(c) it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the company is unable to pay its debts, and in determining whether a company is unable to pay its debts the Court shall take into account the contingent and prospective liabilities of the company. [22] Three features of this structure bear emphasis. First, limbs (a) and (b) are deeming provisions: upon proof of the specified primary facts - a statutory notice of demand unmet for twenty-one days, or execution returned unsatisfied - the company is deemed unable to pay its debts, and the evidential burden shifts to the company. Secondly, limb (c) contains no deeming element: it requires the petitioner to prove, to the satisfaction of the Court, that the company is in fact unable to pay its debts. Thirdly, a petitioner who invokes neither presumption necessarily rests its case on limb (c) and assumes the full burden of proof which that limb imposes. [23] The test of inability to pay debts under limb (c) is commercial insolvency: whether the company is able to meet its current demands as and when they fall due. In Malayan Plant (Pte) Ltd v Moscow Narodny Bank Ltd [1980] 2 MLJ 53 (PC), the Privy Council accepted that a company is unable to pay its debts where it cannot meet the current demands upon it, notwithstanding that its assets, if realised, might exceed its liabilities; and their Lordships, describing as "impeccable" the observations in Buckley on the Companies Acts (13th Edn) at p 460 on commercial insolvency, reaffirmed that the statutory winding-up provision vests in the Court a wide discretion, regard being had always to the statutory provision itself. In Sri Hartamas Development Sdn Bhd v MBf Finance Bhd [1992] 1 CLJ (Rep) 303 (SC), the Supreme Court expressly followed Malayan Plant and applied the same test of commercial insolvency, adopting the observations in Buckley on the Companies Act (13th Edn) at p 460: a company may be at the same time insolvent and wealthy; it may have wealth locked up in investments not presently realisable, but if it has no assets available to meet its current liabilities, it is commercially insolvent and may be wound up. To like effect is Re Sanpete Builders (S) Pte Ltd [1989] 1 MLJ 393 (HC, Singapore), where it was held, adopting McPherson on The Law of Company Liquidation (3rd Ed) at p 54, that the primary meaning of the phrase "unable to pay its debts" is insolvency in the commercial sense - inability to meet current demands, irrespective of whether the company is possessed of assets which, if realised, would enable it to discharge its liabilities in full; that insolvency in this form is principally a question of fact which may be established in any number of ways; and that proof that a creditor's debt has not been paid does not per se establish an inability to pay debts. Equally settled is the proposition that winding-up proceedings are not a mode of execution. In Maril-Rionebel (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor v Perdana Merchant Bankers Bhd and other appeals [2001] 4 MLJ 187 (CA), the Court of Appeal (per Gopal Sri Ram JCA, at p 198) held that "a petition for winding up is not execution, for a winding up petition is not based upon any judgment of a court. Normally, it is based on the inability of a company to pay its debts as and when they fall due". A statutory notice of demand is not a condition precedent to the presentation of a petition; but where a petitioner proceeds without the benefit of the statutory presumptions, what is needed is compelling evidence of the company's inability to pay its debts as and when they fall due. [25] The procedural framework is supplied by the Rules. Rule 26 requires every petition to be verified by an affidavit referring to it, sworn after and filed within four days after presentation, and provides that the affidavit "shall be prima facie evidence of the statements in the petition". Rule 24 requires every petition to be advertised in Form 4, seven clear days (or such longer time as the Court directs) before the hearing, once in the Gazette and twice at least in two local newspapers, with the prescribed contents. Rule 24(b) further provides that an advertisement of a petition for the winding-up of a company which does not contain the note as to notice of intention to appear shall be deemed irregular; and rule 19(d) provides that where any matter was wrongly or inaccurately gazetted or advertised, it shall be re-gazetted or re-advertised with the necessary amendments and alterations. Rule 25(1) governs service and provides, so far as material, that every petition shall be served upon the company at its registered office "by leaving a copy with any member, officer, or servant of the company there, or in case no such member, officer, or servant can be found there, then by leaving a copy at the registered office or principal place of business, or by serving it on such member or members of the company as the Court may direct". Rule 28(1) requires every person who intends