remain or formalize their use.

Conversely, the Plaintiff argues that the Defendants have no legal basis to occupy the Lands. It submits that the Defendants have failed to provide any documentary or evidential proof of license, permission, or consent. In the absence of such proof, the Plaintiff asserts that the Defendants’ occupation of the Lands is illegal.

Under Malaysian land law, any person occupying land without the permission of the registered proprietor or the State Authority is deemed to be in unlawful occupation. Section 425 of the National Land Code 1965 ("NLC") explicitly prohibits the unlawful occupation of State or alienated land, stating: “Any person who unlawfully occupies or erects a structure on State land, reserved land, or alienated land without lawful authority commits an offence.”

Lawful occupation of land requires express permission, either through a lease, tenancy, license, or other forms of consent granted by the proprietor or the State Authority. Mere presence on land, regardless of the duration, does not confer any legal right or title unless explicitly authorized.

A prolonged occupation of State or alienated land without a valid agreement or consent does not confer any rights, title, or legitimate expectation to remain on the land.

The Defendants argue that they had previously applied for a lease of the Lands, which demonstrates their intention to formalize their occupation. They contend that their continued occupation and farming activities were carried out with the tacit approval of the State Authority, as their activities were not immediately objected to or curtailed.

However, during cross-examination, the Defendants admitted that their lease application had been rejected by the State Authority. No further applications or appeals were made, and no documentary evidence was adduced to show that the State Authority subsequently granted any form of permission or consent to occupy the Lands.

The Defendants also alleged that the State Authority had verbally indicated that their occupation was permissible. However, as held in Tan Sri Khoo Teck Puat v Plenitude Holdings Sdn Bhd [1994] 2 MLJ 114, verbal or informal assurances, without corroborating documentary evidence, do not carry legal weight in land disputes.

The Plaintiff submits that it is the registered proprietor of the Lands and has never granted any form of permission, license, or consent to the Defendants. The Plaintiff further argues that the Defendants’ reliance on verbal assurances or implied consent is baseless and unsupported by evidence.

The Court has carefully considered the evidence presented by both parties. It is clear from the Defendants’ own admissions that Their application for a lease of the Lands was rejected by the State Authority and that they have no written agreement, license, or document granting them permission to occupy the Lands.

The Defendants’ reliance on implied consent or tacit approval is untenable. The law is clear that any form of consent must be express and evidenced in writing. The NLC and the Perak Land Rules do not recognize informal arrangements or verbal assurances as valid grounds for lawful occupation of alienated land. Reference was made to the Court of Appeal case of Shaheen Bte Abu Bakar v. Perbadanan Kemajuan Negeri Selangor And Other Cases [1996] 2 CLJ 965; [1996] 1 MLJ 825 where Gopal Sri Ram JCA had stated as follows:- “Consequently, all that is now necessary is to examine the facts of the present appeals to ascertain whether they exclude the operation of O. 89. Since the facts relating the occupation by each appellant differ, I propose to examine them separately. Let me take the case of Shaheen bte Abu Bakar, the first appellant. Her evidence is that in 1982, her father, acting upon the encouragement of the Penghulu of Mukim Sungei Puluh, entered onto the land in question. In 1983, the father built a house on the land. In the following two years, her father and the other occupiers commenced fish farming. They received assistance from the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries, who no doubt were unaware, or at the very least unconcerned, with the legality of the father's occupation of the land in question. Shaheen goes on to say that in 1995, the father 'gifted' the property to her. She says that the State constructed a Surau on the land with public funds, although I must say that the document she relies upon - a voucher from the Petaling district office - speaks, not of construction but of repairs and renovation done to an existing surau. These are then the circumstances upon which Shaheen relies to support her allegation that her initial entry upon the land and her continued occupation of the same. By no stretch of the imagination may a parallel be drawn between her case and that of Bohari. There is, in the present case, no active encouragement of the kind that was found to exist in Bohari's case. No promise to issue title to her or her father was ever made by the state government. Nor were there any actings on the part of the state authority which may be capable of even remotely suggesting the existence of consent or a licence. Unfortunately for her, Shaheen and her father remain what they always were: squatters on state land. The next case is that of the second appellant, Ho Choong Yee. This appellant came onto the land in 1980, when she purchased a house built on it. The vendor of the house, one Ho Yan, came onto the land in 1976. In her evidence, she goes on to say that she expended money in practically rebuilding the house and converting it into a permanent structure. In May 1987, she applied for a temporary occupation licence but was not issued with one. This is all that she has asserted in support of her case. It is more than plain to me that the second appellant has established absolutely no basis for making the suggestion that she does: that her possession of the land is with the consent or by the licence of the state government and PKNS. Her entry upon the land was illegal as is her continued occupation of it. As a squatter, it is not open to her to resist a summary application for possession. There is no suggestion that planning permission was ever obtained for the house she rebuilt. It is an illegal structure, as are no doubt the houses of the other appellants. I now take the case of the third appellant, Lee Yat Yee. His case is that he went into possession of this land in 1969. He applied for a temporary occupation licence ('TOL') and was issued one, but in the name of his neighbour. In 1988, he had the TOL issued in his name. It expired in 1991 and has never been renewed since then. There is no suggestion by Mr Lee that the state authority led him to believe that his TOL would be enlarged into a greater interest in the land. Neither is there any suggestion that, apart from the grant of the TOL, there was a definite promise to issue him with a title to that portion of the land he occupies. Based on the foregoing facts, I am unable to find any material from which the judge could have inferred either consent or a licence to occupy the land in question. Mr Lee, like the other appellants, is also a squatter with no rights whatsoever. ... In conclusion, there is no doubt that each appellant is a squatter with no occupational rights of any kind. The judge was quite correct in holding that they had had neither consent nor a licence to occupy the land. He was therefore right in making the orders for possession against each appellant.”

Furthermore, the Defendants’ farming activities, while longstanding, do not equate to permission or consent. It is also notable that the Defendants did not adduce any evidence of planning permissions or approvals for their activities on the Lands. This omission is fatal to their claim of lawful occupation as held in the Court of Appeal case of Datuk Bandar Majlis Bandaraya Shah Alam v. Yusuf bin Awang and Shaheen bte Abu Bakar as follows:- “[22] Another point canvassed by the respondents was that the appellants failed to establish that the respondents are squatters. We would think that the issue in the instant appeal is whether the buildings erected and owned by the respondents are 'squatter huts'. The definition of 'squatter hut' in regulation 3 of the said Regulations is very clear. Section 101(1) of the Evidence Act 1950 provides 'whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability, dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist'. Thus, the respondents must prove that their respective buildings were erected with plans approved by the local authority, ie, the second appellant. They have not even shown that they are in lawful occupation of the said property. It is an undisputed fact that the registered owner of the said property is Hock Hup Developments Sdn Bhd (now known as Ken Rimba Jaya Sdn Bhd) and not the respondents. Being squatters, having not shown otherwise, they have no right in law or equity. In Sidek bin Haji Muhammad & 461 Ors v. The Government of the State of Perak & Ors [1982] 1 MLJ 313, Raja Azlan Shah CJ (Malaya) (as His Majesty then was) said (at p 314): It is well established that a court of equity will never assist squatters to resist an order of possession illegally acquired; it will never intervene in aid of wrongdoers. (See Grafton v. Griffin). We would like to say this at once about squatters. The owner is not obliged to go to the courts to obtain an order of possession. He is entitled if he so wishes, to take the remedy into his own hands. He can go in himself and turn them out without the aid of the courts of law. He can even use force, so long as he uses no more force than is reasonably necessary. He will not then be liable either criminally or civilly. This however is not to be encouraged because of the disturbance which might follow but the legality of it is beyond question.”

In light of the above findings, this Court holds that the Defendants have failed to prove the existence of any license, permission, or consent to occupy the Lands.

(iv) Whether the Defendants have a legitimate right to remain on the Lands

The Defendants assert that their prolonged occupation of the Lands, coupled with their farming activities and alleged acquiescence by the State Authority, created a legitimate expectation that they could remain on the Lands. This issue requires an examination of whether the doctrine of legitimate expectation is applicable in the context of land disputes involving squatters.

The doctrine of legitimate expectation arises when an individual or group can reasonably expect, based on clear representations or consistent conduct by a public authority, that they will continue to enjoy a certain benefit or treatment. The principle is rooted in fairness, particularly in public law matters involving administrative decisions. However, its application in private land disputes or cases involving unlawful occupation is heavily circumscribed.

Doctrine of legitimate expectations requires:-

A clear and unequivocal representation or assurance from a public authority;

(ii) The representation to be acted upon by the claimant to their detriment; and

(iii) The expectation to be reasonable, lawful, and legitimate within the scope of the law.

Importantly, in land matters, the courts have consistently held that the doctrine cannot override statutory provisions or principles of law that govern land ownership and occupation. In Shaheen bte Abu Bakar v. Perbadanan Kemajuan Negeri Selangor [1996] 2 CLJ 965, the Court of Appeal rejected a squatter’s claim to legitimate expectation, holding that there was no evidence of active encouragement or assurances from the State Authority that could justify such an expectation.

The High Court in Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur & Anor v. Tan Poh Wah & Ors [2019] 1 CLJ 661 further emphasized that squatters cannot invoke legitimate expectation as a basis to resist eviction. The Court held that mere tacit acquiescence or lack of immediate enforcement action by authorities does not give rise to a legal right or expectation.

The Defendants claim that their farming activities on the Lands were conducted with the knowledge and acquiescence of the State Authority, which allegedly provided them with verbal assurances of continued occupation. However, no evidence was adduced to substantiate this claim. The Defendants failed to produce any documentary proof, such as correspondence or formal agreements, that could demonstrate a clear and unequivocal representation by the State Authority.

