Kong Sun Enterprise Sdn Bhd v Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia Berhad (JA-22NCvC-164-11/2020)

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI JOHOR BAHRU DALAM NEGERI JOHOR DARUL TA’ZIM MALAYSIA GUAMAN SIVIL NO. : JA-22NCvC-164-11/2020 ANTARA KONG SUN ENTERPRISE SDN. BHD. (COMPANY NO. : 72678-U) …PLAINTIF DAN

1. BANK KERJASAMA RAKYAT MALAYSIA BERHAD

2. SETIAMAS SDN. BHD. (COMPANY NO. : 92604-X) …DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT 19/03/2026 14:03:21 JA-22NCvC-164-11/2020 Kand. 331 **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 Introduction

1. This suit concerns the Plaintiff’s application to set aside three consent Orders for Sale dated 2 September 2020, obtained in foreclosure proceedings via Originating Summons No. : JA-24FC-450-05/2020 (“OS 450”), No. : JA-24FC-451-05/2020 (“OS 451”) and No. : JA- 24FC-452-05/2020 (“OS 452”) (collectively, “the OS Proceedings”).

2. The trial was conducted on 17 and 18 December 2025. One witness testified for the Plaintiff and three witnesses testified for the Defendants –

4. The Plaintiff, is a housing developer. The 1st Defendant (“D1”), is the lender bank. The 2nd Defendant (“D2”), is the original registered owner of the subject lands. The Plaintiff’s solicitors are Messrs Nurain Nadia & Co. D1’s solicitors are Messrs Azmi & Associates (at trial) and previously Messrs Yusfarizal Aziz & Zaid (“YAZ”) during the material events. D2’s solicitors in the OS Proceedings were Messrs Shearn Delamore & Co (“SDC”).

5. By a Sale and Purchase Agreement dated 13 April 1999 (“the SPA”), the Plaintiff purchased four pieces of land from D2 for RM25,099,446.24, paid in full. Pending conversion and transfer, D2 granted the Plaintiff an Irrevocable Power of Attorney dated 30 July 1999 (“the IPA”), registered at the High Court of Johor Bahru (Registration No. 2737/99, 4 August 1999) and at the land registry (Presentation No. 459/2004, 28 October 2004). The four parcels were amalgamated and subdivided into 945 individual titles, all remaining in D2’s name.

6. The Plaintiff did not effect a transfer of the lands into its own name, nor did it lodge private caveats. D1 submit that this failure is significant. This Court shall address this later in these grounds. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4

7. In 2005, the Plaintiff obtained from D1 a Bridging Finance - I Facility of RM29,000,000.00 under the principle of Bai’ Al Inah (“the Facility”). As security, the Plaintiff charged 552 lands to D1: 551 of the subdivided lands (by way of 3rd Party 1st Legal Charge, with D2 named as chargor but executed by the Plaintiff as attorney under the IPA) and one Lot 46047 (by way of 1st Party 2nd Legal Charge, in the Plaintiff’s own name).

8. This Court pauses here to note three matters of significance regarding D1’s actual knowledge, drawn from the Bank’s own documentation –

9. On 22 March 2018, D1 through YAZ filed OS No. JA-24MFC-135- 03/2018 (“OS 135”) to enforce the 1st Party Legal Charge against the Plaintiff. An Order for Sale was granted on 26 December 2018. The Plaintiff appealed. On 12 November 2019, the Court of Appeal in Civil Appeal No. J-02(MUA)(A)-189-01/2019 unanimously set aside the Order for Sale with costs of RM10,000.00.

10. The contrast between OS 135 and the subsequent OS 450-452 is stark. In OS 135, D1 correctly named the Plaintiff as respondent, the Plaintiff was served, represented, defended the proceedings and succeeded on appeal. In OS 450-452, for the same Facility, D1 proceeded against D2 alone without the Plaintiff’s knowledge.