to appear on the hearing of a petition to serve on the petitioner or his solicitor notice of that intention, so served or, if sent by post, so posted as in the ordinary course of post to reach the address given not later than 12.00 noon of the day previous to the day appointed for the hearing; and by rule 28(3) a person who has failed to comply shall not, without special leave of the Court, be allowed to appear on the hearing. Rule 29(1) requires the petitioner or his solicitor to prepare a list, in Form 9, of the names and addresses of the persons who have given notice of their intention to appear and of their respective solicitors; and rule 29(2) provides that on the day appointed for hearing the petition a fair copy of the list or, if no notice of intention to appear has been given, a statement to that effect shall be handed by the petitioner or his solicitor to the Court prior to the hearing of the petition. Rule 21(b) requires, in the case of an advertisement in connection with a winding-up by the Court, that a copy of the newspaper or Gazette in which the advertisement appeared be delivered to the Official Receiver; rule 192(3) is to like effect, requiring one copy of each local newspaper containing such an advertisement to be left with the Official Receiver or liquidator by the person who inserts the advertisement. Rule 21(c) provides that the memorandum of advertisement is prima facie evidence that the advertisement was published in the Gazette or newspaper mentioned in it - but of nothing more. Rule 31(1) requires the petitioner, when filing the petition, to nominate in writing an approved liquidator, and rule 31(2) requires the nominee's written consent to be obtained and filed before the hearing; by rule 31(3), if no approved liquidator is nominated, the Court shall on making a winding-up order appoint an approved liquidator or the Official Receiver as it deems fit. Finally, rule 194(1) provides that no proceedings under the Act or the Rules shall be invalidated by any formal defect or any irregularity, unless the Court is of the opinion that substantial injustice has been caused by the defect or irregularity and that the injustice cannot be remedied by any order of the Court. The rule saves form; it does not supply substance. It presupposes that the substantive requirements of the winding-up jurisdiction - proof of the statutory ground, and the due bringing of the company before the Court have been met. It cannot be invoked to create evidence which does not exist. E. ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION Issue (a): Whether Inability To Pay Debts Is Pleaded And Proved [27] The starting point is the state of the pleading. The intitulement of the Petition invokes section 465(1)(e) and section 466 generally. The body of the Petition, however, does not identify which limb of section 466(1) is relied upon. It pleads the default judgment of 16.05.2025 (paragraph 6), the computation of the total indebtedness (paragraph 8), and the bare conclusion (paragraph 10) that the Respondent "adalah tak solven dan tidak berupaya membayar hutanghutangnya". No notice of demand under section 466(1)(a) is pleaded or exhibited. No execution upon the judgment, still less any return of execution unsatisfied within section 466(1)(b), is pleaded. It follows that the Petition can only rest on section 466(1)(c), and the Petitioner bears the burden of proving, to the satisfaction of the Court, that the Respondent is in fact unable to pay its debts. [28] A petition which invokes section 466(1)(c) must plead the primary facts said to constitute the inability, not merely assert the statutory conclusion. That is not a technicality. The function of the petition is to define the case which the company must meet and upon which the Court must adjudicate; and where, as here, the petition is unopposed, the pleaded facts - verified on affidavit - are the very material upon which the Court is asked to act. A pleading which asserts only that the company "is insolvent and unable to pay its debts" pleads the conclusion of the statutory inquiry, not its premises. On that ground alone the Petition is defective in substance. [29] The deficiency is not repaired by the evidence; it is compounded by it. The judgment debt proves indebtedness. It does not, without more, prove inability to pay. As Maril-Rionebel (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor v Perdana Merchant Bankers Bhd (supra) makes clear, a winding-up petition is not founded upon the judgment as such but upon the company's inability to pay its debts as and when they fall due; and absent the statutory presumptions there must be compelling evidence of that inability. Non-payment of a single judgment debt is, by itself, equivocal. It may evidence inability to pay; it may equally evidence unwillingness to pay, or ignorance of the judgment - a possibility which cannot be excluded on this record, where the judgment was entered in default of appearance and the certificate of