Kss Timber Sdn Bhd v 1. ) Pengarah Jabatan Perhutanan (CB-25-8-11/2023)

1.

KERAJAAN NEGERI PAHANG …RESPONDEN-RESPONDEN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN Pendahuluan [1] Kesentosaan kehidupan masyarakat adalah bergantung kepada pelaksanaan tanggungjawab oleh Badan-badan Awam yang diberikan amanah menguruskan negara. Badan-badan Awam tidak boleh sekali-kali bertindak tanpa mematuhi lunas undang-undang. Pada masa yang sama undang-undang tidak boleh menjadi kekangan menghalang Badan-badan Awam menunaikan tanggungjawab masing-masing seperti diperuntukkan oleh undang-undang. [2] Mahkamah mempunyai tugas yang penting untuk memastikan keseimbangan tersebut. Ia juga penting bagi memastikan individu tidak ditekan oleh pihak berkuasa seperti yang dinyatakan oleh Yang Amat Arif Raja Azlan Shah dalam kes Pengarah Tanah Dan Galian, Wilayah Persekutuan v. Sri Lempah Enterprise Sdn Bhd [1979] 1 MLJ 135. Kini, perkembangan undang-undang pentadbiran telah memaparkan kesedaran dan mengembangsuburkan prinsip kebertanggungjawaban Badan-badan Awam dalam melaksanakan fungsi dan peranan masing-masing seperti yang telah ditetapkan oleh undang-undang. Keputusan yang dibuat oleh Badan-badan Awam tersebut adalah tertakluk kepada semakan kehakiman yang menjadi tanggungjawab Mahkamah. Perkara ini telah disimpulkan dengan menarik oleh Yang Amat Arif Tun Tengku Maimun Tuan Mat, Ketua Hakim Negara dalam kes SIS Forum (Malaysia) & Anor v. Jawatankuasa Fatwa Negeri Selangor & Ors [2025] MLRAU 172 seperti yang berikut: “[3] In all civilised democracies with independent Judiciaries, judicial review applications are routine against the Executive branch of Government for decisions and omissions they make in the exercise or non-exercise of their discretion. In most cases, the subject matter of the exercise of discretion is not the main issue in the plaint rather it is the manner in which the decision was made and/or concerns a review on the legal basis upon which such power was exercised or not exercised.” [3] Begitu juga Mahkamah Agong di United Kingdom telah menyentuh sedikit berkenaan dengan semakan kehakiman yang sepatutnya dilakukan secara pantas dan berkesan. Ini dinyatakan dalam kes Re McAleenon’s application for judicial review (Northern Ireland) [2025] 1 All ER 577 di mana Lord Sales dan Lord Stephens menyatakan: “[41] Judicial review is supposed to be a speedy and effective procedure, in respect of which disputes of fact which have a bearing on the legal question to be determined by the court – that is, whether the public authority has acted lawfully – do not generally arise. A public authority is subject to a duty of candour to explain to the court all the facts which it took into account and the information available to it when it decided how to act. [42] Given the nature of the legal question to be determined by the court and the duty of candour, the usual position is that a judicial review claim can and should be determined without the need to resort to procedures, such as cross-examination of witnesses, which are directed to assisting a court to resolve disputed questions of fact which are relevant in the context of other civil actions, where it is the court itself which has to determine those facts. In judicial review proceedings the court is typically not concerned to resolve disputes of fact, but rather to decide the legal consequences in the light of undisputed facts about what information the public authority had and the reasons it had for acting. (This is not to say that such procedures are not available in judicial review: cross-examination is available and will be allowed 'whenever the justice of the particular case so requires': O'Reilly v Mackman [1983] 2 AC 237, 283 per Lord Diplock; but usually, given the issues which arise in a judicial review claim, the justice of the case does not require it).” [4] Pemohon dalam kes ini memohon:

Satu perintah Certiorari untuk membatalkan dan/atau mengetepikan keputusan oleh Responden Pertama dan Kedua menerusi surat bertarikh 20.07.2023 ("Keputusan tersebut") yang diterima oleh Pemohon pada 3.08.2023 yang membatalkan kelulusan untuk mengeluarkan saki baki kayu balak dan kayu jaras bagi projek membina jalan dari Kampung Mat Daling, Jerantut, Pahang Ke Kampung Pasir Raja, Dungun, Terengganu (Blok B) seluas ± 60.64 hektar (± 149.84 ekar) di Tanah Kerajaan, Hutan Simpan Gunung ais dan Hutan Simpan Gunung Aais Tambahan, Mukim Ulu Tembeling, Daerah Jerantut ("Kawasan Pembalakan tersebut") dengan alasan bahawa Keputusan tersebut adalah menyalahi undang-undang, tidak sah, tidak mengikut undang-undang, tidak rasional, tidak munasabah, dibuat tanpa mengambil kira jangkaan wajar (legitimate expectation) Pemohon dan melanggar hak Pemohon untuk didengar dan/atau tidak mengendahkan hak Pemohon kepada hasil hutan di Kawasan Pembalakan tersebut;

(ii) Satu Perintah Mandamus bagi Responden Pertama dan Kedua untuk memberi kelulusan bagi Lesen Mengambil Hasil Hutan kepada Pemohon menerusi Majlis Pengurusan Komuniti Kampung (MPKK);

(iii) Satu deklarasi bahawa Responden Pertama dan Kedua telah bertindak bertentangan dengan kuasa berkanun yang diperuntukkan di bawah Akta Perhutanan Negara 1984 dalam membatalkan kelulusan bagi kawasan pembalakan tersebut dan menafikan kelulusan Lesen Mengambil Hasil Hutan;

(iv) Satu deklarasi bahawa Responden Pertama dan Kedua telah bertindak bertentangan dengan keadilan asasi (natural justice) dengan membuat keputusan untuk membatalkan kelulusan untuk kawasan pembalakan tersebut dan menafikan kelulusan Lesen Mengambil Hasil Hutan secara unilateral tanpa memberi sebarang peluang kepada Pemohon untuk didengar;

Satu deklarasi bahawa tindakan Responden Pertama dan Kedua dalam membatalkan kelulusan bagi kawasan pembalakan tersebut dan menafikan kelulusan Lesen Mengambil Hasil Hutan memungkiri jangkaan wajar (legitimate expectation) dan hak ke atas hasil hutan di bawah lesen tersebut; dan

(vi) Satu deklarasi bahawa Responden Pertama dan Kedua terikat untuk melaksanakan keputusan yang diberikan paa 30.03.2022 menerusi surat bertarikh 20.04.2022 apabila mereka meluluskan permohonan untuk mengeluarkan saki baki kayu balak dan kayu jaras bagi projek membina jalan di Kawasan pembalakan tersebut. [5] Pemohon juga memohon gantirugi daripada Responden-Responden. Keputusan yang diperbahaskan [6] Keputusan yang menjadi pertikaian dalam kes ini ialah pada 30.03.2022 Majlis Mesyuarat Kerajaan (MMK) Negeri Pahang telah bersetuju dan meluluskan permohonan pindaan luas bagi Permohonan Kelulusan Mengeluarkan Saki Baki Kayu Balak Dan Kayu Jaras Bagi Projek Membina Jalan Dari Kampung Mat Daling, Jerantut, Pahang ke Kampung Pasir Raja, Dungun, Terengganu [Blok B]. Kelulusan tersebut telah diberikan kepada Pengerusi Jawatankuasa Pembangunan Dan Keselamatan Kampung (JPKK) Kampung Bantal, Jerantut, Pahang. Terdapat juga kelulusan yang sama bagi Blok A dan Blok C kawasan tersebut. [7] Pada 14.06.2023, Majlis Mesyuarat Kerajaan (MMK) dalam mesyuarat yang ke-21/2023 telah membatalkan keputusan yang telah diberikan pada 30.03.2022 tersebut. Surat pembatalan tersebut dialamatkan juga kepada Pengerusi JPKK Kampung Bantal, Jerantut, Pahang. [8] Mahkamah juga mendapati terdapat perjanjian di antara JPKK Kampung Kampung Bantal, Jerantut, Pahang dengan KSS Timber Sdn Bhd iaitu Pemohon dalam kes ini. Ia dikenali sebagai perjanjian pembalakan bertarikh 19.07.2022 bagi Blok B. [9] Mahkamah juga mendapati bahawa lesen mengambil hasil hutan di bawah Borang 1 seksyen 21 (3) Akta Perhutanan Negara 1984 telah dikeluarkan kepada Pengerusi JPKK Kampung Bantal, Jerantut, Pahang dan di dalam lesen tersebut tercatat nama kontraktor Dato’ Haji Abdul Satar bin Haji Jalil di atas nama Syarikat KSS Timber Sdn Bhd. [10] Pada masa yang sama Mahkamah juga meneliti dokumen yang dikeluarkan oleh KSS Timber Sdn Bhd bertarikh 02.05.2023 yang memohon supaya sambungan diberikan bagi lesen membalak bagi tujuan pengeluaran kayu balak dan kayu jaras. Apa yang jelas terdapat perhubungan Pejabat Hutan Daerah Jerantut yang telah menulis surat kepada pihak Pengerusi JPKK Kampung Bantal, Jerantut, Pahang berkenaan dengan urusan di kawasan pembalakan tersebut. [11] Mahkamah juga mendapati terdapat beberapa dokumen seperti kebenaran untuk permit jalan di bawah Borang 7 Akta Perhutanan Negara 1984 dikeluarkan atas nama KSS Timber Sdn Bhd. Begitu juga kebenaran untuk projek pengeluaran saki baki kerja-kerja pembalakan yang dialamatkan kepada KSS Timber Sdn Bhd bertarikh 30.01.2023. [12] Apa yang jelas daripada penelitian kepada dokumen-dokumen tersebut ialah lesen adalah lesen diberikan kepada JPKK Kampung Bantal, Jerantut, Pahang. Sementara kontraktor yang dilantik adalah KSS Timber Sdn Bhd. [13] Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa terma-terma perjanjian pembalakan di antara JPKK Kampung Bantal, Jerantut, Pahang dan KSS Timber Sdn Bhd telah dinyatakan dengan jelas dalam perjanjian pembalakan tersebut. Sebaliknya urusan berkenaan dengan kelulusan pembatalan dibuat oleh pihak Responden Kedua kepada Pengerusi JPKK Kampung Bantal, Jerantut, Pahang. [14] Mahkamah mendapati tiada sebarang dokumen yang menunjukkan bahawa Pengerusi JPKK Kampung Bantal, Jerantut, Pahang pada bila-bila masa mempersoalkan atau mempertikaikan keputusan pembatalan tersebut. Asas kepada permohonan Pemohon [15] Pemohon menyatakan dia telah tidak diberikan peluang untuk membuat representasi kepada Responden Kedua sebelum keputusan pembatalan itu dibuat. Ini telah menyebabkan Responden Kedua telah bertindak dengan tidak memberi peluang kepada Pemohon untuk didengar. [16] Pihak Responden dalam hujahannya menyatakan bahawa keputusan oleh Responden itu boleh dirayu oleh Pemohon. Namun di dalam surat pembatalan tidak dinyatakan berkenaannya. Responden bersandarkan kepada peruntukan yang dinyatakan di dalam Undang-Undang Tubuh Kerajaan Pahang. Adalah dihujahkan oleh Pemohon bahawa Pemohon tidak boleh dianggap mengetahui hak merayu tersebut. Ini adalah disebabkan ia tidak dizahirkan di dalam mana-mana dokumen. [17] Responden-Responden dalam kes ini telah tidak memfailkan affidavit jawapan. Ini adalah disebabkan Mahkamah ini telah menolak permohonan Responden untuk memfailkan affidavit jawapan di luar masa. Permohonan itu dibuat selepas 7 bulan berlalu. Semasa permohonan pelanjutan pemfailan affidavit jawapan tersebut, Responden-Responden telah menyatakan bahawa ianya adalah disebabkan terdapatnya siri perbincangan Pemohon dan pihak Responden bagi penyelesaian kes ini. Di samping itu terdapatnya pertukaran pegawai yang mewakili Responden-Responden dalam kes ini. Setelah menimbangkan hujahan dan alasan tersebut Mahkamah berpendapat ianya tidak mewajarkan perlanjutan tempoh masa pemfailan affidavit tersebut. Mahkamah ini berpendapat masa yang diambil oleh Responden adalah terlalu lama dan gagal mengambil tindakan sewajarnya untuk memfailkan affidavit jawapan tersebut. Tanggungjawab Responden-Responden berterus terang dan kegagalan memfailkan affidavit jawapan [18] Mahkamah dalam perkara ini juga perlu mengambil kira tanggungjawab Responden untuk berterus terang (duty of candour) berkenaan dengan keputusan yang dibuat oleh Responden. Tanggungjawab berterus terang ini telah dinyatakan dalam kes Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur v Perbadanan Pengurusan Trellises & Ors and other appeals [2023] 3 MLJ 829 seperti yang berikut: “ [543] This duty of candour is a duty that public authorities should exercise, not least because they are expected to assist the court with ‘full and accurate explanations of all the facts relevant to the issue which the court must decide’ and that this duty extends to disclosure of ‘materials which are reasonably required for the court to arrive at an accurate decision’. [544] We cite with approval from R (on the application of Bancoult (No 2) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2016] UKSC 35: … ” [19] Tanggungjawab berterus terang ini adalah bagi membolehkah Mahkamah mendapatkan maklumat-maklumat yang mencukupi bagi memutuskan sama ada keputusan yang dibuat oleh Badan Awam tersebut perlu disemak atau sebaliknya. Perkara ini telah dijelaskan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan di United Kingdom dalam kes R v Lancashire County Council, ex parte Huddleston [1986] 2 All ER 941. Sir John Donaldson MR menyatakan seperti yang berikut: “… But in my judgment the position is quite different if and when the applicant can satisfy a judge of the public law court that the facts disclosed by her are sufficient to entitle her to apply for judicial review of the decision. Then it becomes the duty of the respondent to make full and fair disclosure. Notwithstanding that the courts have for centuries exercised a limited supervisory jurisdiction by means of the prerogative writs, the wider remedy of judicial review and the evolution of what is, in effect, a specialist administrative or public law court is a post-war development. This development has created a new relationship between the courts and those who derive their authority from the public law, one of partnership based on a common aim, namely the maintenance of the highest standards of public administration.” [20] Majlis Privy juga menyatakan berkenaan dengan keperluan untuk berterus terang oleh pihak Responden bagi membolehkan Mahkamah membuat keputusan yang tepat. Ini dinyatakan dalam Graham v Police Service Commission and another [2011] UKPC 46; [2011] WIR 404 seperti yang berikut: “ [18] It is well established that a public authority, impleaded as respondent in judicial review proceedings, owes a duty of candour to disclose materials which are reasonably required for the court to arrive at an accurate decision.” [21] Mahkamah ini juga meneliti bagaimana pemakaian tanggungjawab berterus terang digunapakai dalam satu prosiding semakan kehakiman. Ini dapat dilihat dalam kes R (on the application of Bancoult No 2) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No 4) [2017] AC 300. Dalam kes tersebut terdapat kelewatan dalam mengemukakan dokumen yang melibatkan seorang yang dinyatakan sebagai Rashid. Mahkamah juga memutuskan bahawa kegagalan mengemukakan dokumen tersebut adalah tidak disengajakan dan Mahkamah Agong di United Kingdom telah menyatakan seperti yang berikut: “ Delay 181 The respondent has claimed that there was undue delay in making the application to reopen the appeal. I do not consider that there is any merit in that claim. The Rashid documents were disclosed on 1 May 2012, in the course of the Bancoult (No 3) proceedings. The applicant sought to raise the issue of their non-disclosure in those proceedings. He was not permitted to do so. It was held that the feasibility study had not played a part in the decision to create a marine protected area [2014] Env LR 2, paras 81-93, judgment given on 11 June 2013. That decision was appealed to the Court of Appeal, and judgment was given in the Court of Appeal [2014] 1 WLR 2921 on 23 May 2014. 