H.S. (D) 123554, PT 50044, all of which are within Section 41, Bandar Kuala Lumpur, District of Kuala Lumpur, Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur (hereinafter referred to collectively as "the Applicant’s Land"). S/N zF6HyetCk0iNVbjAxhUh7w [4] There are 179 respondents (should have been named as “Defendants”) in this action. In the intitulement, the names of 178 respondents are stated. The 179th Respondent is stated as: “TIAP-TIAP ORANG LAIN YANG MENDUDUKI HARTANAH-HARTANAH TERSEBUT”. [5] Only 23 out of the 178 respondents have appointed solicitors to oppose the Applicant’s application before this Court. They are the 6th, 21st, 30th, 33rd, 40th, 42nd, 44th, 45th, 68th, 74th, 77th, 119th, 126th, 128th, 132nd, 136th, 140th, 143rd, 145th, 146th, 154th, 161st, and 166th Respondent. These 23 respondents are occupying 17 out of the 26 lots of the Applicant’s Land. The Applicant’s Position [6] In his supporting affidavit, the Applicant’s director averred that sometime in year 2016, the Applicant was invited by Persatuan Pemilik Hartanah Kampung Sungai Baru (“PPHKSB”) to redevelop properties located in Kampung Sungai Baru, Kuala Lumpur, in line with an urban renewal policy announced by the Ministry of Federal Territories, through Perbadanan Perkampungan Kampong Baru (“PPKB”). [7] The redevelopment project (“the Project”) is to redevelop the land on which 64 old terrace houses and 264 dilapidated flats stand. Proposals were made for those property owners to enter into a joint venture agreement (“the Joint Venture Agreement”) whereby the owners and/or beneficiaries of the Estate of deceased owners, would vacate their respective unit and authorise the Applicant to redevelop the land. In consideration thereof, they would receive, inter alia, new S/N zF6HyetCk0iNVbjAxhUh7w apartments with essential facilities and infrastructure, as well as monetary compensation. [8] Apparently, the owners of 27 out of the 64 terrace houses and 192 out of the 264 flats signed the Joint Venture Agreement. The Applicant further averred that since the majority support the Project, the Government decided to approve the Project. It was decided that the Land Acquisition Act 1960 would be used to acquire those units belonging to owners who declined to enter into the Joint Venture Agreement, by paying them compensation based on market price – in compliance with the said Act. [9] The Applicant had fully paid compensation to the owners of 37 terrace houses and 72 flats, i.e. those who declined to enter into the Joint Venture Agreement. The compensation paid was pursuant to the Notices of Awards (Form H) issued by the Land Administrator under the Land Acquisition Act 1960. [10] It was further averred that the land acquisition proceedings had been fully completed, with the payment of compensation to the owners of houses and flats acquired, the issuance of Form K for the Land Administrator to take formal possession and the issuance of 26 new titles to the Applicant – to alienate the land under 26 lots as the registered proprietor. [11] Since only 23 respondents herein are contesting the Applicant’s application, the details of the respective payment that they received are set out in the Applicant’s supporting affidavit. S/N zF6HyetCk0iNVbjAxhUh7w [12] The Applicant’s stand is straightforward; having performed their part of the Joint Venture Agreement, paid full compensation as awarded by the Land Administrator and being issued with new land titles, the Applicant expects to be able to proceed with the Project to redevelop the Applicant’s Land without any trouble or delay. [13] On Order 89, learned counsel for the Applicant submitted that it is applicable because rule 1 makes it applicable as against “a person or persons (not being a tenant or tenants holding over after the termination of the tenancy) who entered into or remained in occupation without his licence or consent”. Counsel submitted that emphasis must be given to the words “or remained in occupation” and not just to the words “who entered into”. [14] In support of his submissions, several authorities were cited. I shall refer to them below in my analysis of the facts and law. The Respondents’ Position [15] There was only one affidavit filed by the 23 respondents to resist the Applicant’s application. It was affirmed by one Zainab binti Alias, who is the 68th Respondent. The essence of her affidavit was summarised into 4 points in para 25 thereof. First, she was advised that Order 89 is not applicable because the Respondents are not trespassers. Secondly, the issue of compensation is still not concluded, allegedly pending at the High Court. Thirdly, she avers that they reserve the “rights” to challenge the legality of the land acquisition. Lastly, she avers that sufficient time ought to be given to the Respondents to vacate the Applicant’s Land. S/N zF6HyetCk0iNVbjAxhUh7w [16] Learned counsel who appeared for 23 out of 179 respondents submitted on only the first point in their counsel’s written submissions, i.e. the applicability of Order 89 in this case. Their point is simply that Order 89 is the correct mode to be instituted only against persons who are “squatters simpliciter” who had gained occupation of the land without adequate licence, and not against the Respondents who are occupiers whose land had been acquired under the Land Acquisition Act. [17] Several authorities were cited by learned counsel for the 23 respondents, namely, Che Omar bin Wahab v Embon binti Shafie & Ors [2019] CLJU 1666, Bohari Taib & Ors v Pengarah Tanah & Galian Selangor [1991] 1 CLJ (Rep) 48, Shaheen Abu Bakar v Perbadanan Kemajuan Negeri Selangor (1999) 1 CLJ 74 and Bukit Arena Sdn Bhd v. Wong Seng & Yang Lain [2020] CLJU 1528. Analysis of the Facts and Law [18] First, even though an applicant under Order 89 ought to have been named as “Plaintiff” (see O.89 r.3(1)) while a respondent as “Defendant”, I find that the misnomer in the intitulement of the Originating Summons – in using “Applicant” and “Respondents” – is a technical non-compliance under Order 1A. I had thereby proceeded to hear the merits of the case without requiring any amendment to be made to the intitulement. [19] A careful reading of Order 89 rule 1 shows that the persons who may be cited as defendants (respondents) in an Order 89 application are those who had entered