Knight Capital Sdn Bhd v Raub Resources Sdn. Bhd. (CB-24FC-32-04/2024)

Pada 21.02.2020 Knight Capital Sdn Bhd/Plaintif telah mengemukakan satu surat tawaran pinjaman kepada Raub Resources Sdn Bhd/Defendan. Perjanjian pinjaman wang (pinjaman bercagar adalah bertarikh 26.02.2022). Jumlah pinjaman adalah sebanyak RM 600,000.00 pada kadar faedah 12 % dan jumlah pembayaran ansurans sebanyak RM 18,000.00.

Surat tawaran pinjaman tersebut telah dijamin oleh dua orang penjamin. Di samping itu terdapat juga satu surat akuan bertarikh 13.06.2022 yang ditandatangani oleh Raub Resources Sdn Bhd yang membenarkan Plaintif untuk memasukkan kaveat pemegang lien ke 3 atas hartanah Defendan di Nombor Hakmilik PM 1360, No. Lot 19540 Mukim Gali, Daerah Raub, Negeri Pahang. Defendan telah menyerahkan kepada Plaintif dokumen asal hakmilik hartanah tersebut.

Plaintif berdasarkan kepada surat akuan tersebut telah memasukkan kaveat pemegang lien ke atas hartanah tersebut dan mendaftarkannya di Pejabat Tanah dan Galian Raub pada 27.02.2020 dengan Nombor Perserahan 167/2020.

Plaintif telah memperolehi suatu penghakiman ingkar kehadiran ke atas Defendan dan penjamin-penjamin pada 12.07.2023 untuk hutang sejumlah RM 677,212.62 setakat 02.02.2023 dan faedah pada kadar 12 % seperti yang dinyatakan dalam penghakiman ingkar tersebut.

Dalam affidavit sokongan permohonan untuk perintah jualan hartanah tersebut telah dinyatakan bahawa jumlah hutang setakat 16.04.2024 adalah sebanyak RM 813,007.86. Juga dinyatakan bahawa faedah 12 % ke atas jumlah RM 558,199.20 dan kos sebanyak RM 1,536.00 serta faedah pada kadar 8 % setahun ke atas RM 558,199.20 dari tarikh 03.02.2023 hingga tarikh penyelesaian penuh.

Berdasarkan kepada saman pemula dan affidavit sokongan adalah didapati bahawa Plaintif ingin mendapatkan perintah jumlah terhadap hartanah tersebut berdasarkan kepada surat akuan dan kaveat lien yang telah didaftarkan oleh pihak Plaintif.

Sebaliknya Defendan menyatakan bahawa perintah lelongan hartanah ini tidak wajar dibenarkan oleh Mahkamah. Ia disebabkan permohonan ini adalah cacat dan tidak mematuhi Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah (KKM) 2012. Ini dinyatakan di perenggan 7 affidavit Andrew Kam Tai Yeow bertarikh 31.05.2024.

Selain daripada itu Defendan juga menyatakan dalam affidavitnya bahawa hakmilik hartanah yang dieksibitkan di KJ-3 menunjukkan bahawa lien tersebut didaftarkan pada 27.02.2020 sedangkan surat akuan yang dieksibitkan di KJ-2 adalah bertarikh 10.06.2022.

Defendan di dalam hujahan bertulisnya pula menyatakan bahawa perintah pelelongan tidak wajar diberikan dalam kes ini disebabkan Plaintif tidak mengemukakan Notis 16D Kanun Tanah Negara (KTN) sebelum memulakan prosiding pelelongan ini. Sebaliknya pihak Plaintif menyatakan bahawa seksyen 289 (1) dan (3) KTN adalah terpakai. Ia membawa maksud prosiding ini boleh diteruskan di bawah Aturan 83 KKM 2012. Di samping itu Defendan juga menyatakan bahawa terdapatnya kesilapan di dalam intitulmen dalam saman pemula yang difailkan oleh pihak Plaintif. Oleh itu dokumen-dokumen yang difailkan oleh Plaintif adalah tidak teratur dan wajar permohonan ini ditolak dari awal lagi.

Berdasarkan kepada affidavit-affidavit yang difailkan oleh pihak-pihak dalam kes ini adalah jelas bahawa tindakan Plaintif adalah 5 berdasarkan kepada seksyen 256 KTN. Adalah wajar untuk Mahkamah memahami hakikat sebenar satu permohonan pelelongan hartanah yang telah dinyatakan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Kandiah Peter Kandiah v. Public Bank Bhd. [1993] 4 CLJ 332 seperti yang berikut: “The law: The principles governing the matter are well settled by authority and are not open to question. A chargee who makes an application for an order for sale in foreclosure proceedings under s. 256 of the Code does not commence an action. He merely enforces his rights as a chargee by exercising his statutory remedy against the chargor in default. The chargee, therefore, does not sue for a debt. It is also clear that his claim for an order for sale is not based upon a convenant but under the registered charge. The order for sale when made under s. 256 of the Code is not a judgment or a decree. The Court hearing the application for foreclosure does not make, and in any event ought not to make, any adjudication upon any substantive issue.”

Apa yang jelas di bawah seksyen 256 (3) KTN terdapat peruntukan seperti yang berikut: “256 Application to Court for order for sale

This section applies to land held under-

Registry title;

the form of qualified title corresponding to Registry title; or

subsidiary title, and to the whole of any divided share in, or any lease of, any such land.

Any application for an order for sale under this Chapter by a chargee of any such land or lease shall be made to the Court in accordance with the provisions in that behalf of any law for the time being in force relating to civil procedure.

On any such application, the Court shall order the sale of the land or lease to which the charge relates unless it is satisfied of the existence of cause to the contrary.” [12] Ia telah diberikan pentafsiran di dalam kes Murugappa Chettiar v Letchumanan Chettiar [1939] 1 MLJ 296 seperti yang berikut: “I agree that equitable principles should not be invoked too freely for the purpose of construing our Land Code, but surely a Chargor, who shows that there would be no need to sell his land if the chargee paid up in full what is due from himself in another capacity, has shown good and sufficient cause why the land should not be sold. Section 149 of the Land Code obviously contemplates that there may be cases in which charged land should not be sold, even though there has been a default in payment of the principal sum or interest thereon secured by the charge; and it seems to me that a chargor may “shew cause” either in law or equity against an application for an order for sale, and that the Courts should refuse to make an order in every case where it would be unjust to do so. By “unjust” I mean contrary to those rules of the common law and equity which are in force in the Federated Malay States.” [13] Adalah tidak lengkap perbincangan tentang peruntukan seksyen 256 KTN ini tanpa merujuk keputusan Mahkamah Agong dalam kes Low Lee Lian v. Ban Hin Lee Bank Bhd. [1997] 2 CLJ 36 yang menjelaskan pendekatan yang perlu diambil dalam memutuskan permohonan di bawah seksyen 256 KTN tersebut semasa menentukan sama ada terdapat kausa sebaliknya (cause to the contrary) di bawah seksyen 256 (3) KTN seperti yang berikut: “In our judgment, cause to the contrary within s. 256(3) may be established only in three categories of cases. First, it may be taken as settled that a chargor who is able to bring his case within any of the exceptions to the indefeasibility doctrine housed in section 340 of the Code establishes cause to the contrary. That section provides as follows:

(1) The title or interest of any person or body for the time being registered as proprietor of any land, or in whose name any lease, charge or easement is for the time being registered, shall, subject to the following provisions of this section be indefeasible.

The title or interest of any such person or body shall not be indefeasible

in any case of fraud or misrepresentation to which the person or body, or any agent of the person or body, was a party or privy; or

where registration was obtained by forgery, or by means of an insufficient or void instrument; or

where the title or interest was unlawfully acquired by the person or body in the purported exercise of any power or authority conferred by any written law.

Where the title or interest of any person or body is defeasible by reason of any of the circumstances specified in sub-section (2)

it shall be liable to be set aside in the hands of any person or body to whom it may subsequently be transferred; and

any interest subsequently granted thereout shall be liable to be set aside in the hands of any person or body in whom it is for the time being vested: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall affect any title or interest acquired by any purchaser in good faith and for valuable consideration, or by any person or body claiming through or under such a purchaser.

Nothing in this section shall prejudice or prevent

the exercise in respect of any land or interest of any power of forfeiture or sale conferred by this Act or any other written law for the time being in force, or any power of avoidance conferred by any such law; or

the determination of any title or interest by operation of law. In other words, a chargor who is able to demonstrate that the charge, the enforcement of which is sought, is defeasible upon one or more of the grounds specified under subsections (2) and

(4)(b) above will be held to have established cause to the contrary under s. 256(3). The decision of Smith J in Subchent Kaur V. Chai Sau Kian [1957] CLJU 81; [1957] 1 LNS 81, of the former Federal Court in Phuman Singh V. Kho Kwang Choon [1965] CLJU 132; [1965] 1 LNS 132, of Raja Azlan Shah J (as he then was) in Overseas Union Finance Ltd. V. Lim Joo Chong [1971] CLJU 101; [1971] 1 LNS 101and that of Edgar Joseph Jr. J. (as he then was) in United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd. v. Syarikat Perumahan Luas Sdn. Bhd. [1988] 3 MLJ 352 (affirmed on appeal) sufficiently illustrate the proposition now under discussion. Secondly, a chargor may show cause to the contrary within s. 256(3) of the Code by demonstrating that the chargee has failed to meet the conditions precedent for the making of an application for an order for sale. For example, failure on the part of the chargee to prove the making of a demand or service upon the chargor of a notice in Form 16D would constitute cause to the contrary. So too, where the notice demands sums not lawfully due from the chargee. See, Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. v. Meng Kuang Properties Bhd. [1991] 2 CLJ 1144; [1991] 2 MLJ 283. However, in such a case, it would be open to the chargee to subsequently serve a notice or a proper notice (as the case may be) before commencing proceedings afresh as the cause shown to the contrary does not in substance affect the chargee's right to apply for an order for sale. Thirdly, a chargor may defeat an application for an order for sale by demonstrating that its grant would be contrary to some rule of law or equity. This principle finds its origins in the judgment of Aitken J. in Murugappa Chettiar V. Letchumanan Chettiar [1938] CLJU 42; [1938] 1 LNS 42 where he said: I agree that equitable principles should not be invoked too freely for the purpose of construing our Land Code, but surely a Chargor, who shows that there would be no need to sell his land if the chargee has been paid up in full what is due from himself in another capacity, has shown good and sufficient cause why the land should not be sold. Section 149 of the Land Code obviously contemplates that there may be cases in which charged land should not be sold, even though there has been a default in payment of the principal sum or interest thereon secured by the charge; and it seems to me that a chargor may 'shew cause' either in law or equity against an application for an order for sale, and that the Courts should refuse to make an order in every case where it would be unjust to do so. By 'unjust' I mean contrary to those rules of the common law and equity which are in force in the Federated Malay States.” [14] Mahkamah Agong juga menyatakan pendekatan yang ketat dalam mentafsirkan sekyen 256 (3) KTN dan nasihat yang penting diberikan perhatian berkenaan dengan tafsiran seksyen 256 (3) KTN tersebut seperti yang berikut: “We are conscious that the approach we have adopted results in a very narrow and restrictive interpretation of s. 256(3) of the Code. But there are good reasons of policy for such an interpretation. It must not be forgotten that in the ordinary way, banks and other financial institutions loan moneys deposited with them by their customers to a borrower on the faith of the security of a charge created over the landed property of the borrower, or as here, of a third party. In the event of a default by the borrower, the lending institution normally looks to early recovery of all or a substantial part of the money due to them from a sale of the security. If the Courts of this country interpret the phrase "cause to the contrary" appearing in s. 256(3) of the Code liberally, then, institutional lenders would lose confidence in their right to realise their security through an order for sale. Financial institutions would then become reluctant to lend money to bona fide entrepreneurs. Commerce would come to a standstill and the development of land and industries in this country which are largely dependent upon loans from banks would cease. No judgment of this Court will be designed to produce such a consequence. A Judge hearing an application under s. 256 must bear in mind that the procedure under the section is meant to be speedy and summary in nature. He is first concerned with whether the chargee has given the appropriate statutory notices as stipulated in the Code. Next, he must ensure that the procedural requirements prescribed by O. 83 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 have been complied with. Next, he is concerned with the very narrow question whether the material produced before him by the chargor constitutes cause to the contrary. In this last respect, if he is satisfied, on a careful and an objective assessment of the factual material made available to him, that the chargor has shown cause to the contrary in the sense we have discussed earlier in this judgment, he will refuse an order for sale. On the other hand, if he finds as a matter of law that the allegations raised by the chargor do not constitute cause to the contrary he will merely say so, giving his reasons, and grant the chargee's application. On no account should he express any view on the merits of any or all of the points taken by the chargor, save to say whether, having regard to the three narrow categories we have laid down in this judgment and the relevant authorit ies upon each category, cause to the contrary has been established to his satisfaction. This is because, for reasons which will appear in a moment, any view expressed by a Judge on the general merits of the points taken by the charg or will be purely academic. Although each case turns upon its own facts, we propose to consider, by way of illustration only, the usual kind of case with which this Court has been faced on numerous occasions. An application under s. 256 is opposed by the chargor on the ground that the chargee has acted in breach of contract, eg., by not releasing moneys due under the loan agreement or by increasing the rate of interest without proper notice or by not giving any proper account of the sums paid by the borrower. A Judge faced with such complaints will merely say that they do not, on a proper reading of s. 256(3) and the authorities which have considered the section, constitute cause to the contrary. He will not, and ought not to, enter upon a discussion of the question whether any or all of these complaints have or are devoid of any merit. Much confusion and difficulty has been occasioned in this area of the law by a failure on the part of those concerned with the task of dealing with applications under s. 256 to properly appreciate their true role assigned them by Parliament. We have said that s. 256(3) must be read narrowly. It does not, however, follow from this that the chargor who is unable to satisfy the Court of cause to the contrary is left without any remedy whatsoever. Allegations that fail to amount to cause to the contrary may, as observed earlier, nevertheless form the basis of an action in personam against the chargee.” [15] Mahkamah ini juga perlu melihat sama ada terdapatnya gadaian lien yang dilakukan oleh Plaintif ke atas hartanah yang dikatakan hakmiliknya diberikan oleh Defendan kepada Plaintif bagi mendapatkan sejumlah pinjaman yang dinyatakan dalam affidavit pihak-pihak. Pewujudan dan kesan lien dinyatakan di bawah seksyen 281 KTN seperti yang berikut: “281 Creation and effect, of liens

Any proprietor or lessee for the time being may deposit with any other person or body, as security, his issue document of title or, as the case may be, duplicate lease; and that person or body-

may thereupon apply under Chapter 1 of Part Nineteen for the entry of a lien-holder's caveat; and

shall, upon the entry of such a caveat, become entitled to a lien over the land or lease.

Where the holder of any lien has obtained judgment for the amount due to him thereunder, he shall be entitled to apply to the Court for, and obtain forthwith, an order for the sale of the land or lease.

Any such application shall be made in accordance with any law for the time being in force relating to civil procedure; and the provisions of sections 257 to 259 and section 266 to 269 shall apply, mutatis mutandis, where any such application has been made as they apply where a chargee applies for an order under section 256.

A lien-holder shall, on the written request of the proprietor or lessee, and within such reasonable period as is specified in the request, produce the issue document of title or duplicate lease at any Registry or Land Office so specified for any purpose for which it is required under any provision of this Act.

The costs properly incurred by any lien-holder in complying with any such request shall be payable by the proprietor or lessee on demand.

The provisions of sub-sections (2) to (5) shall apply to all liens, whether created before or after the commencement of this Act.” [16] Hakikat lien di bawah Kanun Tanah Negara telah dijelaskan dengan menarik dalam Tenure and Land Dealings in the Malay States di halaman 191 oleh David S.Y. Wong seperti yang berikut: “While the statutory lien should be conceived of as a kind of security on land, it is important to realise at the same time that it is sui generis. It should by no means be identified with any superficially similar species of security under English law. As will be discussed, this statutory lien should not, on the one hand, merely by reason of it being called a “lien”, be narrowly likened or even related to a “possessory lien” over title deed under English law. On the other hand, it should also not be freely equated to equitable mortgages in English law simply because it involves deposit of title documents for the purpose of providing security for loan.” [17] Hubung kait di antara kaveat lien dengan keesahan lien telah dinyatakan seterusnya oleh David S.Y. Wong di halaman 195 seperti yang berikut: “The statutory lien is therefore no longer capable of being created by deposit of title documents alone. The statutory provisions as well as judicial decisions are clear on this point. Its creation consists in the formality of an entry of a caveat in the register. In other words, the means of its protection under the registration system is also made its mode of creation. It is then important to distinguish this from registration. A lien is nonetheless a non-registered interest though it becomes protected as against registered interests as soon as it is created. The entry of the caveat itself does not warrant the validity of the lien. It seems unquestionable that its validity is dependent on the satisfaction of the prerequisite as to the deposit of title documents as security for loan. On the other hand, as the entry of the caveat is the very manner for effecting a valid lien, it is, as a statutory form of dealing, distinguishable from the lodgement of an ordinary caveat in other cases for the purpose of protecting claims to land. Under the National Land Code, a caveat for creating as well as protecting a lien is now specifically called a lien-holder's caveat.” [18] Apabila mana-mana salinan hakmilik tanah atau salinan sewa telah didepositkan sebagai jaminan (security) di bawah seksyen 281 KTN maka kaveat pemilik lien boleh dipohon kepada Pendaftar Tanah seperti yang dinyatakan di bawah seksyen 330 KTN dengan menggunakan Borang 19D. Seksyen 330 KTN menyatakan seperti yang berikut: “330 Creation and effect of lien-holders’ caveats

Any person or body with whom the issue document of title to any land, or any duplicate lease, has been deposited as security may, as provided in section 281, apply to the Registrar under this section for the entry of a lien-holder's caveat in respect of the land or lease in question.

Any such application shall be in Form 19D, duly attested in accordance with the provisions of section 211 notwithstanding that the provisions dealt with dealings in alienated land, and shall be accompanied by the prescribed fee, and the issue document of title or, as the case may be, duplicate lease.

The Registrar shall note on any such application the time at which it was received (being, in the case of any application sent by post, the time at which it was withdrawn from its cover in the Registry or, as the case may be, Land Office) and, unless he is prohibited from doing so by any Registrar's caveat, private caveat, trust caveat or prohibitory order, shall as soon as may be thereafter-

enter the caveat applied for on the register document of title to the land in respect of which, or a lease of which, it is to have effect; and

serve a notification in Form 19A on the proprietor of that land or, as the case may be, the person or body for the time being entitled to the benefit of the lease in question.

The entry of a lien-holder's caveat on any register document shall be effected by the endorsement thereon, under the hand and seal of the Registrar, of the words "Caveat (Lien)", together with a statement specifying-

whether the caveat binds the land itself, or a lease thereof only;

the person or body on whose application it was entered;

the time from which it is effective (being the time of receipt of the application, as noted thereon pursuant to sub-section

(3)); and

the reference under which the application is filed.

A lien-holder's caveat shall, so long as it continues in force, have the like effect as that specified in sub-section (2) to (5) of section 322 in relation to private caveats, but as if the references in the said sub-section (5) to the person or body at whose instance the caveat was entered were references to the person or body for the time being entitled to the benefit of the lien; and sub-sections

and (7) of the said section 322 shall also apply in relation to lien-holder's caveats as they apply in relation to private ones.” [19] Selain daripada itu penelitian kepada seksyen 281 (3) KTN memperuntukkan bahawa apabila telah wujud lien tersebut maka permohonan boleh dibuat di bawah seksyen 257 KTN dan permohonan untuk pelelongan boleh dibuat dan seksyen 256 adalah terpakai seperti yang berikut: “(3) Any such application shall be made in accordance with any law for the time being in force relating to civil procedure; and the provisions of sections 257 to 259 and section 266 to 269 shall apply, mutatis mutandis, where any such application has been made as they apply where a chargee applies for an order under section 256.” [20] Mahkamah ini meneliti affidavit sokongan Kiranjit Kaur yang telah mengemukakan dalam eksibitnya Borang 19D di eksibit KJ-4. Di samping itu dalam perjanjian bertarikh 26.02.2020 seperti yang tercatat di Jadual Pertama Perjanjian Pinjaman Wang di bawah Jadual K Peraturan-Peraturan Peminjam Wang 2003 telah dinyatakan seperti yang berikut: Particulars of the Security Lien Holder Caveat over an agricultural land held under Pajakan Mukim No Hakmilik 1360 Lot No 19540 Tempat Bukit Kajang Mukim Gali Daerah Raub Negeri Pahang [21] Hartanah tersebut adalah sama dengan eksibit KJ-3 iaitu No. Hakmilik 1360 Tempat Bukit Kajang Mukim Gali, Daerah Raub, Negeri Pahang. Ia juga adalah sama dengan permohonan untuk kaveat pemegang lien dieksibit KJ-4. Mahkamah ini berpuas hati bahawa hakmilik hartanah tersebut telah diserahkan kepada Plaintif untuk tujuan jaminan bagi pinjaman tersebut. Ini dapat disahkan dengan kewujudan Borang 19D sebagai kaveat pemegang lien. Adalah tidak dapat dinafikan bahawa perkara tersebut boleh berlaku dan diiktiraf seperti yang dinyatakan dalam kes Life Paradise Sdn Bhd v. Export-Import Bank Of Malaysia Bhd & Anor And Another Appeal [2022] 2 CLJ 745 seperti yang berikut: “[23] To recapitulate, s. 10 says that no lien can be created and no caveat to support it can be entered in respect of Malay holding. It is true that although s. 17 exempts creation of lien by entities listed in the Second Schedule, it does not specifically mention exemption for a lienholder's caveat. However, in our view that does not mean that the entry of lienholder's caveat to support a lien as done in this case by the respondent is unlawful. Section 10 and 17 should be read together with the relevant provisions of the NLC relating to the creation of a lien. Otherwise, the intention of the Legislature in permitting the creation of lien by specified entities over Malay holding would be frustrated. A statutory lien is created only upon the entry of a lienholder's caveat under s. 281(1)(b) of the NLC. And s. 330(1) of the NLC as we noted earlier entitles a person with whom a title is deposited for security to apply to enter a lienholder's caveat under s. 281. It follows that since s. 17 permits creation of a statutory lien by the entities listed under Second Schedule, the entry of a lienholder's caveat to create the said lien is also not barred. The exemption provided in s. 17 would be completely unworkable if the prohibition against the entry of a lien holder's caveat in s. 10 is read independently. In our view, the prohibition in s. 10 against the entry of a caveat is only ancillary to the prohibition against the creation of a lien which is the primary object of the exemption. It is not a separate prohibition. For the above reasons, we find no merit in the argument that s. 17 does not apply to a lien holder's caveat. A lien holder's caveat is part and parcel of a statutory lien under the NLC.” [22] Adalah tidak dapat dinafikan dalam kes Life Paradise Sdn Bhd (supra) di atas ia diputuskan berkaitan dengan tanah simpanan rezab melayu. Namun ia mengesahkan tentang kewujudannya lien apabila terdapatnya pendaftaran kaveat lien tersebut. [23] Ini bermakna setelah meneliti dokumen-dokumen perjanjian permohonan pemegang lien adalah jelas dan nyata bahawa tanah No. Hakmilik 1360 No. 19540 Tempat Bukit Kajang Mukim Gali, Daerah Raub, Negeri Pahang adalah merupakan harta yang dijadikan sebagai jaminan untuk pinjaman tersebut. Ini bermakna sekiranya terdapat perlanggaran perjanjian maka Plaintif boleh menguatkuasakan haknya untuk memohon perintah pelelongan. Ini dinyatakan di perenggan 4 perjanjian pinjaman wang di bawah Jadual 3 Akta Pemberi Pinjam Wang 1951 seperti yang berikut: “(4) Notwithstanding sub clause (3) herein, the Lender shall be entitled to deal with the Security for the purpose of claiming the balance outstanding from the Borrower as follows:

where the Security is an immovable property, the property shall be dealt with as provided for under Order 83 of the Rules of the High Court 1980; or

where the Security is a movable property, the Lender shall be at liberty to dispose of the security by auction to be conducted by a licensed auctioneer.” [24] Oleh yang demikian Mahkamah ini berpendapat bahawa wujud harta yang menjadi jaminan bagi perjanjian tersebut. Begitu juga berlakunya kemungkiran pihak Defendan bagi melunaskan hutang tersebut, terdapat penghakiman Mahkamah untuk jumlah yang dinyatakan dalam penghakiman tersebut. Mahkamah juga berpendapat ketiadaan Borang 16D seperti yang lazimnya berlaku bagi pelelongan hartanah yang melihatkan harta gadaian di bawah seksyen 242 KTN dibaca bersama-sama dengan Borang 16A dan 16B adalah berbeza bagi kes ini disebabkan ia melibatkan lien dan Borang 19D telah digunakan sebagai rujukan bagi pemilik lien tersebut. [25] Mahkamah juga meneliti peruntukan di bawah seksyen 281 (2) KTN yang memperuntukkan seperti berikut: “(2) Where the holder of any lien has obtained judgment for the amount due to him thereunder, he shall be entitled to apply to the Court for, and obtain forthwith, an order for the sale of the land or lease.” [26] Mahkamah Sesyen Kuala Lumpur melalui guaman nombor WA-B52NCC-251-03/2023 telah memasukkan penghakiman ingkar kehadiran terhadap Defendan Pertama, Defendan Kedua dan Defendan Ketiga pada 12.07.2023 bagi jumlah RM 677,212.62 setakat 02.02.2023. Faedah ingkar sebanyak 12 % setahun ke atas RM 558,199.20 dikira pada dasar harian dari 03.02.2023 hingga tarikh penyelesaian. Faedah ingkar sebanyak 8 % setahun ke atas RM 558,199.20 dikira pada dasar harian mulai 03.02.2023 hingga tarikh penyelesaian dan kos. [27] Pada hemat Mahkamah penghakiman yang dimasukkan tersebut menjadi asas kepada pihak Plaintif bagi mengemukakan permohonan untuk pelelongan hartanah tersebut selaras dengan seksyen 281 (2) KTN. Ini bermakna telah digunakan oleh pemegang lien untuk memfailkan kaveat. [28] Persoalannya dalam kes ini ialah adakah pihak Defendan telah dapat menunjukkan terdapat kausa bertentangan bagi menghalang perintah diberikan di bawah seksyen 256 KTN. Adakah tiga keadaan seperti yang terdapat dalam kes Low Lee Lian (supra) terdapat dalam kes ini bagi menghalang perintah jualan diberikan. Ini adalah persoalan utama dalam kes ini. Mahkamah mendapati tiada sebarang kausa bertentangan ditunjukkan bagi menghalang perintah jualan diberikan. [29] Sebagai pelengkap selain daripada itu Mahkamah juga perlu berhati-hati dalam kes ini disebabkan ia adalah satu perjanjian pinjaman persahabatan dan dipersetujui bayaran faedah pinjaman tersebut. Penelitian kepada dokumen juga menunjukkan bahawa ia dibuat di bawah Akta Pemberi Pinjam Wang 1951. Ini berikutan dengan keputusan berkaitan dengan pandangan Mahkamah Persekutuan berkenaan dengan perjanjian pinjaman wang yang mengenakan faedah dalam kes Triple Zest Trading & Suppliers & Ors v Applied Business Technologies Sdn Bhd [2023] 6 MLJ 818 seperti yang berikut: “[39] So, by cl 1 of the loan agreement the ‘agreed profit’ of RM800,000 to be earned by the respondent was the ‘consideration’ for the RM800,000 loan. Read with cl 3, this ‘agreed profit’ of RM800,000 was in fact and as a matter of law ‘interest’ within the meaning of s 2 of the MA51, as it was a sum that was ‘in excess of the principal paid or payable to the moneylender’. [40] Therefore, when the respondent agreed to lend the RM800,000 to the appellants subject to payment of another RM800,000 as ‘agreed profit’, it was carrying on the business of ‘moneylending’ within the meaning of s 2 of the MA51 as it was ‘lending money at interest, with or without security’. [41] The ‘consideration’ of RM800,000 payable to the respondent at any time before or at the expiry of the agreement period of 30 days was nothing but ‘interest’ at the rate of 100% disguised as ‘agreed profit’. By whatsoever label it was given, the RM800,000 was ‘any amount by whatsoever name called in excess of the principal paid or payable to a moneylender’. If a rose by any other name would smell as sweet, a corpse flower by any other name would smell as foul.” [30] Adalah jelas daripada kes Triple Zest Trading & Suppliers & Ors (supra) itu pinjaman yang dibuat melalui peminjam wang yang menetapkan kadar faedah yang berlebih-lebihan telah diisytiharkan sebagai perjanjian yang tidak sah dan tidak boleh dikuatkuasakan. Dalam hal ini Mahkamah perlu melihat kepada peruntukan di bawah Akta Pemberi Pinjam Wang 1951 terutamanya seksyen 17A yang memperuntukkan seperti yang berikut: “17A Interest for secured and unsecured loans

For the purposes of this Act, the interest for a secured loan shall not exceed twelve per centum per annum and the interest for an unsecured loan shall not exceed eighteen per centum per annum.

Notwithstanding subsection (1), interest shall not at any time be recoverable by a licensee of an amount in excess of the sum then due as principal unless a Court, having regard to all the circumstances, otherwise decrees.

Where in a moneylending agreement the interest charged for a secured loan or an unsecured loan, as the case may be, is more than that specified in subsection (1), that agreement shall be void and have no effect and shall not be enforceable.

Any licensee who contravenes this section shall be guilty of an offence under this Act and shall be liable to a fine not exceeding twenty thousand ringgit or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding eighteen months or to both.” [31] Di dalam perjanjian kes ini ialah kadar faedah ialah 12 %. Ia tidak bercanggah dengan peruntukan Akta Pemberi Pinjam Wang 1951. Malahan ia tidak sepatutnya menjadi isu dalam kes ini disebabkan apa yang lebih penting ialah untuk menentukan sama ada perintah jualan boleh diberikan terhadap Defendan sekiranya tiada keadaan bertentangan yang boleh ditunjukkan oleh Defendan dalam kes ini. [32] Pada masa yang sama Mahkamah juga perlu mempertimbangkan hujahan yang dikemukakan oleh Defendan bahawa terdapat kesilapan dalam intitulmen sehingga menyebabkan permohonan ini tidak teratur dan wajar dibatalkan oleh Mahkamah ini. Hal ini dinyatakan dalam affidavit jawapan Defendan di perenggan 10 affidavit tersebut apabila dinyatakan bahawa kandungan 1 adalah difailkan di bawah kod kes yang salah disebabkan permohonan ini bukan perkara berkenaan dengan gadaian ke atas tanah tetapi sebaliknya lien yang dibuat ke atas tanah. Mahkamah perlu melihat sama ada kekhilafan atau kecatatan tersebut memprejudiskan pihak Defendan. Dalam kes ini Mahkamah berpendapat kesilapan tersebut tidak mengubah keadaan bahawa affidavit-affidavit yang difailkan oleh pihak Defendan dan Plaintif adalah merujuk kepada fakta berkenaan dengan lien. Kesilapan dalam penetapan kod kes pada hemat Mahkamah tidak sekali-kali menjejaskan pendengaran kes ini. Malahan ia tidak menimbulkan apa- apa prejudis kepada pihak Defendan atau Plaintif. Ia juga tidak mengelirukan Mahkamah dalam memutuskan kes ini. Perintah Akhir [33] Berdasarkan kepada penganalisaan di atas, affidavit-affidavit yang difailkan serta prinsip undang-undang yang berkaitan Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa perintah jualan yang dipohon oleh Plaintif adalah dibenarkan. Bertarikh: 19 hb. Februari 2025 (ROSLAN BIN MAT NOR) HAKIM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA TEMERLOH, PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR PIHAK-PIHAK: Bagi Pihak Plaintif Kamarul Akmal Kamarulzaman Tetuan Rajes Hisham Rahim & Gopal Kuala Lumpur Bagi Pihak Defendan Muhillan Sivananthan Tetuan Muhillan Chan & Gomez Kuala Lumpur