182 The applicant then sought to resolve the matter by inviting the respondent to agree that the judgment in the present action should be set aside by consent. This request was made in a letter dated 5 December 2013. It was refused on 5 January 2014. Counsel's opinion was obtained on 26 January 2014 and legal aid was applied for immediately. It was eventually granted on 29 September 2014. There is no suggestion that the applicant was in any way responsible for delay between the submission of the application for legal aid and its grant. The application form was filed on 9 January 2015. There was no culpable delay on the part of the applicant. Duty of candour 183 A respondent's duty of candour in judicial review proceedings is summarised in Fordham's Judicial Review Handbook, 6th ed

(2012), p 125: “A defendant public authority and its lawyers owe a vital duty to make full and fair disclosure of relevant material. That should include (1) due diligence in investigating what material is available; (2) disclosure which is relevant or assists the claimant, including on some as yet unpleaded ground; and (3) disclosure at the permission stage if permission is resisted … A main reason why disclosure is not ordered in judicial review is because courts trust public authorities to discharge this self-policing duty, which is why such anxious concern is expressed where it transpires that they have not done so.” 184 In R (Quark Fishing Ltd) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2002] EWCA Civ 1409 at [50] Laws LJ said, “there is a … very high duty on public authority respondents, not least central Government, to assist the court with full and accurate explanations of all the facts relevant to the issue which the court must decide.” The duty extends to disclosure of “materials which are reasonably required for the court to arrive at an accurate decision”: Graham v Police Service Commission [2011] UKPC 46 at [18]. The purpose of disclosure is to “explain the full facts and reasoning underlying the decision challenged, and to disclose relevant documents, unless, in the particular circumstances of the case, other factors, including those which may fall short of public interest immunity, may exclude their disclosure”: R (AHK) v Secretary of State for Home Department (No 2) [2012] EWHC 1117 (Admin) at [22]. 185 The Rashid documents should have been disclosed. That is accepted by the respondent. They contained material that was obviously germane to the issues between the parties. The fact that they were not disclosed, despite numerous pointed requests for their production and the circumstance that, in some instances, their very existence was denied are deeply disturbing. The failure to locate the documents throughout the proceedings before the Divisional Court, the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords is not merely unfortunate, it is plainly reprehensible. 186 But I am not persuaded that the non-production of the documents until the hearing in Bancoult (No 3) was deliberate. The applicant has accepted as much, having said in his written case that the non-disclosure of the documents may “conceivably” have been due to an oversight. I believe that the preponderance of evidence suggests that this is the most likely explanation, although it was a grievous oversight and one which, it is to be hoped, will be so regarded by the relevant authorities. An omission by government to disclose such material as was contained in the Rashid documents and its failure thereby to discharge its duty of candour was wholly unacceptable when such a fundamental right was at stake. [22] Ia adalah seperti yang dinyatakan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan yang telah memetik perenggan [183] dan [184] kes tersebut dalam kes Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur v Perbadanan Pengurusan Trellises & Ors and other appeals (supra). [23] Pada masa yang sama Mahkamah juga perlu melihat bagaimanakah pihak Responden boleh menunaikan tanggungjawab untuk berterus terang tersebut. Ini telah dinyatakan oleh Majlis Privy dalam kes Belize Alliance of Conservation Non-Governmental Organisations v Department of the Environment and Another (No 2) [2004] UKPC 6 seperti yang berikut: “[86] Similar observations have been made in many later cases, including several decisions of the House of Lords. It is now clear that proceedings for judicial review should not be conducted in the same manner as hard-fought commercial litigation. A respondent authority owes a duty to the court to co-operate and to make candid disclosure, by way of affidavit, of the relevant facts and (so far as they are not apparent from contemporaneous documents which have been disclosed) the reasoning behind the decision challenged in the judicial review proceedings.” [24] Pengemukaan maklumat-maklumat oleh pihak Responden adalah tanggungjawab penting untuk membantu Mahkamah membuat keputusan dengan tepat. Ia dinyatakan dalam kes R (on the application of Quark Fishing Ltd) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2002] EWCA Civ 1409 seperti yang berikut: “50. Mr Parker submits, correctly, that there is no duty of general disclosure in judicial review proceedings. However there is - of course - a very high duty on public authority respondents, not least central government, to assist the court with full and accurate explanations of all the facts relevant to the issue the court must decide. The real question here is whether in the evidence put forward on his behalf the Secretary of State has given a true and comprehensive account of the way the relevant decisions in the case were arrived at. If the court has not been given a true and comprehensive account, but has had to tease the truth out of late discovery, it may be appropriate to draw inferences against the Secretary of State upon points which remain obscure: see Padfield [1968] AC 997, per Lord UpJohn at 1061G - 1062A.” [25] Mahkamah ini juga berpeluang untuk meneliti garis panduan yang menarik berkenaan dengan prinsip berterus terang yang telah dirumuskan kepada 10 perkara penting yang perlu diberikan perhatian. Ini dinyatakan oleh Yang Arif Hakim Fordham dalam kes R (on the application of Police Superintendents’ Association) v Police Remuneration Review Body and another [2024] 1 WLR 166. Pada hemat Mahkamah rumusan tersebut menarik untuk memahami dan menghayati tanggungjawab berterus terang oleh Responden. YA Hakim menyatakan seperti yang berikut: “15 For the purposes of analysing the issue with which I am concerned, I can identify the following as relevant principles. For ease of later cross-referencing, I will give each principle a label. I will identify, for each, some of the supporting sources, to which I will add references to the JR Guide 2022 and to passages in Gardner and JM:

The “Standard Disclosure” Principle. In judicial review, unlike most civil claims (CPR Pt 31), the parties are not generally required to give standard disclosure of documents (CPR PD 54A, para 10.2), which means simply giving or offloading lots of documents is unnecessary and inappropriate (Hoareau, paras 19–20). (JR Guide 2022, para 15.1.1; Gardner, para 22.)