11. On 5 May 2020 while the Plaintiff was actively engaging D1 on repayment (a written proposal was submitted on 1 June 2020, later rejected on 13 July 2020) - D1 through YAZ filed OS 450, OS 451 and OS 452 against D2 to enforce the 3rd Party 1st Legal Charge over 154 of the Plaintiff’s subdivided lands. It is an Agreed Fact **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 (Enclosure 194, paragraph 9) that neither D1 nor D2 made the Plaintiff a party to these proceedings.

12. The same solicitor, YAZ, represented D1 in both OS 135 and OS 450 - 452, in respect of the same Facility. YAZ therefore had actual knowledge of –

13. On 3 August 2020, YAZ inadvertently forwarded to the Plaintiff’s solicitors a letter dated 24 July 2020 captioned “LEGAL ACTION AGAINST THIRD PARTY CHARGOR”. The Plaintiff’s solicitors wrote urgently on 7 August 2020 and sent a reminder on 10 September 2020.

14. YAZ replied 48 days later, on 24 September 2020. This reply did not disclose that Orders for Sale had already been granted on 2 September 2020, three weeks before the reply. YAZ, as D1’s **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 solicitors in both proceedings, possessed this material fact and withheld it while actively corresponding with the Plaintiff’s solicitors on the same Facility. The Consent Orders for Sale dated 2 September 2020

15. The Notes of Proceedings from 2 September 2020, which the Plaintiff extracted on 27 April 2021, reveal the following sequence –

16. This Court regards this sequence, the affidavit substitution, as the most critical evidence in this case. It demonstrates beyond doubt that both D1 and D2 knew at the time of the hearing that – **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8

17. Between August 2020 and April 2021, overlapping with and following the OS Proceedings, D1 received RM5,199,572.50 by way of redemption from the purchasers’ end financiers. D1 accepted these payments without informing the Plaintiff of the Orders for Sale. PW1 also testified that during OS 135, D1 received RM1,970,325.00 in repayments. The Discovery and This Suit

18. The Plaintiff commenced this suit in November 2020. On 24 March 2021, this Court granted leave to intervene as 2nd Defendant in the execution proceedings AE 875, AE 876 and AE 877 and stayed those proceedings. On 27 April 2021, the Plaintiff discovered through extracted Notes of Proceedings that the Orders for Sale had been entered by consent. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9

19. On 24 April 2025, the Plaintiff and D2 entered into a Consent Judgment whereby D2 acknowledged the Plaintiff’s beneficial ownership of the subject lands. D1’s application to set aside paragraph 2(d) of the Consent Judgment was dismissed on 28 October 2025. The contest that remains is between the Plaintiff and D1. Court Analysis

20. Having regard to the Issues to be Tried filed by the Plaintiff (Enclosure 193), D2 (Enclosure 195) and D1 (Enclosure 213) the Agreed Facts (Enclosure 194) and the evidence adduced at trial, this Court distils the issues into three questions – Issue 1 : Whether the consent Orders for Sale dated 2 September 2020 in OS 450, OS 451 and OS 452 should be set aside. Issue 2 : Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to damages and, if so, the quantum thereof. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 Issue 1 : Whether The Consent Orders For Sale Should Be Set Aside

21. Issue 1 is the central and determinative issue. It subsumes the subsidiary questions framed by the parties, namely : whether the Orders were consent orders; whether D1 and D2 had authority to consent; whether D1 and/or D2 misled this Court; whether the Plaintiff was required to be named as a party; and whether the Plaintiff’s statutory right under Section 266 of the National Land Code (“NLC”) was violated. This Court shall address each of these subsidiary questions in the course of my analysis.

22. The Plaintiff advances its case on several grounds inclusive of fraud and concealment by D1, collusion between D1 and D2, breach of natural justice, procedural irregularities and the effect of the 2025 Consent Judgment. D1 defends on the basis that the NLC is a “complete code”, that it complied with statutory procedure, that no fraud has been proved, that the conspiracy plea is defective and that the Plaintiff’s own failures to protect its interest are fatal to its claim. This Court shall address the evidence and law on each ground.

23. The Notes of Proceedings from 2 September 2020 record that counsel for D1 and counsel for D2 appeared and that the Orders for Sale were entered by consent. PW1 confirmed this at trial. The extracted Orders do not state “by consent” on their face, a **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 discrepancy the Plaintiff highlights as supporting its case that the true nature of the orders was obscured.

24. This Court finds that the Orders for Sale were consent orders. Being consent orders, they cannot be appealed but must be set aside by a separate action, which is the course the Plaintiff has taken.

25. The question of D1’s knowledge goes to the heart of the fraud allegation. The Plaintiff submits that D1 had actual knowledge of its beneficial ownership and deliberately excluded it from the OS Proceedings. D1 submits that even if the Plaintiff has beneficial ownership in which D1 denies, D1 had no obligation to notify the Plaintiff under the NLC.

26. This Court observed that the evidence establishing D1’s actual knowledge is overwhelming –

27. This Court also observed that –

(ii) she agreed the Plaintiff signed the charges under the IPA;

(iii) she could not explain who gave instructions for the affidavit substitution; and

(iv) she could not explain why the consent was not recorded on the face of the Orders.

28. Hence, based to my observation on D1’s own documents and D1’s own pleading, this Court finds that D1 had actual knowledge that the Plaintiff was the beneficial owner of the 154 subdivided lands and the actual borrower under the Facility.

29. This Court now turns to what this Court considers the most telling piece of evidence. On 1 September 2020, D1 filed an affidavit of indebtedness naming D2 as the debtor. The next day, before the Court, that affidavit was by consent expunged and a substitute affidavit naming the Plaintiff was admitted. Immediately thereafter, the consent Orders for Sale were recorded.

30. The significance of this sequence cannot be overstated. The substitution means that D1 itself acknowledged, in open court, that **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 D2 was not the debtor. D1 put forward the Plaintiff’s name as the party whose debt was being enforced. Yet D1 did not take any step to bring the Plaintiff before the Court. The Court in the OS Proceedings was therefore presented with a consent between a chargee and a registered chargor, neither of whom was the actual debtor, to sell property beneficially belonging to a third party, to satisfy that third party’s debt - all without the third party’s knowledge.

31. To add it more interestingly, DW3 could not explain who gave the instructions for the substitution or why the consent was not recorded on the face of the Orders.

32. D1 did not call Cik Aini Suraya, the YAZ solicitor who appeared at the hearing and who corresponded with the Plaintiff’s solicitors. Under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950, this Court draws the adverse inference that her evidence would not have been favourable to D1.

33. The Plaintiff submits and this Court accepts, that there was a deliberate pattern of concealment –

(ii) YAZ’s inadvertent letter of 24 July 2020, captioned “Legal Action Against Third Party Chargor”, alerted the Plaintiff for the first time. The Plaintiff’s solicitors wrote urgently on 7 August 2020. YAZ delayed 48 days before replying;

(iii) during that 48-day period, the consent Orders for Sale were obtained on 2 September 2020. YAZ’s eventual reply on 24 September 2020 did not disclose this fact; and

(iv) the Plaintiff did not discover that the Orders were consent orders until 27 April 2021 through extracted Notes of Proceedings.

34. D1 submits there was no duty to disclose and no concealment. This Court does not accept this. There is a distinction between having no statutory obligation to serve a party and having actual knowledge of that party’s interest while deliberately keeping them in the dark. To my mind, a solicitor who is corresponding with the beneficial owner’s solicitors about the same facility, while simultaneously obtaining orders that dispose of the beneficial owner’s property and who suppresses the fact of those orders in the correspondence, has crossed the line from procedural non-compliance to active concealment.

35. The Plaintiff submits that the rules of natural justice were violated. It means that its constitutional right to be heard (audi alteram partem) **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 was violated. This Court agrees. The principle that no person may be condemned unheard is well established. In Majlis Peguam Malaysia v Syed Ahmad Imdadz B Said Abad & Anor [2023] MLJU 2705, the Federal Court reaffirmed the principle articulated by Raja Azlan Shah FJ (as His Majesty then was) in Ketua Pengarah Kastam v Ho Kwan Seng [1977] 2 MLJ 152, that the rule of natural justice that no man may be condemned unheard should apply to every case where an individual is adversely affected.