non-appearance recites service of the writ on a date which is impossible on its face (paragraph [9] above; see further paragraph [45] below). The election of the Petitioner neither to serve a demand after judgment nor to attempt execution deprives the Court of precisely the objective indicia which sections 466(1)(a) and (b) are designed to generate. [30] The only financial material in the cause papers is the SSM corporate information search (Lampiran-A). Its financial information page records "Nil" throughout and states on its face that the information derives from the company's documents registered as at 07.02.2024. That document does not establish the Respondent's cash-flow position, its current assets and liabilities, the existence or extent of other creditors, whether any demand remains unpaid, whether any execution has failed, or whether the Respondent can meet its debts as they presently fall due. A nil record of registered financial information is evidence that documents have not been lodged with the Registrar; it is not evidence of commercial insolvency in April 2026, still less as at the hearing in July 2026. To treat it otherwise would be to convert a filing default into proof of insolvency. [31] Nor does the Afidavit Menentusahkan Petisyen advance the matter. It performs the office assigned to it by rule 26, and no more: it verifies the Petition. Rule 26 renders the verifying affidavit prima facie evidence of "the statements in the petition". But the only statement in the Petition directed to insolvency is the unparticularised conclusion in paragraph 10. Verification cannot give evidential content to a pleading which has none. The prima facie effect of rule 26 attaches to statements of fact; it cannot transform a bare assertion of the statutory conclusion into proof of the matters which section 466(1)(c) requires the Court to be satisfied of, including the company's position as to contingent and prospective liabilities, of which the papers say nothing at all. I have considered whether the Court could nonetheless infer inability to pay from the combination of an unpaid judgment debt of some eleven months' standing, the closed state of the registered office on 06.05.2026, the process server's note that the company secretary claimed to have resigned, and the Respondent's failure to appear. The contention cannot be accepted. An inference must rest upon proved primary facts, and it must be the more probable conclusion from those facts, not a speculation among possibilities. The facts relied upon are as consistent with a company which has ignored, or remained unaware of, the proceedings as with one which cannot pay its debts. None of them speaks to the company's ability to meet current demands: there is no evidence of any demand made and unmet after judgment, no evidence of dishonoured payments, no evidence of cessation of business at the Respondent's business address in Port Dickson - which the process server never attended - and no balance sheet or other financial evidence of any kind. The material before the Court is not weak evidence of insolvency which the absence of opposition might fortify; it is the absence of evidence. The standard set by Maril-Rionebel is not approached. [33] Two further defects in the Petition, though not independently decisive, bear on the integrity of the petitioning debt and must be recorded. First, the interest component. Paragraph 8 pleads interest of RM51,043.72, calculated at 5% per annum on RM983,222.00 from 14.04.2025 to 27.04.2026. On an ordinary simple-interest computation, 378 days yields approximately RM50,912.04 and 379 days yields approximately RM51,046.73. Neither produces the pleaded figure, and no calculation schedule accompanies the Petition or the verifying affidavit. The discrepancy is small, but the petition debt is the foundation of a class remedy, and the sum verified and presented to the Court as the precise indebtedness must be exact or explained. It is neither. [34] Secondly, paragraph 3 of the Petition pleads that the Respondent has a nominal capital of RM200,000.00 divided into 200,000 shares of RM1.00 each. That pleading is wrong in law. Section 74 of the Companies Act 2016 provides that " [a]ll shares issued before or upon the commencement of this Act shall have no par or nominal value". The SSM search itself records an issued share capital of RM200,000.00 comprising 200,000 ordinary shares; it attributes no nominal value to any share. The error is amendable and would not, standing alone, defeat the Petition; but a winding-up petition is a formal document upon which the Court is asked to act, and it must state the company's capital accurately and in accordance with the law in force for nearly a decade. [35] The answer to Issue (a) is therefore that the Petition neither pleads nor proves that the Respondent is unable to pay its debts within section 465(1)(e) read with section 466(1) of the Companies Act 2016. The statutory ground on which the Petition stands is