The “Just Disposal” Principle. In judicial review, the test for ordering disclosure of specific documents or categories of documents (CPR r 31.12(1)) is necessity to resolve the matter fairly and justly (Tweed, para 3), a test also governing requests in judicial review for further information (CPR r 18.1: see R (Bredenkamp) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2013] Lloyd’s Rep FC 690, para 19) and cross-examination. (JR Guide 2022, paras 7.6.2, 11.2.2; Gardner, paras 25, 27, 29 and 35.)

The “Candid Disclosure” Principle. Judicial review is conducted with all cards face upwards on the table (Huddleston, p 945F), meaning full and fair disclosure of all “relevant material” so the court can decide whether the public authority acted lawfully (Bancoult, para 192), based on an underlying principle that public authorities are engaged in a common enterprise with the court to fulfil the public interest in upholding the rule of law (Hoareau, para 20). (JR Guide 2022, para 15.3.5, Gardner, para 20; JM, para 90.)

The “Information-Too” Principle. Candid disclosure also requires that relevant facts be identified in witness statement evidence, insofar as unapparent from disclosed contemporaneous documents (Belize, para 86), which means breach of the duty can lie in non-disclosure of a material document or the omission or obscuring in a witness statement of a fact or identified significance of a fact or document (Citizens UK, para 106(4)). (JR Guide 2022, para 15.3.5; Gardner, para 21.)

The “Relevant Material” Principle. Candid disclosure is required of (a) those materials reasonably required for the court to arrive at an accurate decision (Graham, para 18), (b) full and accurate explanations of all the facts relevant to the issue that the court must decide (Quark, para 50; Citizens UK, para 106(3); Hoareau, para 20) and (c) a true and comprehensive account of the way in which relevant decisions in the case were arrived at (Quark, para 50; Downes, para 21) including the underlying reasoning (CPR PD 54A, para 10.1). (JR Guide 2022, paras 15.3.1, 15.3.4; Gardner, para 20; JM, para 90.)

The “Non-Selectivity” Principle. Candid disclosure must not be selective but must include the unwelcome along with the helpful (Taylor, para 60; Graham, para 18; Hoareau, para 21). (JR Guide 2022, para 15.3.5.)

The “Best Evidence” Principle. Documents should be produced, not gisted or a secondary account given, since the document is the best evidence of what it says: Tweed, para 4; Hoareau, para 24; National Association, paras 47, 49). (JR Guide 2022, para 15.1.3; Gardner, para 21.)

The “Redaction” Principle. Documents need not be disclosed in their entirety but can be redacted (Tweed, para 33) for public interest immunity, confidentiality, legal professional privilege or statutory restriction. (JR Guide 2022, para 15.5.1.)

The “Permission Stage” Principle. The duty of candour applies prior to—and for—the court’s consideration of whether to grant permission for judicial review, though what is required to discharge the duty at the substantive stage will be more extensive (Terra Services, paras 9, 14), and the limited nature of disclosed material could inform a decision to grant permission (R (Sky Blue Sports & Leisure Ltd) v Coventry City Council [2014] BLGR 34, para 25). (JR Guide 2022, para 15.3.2.)

The “Unpleaded Grounds” Principle. The duty of candour extends to documents and information which will assist the claimant’s case or may give rise to further grounds of challenge which might not otherwise occur to the claimant: De Smith’s Judicial Review, 9th ed (2023), para 16-026; “Treasury Solicitor’s Guidance on Discharging the Duty of Candour and Disclosure in Judicial Review” [2010] JR 177, para 1.2; R (K) v Secretary of State for Defence [2014] EWHC 4343 (Admin) at [11]; after R v Barnsley Metropolitan Borough Council, Ex p Hook[1976] 1976] 1 WLR 1052, 1058C–D (cited in Graham [2011] UKPC 46 at [18]).” [26] Mahkamah ini juga perlu menimbangkan sama ada kegagalan memfailkan affidavit jawapan oleh pihak Responden telah menyebabkan Responden gagal menunaikan tanggungjawab untuk berterus terang di dalam prosiding semakan kehakiman ini. Adakah ini bermakna permohonan semakan kehakiman ini wajar dibenarkan disebabkan tiadanya penjelasan berkenaan dengan keputusan-keputusan yang dibuat oleh Responden. [27] Kegagalan untuk memfailkan affidavit jawapan tersebut seperti yang dinyatakan di perenggan [17] di atas menyebabkan Mahkamah hanya dapat melihat satu bahagian daripada keterangan iaitu affidavit yang difailkan oleh pihak Pemohon. Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Overseas Investment Pte Ltd v Anthony William O’Brien & Anor [1988] 3 MLJ 332 yang menyatakan seperti yang berikut: “The plaintiff attached these goods and had them sold on the basis that the goods belonged to the defendant. But what evidence was there to support that contention? None whatsoever except the say-so of the plaintiff's solicitors in the writ of seizure and sale. The plaintiff did not file any affidavit to contradict the affidavits filed by the claimant. Where a case is to be decided on a contest of affidavits, the rule is clear. Material allegations which are not contradicted are deemed to be admitted: see Tynte v Buller (1854) 23 LJ Ch 504; 2 WR 309. At the hearing, the claimant's oral evidence that she was the sole owner of the goods was also unchallenged.” [28] Begitu juga dengan kes Ng Hee Thong & Anor v Public Bank Bhd [1995] 1 MLJ 281 berkenaan dengan prinsip yang sama iaitu apabila ketiadaan affidavit jawapan difailkan, apakah pendekatan yang perlu dilakukan. Di dalam editorial notes yang dibuat dalam kes tersebut dinyatakan bahawa: “… where one party makes a positive assertion upon a material issue, the failure of his opponent to contradict it is usually treated as an admission by him of the fact so asserted.” Dan di muka surat 286 kes tersebut dinyatakan seperti yang berikut: “Now, it is a well settled principle governing the evaluation of affidavit evidence that where one party makes a positive assertion upon a material issue, the failure of his opponent to contradict it is usually treated as an admission by him of the fact so asserted: Alloy Automotive Sdn Bhd v Perusahaan Ironfield Sdn Bhd [1986] 1 MLJ 382; Overseas Investment Pte Ltd v Anthony William O'Brien & Anor [1988] 3 MLJ 332.” [29] Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Agong dalam kes Alloy Automotive Sdn Bhd v Perusahaan Iron Field Sdn Bhd [1986] 1 MLJ 382 di mana dalam kes tersebut Lee Hun Hoe, CJ Borneo menyatakan bahawa: “There is force in the appellant's contention that an affidavit must reply specifically to allegations, and if it does not, then those allegations not replied to must be taken to have been accepted.” [30] Pada masa yang sama Mahkamah juga perlu melihat kesan daripada ketiadaan penjelasan keputusan Responden seperti yang dinyatakan dalam kes Pahang South Union Omnibus Co Bhd v Minister of Labour and Manpower & Anor [1981] 2 MLJ 199 seperti yang berikut: “The scope of judicial review is narrower and limited and it would be useful and apposite to reproduce in extenso the delightfully lucid and comprehensive exposition on this aspect by Lord Denning M.R., in General Electric Co Ltd v Price Commission [1975] ICR 1 (at page 12), 12 when he stresses the supervisory nature of the jurisdiction: “Parliament often entrusts the decision of a matter to a specified person or body, without providing for any appeal. It may be a judicial decision, or a quasi-judicial decision, or an administrative decision. Sometimes Parliament says its decision is to be final. At other times it says nothing about it. In all these cases the courts will not themselves take the place of the body to whom Parliament has entrusted the decision. The courts will not themselves make the original findings of fact. They will not themselves embark on a re-hearing of the matter: see Healey v Minister of Health [1955] 1 QB 221. But, nevertheless, the courts will, if called upon, act in a supervisory capacity. They will see that the decision-making body acts fairly: see In re HK (An Infant) [1967] 2 QB 617, 630 and Reg v Gaming Board for Great Britain, Ex parte Benaim and Khaida [1970] 2 QB 417. The courts will ensure that the body acts in accordance with the law. If a question arises on the interpretation of words, the courts will decide it by declaring what is the correct interpretation: see Punton v Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance [1963] 1 WLR 186. And if the decision-making body has gone wrong in its interpretation, they can set its order aside: see Ashbridge Investments Ltd v Minister of Housing and Local Government [1965] 1 WLR 1320. (I know of some expressions to the contrary, but they are not correct.) If the decision-making body is influenced by considerations which ought not to influence it; or fails to take into account matters which it ought to take into account, the court will interfere: see Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] AC 997, 1007, 1061. If the decision-making body comes to its decision on no evidence or comes to an unreasonable finding — so unreasonable that a reasonable person would not have come to it — then again the courts will interfere: see Associated Provincial

Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB If the decision-making body goes outside its powers, or misconstrues the extent of its powers, then, too, the courts can interfere: see Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147. And, of course, if the body acts in bad faith or for an ulterior object, which is not authorised by law, its decision will be set aside: see Sydney Municipal Council v Campbell [1925] AC 338. In exercising these powers, the courts will take into account any reasons which the body may give for its decisions. If it gives no reasons — in a case when it may reasonably be expected to do so, the courts may infer that it has no good reason for reaching its conclusion, and act accordingly: see Padfield's case [1968] AC 997, 1007, 1061.” [31] Berdasarkan kepada duluan kehakiman berkaitan dengan kegagalan memfailkan affidavit jelas menunjukkan bahawa Mahkamah perlu menerima keterangan dalam affidavit tersebut disebabkan tiada sanggahan dibuat melalui affidavit jawapan atau affidavit balasan. Jika prinsip yang sama digunakan dalam kes ini ia bermakna segala penyataan dalam affidavit Pemohon telah tidak dapat disanggah oleh Responden. Apakah ini bermakna segala penyataan Pemohon tersebut adalah perlu diterima oleh Mahkamah? Pada hemat Mahkamah kegagalan memfailkan affidavit jawapan oleh pihak Responden tidak semestinya menunjukkan bahawa Responden telah tidak berterus terang kepada Mahkamah berkenaan dengan keputusan-keputusan yang dibuat oleh Badan Awam. [32] Mahkamah ini wajar menimbangkan sama ada terdapat apa-apa keengganan Responden mengemukakan dokumen-dokumen atau maklumat-maklumat yang telah diarahkan oleh Mahkamah melalui satu perintah penzahiran dalam prosiding semakan kehakiman ini. Ini adalah disebabkan bagi semakan kehakiman, terdapat peruntukan yang khusus berkenaan dengan penzahiran seperti yang terdapat di Aturan 53 kaedah 6 KKM 2012 seperti yang berikut: “6. Penzahiran, dsb. (A. 53 k. 6) Selepas kebenaran diberikan, mana-mana pihak kepada suatu permohonan bagi semakan kehakiman boleh memohon kepada Hakim untuk penzahiran dan pemeriksaan dokumen menurut Aturan 24, untuk mentadbirkan interogatori menurut Aturan 26, atau untuk memeriksa balas deponen mana-mana afidavit yang difailkan sebagai menyokong atau menentang permohonan itu menurut Aturan 38.” [33] Pemakaian Aturan 53 kaedah 6 KKM 2012 ini telah dijelaskan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Rekapacific Bhd v Securities Commission & Anor and Other Appeals [2005] 2 MLJ 269 seperti yang berikut: “4 The issue before us is whether the learned judge was wrong in adopting the aforesaid approach. Before addressing that question we think it useful to discuss the scope and practical effect of r 6 of the new O 53 that permits discovery and cross-examination. The first point to note is that these are new enabling provisions. As a matter of procedural history, certiorari and the other prerogative remedies were proceedings on the Crown side of the Queen's Bench Division and were not therefore civil proceedings. Section 2 of the Government Proceedings Act 1956 gives statutory recognition of this by excluding applications for prerogative remedies from the definition of ‘civil proceedings’ in that Act. The consequence was that at common law, discovery, whether of documents or by way of interrogatories were procedurally not available in an application for prerogative remedies. So, we see Denning LJ saying in Barnard v National Dock Labour Board [1953] 2 QB 18 that: In certiorari there is no discovery, whereas in an action for a declaration there is. 5 The second point that needs to be made — and made quite emphatically — is that it is only in very rare cases that either cross-examination or discovery or both should be permitted in judicial review proceedings. This is because questions of fact are rarely in dispute in judicial review proceedings. Of course, if there are any essential or fundamentally important questions of fact that are in serious dispute then the judicial review court would be entirely justified in ordering cross-examination to enable it to make the relevant finding of fact. 6 The same may be said of applications for discovery. It is now too well settled that where a public law decision is impugned on the ground of ‘Wednesbury’ unreasonableness or of proportionality (as is the position in the present instance) it is for the public decision-maker to provide reasons to justify his decision. And where a public decision-maker fails to provide reasons, then the court is entitled to conclude that he has no good reason for making the decision in question. No authority is required for this proposition, but if there is need to cite authority, then it suffices to quote from the judgment of the Federal Court delivered by Abdoolcader SCJ in Pahang South Union Omnibus Co Bhd v Minister of Labour and Manpower & Anor [1981] 2 MLJ 199 where his Lordship said: The scope of judicial review is narrower and limited and it would be useful and apposite to reproduce in extenso the delightfully lucid and comprehensive exposition on this aspect by Lord Denning MR, in General Electric Co Ltd v Price Commission [1975] ICR 1, 12 (at p 12) when he stresses the supervisory nature of the jurisdiction: Parliament often entrusts the decision of a matter to a specified person or body, without providing for any appeal. It may be a judicial decision, or a quasi-judicial decision, or an administrative decision. Sometimes Parliament says its decision is to be final. At other times it says nothing about it. In all these cases the courts will not themselves take the place of the body to whom Parliament has entrusted the decision. The courts will not themselves make the original findings of fact. They will not themselves embark on a re-hearing of the matter: see Healey v Minister of Health of Health [1955] 1 QB

But, nevertheless, the courts will, if called upon, act in a supervisory capacity. They will see that the decision-making body acts fairly: see Re HK (An Infant) [1967] 2 QB 617, 630 and Reg v Gaming Board for Great Britain, ex p Benaim and Khaida [1970] 2 QB 417. The courts will ensure that the body acts in accordance with the law. If a question arises on the interpretation of words, the courts will decide it by declaring what is the correct interpretation: see Punton v Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance [1963] 1 WLR 186. And if the decision-making body has gone wrong in its interpretation, they can set its order aside: see Ashbridge Investments Ltd v Minister of Housing and Local Government [1965] 1 WLR 1320. (I know of some expressions to the contrary, but they are not correct.) If the decision-making body is influenced by considerations which ought not to influence it; or fails to take into account matters which it ought to take into account, the court will interfere: see Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] AC 997, 1007, 1061. If the decision-making body comes to its decision on no evidence or comes to an unreasonable finding — so unreasonable that a reasonable person would not have come to it — then again the courts will interfere: see Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp [1948] 1 KB 223. If the decision-making body goes outside its powers, or misconstrues the extent of its powers, then, too, the courts can interfere: see Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147. And, of course, if the body acts in bad faith or for an ulterior object, which is not authorised by law, its decision will be set aside: see Sydney Municipal Council v Campbell [1925] AC 338. In exercising these powers, the courts will take into account any reasons which the body may give for its decisions. If it gives no reasons — in a case when it may reasonably be expected to do so, the courts may infer that it has no good reason for reaching its conclusion, and act accordingly: see Padfield's case [1968] AC 997 1007 1061. 7 Since it is for the public decision-maker to give reasons for his decision, it is open to a court for the just disposal of a judicial review application to require the decision-maker to make discovery of the material on which he based his decision. This would assist the court to determine whether any reasonable person similarly circumstanced as the decision-maker in question would have acted in like fashion. 8 Further, the general rule as to interrogatories is that: Although interrogatories must be confined to matters which are in issue, they may under some circumstances extend to facts the existence or non-existence of which is relevant to the existence or non-existence of the facts directly in issue. (See Marriott v Chamberlain (1886) 17 QBD 154; Osram Lamp Works Ltd v Gabriel Lamp Co (1914) 2 Ch 129). In considering whether the interrogatories should be allowed or not the court must consider whether they are designed to obtain admissions of facts which will reduce the issues, shorten the length of the trial and thus save costs (per Gill CJ (Malaya) in Sheikh Abdullah bin Sheikh Mohamed v Kang Kock Seng [1975] 1 MLJ 89). 9 In an application for judicial review, the ‘matters which are in issue’ and ‘facts the existence or non-existence of which is relevant to the existence or non-existence of the facts directly in issue’ are ex necessitae rei confined to the grounds of review set out in the judgment of Lord Denning quoted in para 6 of this judgment. And those are all matters which may, and in the vast majority of cases, must, be disposed of without the aid of discovery.” Ia juga dinyatakan dalam kes Tan Sri Dato' Sri Khalid Abu Bakar (DIG) Pengerusi Lembaga Tatatertib Polis DiRaja Malaysia & Ors v. Muhammad Farid Muntalib [2015] 1 LNS 15. [34] Apa yang jelas ialah di dalam kes ini tiada sebarang permohonan dibuat oleh Pemohon bagi penzahiran apa-apa dokumen dan tiada juga apa-apa keterangan yang menunjukkan bahawa Responden enggan membekalkan apa-apa dokumen kepada Pemohon. Apa yang ada hanyalah kegagalan pihak Responden memfailkan affidavit jawapan kepada permohonan semakan kehakiman ini. Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada kes Dato’ Sri Mohd Najib bin Tun Hj Abd Razak v. Menteri Dalam Negeri & Ors [2025] MLJU 1754. Dalam kes tersebut terdapat pendirian daripada pihak Responden bahawa Responden tidak berkewajipan untuk menunjukkan Titah Addendum yang dikeluarkan. Dalam konteks tersebut Mahkamah Rayuan melalui keputusan majoriti menyatakan antara lain seperti yang berikut: “[42] In opining so, we find the fact there is no rebuttal affidavit from the Respondent challenging the existence nor the authenticity of the copy Addendum Order and rather disturbing as the Senior Federal Counsel (SFC) representing the Respondents, Encik Syamsul Bolhassan, had on 5 December 2024 informed this panel that the Respondents were seeking for time for the purpose of verifying the copy of the Addendum Order filed vide Enc. 29 as the said Addendum Order was not a signed copy. [43] In answer to our question as to whether they are challenging the contents of the affidavit in support, the SFC answered that the Respondents are taking the stand that, firstly, the Applicant’s application is rather late and does not comply with the test in Ladd v Marshall (supra) and secondly, the Addendum Order has no force as it was made outside the Pardons Board meeting of 29.01.2024. [44] Given the fact that the affidavit in support had clearly stated that the deponent was informed by His Majesty that the original signed copy of the Addendum Order was given to the then Attorney General on 29.01.2024 itself (see paragraph 6 of Enc. 29), we find that the answer given by the learned SFC is rather damning for the following reasons: i. the failure to challenge the above averment tantamount to an admission by the Respondent that the original Addendum Order exists and hence was not frivolous. Support for this finding can be found in the Court of Appeal decision of Ng Hee Thoong v Public Bank [1995] 1 MLJ 281 where Gopal Sri Ram JCA as he then was held that, “where one party makes a positive assertion, upon a material issue, the failure of his opponent to contradict it is usually treated as an admission by him of the fact so asserted” (see also Alloy Automotive Sdn Bhd v Perusahaan Ironfield Sdn Bhd [1986] CLJ (Rep) 45). ii. Having initially taken the position that the Applicant’s leave application contains pure hearsay, is vexatious and frivolous, and, did not meet the minimum threshold of reliability, the Respondents ought not to be permitted to now change its position by saying, ‘Yes, the Addendum Order exists but you are barred from relying on it due to lateness’ (emphasis purely ours). This was indeed a clear example of lack of candour and lack of understanding on the duty of candour on the side of the Respondents. In other words, there was a non-disclosure or suppression of evidence on the existence of the Addendum Order, which was vehemently argued as hearsay i.e. based on evidence which is not credible. iii. Whilst, we do take cognisance that the Respondent had also taken the position that there is no duty on them to produce the Addendum Order, to say that the Appellant’s leave application was frivolous, despite the 3rd Respondent having full knowledge that the document sought exists as the said Addendum Order was sent and personally addressed to the 3rd Respondent’s office, is simply wrong. Had the truth been told about the existence of the Addendum Order, there would have been no necessity for the High Court and this panel to go thru the painstaking process of determining on the issue of hearsay. iv. In this regard, we echo the statement of Nalini Patmanathan FCJ in Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur v Perbadanan Pengurusan Trelisses (supra) at para 543: “Public authorities act in the public’s interest. As such a public authority owes a duty of candour in judicial review proceedings to make full and fair disclosure of all relevant materials. v. This duty of candour is a duty that the public authorities should exercise, not least because they are expected to assist the court with ‘full and accurate expectations of all the facts relevant to the issue which the court must decide’ and that this duty extends to disclosure of all ‘materials which are reasonably required for the court to arrive at an accurate decision’. …” [35] Sebaliknya dalam kes ini tiada sebarang keterangan yang menunjukkan Responden telah dihubungi bagi mendapatkan apa-apa dokumen atau maklumat yang enggan diberikan maklum balas oleh pihak Responden. Malahan dalam kes Dato’ Sri Mohd Najib bin Tun Hj Abd Razak v. Menteri Dalam Negeri & Ors (supra) Mahkamah Rayuan menyatakan ia melibatkan kebebasan individu yang memerlukan tindakan daripada Responden untuk mengemukakan maklum balas dan pengesahan yang dipohon. Hal ini tidak berlaku dalam kes ini. Oleh itu ia harus dibezakan dengan fakta dan keadaan kes Dato’ Sri Mohd Najib bin Tun Hj Abd Razak v. Menteri Dalam Negeri & Ors (supra). [36] Oleh itu Mahkamah ini berpendapat kegagalan memfailkan affidavit jawapan oleh Responden-Responden dalam kes ini tidak tergolong di dalam perlanggaran tanggungjawab Responden untuk berterus terang di dalam prosiding semakan kehakiman ini. Walau bagaimanapun kegagalan Responden-Responden memfailkan affidavit jawapan dalam tempoh yang ditetapkan adalah amat dikesali. Mahkamah ini berpendapat adalah menjadi amalan yang molek dan sempurna sekiranya affidavit jawapan difailkan oleh pihak Responden dalam tempoh yang ditetapkan tanpa memerlukan perintah pelanjutan tempoh masa untuk memfailkannya. Ini adalah sejajar dengan matlamat semakan kehakiman itu sendiri iaitu untuk membolehkan Mahkamah menyemak keputusan-keputusan Badan Awam itu serta dapat diberikan keputusan pada kadar yang segera agar hak pihak yang terkesan dengan keputusan tersebut dapat dipulihkan serta ia tidak mengganggu fungsi-fungsi Badan Awam yang membuat keputusan tersebut. Ia dapat memastikan prosiding semakan kehakiman dapat diputuskan dalam tempoh yang cepat dan keputusan yang tepat berdasarkan kepada maklumat-maklumat dan keterangan-keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh pihak-pihak di hadapan Mahkamah. Adakah keputusan Responden-Responden teratur atau memerlukan kepada semakan kehakiman? [37] Mahkamah ini perlu memberi perhatian bahawa prosiding semakan kehakiman ini adalah tidak seperti prosiding tuntutan sivil. Ia melibatkan semakan Mahkamah untuk melihat sama ada satu writ prerogatif boleh diberikan. Dalam konteks kes ini Mahkamah perlu menentukan sama ada keputusan yang diberikan oleh Responden Kedua adalah:

sah di sisi undang-undang;

adakah keputusan tersebut sesuatu yang tidak rasional; dan

adakah terdapat kejanggalan di dalam prosedur semasa proses membuat keputusan tersebut. [38] Pada hemat Mahkamah penentuan perkara ini boleh dibuat oleh Mahkamah ini dengan meneliti affidavit sokongan dan eksibit-eksibit yang dikemukakan oleh pihak Pemohon. Mahkamah ini adalah tidak sewajarnya tidak mempertimbangkan semakan kehakiman ini dengan hanya semata-mata disebabkan pihak Responden telah gagal memfailkan affidavit jawapan. Jika ini dilakukan Mahkamah ini telah gagal dalam menunaikan tanggungjawab untuk meneliti keputusan pihak Responden sama ada ianya telah memenuhi kriteria di perenggan [37] (a) hingga (c) di atas. [39] Mahkamah ini mendapati dalam affidavit sokongan Pemohon, Mahkamah dapat menemui berkenaan dengan permohonan kawasan pembalakan seluas 161.00 HA (Blok B) bagi projek membina jalan dari Kampung Mat Daling, Jerantut, Pahang ke Kampung Pasir Raja, Dungun, Terengganu daripada Pengerusi MPKK Kampung Bantal, Jerantut di eksibit “AS-3”, kelulusan permohonan pindaan luas bagi kelulusan mengeluarkan saki baki kayu balak dan kayu jaras bagi projek membina jalan dari Kampung Mat Daling, Jerantut, Pahang ke Kampung Pasir Raja, Dungun, Terengganu (Blok B) bertarikh 20.04.2022 di eksibit “AS-8”, perjanjian pembalakan di antara JPKK Kampung Bantal, Jerantut dan KSS Timber Sdn Bhd di eksibit “AS-5” dan surat pemakluman keputusan mesyuarat Majlis Mesyuarat Kerajaan (MMK) Negeri Pahang Kali Ke-21/2023 bertarikh 14.06.2023 yang membatalkan kelulusan mengeluarkan saki baki kayu balak dan kayu jaras bagi projek membina jalan dari Kampung Mat Daling, Jerantut, Pahang ke Kampung Pasir Raja, Dungun, Terengganu (Blok B) di eksibit “AS-17”. [40] Berdasarkan kepada keterbatasan keterangan dan maklumat yang ada di hadapan Mahkamah disebabkan Mahkamah ini hanya dapat bergantung kepada affidavit sokongan dan penyataan yang dikemukakan oleh Pemohon tanpa affidavit jawapan, Mahkamah ini perlu meneliti keputusan yang telah dibuat oleh pihak Responden bagi menentukan sama ada ia adalah mewajarkan satu semakan kehakiman dilakukan atau sebaliknya. [41] Mahkamah ini berpendapat bahawa Responden Kedua iaitu Kerajaan Negeri Pahang melalui Majlis Mesyuarat Kerajaan mempunyai kuasa untuk memutuskan bahawa suatu kelulusan yang telah diberikan dalam kes ini iaitu mengeluarkan saki baki kayu balak dan kayu jaras bagi projek membina jalan tersebut boleh dibatalkan atau sebaliknya. Keputusan pembatalan tersebut telah dimaklumkan kepada Pengerusi JPKK Kampung Bantal, Jerantut melalui surat daripada Timbalan Pengarah Perhutanan (Operasi), Jabatan Perhutanan Negeri Pahang bertarikh 20.07.2023 seperti yang terdapat di dalam affidavit “AS-17”. Pada surat tersebut telah dinyatakan bahawa keputusan Majlis Mesyuarat Kerajaan (MMK) yang memberikan kelulusan tersebut yang telah dibuat pada mesyuarat Majlis Mesyuarat Kerajaan (MMK) Kali Ke-13/2022 pada 30.03.2022 telah dibatalkan. Pemaklumkan kelulusan tersebut telah diberikan melalui surat oleh Pengarah Perhutanan Negeri kepada Pengerusi JPKK Kampung Bantal, Jerantut bertarikh 20.04.2022. [42] Pada hemat Mahkamah ini adalah di dalam wewenang Responden Kedua untuk membatalkan kelulusan yang telah diberikan sebelum ini bagi kelulusan mengeluarkan saki baki baki kayu balak dan kayu jaras di Kawasan tersebut. Apa yang menjadi asas kepada permohonan Pemohon ialah keputusan tersebut telah dibuat sebelum mendengar sebarang representasi daripada Pemohon. [43] Pada hemat Mahkamah keputusan yang dibuat oleh Responden Kedua melalui Majlis Mesyuarat Kerajaan (MMK) itu tanpa sebarang representasi daripada Pemohon tidak akan menyebabkan keputusan tersebut adalah tidak sah atau melampaui bidang kuasa Responden Kedua. Ini adalah disebabkan Responden Kedua telah memberikan kelulusan kepada Pengerusi JPKK Kampung Bantal, Jerantut. [44] Penelitian kepada affidavit sokongan dan penyataan dalam semakan kehakiman ini tidak menunjukkan bahawa pada bila-bila masa JPKK Kampung Bantal, Jerantut telah membantah atau mempertikaikan keputusan Responden Kedua. [45] Namun begitu Mahkamah juga perlu mempertimbangkan hujahan Pemohon yang menyatakan bahawa tiada sebarang rayuan yang boleh dikemukakan kepada Responden Kedua. Peguam Persekutuan telah berhujah bahawa rayuan boleh dikemukakan kepada Responden Kedua. Hakikat yang tidak dinafikan ialah di dalam surat pemakluman keputusan tersebut tiada sebarang petanda yang mencadangkan bahawa rayuan boleh dikemukakan kepada Responden Kedua terhadap keputusan pembatalan tersebut. Sekiranya rayuan boleh dikemukakan ia sewajarnya dikemukakan oleh Pengerusi atau JPKK Kampung Bantal, Jerantut. [46] Walau bagaimanapun Mahkamah perlu memahami bahawa hubung kait Pemohon dengan kes ini ialah apabila terdapat perjanjian pembalakan bertarikh 07.02.2020 di antara Pemohon dan Kampung Bantal, Jerantut seperti yang terdapat di eksibit “AS-5”. Begitu juga terdapatnya surat kuasa wakil di antara JPKK Kampung Bantal, Jerantut dengan Pemohon bertarikh 19.07.2022 di eksibit “SA-7”. Ini ditambah dengan surat daripada Pemohon kepada Pengarah Perhutanan Negeri Pahang bertarikh 05.09.2022 di eksibit “AS-13” yang menyatakan bahawa Pemohon telah dilantik sebagai kontraktor bagi menjalankan proses-proses mengeluarkan saki baki kayu balak dan kayu jaras di kawasan tersebut. Dalam surat tersebut juga telah dikemukakan salinan surat kuasa wakil bagi Blok A, Blok B dan Blok C. [47] Ini bermakna pihak Responden Pertama telah mengetahui berkenaan dengan kedudukan Pemohon berkaitan dengan kawasan kayu balak tersebut. Apakah ini tidak mewajarkan Pemohon diberi peluang untuk membuat representasi kepada Responden Kedua sebelum keputusan pembatalan itu dibuat oleh Responden Kedua. Mahkamah ini berpendapat kedudukan Pemohon sebagai kontraktor tidak dapat menolak hakikat bahawa kebenaran tersebut telah diberikan kepada Pengerusi JPKK Kampung Bantal, Jerantut dan bukannya Pemohon. Perjanjian pembalakan di antara Pemohon dan JPKK Kampung Bantal, Jerantut tidak sewajarnya dijadikan asas dalam keputusan Responden Kedua untuk membatalkan kelulusan yang telah diberikan sebelum ini kepada JPKK Kampung Bantal, Jerantut. [48] Mahkamah ini menyedari bahawa hak untuk didengar adalah merupakan tonggak utama dalam prinsip keadilan asasi. Ini dinyatakan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Datuk Hj Mohammad Tufail bin Mahmud & Ors v Dato Ting Check Sii [2009] 4 MLJ 165 seperti yang berikut: “The right to be heard is an integral part of the rules of natural justice. The right to be represented by counsel of one’s choice is however conditional upon the laws regulating it. Such conditions are the subject matter of this judgment.” [49] Kedudukan prinsip keadilan asasi bahawa seseorang itu tidak boleh dinafikan hak untuk didengar yang merupakan kepada asas keadilan asasi juga telah dinyatakan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Ketua Pengarah Kastam v Ho Kwan Seng [1977] 2 MLJ 152 di mana YA Raja Azlan Shah, Hakim Mahkamah Persekutuan (ketika itu) menyatakan seperti yang berikut: “In my opinion, the rule of natural justice that no man may be condemned unheard should apply to every case where an individual is adversely affected by an administrative action, no matter whether it is labelled “judicial”, “quasi-judicial”, or “administrative” or whether or not the enabling statute makes provision for a hearing. But the hearing may take many forms and strict insistence upon an inexorable right to the traditional courtroom procedure can lead to a virtual administrative breakdown. That is because a formal hearing is too slow, too technical and too costly. Lord Shaw's caveat on administrative adjudication that “judicial methods may … be entirely unsuitable, and produce delays, expenses, and public and privateinjury” is too well-known to be side-stepped: see Local Government Board v Arlidge [1915] AC 120 138. In the last analysis, it depends on the subject-matter. The great need is to deal efficiently and fairly, rather than to preserve all the accoutrements of the courtroom; the considerations of basic fairness are paramount. A passage from the judgment of Lord Denning M.R. in R. v. Gaming Boardfor Great Britain, ex parte Benaim and Khaida, supra, is apt: “It is not possible to lay down rigid rules as to when the principles of natural justice are to apply: nor as to their scope and extent. Everything dependson the subject-matter: see what Tucker L.J. said in Russell v Norfolk (Duke of) [1949] 1 All ER 109 118 and Lord Upjohn in Durayappah v Fernando [1967] 2 AC 337 349. At one time it was said that the principles only apply to judicial proceedings and not to administrative proceedings. That heresy was scotched in Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40. At another time it was said that the principles do not apply to the grant or revocation of licences. That too is wrong. Reg v Metropolitan Police Commissioner Ex parte Parker [1953] I WLR 1150 and Nakkuda Ali v Jayaratne [1951] AC 66 are no longer authority for any such proposition. See what Lord Reid and Lord Hodson said about them in Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40 77–79 133.” And in the following passage he said this: “It follows, I think, that the board have a duty to act fairly. They must give the applicant an opportunity of satisfying them of the matters specified in the sub-section. Theymust let him know what their impressions are so that he can disabuse them. But I do not think that they need quote chapter and verse against him as if they were dismissing him from an office, as in Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40; or depriving him of his property, as in Cooper v Wandsworth Board of Works (1863) 14 CBNS 180.” [50] Malahan Mahkamah Persekutuan juga menjelaskan bagaimana tatacara untuk penzahiran prinsip keadilan asasi tersebut perlu dilakukan oleh Badan Awam yang membuat keputusan terhadap sesuatu pihak. Ini dinyatakan dalam kes Tan Hee Lock v Commissioner For Federal Capital & Ors; Haris Bin Idris v Commissioner For Federal Capital & Ors [1973] 1 MLJ 238 seperti yang berikut: “It is clear from the authorities that natural justice does not mean that a person performing an administrative or ministerial act must follow the procedure of a court of law or adopt procedure analogous to that of a court of law.” [51] Penelitian kepada keterangan dalam kes ini adalah didapati bahawa keputusan yang dibuat itu adalah keputusan Majlis Mesyuarat Kerajaan (MMK). Mahkamah juga mendapati tiada sebarang keterangan yang menunjukkan bahawa keputusan tersebut telah dilakukan di luar daripada bidang kuasa dan budi bicara Majlis Mesyuarat Kerajaan (MMK). Apa yang dinyatakan oleh Pemohon ialah dia tidak diberikan peluang untuk membuat representasi yang pada hemat Mahkamah ini tidak menjejaskan keesahan keputusan yang dibuat oleh Majlis Mesyuarat Kerajaan (MMK) tersebut. Ia tidak bercanggah dengan prinsip-prinsip keadilan asasi untuk Pemohon didengar. Sebaliknya pihak yang sepatutnya yang menimbulkan isu ini adalah pihak JPKK Kampung Bantal, Jerantut yang tidak ditimbulkan dalam kes ini. [52] Berdasarkan kepada penganalisaan kepada fakta dan keterangan dalam kes ini Mahkamah berpendapat Responden Kedua mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk membuat keputusan membatalkan kelulusan tersebut tanpa terlebih dahulu memberi peluang kepada Pemohon untuk membuat representasi. Keputusan tersebut adalah di dalam bidang kuasa Responden Kedua. [53] Mahkamah juga mendapati tiada keterangan yang dikemukakan untuk menunjukkan bahawa keputusan pihak Responden Kedua itu adalah melangkaui daripada bidang kuasa yang ada pada Responden Kedua. Oleh itu Responden Kedua mempunyai kuasa di sisi undang-undang dan tidak melangkaui bidang kuasa atau berlawanan dengan bidang kuasa Responden Kedua. [54] Mahkamah ini berpendapat adalah tidak munasabah untuk Responden Kedua di dalam membuat keputusan untuk membatalkan suatu kelulusan yang terdahulu perlu memaklumkan kepada pihak-pihak dan menimbangkan representasi pihak-pihak tersebut sebelum membuat keputusan. Jika ini dilakukan ia telah menyebabkan Responden Kedua yang mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk memutuskan sesuatu keputusan tidak dapat membuat keputusan tersebut semata-mata kerana tiadanya representasi daripada pihak-pihak yang terkesan dengan keputusan tersebut. Ini adalah suatu yang tidak wajar dan tidak munasabah. Adakah keputusan Responden-Responden tidak rasional? [55] Seterusnya adakah keputusan Responden Kedua untuk membatalkan kelulusan tersebut adalah sesuatu yang munasabah. Ini adalah disebabkan pertimbangan yang dibuat oleh Majlis Mesyuarat Kerajaan (MMK) dalam membatalkan kelulusan tersebut tidak dapat ditunjukkan adalah sesuatu yang dilakukan tanpa sebarang pertimbangan yang sewajarnya. Adalah tidak dapat dinafikan bahawa di dalam surat pemaklumkan berkenaan dengan pembatalan tersebut tiada disertakan alasan pembatalan tersebut. Ini ditambah lagi dengan tiadanya affidavit jawapan daripada pihak Responden untuk menjelaskan mengapakah keputusan itu dibuat. Adakah disebabkan tiadanya penjelasan daripada Responden Kedua berkenaan dengan keputusan tersebut ia telah menyebabkan keputusan tersebut adalah sesuatu yang tidak munasabah? Adakah sesuatu keputusan daripada Majlis Mesyuarat Kerajaan (MMK) yang kemudiannya dibatalkan di dalam suatu mesyuarat Majlis Mesyuarat Kerajaan (MMK) yang lain akan menyebabkan keputusan pembatalan tersebut adalah tidak munasabah? Jika ini dilakukan ia akan menyebabkan Majlis Mesyuarat Kerajaan (MMK) tidak dapat membuat apa-apa keputusan bagi membatalkan keputusan yang lalu atas alasan tindakan sedemikian adalah sesuatu yang tidak munasabah. [56] Pada hemat Mahkamah ini ia adalah tidak sejajar dengan prinsip-prinsip undang-undang pentadbiran awam. Ianya hanya dapat dikatakan sesuatu yang tidak munasabah atau tidak rasional sekiranya terdapat keterangan di dalam affidavit sokongan atau mana-mana dokumen yang dapat menunjukkan bahawa pertimbangan-pertimbangan yang dibuat oleh sesebuah Badan Awam tersebut dilakukan berdasarkan kepada alasan-alasan yang tidak munasabah untuk dilakukan oleh sesebuah Badan Awam. [57] Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada apakah yang dimaksudkan dengan suatu keputusan yang tidak munasabah seperti yang dinyatakan oleh Lord Greene dalam kes Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corpn [1947] 1 KB 223 seperti yang berikut: “It is true to say that, if a decision on a competent matter is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it, then the courts can interfere. That, I think, is quite right; but to prove a case of that kind would require something overwhelming, and, in this case, the facts do not come anywhere near anything of that kind. I think Mr. Gallop in the end agreed that his proposition that the decision of the local authority can be upset if it is proved to be unreasonable, really meant that it must be proved to be unreasonable in the sense that the court considers it to be a decision that no reasonable body could have come to. It is not what the court considers unreasonable, a different thing altogether.” [58] Sebagai pelengkap kepada isu berkenaan dengan sama ada keputusan Responden Kedua adalah munasabah atau tidak wajar untuk diteliti pandangan yang dikemukakan oleh Professor Madya University of Oxford, Adam Perry berkenaan dengan perkara ini dalam artikelnya bertajuk Wednesbury Unreasonableness [2023] Cambridge Law Journal 483 dengan mengemukakan pandang yang menarik dalam analisa berkenaan dengan ketidakmunasabahan seperti yang berikut: “ First, unreasonableness concerns the balance of reasons for and against a decision. 17 In Tesco Stores v Environment Secretary, 18 Lord Keith said that “it is entirely for the decision maker to attribute to the relevant considerations such weight as he thinks fit, and the courts will not interfere unless he has acted unreasonably in the Wednesbury sense”. 19 The implication of the last clause is that unreasonableness regulates the weight placed on relevant reasons. Later courts are more explicit. For example, Lord Mance said in Kennedy v Charity Commission that “reasonableness review ::: involve[s] considerations of weight and balance”. 20 Second, unreasonableness is a high standard. 21 That means it takes more than the balance of relevant reasons opposing a decision to make it unreasonable. It takes more than wrongness, in other words. Lord Hailsham expressed this thought when he said that “[n]ot every reasonable exercise of judgment is right, and not every mistaken exercise of judgment is unreasonable”. 22 So did Lord Ackner when he said that the Secretary of State’s decision to issue certain directives could be reasonable “whether the Secretary of State was right or wrong to issue [them]”. 23 Third, unreasonableness review is neither an appeal nor a form of merits review. 24 The nature of the distinction between unreasonableness and merits review is something a good analysis would illuminate. For now, we can say that a decision is not unreasonable just because a court, based on its own assessment of the relevant reasons, considers it wrong. A court must not, in the guise of unreasonableness review, “substitute its, the judicial view, on the merits” 25 for the authority’s view. Fourth, unreasonableness is context-dependent: a decision is more or less likely to be unreasonable depending on a range of contextual factors. Two factors are especially important. One is an authority’s expertise on the matter decided relative to the court’s. The greater the authority’s relative expertise, the less likely its decision is unreasonable, other things being equal. 26 For instance, the British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection claimed that an investigator’s findings as to the suffering caused by certain animal experiments were unreasonable. 27 In rejecting that claim, the reviewing court said that it should be careful not to “substitute its own inexpert view of the science” 28 for that of an “expert and experienced”29 scientist. The other main contextual factor is the impact of the decision. A decision that impacts a fundamental right or interest is subject to “anxious scrutiny”, 30 meaning that a court is “entitled to start from the premise” that the decision “requires to be justified”31 and that only an important justification will do. Thus, it was unreasonable for the Bloody Sunday inquiry to publish the full names of soldiers who had fired live rounds during the massacre given that (1) the decision risked “the most fundamental of all human rights” 32 – the lives of “the former soldiers and their families” 33; and (2) there was no “compelling justification” 34 for publishing the names. Fifth, unreasonableness is evidence-dependent. The court’s task is to test the authority’s “conclusion against the evidence before [the authority]” and “ask whether the conclusion can ::: be safely justified on the basis of that evidence”. 35 One implication is that a decision is unreasonable if there is clearly no support for that decision in the evidence before the authority. Another implication is that a decision is not unreasonable if evidence that would have counted decisively against it becomes available only after the decision has been made. 37 In one recent case, it was reasonable for a parole board panel to direct the release of a prisoner who had been smuggling large amounts of steroids and alcohol into a prison, given that the panel did not learn of the smuggling until after it made its decision.38 The sixth truism concerns moral legitimacy or justification. Judges generally believe that unreasonableness review is morally justified. Coke’s words still inspire: [N]otwithstanding the words of the commission give authority to the commissioners to do according to their discretions, yet their proceedings ought to be limited and bound with the rule of reason and law. For discretion is a science or understanding to discern between falsity and truth, between wrong and right, between shadows and substance, between equity and colourable glosses and pretences, and not to do according to their wills and private affections. It could be that judges are mistaken, and they should not engage in unreasonableness review. Perhaps they should engage in a more or less intrusive form of review instead. Judges are, however, typically intelligent people, knowledgeable in the law, acting in good faith. If they say that unreasonableness review is justified, then it is at least plausible that it is justified. So, an analysis of unreasonableness does not need to explain why it is justified, but it does need to explain why it “might plausibly be thought to be” 40 so. Finally, there are indicia of unreasonableness, that is, features of decisions reliably associated with unreasonableness.” [59] Professor Madya Adam Perry juga meletakkan petanda kepada ketidakmunasabahan berdasarkan keputusan-keputusan oleh Mahkamah di United Kingdom dengan menyatakan seperti yang berikut: “(1) Oppressiveness. The fact that a decision imposes costs on an individual disproportionate to its benefits suggests unreasonableness.42 For example, Ms. F had been raped by three soldiers while living in Kosovo. She suffered lasting psychiatric injury as a result. When F applied for asylum in the UK, she was refused. F appealed. A psychiatrist would be able to submit a report on F’s injuries, but not until a few days after the appeal hearing was scheduled. The special adjudicator refused to adjourn the hearing. In R. (F) v A Special Adjudicator, 43 the refusal was quashed as unreasonable. On the one hand, the psychiatrist’s report would have assisted F’s asylum application. On the other, the delay to the hearing was minor. Overall, it was clear that the costs of the refusal far exceeded its benefits.

