KLF AUTOMATE SDN. BHD. (dahulunya dikenali sebagai Hainan Long Quan Wen Chang Chicken (M) Sdn. Bhd. v WONG SEIW WAI (BA-12A-19-04/2025)

(M) Sdn. Bhd.) [No. Syarikat: 200301001211(603631-H) ...PERAYU DAN WONG SEIW WAI (No. K/P:790212-14-5754) ...RESPONDEN [Dalam Perkara Mahkamah Sesyen Di Shah Alam Dalam Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan, Malaysia Guaman Sivil No: BA-A52-59-05/2024 Antara Wong Seiw Wai (No. K/P:790212-14-5754) ...Plaintif Dan KLF Automate Sdn. Bhd. (Dahulunya Dikenali Sebagai Hainan Long Quan Wen Chang Chicken

(M) Sdn. Bhd.) (No. Syarikat: 200301001211(603631-H) …Defendan] JUDGMENT

This is an appeal by the Appellant/Defendant against the decision of Sessions Court in allowing the Respondent/Plaintiff’s application for summary judgment against the Appellant/Defendant in respect of one of the reliefs claimed, that is, liquidated damages.

The suit before the Sessions Court remains pending, as the claims for injunctive reliefs and general damages by the Respondent/Plaintiff have yet to be adjudicated. This appeal was fixed for early hearing pursuant to a Certificate of Urgency filed by the Appellant/Defendant, who has also applied for a stay of proceedings in the Sessions Court.

The principal question in this appeal is whether the Appellant/Defendant has a defence to the claim for special damages. In other words, the issue is whether there exists any triable issue or question in dispute concerning the claim for liquidated damages.

The Respondent/Plaintiff’s version of the background facts was that she had purchased a white 2011 Audi Q7 SE TFSI Quattro (Registration No. W6615E) for RM18,000.00 on 21 October, 2021, a vehicle which had previously been sold by the Appellant/Defendant to Trendy Auto Parts Sdn Bhd (“Trendy Auto Parts”).

Purportedly acting on the instructions of Trendy Auto Parts, the Respondent/Plaintiff averred that she paid RM9,000.00 directly to the Appellant/Defendant via online bank transfer, and the remaining RM9,000.00 to Trendy Auto Parts. According to the Respondent/Plaintiff, two receipts were issued to her evidencing these payments. After making full payment, the Respondent/Plaintiff was allegedly informed that the vehicle had to be sent for PUSPAKOM inspection before ownership could be transferred.

The Respondent/Plaintiff asserted that on 13 October, 2023, she agreed to sell the vehicle to one Soon Siew Kiew for RM55,900.00, with the condition that ownership transfer be completed within 30 days. However, upon enquiring with Trendy Auto Parts, the Respondent was informed that the vehicle was still under the Appellant/Defendant’s name. The Respondent/Plaintiff claimed that she contacted the Appellant/Defendant several times in October 2023 to request transfer of ownership, but despite assurances, the Appellant/Defendant failed to take the necessary steps.

The Respondent/Plaintiff pointed out that the relevant B5 inspection form for JPJ ownership transfer was valid only until 23 December, 2023.

It was the Respondent/Plaintiff’s contention that the Appellant/Defendant, having received full payment in 2021, deliberately, negligently or otherwise failed to effect transfer of ownership, resulting in loss, inconvenience and damage to the Respondent/Plaintiff.

Despite a letter of demand sent on 29 November, 2023, the Appellant/Defendant took no remedial action, leading to the initiation of the present suit on 19 February, 2024.

The pertinent background facts, as narrated by the Appellant/Defendant, are more complex than the Respondent/Plaintiff’s version.

The Appellant/Defendant highlighted the fact that it is a company engaged in the buying and selling of vehicles classified as beyond economical repair, typically accident-damaged vehicles. According to the Appellant/Defendant, the said Audi Q7 was sold not to the Respondent/Plaintiff but to Trendy Auto Parts for RM18,000.00, with payment made in two instalments by Trendy Auto Parts. An invoice was issued to Trendy Auto Parts, and the vehicle was towed from the Appellant/Defendant’s premises on 2 November, 2021. The Appellant/Defendant averred that at that material time, it had no knowledge of the Respondent/Plaintiff and had only dealt with Trendy Auto Parts representative, Wong Thiam Foo.

The Appellant/Defendant went on to state that in 2022, an individual named Chung, claiming to represent Foshun Auto Parts PLT (“Foshun”), a partnership in which the Respondent/Plaintiff is a partner, approached the Appellant/Defendant and stated that Foshun had taken over Trendy Auto Part’s business, including ownership of the Audi Q7. During a meeting involving Chung and a Trendy Auto Part employee, the Appellant/Defendant raised the issue of an outstanding debt of RM16,750.00 owed by Trendy Auto Parts for another vehicle. It was alleged that Chung had proposed that the Appellant/Defendant purchase spare parts from Foshun, and the value would be set off against the debt. Acting on this arrangement, the Appellant/Defendant averred that it ordered RM7,100.00 worth of spare parts from the Respondent/Plaintiff in 2022, pending formal confirmation that Foshun had indeed assumed Trendy Auto Parts’ obligations.

The Appellant/Defendant went on to assert that in October 2023, a person identifying herself as “Tess” from Foshun contacted the Appellant/Defendant and demanded payment of RM7,100.00 for the spare parts as well as the release of the vehicle ownership documents. The Appellant/Defendant contended that these demands contradicted the earlier arrangement with Chung and that despite attempts, Chung could no longer be reached. Tess continued to press the Appellant/Defendant’s representative with threats of police and regulatory complaints. Thereafter, a notice of demand was issued by the Respondent/Plaintiff’s solicitors seeking transfer of the Audi Q7. The Appellant/Defendant’s solicitors replied that the Appellant did not owe any duty to the Respondent/Plaintiff or Foshun and would only proceed with the transfer if confirmation or approval was obtained from Trendy Auto Parts.