not made out. That conclusion is dispositive of the Petition. Issue (b): Whether Service Under Rule 25 Was Effected And Sufficiently Proved [36] Although Issue (a) determines the outcome, the state of the proof of service is a matter of substance on which, had it stood alone, the Petition could not have proceeded to an order, and it is appropriate that the deficiencies be identified. [37] Rule 25(1) prescribes a hierarchy. The primary mode is service at the registered office by leaving a copy with a member, officer or servant of the company there. The secondary mode, available only "in case no such member, officer, or servant can be found there", is leaving a copy at the registered office. The tertiary mode is service on such member or members as the Court may direct. An affidavit of service must therefore enable the Court to determine which permitted mode was in fact employed and that its conditions were satisfied. [38] Measured against that requirement, paragraph 6 of the Afidavit Penyampaian is materially ambiguous. It does not name the company secretary said to have been encountered on 07.05.2026. It does not state whether that person was physically present at the registered office. It does not state whether the documents were tendered to and refused by that person, or whether the refusal extended only to signing an acknowledgment while the documents were accepted. It does not state precisely where the documents were left, or with whom, or in what manner - whether through a letter box, at a counter, affixed to a door or otherwise. And it does not aver that no member, officer or servant of the company could be found at the registered office, which is the condition upon which the secondary mode of leaving the documents depends. [39] The handwritten endorsements exhibited within Eksibit-3 deepen, rather than resolve, the difficulty. The endorsement of 06.05.2026 records that the individual telephoned by the process server said that he had resigned as the Respondent's company secretary "since a long time ago"; the endorsement of 07.05.2026 records that the "company secretary refused to receive" the documents for that same reason, and that the documents were "left at their office". Yet the SSM search generated on 27.04.2026 continues to record the named individual as the Respondent's secretary, appointed on 12.04.2022. More significant still, Eksibit-3 contains a second search: a "Particulars of Company Secretary" search printed on 12.05.2026 - after both attendances at the registered office - which continues to record Nicholas Ee Herng Wai as the company secretary of the Respondent, appointed on 12.04.2022, and which returns "No Information" against the particulars of any previous company secretary. The Petitioner's own search, obtained after the very events deposed to, therefore records no resignation and no cessation of office at all; and it contradicts the process server's account more forcefully than the search of 27.04.2026, for it cannot be answered by the possibility that a resignation had simply not yet found its way onto the register by the date of the earlier search. The conflict is unexplained. If the person encountered had in truth ceased to be an officer of the Respondent, then leaving the documents with him, or refusal by him, was neither service upon an "officer" within the primary mode nor, without more, proof that no officer or servant could be found. If the documents were left "at their office" - the office of the secretarial firm or former secretary - the affidavit does not establish, in terms, that this is one and the same as the Respondent's registered office, although the covering letter is addressed there. These are not matters on which the Court should be left to reconstruct events from marginalia. [40] There is a further vice in the manner of proof: the affidavit under-deposes to its own exhibits. Paragraph 4 of the Afidavit Penyampaian deposes only that on 06.05.2026 at 11.55 a.m. the deponent attended at the registered address to effect service and found the office closed. It says nothing of the telephone conversation of that day. The fact that the deponent spoke with Nicholas Ee Herng Wai, and that he claimed to have resigned as the Respondent's company secretary "since a long time ago", appears only in the handwritten endorsement upon the exhibited covering letter; it is nowhere sworn to in the body of the affidavit. Yet that fact bears directly upon whether any officer of the company could be found at the registered office - the very condition upon which the secondary mode of service under rule 25(1) depends - and upon the reliability of the account of what occurred on the following day. A material fact of that order must be deposed to; it cannot be left in the margin of an exhibit. The deponent's marginalia are not testimony, and an exhibit cannot supply an averment which the affidavit does not make. [41] There is a further and related contradiction. Paragraph 6 of the affidavit asserts both that the documents were left at the registered address and that the secretary refused to sign acknowledgment of receipt; the endorsement asserts a refusal to receive. The two accounts have different legal consequences. If the secretary accepted the documents but declined to sign, service upon an officer at the registered office may well have been effected under the primary mode. If he refused to accept them, the affidavit must then establish the conditions and manner of the secondary mode. The affidavit, as drawn, does not permit the Court to determine which of these occurred. Finally, the sealed copy of the Petition and verifying affidavit said to have been left at the registered office is not itself exhibited or identified in the exhibits to the Afidavit Penyampaian, which comprise the acknowledgments of the Insolvency Department and SSM, the covering letters and the SSM searches. Rule 25 contemplates proof of service of the sealed petition; the documents served should be identifiable from the affidavit and its exhibits. This omission is evidential and would have been curable by a supplemental affidavit producing the sealed copy served; but it was not cured. [43] Service of the petition is not a formality. It is the act by which the company is brought before the Court in proceedings which, if they succeed, divest it of its assets and its management and take effect against the world. Deficiencies of this kind are accordingly not to be waved through under rule 194 as matters of form. At the same time, the deficiencies here are deficiencies of proof - possibly of narrative rather than of the underlying events - and might have been met by a further affidavit from the process server deposing with precision to what occurred. The contradiction presented by the search of 12.05.2026, however, is not a matter of narrative alone; it required to be confronted squarely on oath, and it was not. Because the Petition fails in any event on Issue (a), it is unnecessary to decide whether the state of the proof of service would, standing alone, have warranted dismissal rather than an adjournment to cure, and I expressly leave that question open. It suffices to hold, as I do, that on the papers as they stand due service under rule 25 has not been satisfactorily proved. [44] A further matter bearing upon the bringing of the Respondent before the Court must be noticed. The endorsement upon the Petition, as it appears on the face of Enclosure 1, appointed the Petition to be heard on 03.07.2026 at 9.00 a.m., and the sealed copies delivered and left on 06.05.2026 and 07.05.2026 would accordingly have borne that date. The Petition was in fact heard on 17.07.2026, the date consonant with the gazetted notice, which fixed 12.00 noon on 16.07.2026 as the time by which notices of intention to appear must reach the Petitioner's solicitors. It may be that the hearing date was refixed at the case management of 02.06.2026; but nothing in the cause papers evidences that notice of the substituted hearing date was ever given to the Respondent. Advertisement is notice to the world of creditors and contributories; it is not a substitute for informing the company itself - served, if served at all, with process returnable on one date - that the hearing will take place on another. On the papers as they stand, therefore, even had service on 07.05.2026 been satisfactorily proved, the Respondent's absence at the hearing on 17.07.2026 could not safely be equated with default in the face of due notice. This too was a matter for a supplemental affidavit; none was filed. [45] One further documentary matter falls under this head: the recital in the Perakuan Ketidakhadiran, noticed at paragraph [9] above, that the writ and statement of claim were served on the Respondent "pada 7 Mac 2024 pada 22 April 2025". Service on 07.03.2024 is impossible: it would precede the filing of the Sessions Court action by more than a year. The recital is in all likelihood a clerical error, and it does not of itself impeach the sealed default judgment, which remains in force unless and until set aside. But the certificate forms part of the evidential foundation by which the Petitioner proves the judgment debt in these proceedings, and the error which affects the very question of whether and when the Respondent was made aware of the claim against it - called for explanation, or for production of the actual Sessions Court affidavit of service. Neither was forthcoming. The inconsistency reinforces the conclusion, reached under Issue (a), that the Respondent's awareness of the judgment, and hence the significance of its non-payment, cannot simply be assumed. Issue (c): Advertisement, Gazette And The Remaining Requirements Of The Rules [46] In point of time and frequency of publication the advertisement was compliant with rule 24. The Petition was advertised twice in each of two local newspapers - Berita Harian on 01.07.2026 and 02.07.2026 and the New Straits Times on 01.07.2026 and 02.07.2026 - and