36. More specifically, Section 266 NLC provides that on the hearing of an application for an order for sale, the Court shall, unless cause is shown to the contrary, grant the order. The right to show cause is available to “any person entitled to redeem”. The Plaintiff, as the actual borrower under the Facility who was making active repayments of RM5,199,572.50 between August 2020 and April 2021, was undoubtedly “a person entitled to redeem”.

37. Therefore, this Court finds that the Plaintiff’s statutory right under Section 266 NLC to show cause against the Orders for Sale was violated. This is not a matter of fraud. It is a matter of statutory entitlement. A party entitled to redeem was deprived of its right to show cause. In my considered view, this ground alone is sufficient to set aside the Orders for Sale, independent of any finding on fraud. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17

38. This Court now addresses the central legal contest between the parties. D1’s defence rests fundamentally on the proposition that the NLC is a “complete code” and that D1, as a registered chargee, was entitled to enforce the charge against D2 as the registered chargor. D1 relies on –

(ii) Keng Soon Finance Bhd v MK Retnam Holdings Sdn Bhd & Anor [1989] 1 MLJ 457, Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd v Mahmud Bin Haji Mohamed Din (Datin Hajjah Salma bte Md Jamin, Intervener) [1989] 1 MLJ 381 and Pushpaleela a/p R Selvarajah & Anor v Rajamani d/o Meyappa Chettiar and other appeals [2019] MLJU 134 for the principle that registered interests prevail over unregistered equitable interests.

39. The Plaintiff counters with –

(ii) Hock Hua Bank Bhd. v. Sahari bin Murid [1981] 1 MLJ 143 for the principle that fraud vitiates everything, and that a fresh action will lie to impeach a judgment or order obtained by fraud. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18

40. This Court accepts that the NLC establishes a comprehensive framework for land dealings and Section 340(1) NLC provides for indefeasibility of registered interests. However, Section 340(2)(a) NLC expressly provides that title or interest is defeasible on the ground of fraud. In this Court’s understanding, these two provisions must be read together. The NLC’s protection of registered interests is not absolute. It yields to fraud. As rightly cited by the Plaintiff, the Federal Court held in Hock Hua Bank, fraud vitiates everything. The question is whether the facts of this case cross the threshold into fraud.

41. D1's reliance on Keng Soon Finance Bhd, Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd and CIMB Investment Bank Bhd (previously known as Commerce International Merchant Bankers Bhd) v Metroplex Holdings Sdn Bhd [2014] 6 MLJ 779 is distinguishable. Those cases concerned the priority of registered interests over unregistered equitable claims in the ordinary course. In particular, in CIMB Investment Bank Bhd, the Federal Court itself acknowledged that a fresh action would be permissible where the order for sale was procured by fraud. The cases relied upon by D1 did not involve a chargee who –

(ii) had previously litigated against the actual borrower for the same facility; **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19

(iii) substituted the actual borrower’s name into the indebtedness affidavit in open court; and

(iv) suppressed the existence of the orders from the actual borrower’s solicitors. It must be understood that the present case is not one of competing equitable and registered interests. It is a case of active conduct designed to exclude a known interested party.

42. Hence, applying EU Finance Berhad and Hock Hua Bank, this Court is satisfied that D1’s conduct taken in totality, constitutes fraud within the meaning of Section 340(2)(a) NLC. The fraud consists not of a single act but of a pattern –

(ii) the use of the same solicitor; the failure to serve or notify the Plaintiff;

(iii) the affidavit substitution acknowledging the Plaintiff as the true debtor while excluding the Plaintiff from the proceedings;

(iv) the concealment of the Orders in the 24 September 2020 correspondence; and

43. The Plaintiff pleads that D1 and D2 conspired to obtain the consent Orders for Sale. D1 submits, relying on Dato Abdullah bin Ahmad & Ors v Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad [2001] MLJU 638, that the conspiracy plea is defective because the alleged agents of the conspiracy (YAZ and SDC) are not parties to this suit. D1 further submits that the Consent Judgment between the Plaintiff and D2 caused the conspiracy claim to “evaporate”.

44. This Court notes the force of D1’s submission on the conspiracy point. However, this Court’s findings on fraud do not rest on establishing a formal conspiracy between D1 and D2. They rest on D1’s independent conduct as follows –

(ii) the non-notification of the Plaintiff’s known solicitors; and

(iii) the active concealment in the 24 September 2020 correspondence. These facts establish fraud independently of any conspiracy with D2.

45. As for the Consent Judgment, the Plaintiff’s reply submission recharacterises it not as the death blow to the conspiracy claim, but as D2’s admission that the lands belong to the Plaintiff “without reservation”. This Court accepts the Plaintiff’s characterisation. The Consent Judgment is evidence confirming that D2 had no beneficial **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 interest in the lands at the time it consented to the Orders for Sale, which reinforces the conclusion that the consent was given without authority. D1’s argument that the Consent Judgment is res inter alios acta has technical merit on privity, but does not change the fact now judicially recorded that D2 was a bare trustee at the material time.

46. DW1 (He Hui Ting) confirmed at trial that SDC appeared for D2 and consented to the Orders for Sale. Under cross-examination by the Plaintiff’s counsel, DW1 made the following critical admissions –

(ii) there was no proof of acknowledgment or receipt of the SDC letters by the Plaintiff;

(iii) SDC knew that G&W were the solicitors on record for the Plaintiff, but sent cause papers by DHL to corporate addresses instead of to G&W;

(iv) SDC did not receive instructions to bring the Plaintiff into the proceedings; and

47. Plaintiff submitted that DW1, whom D1 had subpoenaed, gave evidence that backfired on D1. Her admissions were more helpful to the Plaintiff than to D1. This Court agrees. DW1’s evidence confirms that D2, through SDC, consented to the Orders for Sale without the Plaintiff’s knowledge, without the Plaintiff’s authority and without making any effective attempt to involve the Plaintiff.

48. This Court finds that D2 had no authority to consent to the Orders for Sale. D2 was a bare trustee that had divested all beneficial interest under the 1999 SPA. The IPA gave the Plaintiff not D2, the authority to deal with the lands. The Consent Judgment confirms this. D2’s consent was given without authority and is not binding on the Plaintiff.

49. The Plaintiff raises two further procedural irregularities. First, that D1 recycled the same Form 16D that had been used in OS 135, which was set aside by the Court of Appeal. PW-1 testified : “The Form 16D in the current three Orders for Sale is the same 16D that was thrown out by Court of Appeal back in year 2018 and 2019”.

50. Second, that no fresh Notice of Demand was issued to the Plaintiff before OS 450-452, despite the Court of Appeal having set aside OS 135 and substantial repayments having been made.

51. DW2 agreed at trial that no fresh Form 16D was issued after the Court of Appeal set aside the previous order on the same Facility. While **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 D1 relies on Clause 9 of the Letter of Offer (waiver of prior notice), and submits that the original 2017 NOD/F16D were sufficient for all properties under the same Facility, this Court is not satisfied that recycling a Form 16D previously set aside by the Court of Appeal, without issuing a fresh notice reflecting the changed circumstances (including substantial repayments), complied with the spirit and purpose of the NLC’s notice requirements.

52. This Court has carefully considered D1’s and reply submission and observed that D1’s defence rests on two principal pillars. The “NLC Complete Code” Defence

53. D1 submits that the NLC is a complete code and that strict compliance with the statutory foreclosure procedure is sufficient. D1 argues it was entitled to proceed against D2 as the registered chargor under Section 256 NLC and had no obligation to notify or include the Plaintiff.

54. This Court accepts that the NLC establishes the procedural framework for foreclosure. This Court accepts that proceedings are commenced against the chargor. However, this Court does not accept that procedural compliance immunizes a chargee from the **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 consequences of fraud. Section 340(2)(a) NLC itself recognizes that fraud defeats registered interests. A party cannot invoke the NLC’s procedural framework as a shield while simultaneously acting in a manner that defeats the substantive rights of a known beneficial owner. As the Plaintiff’s reply submission puts it, D1’s position that it had “no obligation” to notify the Plaintiff is itself evidence of the fraudulent intent. The Plaintiff’s Own Failures

55. D1 submits that the Plaintiff bears responsibility for its predicament by failing to lodge caveats, complete title transfers, or take immediate action upon receiving the inadvertent letter in July 2020. D1 also points to PW1’s credibility issues under cross-examination, including the blanket refusal to acknowledge banking documents and contradictions regarding default and compliance with the 2015 Settlement Agreement.

56. This Court accepts that the Plaintiff’s failure to lodge caveats or complete transfers over more than 20 years was imprudent. This Court also notes PW1’s credibility difficulties under cross-examination. However, these matters do not absolve D1 of liability. The Plaintiff’s omission to register does not authorize D1 to obtain orders for the sale of the Plaintiff’s property without the Plaintiff’s knowledge, especially where D1 possessed actual knowledge of the Plaintiff’s interest. Two wrongs do not make a right. More importantly, the documentary evidence, namely the Notes of **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 Proceedings, the affidavit substitution, the Bank’s own 1999 PPA, the YAZ correspondence, speaks for itself and does not depend on PW1’s credibility. The Adverse Inference Contest

57. D1 invokes Section 114(g) Evidence Act 1950 against the Plaintiff for not cross-examining DW1 specifically on fraud. The Plaintiff invokes the same provision against D1 for failing to call Cik Aini Suraya.

58. This Court finds the Plaintiff’s adverse inference argument stronger for the following reasons –

(ii) DW3’s admissions were already damaging to D1 without further cross-examination on fraud; and

(iii) Cik Aini Suraya, by contrast, was the YAZ solicitor who appeared at the OS 450-452 hearing, who corresponded with the Plaintiff’s solicitors and who authored the 24 September 2020 letter. She was uniquely positioned to explain why the Plaintiff was excluded and why the Orders for Sale were concealed. D1’s failure to call her warrants a strong adverse inference under Section 114(g). **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 The Damages Objection

59. D1 relies on Golden Star & Ors v. Ling Peek Hoe & Anor & Another Appeal [2024] 4 MLRA 345 to argue that the Plaintiff cannot unilaterally bifurcate the trial and that its prayer for “damages to be assessed” is impermissible. This Court shall address this under Issue 2. Finding on Issue 1

60. For the reasons above, this Court finds that the consent Orders for Sale dated 2 September 2020 in OS 450, OS 451 and OS 452 were obtained in circumstances that vitiate them. The Plaintiff has established –

61. Accordingly, the Orders for Sale dated 2 September 2020 in OS 450, OS 451 and OS 452 are set aside. Issue 2 : Damages

62. The Plaintiff claims damages against D1. D1 submits, relying on Golden Star & Ors v. Ling Peek Hoe & Anor & Another Appeal [2024] 4 MLRA 345, that the Plaintiff cannot unilaterally bifurcate the trial and that its failure to adduce evidence on quantum at trial is fatal to its damages claim.

63. This Court observed that the evidence on quantum is limited. The Plaintiff did not adduce detailed evidence of specific quantifiable losses at trial. The 154 subdivided lands have not been sold at **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 auction as the execution proceedings (AE 875-877) were stayed by this Court. The primary loss claimed, i.e. the RM5 million discrepancy between the RM13 million stated in the Orders for Sale and the approximately RM9 million stated by DW-2 as outstanding, was identified but not fully particularized.

64. This Court is mindful of the Federal Court's caution in Golden Star against conducting trials in a truncated fashion. However, in the circumstances of this case, where the Court has found fraud and the execution proceedings were stayed, justice requires that the Plaintiff be afforded the opportunity to prove its damages. The question of damages, if any, shall be assessed separately. Court’s Decision

65. For the reasons set out above, this Court makes the following orders–