The Sessions Court allowed the Respondent/Plaintiff’s claim for liquidated damages of RM56,300.00 with interest at the rate of 5% per annum on the judgment sum calculated from the date of filing of the Writ of Summons up to the date the full sum is received by the Respondent and costs of RM3,000.00.

The grounds of the said judgment have not been made available to this Court.

At the outset, it was submitted that there were numerous issues pertaining to law, procedure and facts arising in this suit which rendered it unsuitable to be disposed summarily.

The Appellant/Defendant raised numerous grounds to oppose this Order 14 application. Amongst the grounds were that the affidavit-in-support of the application for summary judgment was defective and “the reliefs sought should not be allowed in isolation”. These grounds are raised under the heading of preliminary objection.

In addition, the Appellant/Defendant also raised the arguments that the Respondent/Plaintiff “has failed to plead a clear cause of action” and that the Appellant/Defendant “has a meritorious defence which raises issues to be tried”.

Chief amongst the arguments raised by the Respondent/Plaintiff was that the Appellant/Defendant “has received the entire sale proceeds of the vehicle” and hence, the learned Sessions Court Judge “has made a correct decision in terms of law and facts in this legal action”.

The Respondent/Plaintiff further asserted that the involvement of third parties was irrelevant for purposes of the present suit.

The Respondent/Plaintiff then went on to cite the case of Paya Terubong Estates Sdn Bhd v Pusaka Warisan Sdn Bhd [1998] 3 AMR 2356; [1998] 2 CLJ 909; [1998] 2 MLJ 463; [1998] 1 MLRA 228 for the proposition that an appellate court should be reluctant “to disturb the primary exercise of discretion” by the Sessions Court and that “a court of appeal in a matter such as the present does not possess an original discretion, its initial function being one of review only”.

In addition, the Respondent/Plaintiff also relied on the case of Ahmad Nizar Safian v Malayan Banking Berhad [2024] AMEJ 2014; [2024] CLJU 1941; [2024] MLJU 2264 for the proposition that an appellate court should not lightly interfere with the findings made by the Sessions Court unless it could be shown that the decision was one that no reasonable judge could have reached”. The Decision of this Court

This Court is mindful of the legal framework and applicable principles governing an appeal of this nature, particularly those arising from summary judgment proceedings under Order 14 of the Rules of Court 2012.

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In exercising its appellate jurisdiction, this Court has undertaken a fresh and independent consideration of the matter.

Both parties were afforded a full opportunity to be heard. This has enabled the Court to address any errors, omissions or oversights that may have arisen in the Sessions Court’s decision.

The present appeal relates to the award of liquidated damages of RM56,300 by the Sessions Court by way of Summary Judgment to the Respondent/Plaintiff. As noted, this claim for special damages is only one of a number of reliefs/prayers sought by the Respondent/Plaintiff.

The Appellant/Defendant raised 4 main grounds. 3 of these grounds may be considered under the heading of Preliminary or Procedural Objection and the remaining ground concerned the merits of the summary judgment application.

The first of the various contentions was that there was non-compliance with Form 13 – in particular paragraphs 1 and 2 of Form 13 of the Rules of Court 2012. The Appellant/Defendant relied on Chai Cheon Kam v Hua Joo Development Co Sdn Bhd [1989] 4 MLRH, Tan Tik Sing v Gomez Development Co Sdn Bhd [1978] CLJU 201 and a 2016 Sessions Court decision which is of no binding nor persuasive influence over this Court.

Reliance on these cases are misconceived as these cases represent the old approach. The non-compliance with Form 13 is not fatal.

The second ground raised by the Appellant/Defendant was that the relief sought should not be allowed in isolation.

Order 14 rule 1(1) of the Rules of Court 2012 permits summary judgment to be entered to a particular part of such a claim. Therefore, this Court regards this preliminary objection as without merit.

The third ground advanced by the Appellant/Defendant was that there was a failure to plead a clear cause of action. Indeed, the pleadings in the Statement of Claim were not by any measure one that could be regarded as exemplary. However, it could not be said to be fatal as there was reference to “hutang” and sufficient facts that have been pleaded. On this ground, the objection is again rejected.

This brings us to the fourth ground raised by the Appellant/Defendant, that is, the existence of issues to be tried.

The Appellant/Defendant raised a number of arguments which it regarded as amounting to triable issues. This Court finds that references to the involvement of third parties were mere red herrings that have no bearing on this claim. Be that as it may, this Court agrees that the award of the special damages by way of the summary procedure ought to be set aside for it to be proven and ventilated at trial.

This Court would like to emphasize that while the grounds raised by the Appellant/Defendant’s allegations may ultimately fail under the scrutiny of trial, the award of special damages should not be allowed through the summary judgment procedure under Order 14.

Should the Respondent/Plaintiff ultimately succeed after trial on this claim for special damages (together with the other reliefs), she may be adequately compensated by way of costs.

The decision of the Sessions Court is set aside. This appeal is allowed with costs of RM5,000

This case is remitted to be heard in another (Sessions) Court. Dated: 8 August, 2025 sgd (CHOONG YEOW CHOY) JUDGE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA SHAH ALAM, SELANGOR Counsel: For the Appellant : Harmesh Singh a/l Awthar Singh (Messrs Darshan Chong & Co.) For the Respondent : Tiew Way Keng (Messrs Tiew & Associates)