into or remained in S/N zF6HyetCk0iNVbjAxhUh7w occupation without the proprietor’s licence or consent, or that of his predecessor in title. The said rule 1 reads: “Where a person claims possession of land which he alleges is occupied solely by a person or persons (not being a tenant or tenants holding over after the termination of the tenancy) who entered into or remained in occupation without his licence or consent or that of any predecessor in title of his, the proceedings may be brought by originating summons in accordance with the provisions of this Order.” (emphasis added) [20] The terms of Order 89 rule 1 are in fact quite clear, with the use of the word “or” in the phrase “who entered into or remained in occupation without his licence or consent”. This means that it is not applicable only to squatters who “entered into” the land without the registered proprietor’s consent. The only illegal occupiers expressly excluded from the application are “tenants or tenants holding over after the termination of tenancy”. On this point, the principle of statutory interpretation known in Latin as Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius is of assistance. A literal translation of Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius is “The Expression of One Is the Exclusion of Another”. Thus, when this principle is applied to Order 89 rule 1, it means that since tenants (and tenants holding over) are expressly stated, other occupiers who are omitted from rule 1 are presumed to have been intentionally omitted. [21] The facts in Che Omar bin Wahab v Embon binti Shafie & Ors [2019] CLJU 1666 are obviously distinguishable from the present case. There, the learned High Court judge made a finding that there were documentary evidence exhibited in the Defendant’s S/N zF6HyetCk0iNVbjAxhUh7w affidavit raising triable issues as to the capacity of the transferor to transfer title to the plaintiff there. The following passage is self-explanatory: “[16] The defendants’ averments together with the supporting documentary exhibits (paragraph 8 is referred) shows that the defendants had lawfully entered the land with Ismail’s permission. The defendants have also raised triable issues, the most significant being Haslinda’s capacity to pass a good title to the plaintiff.” [22] The judgment of the Supreme Court in Bohari Taib & Ors v Pengarah Tanah & Galian Selangor [1991]1 MLJ 343 is not about action against occupiers of land that had been legally acquired under the Land Acquisition Act 1960. It clearly shows that a triable issue existed in that case because there was documentary evidence of the Selangor State Executive Council, acting under the National Land Code 1965, having approved the alienation of the subject land to the appellants and the other selected settlers. This triable issue is highlighted in the judgment of Mohamed Azmi SCJ in Bohari Taib (supra): “There is some evidence by affidavit and documentary exhibits to show that on or about 4 September 1980, the Selangor State Executive Council, no doubt acting under the National Land Code 1965, had approved the alienation of the said land to the appellants and the other selected settlers, and on 1 November 1980, one Dato' Haji Kamarulzaman bin Haji Ahmad, the then member of the State Executive Council, had personally confirmed the approval and assured them that they would be given titles to the said land. … S/N zF6HyetCk0iNVbjAxhUh7w The approval of the state authority as exhibited by the appellants, would appear to have been made on 4 September 1980, according to the letter of the Collector of Sabak Bernam dated 25 October.” [23] In Shaheen Abu Bakar v Perbadanan Kemajuan Negeri Selangor (1999) 1 CLJ 74, it was highlighted by the Federal Court that since the subject land had been transferred to another company, i.e. Punca Alam, PKNS ceased to have the right to claim possession of the same. The following passage from the judgment of Zakaria Yatim FCJ made the above point of locus standi crystal clear: “Once the said land was transferred to Punca Alam, PKNS could no longer claim possession of the said land. In our view, this is a triable issue. The Court of Appeal said that the learned judge was entirely right in holding that PKNS and Punca Alam had the necessary standing. In our view, the question of whether PKNS had the locus standi to file the O 89 application against Shaheen in the circumstances of the present case is a triable issue. On this ground alone, the appeal ought to be allowed.” [24] Finally, the judgment of the High Court in Bukit Arena Sdn Bhd v. Wong Seng & Yang Lain [2020] CLJU 1528 is also not about occupiers who had received compensation. The Plaintiff’s application under order 89 was allowed. The final paragraph of the judgment provides guidance that this Court ought to ‘peel’ (kupas) through the facts to determine the true facts: “[49] Kesimpulannya, berdasarkan kepada kesemua yang telah dikupas di atas, mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa sememangnya Defendan Pertama, Ketiga dan Ketujuh merupakan penceroboh dan/atau setinggan yang berada di atas Tanah-Tanah tersebut S/N zF6HyetCk0iNVbjAxhUh7w secara haram. Defendan Pertama, Ketiga dan Ketujuh dalam kes ini telah gagal untuk membangkitkan sebarang isu-isu untuk dibicarakan. Maka, Defendan Pertama, Ketiga dan Ketujuh tidak mempunyai hak dalam undang-undang mahupun dalam ekuiti untuk terus berada di atas Tanah-Tanah tersebut.” [25] By reason of the above analysis, it is my judgment that Order 89 is applicable against occupiers who are remaining in occupation of land after having received compensation for their lands that had been acquired under the Land Acquisition Act 1960. In other words, even though Order 89 is usually used to evict squatters, it is not restricted to only the eviction of squatters. I hold that the Applicant has rightly based its application under Order 89 of the Rules of Court 2012, which contains distinct rules applicable specifically for the eviction of unlawful occupiers of land. [26] The next issues are on whether the Applicant has complied with the requirements of Order 89, and the law applicable to weigh applications under Order 89. [27] In this case, the Applicant (should have been named as “Plaintiff”) had complied with O.89 r.3(1) in having stated in its supporting affidavit: