(iii) He refused to accept the contents of the Shabana’s lawyers’ Official 10 Receipt dated 7.1.2014 which stated that RM4 million was the full 11 purchase price for the sale of the Land. The Plaintiff obdurately maintained 12 that D1 had not paid the full purchase price of the Land. His response 13 under cross-examination was as follows : 14 15 JW : Below there, under the section, being payment of, do you agree 16 that it says there, full purchase price for, and then this is the Subject 17 Land? 18 PW 1 : Yes, correct. 19 20 JW : So you agree that Shabana’s lawyers said that RM4 million is 21 the full purchase price for the Subject land? 22 PW 1 : Disagree. 23 24 [69] This was so even after PW 1 was referred to his own Witness 25 Statement where he had stated in Paragraph 2 of Question 20 that 26 Shabana had agreed to the selling price of RM4 million. He claimed that 27 the answer in the witness statement is incorrect. 28 29 [70] Next to be addressed is the Plaintiff’s contention that he had 30 returned the RM4 million to D1 which I find is inconsistent with the 31 contemporaneous documents and the Plaintiff’s answers under cross- 1 examination. I have seen the letter from Messrs Gan, Lau & Associates 2 dated 22.1.2014 and it clearly states only RM3,889,467.45 was released 3 to Shabana. 4 5 [71] This was the selling price after deductions made for legal fees and 6 other expenses. 7 8 [72] Another instance of the Plaintiff’s many other contradictory 9 statements is in regard to whose duty it shall be to have the tenant 10 removed from the Land. Clause 8.3.1 of the SPA states it shall be the duty 11 of the vendor to remove the tenant. Even when shown the clause, the 12 Plaintiff adamantly insisted that it was D1’s obligation to do so. 13 14 [73] To compound matters further the Plaintiff has disputed the validity of 15 the LOGs in particular those that contain the supersede clauses. 16 17 [74] Although he admitted signing those LOGs he denied that the said 18 clause is binding. The Plaintiff’s reasons for refusing to accept the 19 documentary evidence is untenable and unjustifiable. There is no 20 escaping that the Plaintiff has given evidence that runs counter to the 21 contemporaneous documentary evidence adduced in this case. 22 23 [75] As I see it, it is a basic rule of law that what has been agreed to by 24 the contracting parties and put into writing shall be the truth between them. 25 The intention of the parties contained therein must be given effect to. The 26 Federal Court in Michael C. Solle v United Malayan Banking Corp Bhd 27 [1984] 1 CLJ Rep 267 said as follows : 28 29 “The principles of construction to be applied to the undertaking are 1 similar to those applied to an ordinary contract. The intentions of the 2 parties are to be gathered from the language used. They are 3 presumed to have intended what they said. The common and 4 universal principles is that an agreement ought to receive that 5 construction which will best effectuate the intention of the parties to be 6 collected from the whole agreement.” 7 8 [76] It is not for the Plaintiff or his counsel to say what the SPA is 9 supposed to say and mean. The Plaintiff is bound by what he signed in 10 the absence of fraud or misrepresentation. 11 12 [77] Arising therefrom I am in complete agreement with the Defendants 13 contention that no evidence except for the documents itself shall be given 14 in proof of the SPA dated 31.12.2013 and the LOGs. 15 16 [78] This statement of the law is supported by Section 91 of the Evidence 17 Act 1950. The evidence of the Plaintiff calls to mind the case of Keng Huat 18 Film Co Sdn Bhd v Makhanlall (Properties) Pte Ltd [1984]1 MLJ 243 19 where the Federal Court held as follows : 20 21 “For the construction of a written agreement the established doctrine is 22 firstly to exclude evidence of negotiations leading up to the contract 23 on the ground that it is only the final agreement which records a 24 consensus and as such evidence of negotiations is unhelpful; and 25 secondly to exclude evidence of the parties’ subjective intentions 26 so that any individual purpose which either of them hopes to 27 achieve by the agreement and their own interpretation and 28 understanding of the agreement is not admissible.” 29 30 [79] The Plaintiff’s version that the Sales and Purchase Agreement and 1 the Letters of Guarantee are “back to back arrangements” is unsupported 2 by any documentary evidence. The Plaintiff’s evidence of this 3 arrangement is so glaringly in contradiction with the terms of the SPA 4 dated 31.12.1013 as well as the subsequently LOGs. If it were true that 5 this was a back to back arrangement then I would expect to see some 6 contemporaneous documentary evidence of it. The importance of 7 contemporaneous documentary proof can never be underrated. 8 9 [80] Parties do not need to be reminded that the paramount rule of law 10 by which contemporaneous documentary proof are of high probative value 11 in assisting a judge to come to a clear decision. They are the best form of 12 corroborative evidence. 13 14 [81] I find that the Plaintiff’s testimony and evdience are incongruous with 15 the documentary evidence that was adduced alongside. 16 17 [82] In my view the Plaintiff is barred from using and relying on the terms 18 of the 3 draft SPA to state his case. Those do not bind Shabana and the 19 Plaintiff as it offended the parol evidence rule encapsulated in Sections 91 20 and 92 of the Evidence Act. 21 22 [83] It is the terms of the SPA dated 31.12.2013 that bind the parties. The 23 full terms of the SPA are incorporated and formed therein and hence are 24 binding upon both parties i.e. the Plaintiffs and all the Defendants. 25 Otherwise it will go against the grain of established principles of law. The 26 legal position is very clear that parties are bound by the terms of the 27 contract which they had executed whether or not they take the trouble of 28 reading them or not. 29 [84] This Court does not accept the Plaintiff’s reliance on the draft SPAs 1 and draft Letter of guarantee or that there was an understanding between 2 the parties in regard to the Land i.e. that the Land be sold for RM6 million 3 and the payment would be made 12 months later by way of the execution 4 of an irrevocable letter of guarantee by the directors. I find that version 5 improbable and highly unbelievable. Had it been a back to back 6 arrangement the documents would have reflected this stance. 7 8 [85] In any event the parties are reminded to take note that Clause 9.17 9 of the SPA dated 31.12.2013 contains a supersession clause in relation to 10 all prior agreements between the parties. Clause 9.17 states as follows : 11 12 “9.17 Supersedes prior agreements 13 This Agreement supersedes any prior agreements between the 14 parties whether written or oral and any such prior agreements are 15 cancelled as at the date of this Agreement.”. 16 17 [86] This particular clause 9.17 is akin to an entire agreement clause and 18 its effect calls to mind the approval given to it by the Federal Court in Solid 19 Investments Ltd v Alcatel Lucent (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd [2014] 3 CLJ 73 20 quoting the passage in the English case of Inntrepreneur Pub Co v East 21 Crown Ltd [2000] 3 EGLR 31 as follows : 22 23 “The purpose of an entire agreement clause is to preclude a party to a 24 written agreement from threshing through the undergrowth and finding, 25 in the course of negotiations, some (chance) remark or statement (often 26 long-forgotten or difficult to recall or explain) upon which to found a 27 claim, such as the present, to the existence of a collateral warranty. The 28 entire agreement clause obviates the occasion for nay such search, and 29 the peril to the contracting parties posed by the need that may arise in 30 its absence to conduct such a search. For such a clause constitutes a 1 binding agreement between the parties that the full contractual 2 terms are to be found in the document containing the clause and 3 not elsewhere, and that, accordingly, any promises or assurances 4 made in the course of the negotiations (which, in the absence of 5 such a clause, might have effect as a collateral warranty) shall have 6 no contractual force, save in so far as they are reflected and give 7 effect in that document.” 8 9 [87] Such a clause closes the door on any argument of there being an 10 existence of a collateral agreement. Therefore, the Plaintiff’s attempt to 11 bring up the contention that a collateral agreement can exist side by side 12 with another contract and can exist in contradiction of that contract is an 13 afterthought in the circumstances of the instant suit. 14 15 [88] In the same manner I am of the view that the terms of the LOG dated 16 31.12.2013 binds both the Plaintiff and the Defendants. The Plaintiff is 17 barred from referring to the draft copies of the LOG prior to that as it goes 18 against the terms of the LOG that was signed and executed by the parties. 19 Weighing the oral evidence and testing them against the 20 contemporaneous documents it is evident that his oral evidence can have 21 no weight in view of the documentary evidence which states otherwise. In 22 Tindok Besar Estate Sdn Bhd v Tinjar Co [1979] 2 MLJ 229 the Federal 23 Court held : 24 25 “For myself, I would with respect feel somewhat safer to refer to and 26 rely on the acts and deeds of a witness which are 27 contemporaneous with the event and to draw the reasonable 28 inferences from them than to believe his subsequent recollection 29 or version of it, particularly if he is a witness with a purpose of his 30 own to serve and if it did not account for the statements in his 31 documents and writings. Judicial reception of evidence requires that 1 the oral evidence be critically tested against the whole of the other 2 evidence and the circumstances of the case. Plausibility should never 3 be mistaken for veracity.” 4 5 [89] There is no getting away from the fact that the Plaintiff’s evidence is 6 unsupported by any contemporaneous documentary proof. The SPA is a 7 stand alone agreement in view of the fact the transaction has been 8 completed and transfer of ownership of the Land had been carried out on 9 15.9.2014. D1 is now the registered owner of the Land. 10 11 [90] Taking that into account D1 cannot be said to be in breach of the 12 terms of the SPA. The 7 LOGs in succession over a period of almost 6 13 years showed that the Plaintiff consented to extensions of time in relation 14 to the issuance of shares to him for his investment. The Plaintiff had by 15 conduct consented to the delay in obtaining the shares. He had never 16 objected to the delay nor had he conveyed to the Defendants that he was 17 unhappy with the delay. 18 19 [91] The Plaintiff had accepted all the benefits offered by the Defendants 20 in his wait for the issuance of the shares. 21 22 [92] It would be safe to conclude and to draw the reasonable inference 23 he was agreeable to and not unhappy with the extensions of time in 24 relation to the issuance of shares to him. There was much drum beating 25 about the Plaintiff being allowed to receive direct rental from the tenant on 26 the Land for a period of six months. The Defendant’s explanation that it 27 was given on the basis of goodwill was reasonable and nothing more 28 should be made out of it. 29 [93] To recapitulate the significance of the Plaintiff acknowledging and 1 signing the 5th and 6th LOGs cannot be emphasized often enough. First of 2 all, the fact that the Plaintiff signed the LOGs in particular the 5th and the 3 6th ones signifies that he is bound by the terms set out in the said LOGs. 4 By signing those Letters of Guarantee the Plaintiff acknowledged that he 5 had agreed to the terms of the Letters of Guarantee. In the case of CIMB 6 Bank Bhd v Anthony Lawrence Bourke & Anor [2019] 2 MLJ 1, the 7 Federal Court held : 8 9 “[26] We agree with the defendant that parties are bound by the terms 10 of the contract which they entered into and that it is the court’s duty to 11 give effect to the clear and plain meaning of the words in the said clause. 12 That is quite trite. 13 [27] The law recognises the principle of freedom of contract. Parties to 14 a contract are free to determine for themselves what their obligations 15 are.” 16 17 [94] In this framework I am of the view the Plaintiff is bound by the terms 18 of the LOGs and he cannot be excused from or denying his liability. The 19 Plaintiff is estopped from denying that he consented to the extensions of 20 time in relation to the issuance of shares to him for his investment of 21 shares (see Boustead Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v Arab-Malaysian 22 Merchant Trading Bank Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 331. He has to bear with the 23 consequences of consenting to the subsequent LOGs. 24 25 [95] The 7th and last LOG signed by the Plaintiff contained the 26 supersession clause. By consenting to this, it meant that the Plaintiff had 27 agreed to dispense with the performance of and/or extended time for the 28 performance of the 1st LOG dated 31.12.2013. I have no doubt that it 29 encompassed the intention of the parties which was that this LOG would 1 supersede all earlier LOGs. 2 3 [96] Section 64 of the Contracts Act 1950 applies in this situation : 4 “Every promise may dispense with or remit, wholly or in part, the 5 performance of the promise made to him or may extend the time for such 6 performance, or may accept instead of it any satisfaction which he thinks 7 fit.” 8 9 [97] In this suit the Plaintiff attempted to cherry pick and choose the 10 LOGs which he felt was not applicable to him. The Plaintiff denies the 11 validity and the applicability of the 4th to 7th LOGs and only chooses to rely 12 on the 1st LOG. Yet parties had acted on the terms of every single LOG. 13 For example, the Plaintiff accepted the payment of the 6 months rental 14 that came with the 3rd LOG dated 1.1.2016. 15 16 [98] For the 2nd LOG the Plaintiff requested and the 3rd Defendant agreed 17 to bear the expenses of the Real Property Gains Tax amounting to 18 RM50,000. Then came the 3rd LOG where the Plaintiff acknowledged that 19 the guarantors had assigned the monthly rental of the Subject land for 6 20 months to the Plaintiff in consideration. Although it may seem trivial but 21 the Plaintiff even requested the Defendants to bear the cost of the feng 22 shui invoice for which they did in order to appease the Plaintiff. 23 24 [99] It is important to highlight the fact that the Plaintiff does not deny that 25 he had agreed to the settlement proposal contained in the LOG dated 26 23.11.2017. Further to that he also agreed that D1 had paid him 27 RM300,000 after he signed acceptance of the 23.11.2017 LOG. This 28 evidence is supported by the testimony of the Plaintiff’s brother (DW 4) 29 who confirmed that the Plaintiff willingly signed the LOG. There was no 1 pressure from the others to force the Plaintiff to accept it. 2 3 [100] Having done so, the Plaintiff is not allowed to approbate and 4 reprobate at the same time. It is unconscionable and unfair to the other 5 party. In the case of First Count Sdn Bhd v Wang Yew Logging & 6 Plantations Sdn Bhd [2013] 4 MLJ 693, the Court of Appeal made the 7 following observations in relation to a similar situation such as that faced 8 by the Plaintiff. The pertinent passage of the judgment I want to refer to is 9 this : 10 11 “(2) The Plaintiff had accepted the reduced contract fees and continued 12 to perform the contract when it had the option of insisting on the 13 performance of the terms of the original contract. As such, the plaintiff 14 was barred from asserting something when it had the right and 15 opportunity to do so earlier. The doctrine of estoppel applied to estop 16 the plaintiff from making any claim which appeared to be an afterthought 17 against the defendant under the contract. It would be unjust and 18 unconscionable to permit the plaintiff to file an action to question the 19 validity of the reduction of the contract fees after six years…” 20 21 [101] Having accepted all the consideration and benefits that 22 accompanied the subsequent LOGs the Plaintiff is estopped from 23 disputing the validity of the LOGs and its applicability to the parties 24 concerned. It is unfair and unreasonable to allow the Plaintiff to renege on 25 his agreement. 26 27 [102] Before proceeding further, I would take this opportune moment to 28 briefly address my mind on the issue of the conduct and credibility of all 29 the witnesses called to give evidence at the trial. 30 [103] The Plaintiff would have me think that he was only a hapless victim 1 of the Defendants, caught up in the web of deceit and treachery practised 2 on him by D2, Datin Jo (his sister), SP 3 and the other Defendants. He 3 claimed that he had been lured into the meeting at Visiber’s office on 4 31.12.2019. 5 6 [104] I did not see it that way. In my assessment of his credibility I found 7 the Plaintiff to be a shrewd businessman. He was no novice at the mercy 8 of the Defendants. Far from being unaware of the nature of the 9 transaction, the Plaintiff knew very well that the sale and purchase of the 10 Land and the letters of guarantee for the issuance of shares to him were 11 for two different separate and independent transactions. I found it 12 incredible to believe that the Plaintiff who has been a businessman for 30 13 years and runs a highly successful business would have signed the SPA 14 willingly if it did not contain all the terms and conditions which he wanted 15 to be put in. 16 17 [105] For the same reasons I found the Plaintiff’s evidence on his 18 understanding of the sale and purchase of the Land and the issuance of 19 the shares to him for his investment is not at all consistent with the clear 20 and unambiguous terms of the executed documents. The SPA clearly 21 stated that the purchase price for the sale of the Land was RM4 million 22 and not RM6 million. The Plaintiff has given contradictory answers that 23 went against the contemporaneous documentary evidence and this has 24 greatly undermined his credibility. I had always kept in the forefront of my 25 mind that contradictions in witnesses testimonies are not uncommon and 26 reminded myself that there is no hard and fast rule for determining the 27 credibility or otherwise of a particular witness. 28 29 [106] Slight discrepancies in testimony are understandable and did not 1 render the whole of the testimony acceptable but when a witness gives 2 evidence which differ in material particulars, there must necessarily be 3 grounds for believing that he is not a truthful witness. Having taken that 4 into consideration I was of the opinion that I had to treat the Plaintiff’s 5 evidence with great caution since it was full of contradictions with the 6 contemporaneous documents. 7 8 [107] In this case I find the testimonies of the Defendants’ witnesses to be 9 credible. Despite vehement and vigorous cross-examination their 10 evidence remained intact. This speaks volumes of their credibility. They 11 were forthright and convincing. More importantly their account of the 12 events is supported by documentary evidence. With that I make the 13 finding that the Plaintiff has raised baseless accusations in regard to the 14 credibility of the Defendants’ witnesses and SP 3. In reference to the 15 testimony of SP 3, she was questioned determinedly on the transactions 16 and her answers were consistent and remained unwavering. That too 17 spoke to her credibility as a witness. 18 19 [108] The Plaintiff’s assertion that there were meetings between him and 20 the Defendants in the presence of SP 3 in 2012 and 2013 are bare 21 assertions with no evidence to support them. Since the Plaintiff is the party 22 asserting the existence of these meetings, he has the burden to prove his 23 version is more credible. In my respectful view he has failed miserably to 24 do so. 25 26 [109] Coming back now to the issue at hand, I find that the intentions of 27 the parties in these transactions can easily be seen from the contents of 28 all the LOGs. As highlighted earlier, in law, parties are bound by the terms 29 of the contract they have entered into and it is axiomatic that the duty of 1 the court is to give effect to the clear intention of the parties as expressed 2 in plain and unambiguous language. 3 4 [110] As a whole I decline the Plaintiff’s invitation to make a finding that 5 the SPA and the 1st LOG are back to back agreements intended to be read 6 together. To my mind and as I have emphasized earlier the cold hard 7 evidence showed that the SPA and the 1st LOG are 2 separate and 8 independent transactions. The SPA is in regard to the Land while the 9 LOGs were for the issuance of shares to the Plaintiff for his investment of 10 shares. 11 12 The significance of the Supersession clause in the Letters of 13 Guarantee 14 [111] Uniquely in the present case is the presence of the supersession 15 Clause in the 5th and 7th LOGs. The supersession clause is present in 16 particular in the last LOG and there are no other subsequent LOGs to 17 supersede the last one. 18 19 [112] In view of it being the last and final LOG its terms form the intention 20 of the parties and binds them to its contents. All the other previous LOGs 21 are no longer binding nor are they enforceable with the coming into 22 existence of the last LOG. 23 24 [113] The LOGs culminating in the last one were in regard to the sale of 25 shares to the Plaintiff in 2017. The Plaintiff could not have misunderstood 26 its purpose. Apart from its contents there were also WhatsApp messages 27 exchanged between the Plaintiff and D3 in regard to the progress and 28 allotment of the shares. These WhatsApp messages were exchanged by 29 them between 5.11.2018 and 7.11.2018 plainly showed that the Plaintiff 1 was kept informed of the delay in allotment and transfer of shares. The 2 Plaintiff seemed to appreciate the reason for the delay and made no 3 protest as to its contents. I produce below a WhatsApp messages dated 4 6.11.2018 between the Plaintiff and D3 : 5 6 7 8 [114] Based on the above messages it is evident that the understanding 9 between the parties then was still that the Plaintiff would be issued shares. 10 Counsel for the Defendants have urged this Court to take into 11 consideration the fact that the Plaintiff has refused to sign the Stock 12 Purchase Agreement which was handed to him personally on 31.12.2019. 13 They argue that his refusal has absolved all the Defendants from any 14 liability to the Plaintiff’s claim in the present civil suit. 15 16 [115] I am in full agreement with that contention. I make the finding that 17 the Defendants including D6 and Lee Chee Herng are absolved and 18 released from any liability to the Plaintiff and this is in line with the 19 provisions of Section 68 of the Contracts Act 1950. which provides as 20 follows : 21 22 “If any promisee neglects or refuses to afford the promisor reasonable 1 facilities for the performance of his promise, the promisor is excused by 2 the neglect or refusal as to any non-performance caused thereby.” 3 4 [116] I accept the Defendants’ contention that since the shares in 5 Visber57 Corp had been transferred to the Plaintiff, they had complied 6 with the terms contained in the 23.11.2017 LOG and they are released 7 from their obligations therein. 8 9 [117] Looking back at the conduct of the parties coupled with the 10 contemporaneous documentary evidence I find the Defendants are not in 11 breach of the 1st LOG dated 31.12.2013 or for that matter, any one of the 12 other LOG. 13 14 [118] As at 6.3.2020 the Plaintiff is the registered owner of 1,125,000 15 shares of Visiber57 Corp. The Plaintiff should not deride nor pour scorn 16 on the value of the share certificate that was issued without proof. 17 18 [119] The Defendants reckon that these shares were worth 19 USD2,812,500 (approximately RM11,250,000.00 on 8.4.2020 and 20 15.4.2021. Whether he believes it or not the Plaintiff is now owner of very 21 valuable shares and if he converts those shares into cash, he will be a 22 very wealthy man. 23 24 Role of D6 25 [120] One other matter that needs to be canvassed is in relation to the 26 position of D6 in this transaction. The appearance of the superseding 27 clause that was incorporated in the 5th and 7th LOGs is crystal clear in 28 intent – it stipulated that the earlier LOGs signed by the Defendants will 29 be superseded. In addition, I find the Plaintiff had waived his right to object 1 to the change of signatories in the subsequent LOG when he did not object 2 at the material time. Instead he accepted consideration and benefits which 3 accompanied the subsequent LOGs. 4 5 [121] In my judgment it is obvious that D6 has been released and 6 exonerated from his obligations as a guarantor as he was no longer in the 7 picture when the 5th and 7th LOGs were executed. I do not find it necessary 8 to even discuss whether a valid demand had been served on him or not. 9 10 Whether the Counterclaim should be allowed 11 [122] The 1st to 5th Defendants’ counterclaim is connected to their defence 12 against the claim by the Plaintiff. I had earlier found the Plaintiff had failed 13 to prove that the SPA was a back to back agreement with the 1st LOG of 14 even date, the Counterclaim must therefore succeed. 15 16 [123] At the trial the Plaintiff had conceded that D1 is the owner of the 17 Land and indeed the transfer had been concluded on 15.9.2014. It 18 followed that as the owner of the Land D1 has an unfettered right to deal 19 with the Land as it pleased. Section 340(1) of the National Land Code 20 provides that D1 has an indefeasible title to the Land. The Plaintiff cannot 21 claim to override D1’s ownership and proprietorship of the Land (see Eng 22 Mee Yong & Ors v V Letchumanan [1979] 2 MLJ 212). 23 24 [124] Despite the position of the law, the Plaintiff still claims that he can 25 and must interfere in the development of the Land. Under cross- 26 examination the Plaintiff gave evidence that he must and wants to deal 27 with the Land. The Defendants are dismayed and alarmed with the 28 contentions of the Plaintiff and have argued there is a foreseeable risk that 29 the Plaintiff may take legal steps regarding the Land, thereby disrupting 1 the joint venture agreement. In such an event the Defendants will be liable 2 to suffer losses. 3 4 [125] In the circumstances this Court agrees that the risk is foreseeable 5 with the Plaintiff having clearly manifested his intention to take legal steps 6 regarding the Land and this will certainly disrupt and interfere with D1’s 7 ownership and enjoyment of the Land. There is reasonable grounds to 8 believe that this would induce a breach of the joint venture agreement 9 between D1 and Laubros. It behoves upon this Court to restrain the 10 Plaintiff whether by himself, his servants, agents or nominees, from 11 entering, dealing with or in any way interfering in the development of the 12 Land pursuant to the Joint Venture Agreement between D1 and Laubros. 13 14 [126] In view of the Plaintiff’s responses during cross-examination this 15 Court is of the opinion that the Plaintiff should also be restrained form 16 lodging any private caveat or any encumbrances on the Land, which may 17 affect D1’s title to the Land. 18 19 Conclusion 20 [127] For the reasons above, I am satisfied and make the finding that the 21 Plaintiff has failed to establish his claim on a balance of probabilities and 22 I dismissed his claim against all the Defendants. 23 24 [128] I make the further finding that 1st to 5th Defendants have established 25 their Counterclaim on a balance of probabilities and I allowed the 26 Counterclaim. 27 28 [129] I granted costs of RM40,000 to be paid to D1 to D5 and RM15,000 1 to D6. These costs come subject to allocator. 2 3 Dated 21 June 2024. 4 5 6 7 8 (JULIE LACK) 9 Judge 10 High Court of Malaya 11 Shah Alam, Selangor Darul Ehsan 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 Counsel 1 For the Plaintiff : 2 Foo Wen Cong with Lim Yew Yi 3 (MESSRS. FOO LEONG TAN & CHAN) 4 5 For the 1st-5th Defendant : 6 Judy Lim Pek Eng, Joshua Wu Kai-Ming and Melissa Ong Wi Xin 7 (MESSRS. L HO & ASSOCIATES) 8 9 For the 6th Defendant : 10 Datuk Ringo Low Kim Leng with Ting Lee Ping and Melvin Chong Jia 11 Shern 12 (MESSRS. RINGO LOW & ASSOCIATES) 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29