Incoherence. That an authority adopted an end but not the necessary means to that end indicates unreasonableness.44 In R. (Cawser) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 45 for example, the Secretary of State conceded “that it would be irrational to have a policy of making release [from prison] dependent upon the prisoner undergoing a [sex offender rehabilitation] treatment course without making ::: provision for such courses”. 46

Inconsistency. That a present decision is inconsistent with a prior decision also suggests that the present decision is unreasonable.47 For instance, in 2005 the Home Office adopted a scheme for highly skilled migrants under which they would be eligible to obtain indefinite leave to remain (ILR) after four years’ residence. The Home Secretary later changed the rules of the scheme, making it more difficult to obtain ILR. Some migrants left the UK as a result. Others who happened to be abroad when the changes were announced chose not to return. The rule changes were then declared unlawful. The question thus arose: should a migrant’s absences due to the unlawful rule changes be counted against them when they applied for ILR? In Patel v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 48 it was held unreasonable for the Home Secretary to count the absences of those who had stayed abroad against them. An important reason was that (i) the Home Secretary had earlier decided not to count the absences of those who left the UK against them and (ii) the two groups were very similar.

Lack of stated reasons. Lord Pearce said in Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food 49 that if “all of the prima facie reasons seem to point in favour” 50 of a decision, and if the authority “gives no reason whatever for taking a contrary course, the court may infer that he has no good reason”. 51 The use of the power is unreasonable, as a result." [60] Hal ini tidak dapat ditunjukkan di hadapan Mahkamah ini. Mahkamah ini berpendapat adalah tidak wajar untuk Mahkamah memutuskan berkenaan dengan kemunasabahan sesuatu keputusan semata-mata disebabkan keputusan asal dibatalkan oleh keputusan yang terkemudian. Apakah terdapat kejanggalan prosedur dalam keputusan Responden-Responden? [61] Mahkamah ini juga berpendapat bahawa berdasarkan kepada keterangan yang dikemukakan, keputusan Responden Kedua untuk membatalkan kelulusan itu adalah bukannya suatu yang janggal. Ia adalah satu proses pentadbiran biasa bagi suatu keputusan dikaji semula atau dibatalkan. Sekiranya tindakan Responden Kedua untuk membatalkan suatu tindakan itu dikatakan janggal, maka bagaimanakah Responden Kedua akan berfungsi dalam menjalankan tugas sebagai Badan Awam dalam membuat apa-apa keputusan, membatalkan apa-apa kelulusan dan tindakan-tindakan pentadbiran lain. Jika ini dilakukan ia akan melemahkan dan membantutkan mekanisma pengurusan sesebuah Badan Awam. [62] Mahkamah ini berpendapat bahawa penentuan sama ada terdapat satu kejanggalan prosedur semasa sesuatu keputusan dibuat oleh badan awam adalah bergantung kepada tugas dan fungsi eksklusif badan pembuat keputusan tersebut dan keadaan sesuatu keputusan itu dibuat. Perkara ini telah dinyatakan oleh Lord Scarman dalam kes Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 seperti yang berikut: “As respects "procedural propriety" I see no reason why it should not be a ground for judicial review of a decision made under powers of which the ultimate source is the prerogative. Such indeed was one of the grounds that formed the subject matter of judicial review in Reg. v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, Ex parte Lain [1967] 2 Q.B. 864. Indeed, where the decision is one which does not alter rights or obligations enforceable in private law but only deprives a person of legitimate expectations, "procedural impropriety" will normally provide the only ground on which the decision is open to judicial review. But in any event what procedure will satisfy the public law requirement of procedural propriety depends upon the subject matter of the decision, the executive functions of the decision-maker (if the decision is not that of an administrative tribunal) and the particular circumstances in which the decision came to be made.” [63] Pada masa yang sama ia tidak bermaksud bahawa Responden Kedua boleh membuat keputusan membatalkan sesuatu kelulusan dengan sewenang-wenangnya dan disampaikan kepada Pemohon melalui Responden Pertama kerana semata-mata ia dianggap sebagai suatu tindakan yang tidak janggal. Ini akan menyebabkan Responden Kedua atau Badan Awam yang lain akan memandang enteng kepada sebarang bantahan atau kesan keputusan itu kepada pihak-pihak yang terkesan. Ini akan menyebabkan Badan Awam itu terdedah untuk membuat keputusan tanpa mempertimbangkan kepentingan awam atau kesannya kepada pihak yang berkaitan dengan keputusan tersebut. Oleh itu semakan kehakiman akan berfungsi untuk memastikan Badan Awam tersebut membuat keputusan-keputusan yang munasabah, setimpal, tidak janggal dan bukannya satu tindakan ultra vires. Fungsi Mahkamah untuk menjalankan semakan kehakiman ini boleh dilakukan dengan pengemukaan keterangan-keterangan oleh Pemohon yang dapat menyokong dakwaan bahawa terdapat ketidakpatuhan kepada prinsip-prinsip di atas. [64] Oleh itu Mahkamah berpendapat dalam kes ini keputusan Responden-Responden tidak tergolong di dalam kejanggalan prosedur bagi membenarkan semakan kehakiman oleh Pemohon. [65] Setelah meneliti keterangan-keterangan dalam kes ini keadaan sedemikian tidak wujud bagi membolehkan Mahkamah melakukan suatu semakan kehakiman. [66] Pada masa yang sama Mahkamah juga perlu menimbangkan bahawa terdapat perjanjian di antara JPKK Kampung Bantal, Jerantut dan pihak Pemohon dan terdapat surat kuasa wakil yang telah diberikan kepada pihak Pemohon. Adakah dengan adanya surat kuasa wakil dan perjanjian tersebut menyebabkan tindakan-tindakan yang melibatkan kawasan pembalakan ini diuruskan oleh pihak Pemohon dan keputusan Responden-Responden berkenaan dengan kelulusan tersebut wajar mengambil kira kepentingan Pemohon. Dalam erti kata lain adakah Pemohon mempunyai harapan yang sah untuk dipertimbangkan oleh Mahkamah. Harapan yang sah Pemohon [67] Oleh kerana itulah maka didapati bahawa Pemohon menyatakan bahawa mereka adalah pihak yang terkesan dalam kes ini dan perlu diberikan pertimbangan yang sewajarnya dan mempunyai asas untuk menyatakan bahawa keputusan yang diberikan oleh pihak Responden Kedua itu adalah suatu yang tidak teratur di sisi undang-undang dan tidak mematuhi prinsip Wednesbury seperti yang dinyatakan di atas. [68] Perkara-perkara tersebut perlu dipertimbangkan oleh Mahkamah dalam menentukan sama ada permohonan ini dibenarkan atau tidak. Apatah lagi apa yang menarik dalam kes ini adalah Pemohon sebagai pihak yang terlibat dalam perjanjian di antara JPKK Kampung Bantal, Jerantut dan juga surat kuasa wakil yang telah dibuat, Pemohon mempunyai harapan yang sah (legitimate expectation) terhadap kawasan pembalakan tersebut dan tindakan pihak Responden Kedua untuk membatalkan adalah bercanggah dengan prinsip harapan yang sah. [69] Harapan yang sah telah dinyatakan oleh Lord Denning dalam kes Schmidt and Another v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs [1969] 2 Ch. 149 seperti yang berikut: “The third point is whether there is any ground for saying that the Home Secretary did not observe the precepts of natural justice. Mr. Quintin Hogg submitted that the Minister ought to have given the students a hearing before he refused to extend their stay in this country. I see no basis for this suggestion I quite agree, of course, that where a public officer has power to deprive a person of his liberty or his property, the general principle is that it is not to be done without his being given an opportunity of being heard and of making representations on his own behalf. But in the case of aliens, it is rather different: for they have no right to be here except by licence of the Crown. And it has been held that the Home Secretary is not bound to hear representations on their behalf, even in the case of a deportation order, though, in practice he usually does so. It was so held in Rex v. Leman Street Police Station Inspector and Secretary of State for Home Affairs, Ex parte Venicoff [1920] 3 K.B. 72, which was followed by this court in Soblen's case [1963] 2 Q.B. 243. Some of the judgments in those cases were based on the fact that the Home Secretary was exercising an administrative power and not doing a judicial act. But that distinction is no longer valid. The speeches in Ridge v. Baldwin [1964] A.C. 40 show that an administrative body may, in a proper case, be bound to give a person who is affected by their decision an opportunity of making representations. It all depends on whether he has some right or interest, or, I would add, some legitimate expectation, of which it would not be fair to deprive him without hearing what he has to say.” [70] Ini bermakna hujahan daripada pihak Pemohon yang perlu difahami ialah mereka perlu diberikan hak tersebut untuk didengar kerana mereka adalah pihak yang terkesan kepada keputusan yang diberikan oleh Responden Kedua. Prinsip mengenai harapan yang sah telah diterima masuk dalam sistem kehakiman kita dalam kes Darahman Ibrahim & Ors v. Majlis Mesyuarat Kerajaan Negeri Perlis & Ors [2008] 4 CLJ 538 yang mana dalam kes tersebut dinyatakan: “[50] The principle of legitimate expectation was first perceived by Lord Denning MR in Schmidt v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs [1969] 2 Ch 149, CA to denote something less than a right which may nevertheless be protected by the principles of natural justice. Put in another way, a legitimate expectation amounts to an expectation of receiving some benefit or privilege to which the individual has no right. It has been used by the courts on numerous occasions and in different contexts with the result that "there are many semantic confusions which have bedevilled this area of our law" (per Simon Brown LJ, in R v. Devon County Council, ex p. Baker [1995] 1 All ER 73, CA). In the words of Taylor J, in R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p. Ruddock [1987] 2 All ER 518, "the doctrine of legitimate expectation in essence imposes a duty to act fairly." The duty to act fairly applies in the context of legitimate procedural expectations as demonstrated by the case of R v. Liverpool Corpn, ex p. Liverpool Taxi Fleet Operators' Association [1972] 2 QB 299, CA. In R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p. Ruddock (supra), the substantive benefit was that individuals not falling within the government's published criteria for telephone tapping would not have their telephone calls intercepted by the security services. [51] I venture to say that even where no promise of a benefit has been made and there is no established practice of granting that benefit, the person concerned is, elementarily, entitled to be treated fairly. Thus, stall-holders in a market are entitled to be consulted before charges are increased (R. v. Birmingham C.C. ex p. Dredger [1993] COD 340). But residents in an old people's home to whom no promise of consultation has been made need not be consulted before the local authority closes the home (R. v. Devon County Council ex p. Baker (supra) at p. 89 adopting the approach of A.G. for New South Wales v. Quin [1990] 93 ALR 1 at 39). [52] Whether an expectation exists, is clearly a question of fact. So, if a person did not expect anything, then there is nothing that the doctrine of legitimate expectation can protect. Here, the appellants expected the respondents to keep to their promises and so the appellants expect that the doctrine of legitimate expectation to protect them and the said doctrine can be invoked to protect them. As I said, the statement of claim made reference to the doctrine of legitimate expectation and I must give effect to it in this judgment. But if a person is unaware of an undertaking made by a public authority, then he cannot expect compliance with that undertaking (Chundawara v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal [1988] Imm. AR 161, where an unincorporated but ratified treaty of which the claimant was unaware could not found legitimate expectation). A taxpayer, for instance, must rely upon a representation from the Revenue before his expectation will be protected (R. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners ex p. Matrix-Securities Ltd [1994] 1 WLR 334). But taxpayers seeking revenue clearance for their proposals must make full disclosure before the revenue's assurances will be binding (R. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners ex p. MFK Underwriting Agencies Ltd [1990] 1 WLR 1545).” [71] Malahan Mahkamah Agong dalam kes JP Berthelsen v Director General of Immigration, Malaysia & Ors [1987] 1 MLJ 134 telah membincangkan perkara yang sama dan yang menarik dalam perkara ini terdapat satu artikel yang ditulis oleh Wan Azlan Ahmad dan Mohsin Hingun dalam artikel bertajuk Abdoolcader SCJ, Legitimate Expectation and Locus Standi: A Note [1994] 3 MLJ liv yang menyatakan bahawa: “In Berthelsen, the appellant's employment pass, issued under reg 19 of the Immigration Regulations 1963, was terminated on the ground that he had contravened or failed to comply with the terms of its issuance, and that his continued presence in the country would be prejudicial to the security of the country. The appellant was not given a hearing before the pass was revoked and the Supreme Court, rightly, emphasized the nature of judicial review: that the decision to cancel the permit was an executive discretion which as far as merit is concerned, remains outside the purview of the courts. While this discretion is one for the executive, it remains a discretion to be exercised according to law. Fundamental in this respect is the operation of the rules of natural justice, and we may also add, they include what are now established components of these common law procedural safeguards: the doctrine of legitimate expectation and the duty to act fairly.” [72] Ini bermakna dalam kes-kes tersebut dinyatakan bahawa pihak berkuasa yang ingin membuat keputusan atau menjalankan apa-apa tindakan perlu mengambil kira tentang hak pihak-pihak untuk didengar dan mereka harus bertindak dengan wajar. Sekiranya dilihat kepada sejarah bagaimana wujudnya harapan yang sah ini adalah seperti seperti artikel yang ditulis oleh C. Forsyth dalam artikelnya bertajuk The Provenance and Protection of Legitimate Expectation [1988] Cambridge Law Journal (C.L.J.) 238 yang dinyatakan diambil kira dalam undang-undang di United Kingdom iaitu undang-undang daripada Jerman. Ia dinyatakan oleh Professor Alison L Young di dalam artikelnya Stuck At A Crossroad? Substantive Legitimate Expectations In English Law [2021] Cambridge Law Journal (C.L.J.) 179. [73] Berdasarkan kepada keterangan yang ada dalam kes ini dan kedudukan Pemohon yang tidak dapat ditunjukkan berurusan secara terus dengan Responden Pertama atau Responden Kedua atau terdapat apa-apa penyataan yang diberikan oleh Responden Pertama atau Responden Kedua berkenaan dengan kelulusan tersebut maka adalah sukar untuk Pemohon bersandarkan kepada prinsip harapan yang sah bagi membolehkan suatu semakan kehakiman dilakukan terhadap keputusan Responden Pertama dan Responden Kedua. [74] Akhirnya, setelah menimbangkan affidavit sokongan, hujahan pihak-pihak, eksibit-eksibit yang dikemukakan, prinsip undang-undang dan keadaan dalam kes ini, Mahkamah berpendapat permohonan semakan kehakiman oleh Pemohon adalah ditolak dengan kos. Bertarikh: 26 hb. Jun 2025 (ROSLAN BIN MAT NOR) HAKIM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA TEMERLOH, PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR PIHAK-PIHAK: Bagi Pihak Pemohon Wan Aizuddin bin Wan Mohammed dan Mohamad Rahmat bin Abu Bakar Tetuan Rahman, Wan & Rahmat 22-2, Jalan Sri Hartamas 8 Sri Hartamas 50480 Kuala Lumpur Bagi Pihak Responden-Responden Rozanna binti Abd Hadi Pejabat Penasihat Undang-undang Negeri Pahang Tingkat 3, Blok B, Wisma Sri Pahang 25000 Kuantan Pahang Darul Makmur