17.6 Embition cannot use the excuse that Progress Certificate no. 20 was wrongly certified to avoid paying KESB. [18] In this respect, I have noted that learned counsel for Embition has contended amongst others that the Adjudicator should have called the Architect to explain and referred to several case laws which show that the Architect when certifying is independent and cannot be imputed on parties. It was thus submitted that the Adjudicator had erroneously made a finding of fact/law on who the Architect is acting for, which is contrary to clause 11.1.c of the LA. [19] With respect, I agree with learned counsel for KESB that Embition ought to have raised all its defences with regards the said Progress Certificate No. 20 and/or the issues against the Architect for issuing the same and that Embition’s failure to do so was on its own peril and cannot be faulted on the Adjudicator. [20] Be that as it may, after considering Embition’s contentions and after going through the AD as mentioned above, I hold that the Adjudicator had identified, considered and analyzed the relevant documents and had asked himself the rights questions on this issue including in particular, but not limited to, Embition’s allegations that all variation works are subject to Embition’s approval and his decision thereafter that it was “..not open for the Respondent to distant itself from the certification by the Architect….”. [21] It was only after such analysis that the Adjudicator had come to his decision on the same. Whether his answer is one which is right or wrong is something which this Court will not interfere as that would be going into the merits of the matter which, according to settled law, this Court cannot do in an application to set aside the AD under section 15 CIPAA. Stay Application Under OS 80 [22] I have consequently considered OS 80, which is the Stay Application pursuant to section 16 of the Arbitration Act 2005 on the ground of that the AD should be stayed pending the disposal of the Arbitration proceedings. [23] It is trite that the fact there is an arbitration proceeding between the parties does not automatically mean that there is to be a stay of the AD, and that both the Adjudication proceedings and the Arbitration proceedings can exists independently. I quote and rely on the Federal Court’s decision in Martego Sdn Bhd v Arkitek Meor & Chew Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2019] MLJU 742 where the Court had stated: “[76] …We are fully in agreement with the learned High Court Judge that there is nothing to stop CIPAA 2012 from applying to the case at hand and there is no need to see adjudication and arbitration to be mutually exclusive to each other. …..” and quoting and adopting what the learned High Court Judge in the matter below had stated on the matter which was as follows: “… After the introduction of Adjudication, both Arbitration and Litigation will still continue except that now there is an additional dispute resolution mechanism of temporary finality that can be embarked upon before or concurrently with Arbitration or Litigation as the case may be. Thus, one need not have to choose in an “either or” approach between Adjudication and Arbitration but one can proceed in a “both and” approach in resolving a dispute on an architect’s claim against his client for his professional fees. Adjudication under CIPAA was never designed to be in conflict with Arbitration and Litigation and so its process may be activated at any time where there is a valid payment claim under a construction contract. Premised on that proper perspective, the question of which would prevail over the other does not arise at all.” (emphasis added)” [24] I further find that the test of exceptional circumstances to justify a stay application has not been proven to the satisfaction of this Court. Justice Mary Lim (now FCJ) had in Subang Skypark Sdn Bhd v Arcradius Sdn Bhd [2015] 11 MLJ 818 that a stay should only be granted in exceptional circumstances and wherein Her Ladyship stated as follows: - “[32] It is my further view that stay should only be granted in exceptional circumstances; and such circumstances must necessarily refer to the financial status of the other party. The merits of the case before the arbitration or the court; or even the chances of success in setting aside the adjudication decision are not relevant considerations. The grant of any stay must always weigh in the primary object of the CIPAA 2012; that it is to ensure a speedy resolution of a payment dispute; that it is to inject much needed cashflow into the contractual arrangements between parties that saw progressive payments of claims as the recognised and accepted way of doing business in construction contracts. It would be futile to encourage parties to resort to adjudication and then deprive a successful claimant of its claim by staying the access to the cash simply because there is another proceeding of the nature described in sub-s 16(1) which is pending. The whole concept of temporary finality would be lost and the object of the Act defeated if such was the consideration.” [25] Thus, based on the above tests and the same grounds I have afore mentioned for this Court in dismissing the Setting Aside of the AD herein, I dismiss the said Stay Application under OS 80. Enforcement of AD [26] Since this Court has dismissed the application for Setting Aside of the AD, and there is to date no payment of the same from Embition to KESB’ I hold that there is nothing to prevent the AD from being enforced pursuant to section 28 of CIPAA.