Furthermore, the Defendants conceded that their application for a lease of the Lands was rejected. This fact directly contradicts their claim of any assurance or expectation of continued occupation. As noted in Shaheen bte Abu Bakar, the absence of any promise or conduct capable of suggesting lawful consent negates the basis for a claim of legitimate expectation.

For a legitimate expectation to be recognized, the expectation must not only be reasonable but also lawful. Section 425 of the National Land Code (NLC) expressly prohibits unauthorized occupation of alienated land. The doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot operate to legitimize an act that is expressly unlawful.

The Defendants also argue that the State Authority’s failure to act against their occupation for many years amounts to tacit acquiescence, creating a legitimate expectation. However, the courts have consistently rejected this argument.

In Shaheen bte Abu Bakar, the Court of Appeal held that the mere passage of time or failure to enforce eviction does not convert unlawful occupation into lawful possession or give rise to legitimate expectation. Similarly, in Sidek bin Haji Muhammad & 461 Ors v. The Government of the State of Perak & Ors [1982] 1 MLJ 313, Raja Azlan Shah CJ (Malaya) (as His Majesty then was) held that tacit acquiescence by the authorities does not alter the legal status of squatters or confer any legal rights upon them.

Moreover, the law is clear that prolonged occupation, even if facilitated by third parties or carried out with tacit acquiescence, does not confer any legal rights upon squatters. This was emphasized in Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur v. Tan Poh Wah, where the Court held that tacit acquiescence by authorities does not convert squatters into lawful occupants.

The Defendants further contend that they invested significant resources into farming activities on the Lands, thereby relying on the alleged representations to their detriment. However, the doctrine of legitimate expectation requires a direct causal link between the representation made by the public authority and the actions taken by the claimant.

In this case, the Defendants’ farming activities were initiated without any documented approval or license from the State Authority. Their actions were self-initiated and cannot be attributed to any specific assurance by the authorities. As such, there is no basis to claim detrimental reliance.

In conclusion, the Defendants’ claim of legitimate expectation is unsustainable both in fact and law. The Court reaffirms that the doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot be invoked to legitimize unlawful occupation of land or to circumvent statutory provisions.

The Defendants are in my considered view squatters with no legal or equitable rights to occupy the Lands and their occupation on the Lands is unlawful under section 425 of the NLC.

WHETHER THE COURT SHOULD GRANT THE RELIEF SOUGHT BY THE PLAINTIFF

Having addressed the issues concerning the lawfulness of the land alienation, the validity of the Section 425 Notices, and the Applicants’ claims to remain on the lands, the Court must now consider the appropriateness of the relief sought by the Respondents. The relief claimed includes orders for vacant possession of the lands and recovery of legal costs incurred in this action.

Section 425 of the National Land Code (NLC) empowers the landowner or lawful authority to take legal action to recover possession of alienated lands from persons in unlawful occupation. Subsection 425(1) imposes a duty on the Land Administrator to issue notices to the unlawful occupiers requiring them to vacate the lands within the stipulated period. Where the notices are not complied with, the landowner or relevant authority may pursue legal remedies, including an order for vacant possession.

In the present case, the lands have been alienated to the Plaintiff, who is the registered proprietor. Under Section 340 of the NLC, registration confers indefeasible title and ownership of the lands to the Plaintiff, subject only to exceptions of fraud, misrepresentation, or forgery. None of these exceptions have been established in this case.

The Defendants’ occupation of the lands is in direct contravention of Section 425(1) of the NLC, as they are neither tenants nor licensees of the Plaintiff.

Based on these facts, the Plaintiff is entitled to an order for vacant possession. The Defendants continued occupation amounts to trespass, which deprives the Plaintiff of its lawful right to enjoy and develop the lands in accordance with their alienated purpose.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the Respondents are entitled to the relief sought. The judgment is summarized as follows:

The Plaintiff is granted vacant possession of the lands. The Defendants are ordered to vacate the lands within thirty (30) days from the date of this judgment, failing which enforcement actions may be taken;

(ii) The Court further orders an injunction restraining the Defendants, whether by themselves, their agents, or assigns, from re-entering or interfering with the lands after eviction; and

(iii) Costs of this action of RM10,000.00 to be paid by the Defendants to the Plaintiff in equal share. Dated: 08.08.2025 Pihak-Pihak: Tetuan Chan Weng Keng & Associates bagi pihak Perayu 1 sehingga 9. Peguamcara & Peguambela No. 8, Jalan Suasana 4/2B, Bandar Tun Hussein Onn 43200 Cheras Selangor Ruj: CWK/12-2022/ROG/00 Tel:

012.2758191 Emel: chengyijustice@gmail.com Tetuan Leon & Lim bagi pihak Responden Peguamcara & Peguambela No. 25, Jalan Tun Sambanthan 30000 Ipoh Perak Ruj: