KOAY KIM HOE (menuntut sebagai nominee SOMPO INSURANCE SINGAPORE PTE LTD dan untuk diri sendiri) v WONG CHENG NUN (Passport No. F8357492P, seorang warganegara Malaysia yang beralamat di Malaysia) (JA-22NCvC-60-05/2023)

The Plaintiff commenced this action in the High Court of Malaya at Johor Bahru, seeking damages against the Defendant arising from a road traffic accident which occurred on 03.04.2020 at Pan Island Expressway (PIE) Singapore.

After reading the pleadings and the written submissions of Plaintiff, I dismissed the Plaintiff’s claim without costs.

Below are my grounds of the decision. 07/01/2026 18:51:24 JA-22NCvC-60-05/2023 Kand. 29

The background facts in this case are gathered from the cause papers filed by the parties.

The material facts are largely undisputed.

The Plaintiff is a Singaporean and the Plaintiff’s motor vehicle bearing registration number SLB 9886 Z was insured by Sompo Insurance Singapore Pte Ltd at the material time.

The Defendant is a Malaysian citizen and residing in Perak, Malaysia. The Defendant’s motor vehicle bearing registration number JRS 9821 was insured by Takaful Ikhlas General Berhad.

The accident occurred along the PIE, Singapore on 03.04.2020, involving three (3) vehicles in a chain collision.

Police reports were lodged with the Singapore Police Force. No personal injuries were reported. Damages was confined to the vehicles involved.

The Plaintiff is of the view that the Malaysian Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter since the Defendant is residing in Perak, Malaysia and they have submitted to the jurisdiction of this Court. The parties have reached settlement and would like to record consent judgment before this Court. However, the Plaintiff could not agree on the judgment sum being paid by the Defendant in Malaysia currency instead of Singapore currency.

The issues for determination are as follows:

whether this Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the Plaintiff’s claim arising from a road accident that occurred in

whether this Court is the appropriate forum; and

whether the Plaintiff has established entitlement to the reliefs sought. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

whether this Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the Plaintiff’s claim arising from a road accident that occured in

The jurisdiction of the High Court is governed by section 23 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 [Act 91]. Section 23 of Act 91 provides that— “(1) Subject to the limitations contained in Article 128 of the Constitution the High Court shall have jurisdiction to try all civil proceedings where—

the cause of action arose;

the defendant or one of several defendants resides or has his place of business;

the facts on which the proceedings are based exist or are alleged to have occurred; or

any land the ownership of which is disputed is situated, within the local jurisdiction of the Court and notwithstanding anything contained in this section in any case where all parties consent in writing within the local jurisdiction of the other High Court.

Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), the High Court shall have such jurisdiction as was vested in it immediately prior to Malaysia Day and such other jurisdiction as may be vested in it by any written law in force within its local jurisdiction.”. [Emphasis added]

As decided in the case of Siti Nur Aishah Bt Ishak v. Golden Plan Holdings Bhd.[2017]3 MLJ 701, the conditions under section 23 of Act 91 are to be applied disjunctively. Thus, a party who intends to commence civil proceedings in any branch of High Court may do so if the case falls within any of the conditions laid down in section 23 of Act 91.

Section 3 of Act 91 defines “local jurisdiction” as the territory comprising Johor, Kedah, Kelantan, Malacca, Negri Sembilan, Pahang, Penang, Perak, Perlis, Selangor, Terengganu and the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur and in the case of the High Court in Sabah and Sarawak, the territory covers Sabah, Sarawak and the Federal Territory of Labuan.

The Plaintiff relied primarily on the fact that the Defendant is a Malaysian citizen and residing at 60D, Tepi Laut, Jalan Teluk Batik, Teluk Muruh, 32200 Lumut, Perak. Therefore, the Plaintiff is of the view that the High Court of Malaya has jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter. In supporting the argument, the Plaintiff refers to the case of Matchplan (M) Sdn. Bhd. & Anor. v. William D Sinrich & Anor. [2004] 2 MLJ 424, Malayan Banking Berhad v. International Tin Council and another appeal [1989] 3 MLJ 286 and Malacca Securities Sdn. Bhd. v. Loke Yu [1999] 6 MLJ 112.

Based on section 23 of Act 91, the Defendant being a Malaysian citizen and residing at Lumut, Perak, it seems that Plaintiff has fulfilled the conditions of paragraph 23(1)(b) of Act 91 so to confer the jurisdiction on this Court to hear and determine the Plaintiff’s claim.

The Plaintiff also argued that although the claim is relatively small sum of approximately SGD20,000.00, they are not able to file the case in the Subordinate Courts in Singapore as they could not enforce the judgment against the Malaysian insurer, if obtained. This is because subsection 3(1) of the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act 1958 [Act 99] provides that only “judgment given in the superior courts of recognizing countries” may be registered in the High Court of Malaya.

The First Schedule of Act 99 lists Singapore as reciprocating country and superior court as defined under subsection 3(3) of Act 99 is High Court. Hence, only a Singapore High Court judgment can be registered under the Act 99 and not a judgment of the Subordinate Court in Singapore.

The Plaintiff argued that the Subordinate Courts in Malaysia has no jurisdiction to try this matter as subsection 59(2) of the Subordinate Court Act 1948 [Act 92] provides that the Session Court has “the jurisdiction to hear and determine any civil or criminal cause or matter arising within the local limits of jurisdiction assigned to it or if no such local limits have been assigned, arising from any part of Peninsular Malaysia”. Since the accident happened in Singapore, the Session Court in Malaysia does not have jurisdiction to hear and determine the Plaintiff’s claim.

I find the arguments of the Plaintiff devoid of merits. If the arguments of the Plaintiff are true, I am of the considered view that the Plaintiff is able to file the claim in the Singapore High Court like what they did in this Court. This will enable the Plaintiff to register the judgement obtained from the Singapore High Court under subsection 3(1) of Act 99 and enforced against the Defendant.

Further, I am of the considered view that the Malaysia Magistrate Court is seized with the jurisdiction to hear this claim pursuant to section 99A read together with Third Schedule of Act 92 since Defendant is residing at Perak, Malaysia. The total claim of the Plaintiff would be approximately RM64,000.00 (SGD30,000.00 x RM3.20) if converted to Malaysia currency.

On the facts of this case, I find that jurisdiction is technically available, the Court must still consider whether it is the appropriate forum to hear and determine the Plaintiff’s claim. I find that domicile alone is insufficient where the cause of action arose wholly outside Malaysia and where the connecting factors are overwhelmingly foreign. Therefore, it is pertinent for this Court to determine based on the doctrine of forum non-convenience.

whether this Court is the appropriate forum

The doctrine of forum non-convenience was evolved to confer the Court with the discretion to decline jurisdiction where the forum selected by the Plaintiff is inappropriate. This doctrine is enunciated by Lord Golf in the case of Spiliada Maritime Corp. v. Consulax Ltd. (The Spliliada) [1986] 3 All ER 843 where Lord Golf restated the law to the effect that a stay would be granted “where the court is satisfied that there is some other available forum, having competent jurisdiction, which is the appropriate forum for the trial of the action, in which the case may be tried more suitably for the interest of all the parties and the ends of justice.”

I refer to the Singapore Court of Appeal decision in the case of Rickshaw Investment Ltd. And another v. Nicholai Baron von Uexkull [2007] 1 SLR(R) 377 in deciding whether Singapore court is a natural and appropriate forum to determine the claim as held as follows: “(1) The governing principle in natural forum cases was that articulated in the seminal House of Lords decision of Spiliada Maritime Corporation v Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460 (“Spiliada”). Under Spiliada, the first issue that had to be determined was whether, prima facie, there was some other available forum which was more appropriate for the case to be tried (“Stage One”). At this stage, the burden would be on the defendant. If the court concluded that there was a more appropriate forum, the court would ordinarily grant a stay unless there were circumstances by reason of which justice required that a stay should nonetheless not be granted (“Stage Two”): at [12] and [14].

Under Stage One, the following factors were to be considered in order to determine if Singapore was the appropriate forum in the circumstances:

general connecting factors; (b) the jurisdiction in which the tort occurred;

choice of law (ie, whether the choice of law clause in the contract was exclusive, and if not, which law should be applied to the claims in tort and equity); and (d) the effect of the concurrent proceedings in Germany. It was trite law that a court, when engaging in the enquiry under Stage One, could and should attribute differing weight to each connecting factor depending on the nature of the particular dispute: at [15] and [23].

Given the likelihood of the appellants’ claims in the Singapore proceedings raising a significant number of disputed factual issues, the location of witnesses should be attributed significant weight when one assessed the appropriateness of Singapore as a forum for the dispute. Since the key witnesses were located in Singapore, this was a factor that pointed towards Singapore being the most natural forum to hear the substantive disputes. In addition, it was significant that the principal witnesses for the claims for breach of fiduciary duty and breach of confidence were clearly compellable to testify in the Singapore proceedings, whereas this was not the case in so far as the German proceedings were concerned: at [23] and [25].

The jurisdictional connections of the parties also pointed towards Singapore as the appropriate forum to hear the substantive action. The respondent was a permanent resident of Singapore and was resident in Singapore at the time the alleged tortious acts and equitable breaches took place. The second appellant had initially hired him as its agent precisely because he had represented that he had connections in Singapore. In addition, though the first appellant was incorporated in the Cayman Islands, it used a related Singapore registered company as a vehicle for its Singapore operations. Finally, the second appellant, which was a German partnership, had already transferred all its assets to the first appellant and had only been joined as a party to ensure that all parties were before the court: at [30], [31] and [34].

As a general rule, the place where a tort occurred was prima facie the natural forum for determining the claim. However, this was only the prima facie position and/or a weighty factor pointing in favour of that jurisdiction. The fact that the respondent’s alleged torts were committed in Singapore pointed towards Singapore as being the natural forum to hear the dispute. However, that was only one of the factors to be taken into account in the overall analysis, albeit a significant one: at [37] and [40]…”. [Emphasis added]

The Singapore Court of Appeal further explained in pages 392 to 394 whether the Singapore court is a natural and most appropriate forum to try the case based on torts committed in Singapore in pages 392 to 394 that— “Whether the natural and most appropriate forum is that in which the tort occurred [35] At the trial below, the appellants relied on the case of Cordoba Shipping Co Ltd v National State Bank, Elizabeth, New Jersey (The Albaforth) [1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 91 (“Albaforth”), which states that the place where a tort occurred is prima facie the natural forum for determining the claim. According to the appellants, the Albaforth principle illustrates the application of the more general Spiliada principles to a particular fact situation (here, where a tort has occurred within the jurisdiction). This principle was accepted by the House of Lords in Berezovsky v Michaels [2000] 1 WLR 1004 (“Berezovsky”) as well as by the English High Court in Caltex Singapore Pte Ltd v BP Shipping Ltd [1996] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 286 and The Xin Yang and An Kang Jiang [1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 217 (“The Xin Yang”), and has been applied locally by the Singapore High Court in the case of Evergreen International SA v Volkswagen Group Singapore Pte Ltd [2004] 2 SLR(R) 457. The appellants contended that all the elements of the respondent’s alleged tortious acts occurred in Singapore, and therefore that the Albaforth principle should be given its full weight. Following from this, the appellants submitted that since the tort claims should be heard in Singapore, it made sense that the claims in equity should be heard in Singapore as well, so that the claims could be heard together. [36] The respondent dealt with these arguments by submitting that the strength of the Albaforth principle depends on the facts of every case: The Forum Craftsman [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 291. The strength of the presumption in every case turns upon the likely issues in dispute: The Xin Yang. This is consistent with the approach in Spiliada of determining the best forum to decide the case in the interests of the parties and to achieve the ends of justice. In the present case, an analysis of the alleged causes of action would not be either simple or clear. At the hearing before us, the appellants made the cogent rebuttal that The Forum Craftsman was distinguishable as Ackner LJ had made it clear that the Albaforth principle did not apply to torts that were committed on moving vehicles such as ships and aeroplanes, which was not the case here. [37] In our view, a close reading of Albaforth and Berezovksy does indeed support the appellants’ contention that, as a general rule, the place where a tort occurred is prima facie the natural forum for determining the claim. Lord Steyn’s judgment in Berezovsky sought to accommodate the Albaforth principle within the traditional Spiliada formulation. His Lordship opined that while Lord Goff of Chieveley’s analysis in Spiliada sought to explore and explain the legal principles and provide guidance, it did not examine exhaustively the classes of cases that could arise in practice. The principle contained in Albaforth, on the other hand, was concerned with “practical problems at a much lower level of generality” (Berezovsky at 1014). His Lordship also suggested that there was a very fine distinction between a prima facie position, ie, considering the place where the tort occurred as the prima facie natural forum, and treating the same factor as a weighty circumstance pointing towards a particular forum. [38] The Albaforth principle was also confirmed in The Xin Yang, where Clarke J emphasised that the place where the tort occurred is of some significance as a pointer towards the natural forum, even if the parties have limited connection with that jurisdiction. Importantly, however, Clarke J’s approach suggests that the result reached by applying the Albaforth principle is only one of the factors to be considered in the Spiliada balancing exercise. [39] In our opinion, the principle articulated in Albaforth is logical and sound, and should be applied in Singapore. As Robert GoffLJ (as he then was) stated in Albaforth (at 96): [W]here it is held that a Court has jurisdiction on the basis that an alleged tort has been committed within the jurisdiction of the Court, the test which has been satisfied in order to reach that conclusion is one founded on the basis that the Court, so having jurisdiction, is the most appropriate Court to try the claim, where it is manifestly just and reasonable that the defendant should answer for his wrongdoing. This being so, it must usually be difficult in any particular case to resist the conclusion that a Court which has jurisdiction on that basis must also be the natural forum for the trial of the action. If the substance of an alleged tort is committed within a certain jurisdiction, it is not easy to imagine what other facts could displace the conclusion that the Courts of that jurisdiction are the natural forum. [40] However, we must emphasise that the result that is arrived at through the application of the Albaforth principle is only the prima facie position and/or a weighty factor pointing in favour of that jurisdiction. Applying this to the present case, the fact that the respondent’s alleged torts were committed in Singapore does point towards Singapore as being the natural forum to hear the dispute, but this is only one of the factors to be taken into account in the overall analysis, albeit a significant one…”. [Emphasis added]

I refer to the case of Mohd Syed bin Syed Jamaludin & Ors. V. MMIP Services Sdn Bhd &Ors [2023] 7 MLJ which bear striking similarities to the case at hand where the Singaporean Plaintiffs brought tort claims against the Malaysian Defendants in Kuala Lumpur High Court for road accident occurred at Malaysia’s North-South Expressway. Justice Mohd Nazlan in deciding the issue of forum has stated the following: “[51] I would be inclined to agree with the plaintiffs’ counsel that the issue of forum of convenience raised by the defendants is of no relevance at this stage given that judgments on the legal suits have been granted by the High Court of Singapore, and the same are eligible to be registered and enforced in accordance with the relevant provisions under the REJA. [52] At the risk of repetition, the defendants could have but chose not to challenge the jurisdiction of High Court of Singapore in Singapore. Further, there is also merit in the plaintiffs’ submission that the issue of forum of conveniences also not relevant to the setting aside of the ex parte order because the application is not a transfer application, which is only applicable to settle the conflict of localities within the different branches of the High Court and 98 Malayan Law Journal [2023] 7 MLJ lower courts of Malaya, having regard to among others the provisions under s 3 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 as well as s 59 of the Subordinates Courts Act 1948 where the subordinate courts have exclusive and unlimited jurisdiction to hear running down claims, and O57 of the Rules of Court 2012 on transfer of proceedings. [53] In any event although it is irrelevant now, it should still be mentioned that whilst the defendants’ place of residence and the place of the accident is undoubtedly in Malaysia, the material witnesses of this accident, other than for the defendants, are all from Singapore. All of the plaintiffs are residing in Singapore. The doctors and medical professionals treating the plaintiffs too are all from Singapore. The administrators of the deceased plaintiffs are also all from Singapore, and some of the plaintiffs have practical difficulties to travel to Johor given the serious injuries sustained from the accident. [54] In other words it certainly cannot be said that the place of business of the defendants and the place of accident must mean that the forum of convenience would be in favour of the sessions court in Muar. After all the relevant conditions are to be applied disjunctively (see Siti Nur Aishah bt Ishak v Golden Plus Holdings Bhd [2017] 3 MLJ 701; [2017] 8 CLJ 272).”. [Emphasis added]

The Plaintiff’s claim is for the damages arising from the said accident and the special damages are in Singapore currency (please refer to paragraph 6 of the Statement of Claim). The Plaintiff’s claims are supported mainly by documents originating from Singapore (please refer to the Common Bundle of Documents in Enclosure 10) and the Plaintiff’s witnesses are from Singapore (please refer to the Witness Lists in Enclosure 13).

It is not disputed that the accident occurred entirely in Singapore. The applicable law is Singapore traffic law since the accident occurred in PIE, Singapore and the investigations were conducted by the Singapore police. The accident location and material witnesses are in Singapore. The police investigation, accident reports, and contemporaneous evidence are all based in Singapore. Hence, it is more suitable and the appropriate forum would be the Singapore court.

Based on the authorities above, it is clear that the Plaintiff bear the burden to prove that Malaysia Court is a more appropriate forum to hear and determine the Plaintiff’s claim. Domicile of the Defendant alone is not the sole determining factor when the cause of action arose wholly outside Malaysia and the connecting factors are overwhelmingly shown to occur in Singapore together with all relevant documents and witnesses being based in Singapore.

Further, I refer to Order 38 rule 18(2) of the Rules of Court 2012 which provides that the writ of subpoena shall not be served on any person outside the jurisdiction. The usage of the word “shall” impose a strict prohibition and therefore it would be futile exercise for the Plaintiff to secure the attendance of the witnesses from Singapore since they cannot be compelled to give evidence in Malaysia court. It further reinforces the suitability and appropriateness of the Singapore court which is in the position to secure the attendance of the witnesses.

For the reasons stated above, I rule that the Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate why the Singapore courts are an inappropriate forum. I am therefore of the considered view that Malaysia court is not the natural or appropriate forum for the determination of this claim.

whether the Plaintiff has established entitlement to the reliefs sought

Since the Plaintiff has failed to overcome the threshold issues of jurisdiction and forum, therefore, in the absence of such foundation, the merits of the claim do not arise for substantive determination.

In the instant case, although the Plaintiff claims that the parties wish to enter a consent judgment, yet the parties could not agree on the type of currency to be paid for the amount of settlement. Hence, there is still dispute amongst the parties on the type of currency to be paid for the agreed sum and eventually the matter may go on to trial in the future.

Having considered the Plaintiff’s claim and the Plaintiff’s submissions, I find that even this Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter under paragraph 23(1)(b) of Act 91 and the Defendant has not raised any jurisdiction issue, domicile alone is not the sole determining factor where the cause of action arose wholly outside Malaysia and the connecting factors are overwhelmingly foreign. The vital principle which the Court has to consider is whether this Court has the discretion to entertain the Plaintiff’s claim based on the doctrine of forum non-convenience.

Therefore, I rule that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate why the Singapore courts are an inappropriate forum and the Plaintiff has not established a sustainable basis for the claim to be filed in the Malaysia court.

Accordingly, I strike out the Plaintiff’s claim with no order as to costs. Dated 2 January 2026 Signed by: sgd ……………….. Wong Mee Ling Judge High Court of Malaya Johor Bahru Johor Darul Ta’zim. Counsel/Solicitor For the Plaintiff : Mr. Ong Chee Yong Messrs C. Y. Ong& Co. Counsel/Solicitor For the Defendant : Ms. Gayathiry