once in the Gazette on 03.07.2026, in each case more than seven clear days before the hearing on 17.07.2026. Compliance in point of content, however, is a distinct question, and on the material exhibited it is not made out (paragraphs [47] and [48] below). [47] The requirement of rule 24 is not merely that a petition be advertised, but that it be advertised in Form 4; and rule 24(b) prescribes what the advertisement must contain - the date on which the Petition was presented, the name and address of the Petitioner and of its solicitor, and, at the foot, the note as to notice of intention to appear. The burden of proving due advertisement in the prescribed form lies upon the Petitioner. That burden is not discharged on the exhibits before me. The newspaper advertisements are exhibited, both to the Afidavit Pengiklanan dan Perwartaan and to the Memorandum Pengiklanan, as complete newspaper pages, within which the advertisement of this Petition appears as one small entry among many; and the text of that entry is not legible on the exhibits as filed. The Court is in consequence unable to read the newspaper advertisements, and unable to satisfy itself that they were in Form 4, that they stated the particulars required by rule 24(b), or that they carried the note without which such an advertisement is deemed irregular. What ought to have been exhibited is a clear cutting, or a legible copy, of the advertisement as it appeared in each issue. Proof that an advertisement of some kind was published is not proof that the advertisement which rule 24 requires was published. [48] The gazetted notice (Lampiran E; Warta Kerajaan Persekutuan No. 20667 of 03.07.2026) is, by contrast, legible. It states the date of presentation, the names and addresses of the Petitioner and of its solicitors, and the note required by rule 24(b) fixing 12.00 noon on 16.07.2026 as the time by which notice of intention to appear must reach the Petitioner's solicitors; to that extent it answers to Form 4. It is, however, inaccurate in a material respect. The Petition, the verifying affidavit and the intitulement of these proceedings found the Petition upon section 465(1)(e) read with section 466 of the Companies Act 2016; the gazetted notice describes the Petition as brought under section 465(1)(e) and section 406 of that Act. Section 406 is not section 466, and is not a provision upon which this Petition is, or could properly be, founded. The averment in paragraph 5 of the Afidavit Pengiklanan dan Perwartaan, that the notice gazetted was the "same" as that published in the newspapers, is to that extent inaccurate. The imprecision, moreover, appears on the face of Enclosure 6 itself, before the Gazette is even opened: paragraph 3 of the affidavit describes the Berita Harian advertisement under the title "Notis Pengiklanan Petisyen", while paragraph 4 describes the New Straits Times advertisement under the title "Advertisement of Petition". The affidavit thus applies differing descriptions to the very notices which paragraph 5 asserts to be the "same", and - the newspaper exhibits being illegible - affords the Court no means of verifying that assertion against the documents themselves. The misdescription of the statutory foundation of the Petition in the gazetted notice is an inaccuracy of exactly the kind to which rule 19(d) is directed. It is not a slip which rule 194(1) simply overlooks, but a matter which rule 19(d) requires to be corrected by re-gazettement before the Petition is fit to be heard on its merits. [49] The proof of the advertisement is another matter. The Afidavit Pengiklanan dan Perwartaan applies a single exhibit mark, "Eksibit N-1", to three distinct classes of publication the Berita Harian notices in the national language, the English-language advertisement in the New Straits Times, and the gazetted notice - and a single exhibit certificate in like terms accompanies the affidavit. The publications are not one document, and the practice creates uncertainty as to precisely which documents were authenticated by the Commissioner for Oaths. Each newspaper issue and the Gazette notice ought to have been separately identified and separately marked. The difficulty is aggravated by the cause papers themselves: Enclosure 6 marks all five publications under the single mark "Eksibit N-1", while Enclosure 7 annexes the identical five publications as Lampiran A to E. Two incompatible schemes of identification are thus applied to the same material within the same set of papers, and no publication carries a single consistent mark by which the Court can be satisfied that the document authenticated before the Commissioner for Oaths under Enclosure 6 is the very document annexed to Enclosure 7. Taken in isolation this would be a formal irregularity: the identity and dates of the publications are independently ascertainable from the Memorandum Pengiklanan, which lists the five publications and annexes each as Lampiran A to E. But it does not stand in isolation. Coupled with the illegibility of the newspaper advertisements, it compounds rather than cures the difficulty already described, for the Memorandum is, by rule 21(c), prima facie evidence only that an advertisement was published - not of what the advertisement contained. [50] One further inconsistency appearing on the face of the cause papers falls to be recorded under this head. The endorsement to the Petition states that it is filed by Tetuan Marcia Lopez & Sharifah Zuraida of No. 18-17-A Menara Gurney, Persiaran Gurney, 10250 Pulau Pinang; the Afidavit Menentusahkan Petisyen, and the Sessions Court judgment and certificate of non-appearance exhibited within Lampiran-B, give the same firm's address as 27-D, Menara Gurney, No. 18 Persiaran Gurney, 10250 Pulau Pinang. Rule 24(b) requires the advertisement to state the name and address of the Petitioner's solicitor, and the note which the advertisement must carry directs that notices of intention to appear be delivered or sent to that address. Where the cause papers themselves carry two different addresses for the same firm, and the newspaper advertisements cannot be read, the Court is unable to be satisfied that a creditor or contributory minded to appear was directed consistently to the correct address. The discrepancy is doubtless clerical and would have been amendable; but exactness in these particulars is not optional in proceedings of this nature. [51] Compliance with rule 21(b) and rule 192(3) stands differently. Those provisions require that a copy of each newspaper and of the Gazette containing the advertisement be delivered to, or left with, the Official Receiver. The memorandum filed in Court is, by rule 21(c) and rule 192(4), prima facie evidence that the advertisements were published; it is not evidence that the delivery requirement was fulfilled, and nothing else in the papers addresses it. The requirement is not idle: it ensures that the Official Receiver, whose appointment as liquidator is sought in the prayers, has notice of the proceedings advertised. The omission was capable of cure by further affidavit; it was left uncured. [52] The list of persons attending the hearing stands on a different footing. Rule 29(2) required the Petitioner or its solicitors to hand to the Court, on the day appointed for the hearing and prior to it, a fair copy of the list prepared under rule 29(1) or, where no notice of intention to appear had been given, a statement to that effect. The Senarai Pihak-Pihak Yang Menghadiri Pendengaran Suatu Petisyen (Enclosure 10) answers Form 9 and performs both offices: it sets out the prescribed tabular particulars and records "Tiada". It was filed through the electronic filing system on 16.07.2026 at 10.37 p.m. - the evening before the day appointed, rather than upon it. The deviation works no mischief. The latest time by which any notice of intention to appear could as of right have reached the Petitioner's solicitors was, by rule 28(1) and the note in the gazetted notice, 12.00 noon on 16.07.2026; a statement made after that hour accordingly speaks to the whole of the period within which such notice could have been given, and its lodgment on the eve of the hearing placed it before the Court prior to the hearing, which is the object of the rule. Any departure from the letter of rule 29(2) in the time and mode of delivery is a formal irregularity within rule 194(1) which occasions no injustice to anyone, and I treat Enclosure 10 as sufficient compliance. It is right that this instance of compliance be recorded. Two observations only need be added: first, the statement does not, and could not, foreclose an application for special leave to appear under rule 28(3), though none was made; secondly, Enclosure 10, which identifies the hearing date as 17.07.2026, is the Petitioner's own document - it evidences the Petitioner's knowledge of the substituted date, and does nothing to supply the want, noted at paragraph [44] above, of proof that the Respondent was notified of it. 3] As to the liquidator: rule 31(1) required the Petitioner, when filing the Petition, to nominate in writing an approved liquidator, and rule 31(2) required the nominee's written consent to be filed before the hearing. No approved liquidator was nominated; the Petition prays instead for the appointment of the Official Receiver. Rule 31(3) contemplates precisely this event and empowers the Court, on making a winding-up order, to appoint an approved liquidator or the Official Receiver as it deems fit. The absence of a nomination is accordingly not an independent bar to relief, and I do not treat it as such; it is, however, a further respect in which the papers do not conform to the scheme of the Rules, and it would fall to be regularised in any properly constituted petition. [54] Drawing the threads of Issue (c) together: the defects in exhibit marking (including the incompatible schemes of identification applied by Enclosures 6 and 7 to the same publications) and the inconsistent statement of the solicitors' address, like the mispleading of the share capital and the unexplained interest computation, are formal or amendable matters which rule 194(1) could accommodate, and the requirement of rule 29(2) was, for the reasons given, met in substance (Enclosure 10). But two of the matters raised under this head are not of that order. The Court cannot verify from the exhibits that the newspaper advertisements were in Form 4 or contained the particulars and the note that rule 24 requires, so that due advertisement in the newspapers is not proved; and the gazetted notice misdescribes the statutory basis of the Petition, an inaccuracy which rule 19(d) requires to be corrected by re-gazettement and which rule 194(1) does not simply excuse. The failure to demonstrate delivery of the publication copies to the Official Receiver is a compliance failure capable of cure but not cured. Had the substance of the Petition been in order, these advertisement deficiencies would not have been passed over; they would have required at least re-advertisement and further proof before any order could issue. But rule 194 cannot supply what is absent at the core of the Petition: proof of the statutory ground of inability to pay debts, and satisfactory proof that the company was duly served. Form can be forgiven; defective advertisement must be put right; substance cannot be presumed. F. CONCLUSION [55] The three issues are answered as follows. On Issue (a), the Petition does not plead the limb of section 466(1) relied upon, pleads no primary facts of insolvency beyond the existence of a judgment debt, and is supported by no evidence whether by statutory demand, execution, financial material or otherwise capable of proving to the satisfaction of the Court that the Respondent is unable to pay its debts. On Issue (b), due service of the Petition under rule 25 has not been satisfactorily proved on the affidavit as filed, though it is unnecessary to decide whether that deficiency alone would have compelled dismissal. The affidavit of service, moreover, under-deposes to its own exhibits, stands contradicted by the Petitioner's own company-secretary search of 12.05.2026, and is unaccompanied by any proof that the Respondent was notified of the substituted hearing date of 17.07.2026. On Issue (c), the advertisement was timeous and sufficient in frequency, but its regularity in content is not established: the newspaper advertisements are not legible on the exhibits and cannot be shown to be in Form 4 or to contain the note required by rule 24(b), while the gazetted notice misdescribes the statutory foundation of the Petition and falls to be corrected under rule 19(d). The remaining irregularities identified - the incompatible schemes of exhibit identification applied to the same five publications, the inconsistent statement of the solicitors' address and the unproved delivery of the publication copies to the Official Receiver - would each have required rectification before a winding-up order could properly be made; the statement required by rule 29(2) was, by contrast, duly placed before the Court (Enclosure 10). These matters reinforce, but are not the primary ground of, the dismissal. [56] The consequence is that the Petition fails at its foundation. Where a petition is proved in substance and only the machinery of proof lags behind, the proper course will ordinarily be an adjournment with directions to cure. That course is not open here, because what is wanting is not machinery but the substance of the statutory ground itself: the Court would not be permitting the Petitioner to perfect its proof, but inviting it to construct, for the first time, a case which the Petition never pleaded. A winding-up order made on this material, unopposed though the Petition was, would rest on assertion rather than proof, and the in rem character of the order makes that impermissible. The scrutiny which the Court applies to an unopposed petition is more exacting, not less, precisely because no contradictor stands between the petitioner and the order. [57] Nothing in these grounds forecloses the Petitioner's remedies. The judgment of the Sessions Court stands, and the ordinary processes of execution remain available. So too does the winding-up jurisdiction, upon a fresh petition properly framed: one which identifies the limb of section 466(1) invoked and pleads and proves the facts that limb requires - whether a statutory notice of demand under section 466(1)(a) left at the registered office and unmet for twenty-one days, or execution returned unsatisfied under section 466(1)(b), or evidence of actual commercial insolvency under section 466(1)(c) - supported by an affidavit of service which proves, with precision, a mode of service permitted by rule 25. The dismissal of this Petition is accordingly without prejudice to the presentation of a fresh petition on proper material. G. ORDERS OF THE COURT [58] For the reasons given, the Court orders as follows: