Kuan Shin @ Kuan Nyong Hin v Ng Aik Kee & 9 Lagi (WA-22NCC-97-03/2017 (No.2))

NG AIK KEE

KAMAL BIN MOHD NOOR

CHUA WYE MAN

LER CHENG CHYE

LIM SWEE GEOK

QUAH HOE PHANG

LEE CHEE KHENG

AHMAD TAJUDDIN BIN ABDUL MAJEED

KOH KWEE CHAI

NYANASEKARAN A/L MURUGAN

PARAMESWARAN A/L SUBRAMANIAM

CHERNG CHIN GUAN

YEO JOSEPH (Beramal di bawah nama dan gaya

ALVIN JOHN (Beramal di bawah nama dan gaya Tetuan Alvin John & Partners) ...DEFENDANTS DI HADAPAN YANG ARIF TUAN MOHD NAZLAN BIN MOHD GHAZALI HAKIM JUDGMENT Introduction [1] This is an application documented in enclosure 120 filed by the Plaintiff to stay the proceedings in the writ action following my striking out of the Plaintiff‟s claim against the 14th Defendant. At the conclusion of the hearing, I dismissed the application and highlighted the primary grounds for the same. This judgment contains the full reasons for my decision. Key Background Facts Parties & Context [2] The underlying writ action instituted by the Plaintiff is against fourteen (14) defendants. The 1st to the 12th Defendants were at the material time directors or officers of either one or both of Chin Foh Bhd (“CFB”) and Chin Foh Trading Sdn Bhd (“CFT”). [3] The Plaintiff founded and set up CFT in 1976, dealing in the trading of non-ferrous metal products, which corporatisation and Page 3 of 15 subsequent business expansion led to the incorporation and listing of CFB as the holding company. Both CFT and CFB have now been wound up. [4] The Plaintiff had during 1996 to 2004 made various advances of monies to CFT at the request of CFB. On 19 October 2005, the Plaintiff entered into an assignment agreement with CFT where, as repayment of the amount due to the Plaintiff, CFT agreed to assign debts due to CFT from several debtors to the Plaintiff (“the Assignment”). [5] Following a change in ownership, the boards of directors of CFT and CFT were reconstituted in August 2005 which led to CFB rescinding the Assignment. This in turn resulted in the Plaintiff commencing proceedings against CFT and CFB. [6] The 13th and 14th Defendants are firms of solicitors. They were solicitors for CFB and CFT when the latter two got into various legal disputes with the Plaintiff: in Kuala Lumpur High Court Suit No: D8-22-192- 2006 (“Suit 192”); and in litigation with other parties, in particular K3 Metal Service Center Sdn Bhd in the Shah Alam High Court Suit No: MT4-22- 1560-2006 (“Suit 1560”). The key complaint of the Plaintiff against the 14th Defendant are allegations concerning the discharge of the 14th Defendant‟s stakeholder duties as solicitors for CFB and CFT in the 14th Defendant‟s receipt of payments in those litigation. [7] More specifically, the Plaintiff‟s pleaded claim against the 14th Defendant concerns the following issues:

That the 14th Defendant failed to account for interest accrued on the stakeholder sum held by the 14th

That the 14the Defendant failed to deposit the sum of RM1,000,000.00 received from K3 Metal Sdn Bhd (“K3 Metal”) into the stakeholder account in Suit 1560. [8] On the application by the 14th Defendant, I then struck out the claim by the Plaintiff against the 14th Defendant under Order 18 r 19 of the Rules of Court 2012 as I found it to be plainly and obviously unsustainable by reasons primarily of the clear terms of the Interpleader Order in Suit 192 and the Consent Judgment in Suit 1560 concerning payments handled by the 14th Defendant, which pronouncements are valid and binding, and which have never been challenged, and also because the claim represents Page 4 of 15 an afterthought. In other words, I had determined that the claim against the 14th Defendant did not disclose a reasonable cause of action under limb

(a), is frivolous and vexatious under limb (b) and is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court under limb (d) of Order 18 r 19 (1) of the RC 2012. [9] Following the striking out of the claim against the 14th Defendant, trial should therefore proceed as scheduled to commence against the other remaining Defendants who had filed their defence, and against whom the suit has not been withdrawn, namely the 1st, 6th, 9th and 12th Defendants. The Plaintiff however filed the instant application to stay proceedings until after the disposal of the appeal against my decision striking out his claim against the 14th Defendant. Evaluation & Findings of this Court Principles Governing Stay of Proceedings [10] I should first briefly state the law on stay of proceedings, a task made much simpler by the summary on the same made by Mohd Zawawi Salleh JCA in the Court of Appeal decision in Jagdis Singh Banta Singh v Outlet Rank (M) Sdn Bhd [2013] 3 CLJ 47, the relevant passages of which read as follows:- “Principles of Stay Proceedings [22] Now, what factors or principles will, and should, guide the courts in applications for a stay of an order granted by a court. These factors or principles have been reiterated in very many of cases decided by our courts. The factors or principles so enumerated are in-exhaustive, and not all of them are applicable to every case. Each has its own peculiar principle. Some of the principles to be considered in the motions may be stated as follows:

The courts have an unimpeded discretion to grant or refuse stay. In this, like in all other instances of discretion, the court is bound to exercise that discretion both judicially as well as judiciously and not erratically. (See Serangoon Garden Estate Ltd v. Ang Keng [1953] 1 LNS 98; [1953] 19 MLJ 116; Leong Poh Shee v. Ng Kat Chong [1965] 1 LNS 90; [1966] 1 MLJ 86)

An unsuccessful party applying for a stay must show "special circumstances". What will constitute "special circumstances" will no doubt vary from case to case. The fact that an appeal would be rendered nugatory if stay was refused is the most common one. (See Kosma Palm Oil Mill Page 5 of 15 Sdn Bhd & Ors v. Koperasi Serbausaha Makmur Bhd [2003] 4 CLJ 1 and Re Kong Thai Sawmill (Miri) Sdn Bhd; Ling Beng Sung v. Kong Thai Sawmill (Miri) Sdn Bhd & Ors (No 2) [1974] 1 LNS 136; [1976] 1 MLJ 131). The application is not granted as a matter of routine and it is not an automatic or mechanical relief slavishly followed after filing an appeal. In every matter or suit before a court of law, whether in its original or appellate stage of proceedings, the court will consider the competing rights of both parties including the applicant and respondent to justice.

There is a need to preserve the res or preservation of the subject matter of litigation. The courts have an obligation to protect the res for the purpose of ensuring that the appeal, if successful, will not be rendered nugatory. (See Erinford Properties Ltd v. Cheshire County Council [1974] 2 WLR 749). But where it is shown by affidavit evidence, say by the respondent, that the res will not be destroyed or there is in fact no res, an application may not be granted.

Where an application is an abuse of the court process, then the stay of proceedings will not be granted. A typical example of abuse of court process is where a suit is duplicated or where a party employs improper and perverse procedure to obtain an advantage undeservedly.

It is important to stress that initiation of a suit in a court of law demands the suit will be heard expeditiously and completed without any inhibition midway. Therefore, where an application for stay of proceedings is intended to merely stop or suspend the proceedings; it will be refused. Some applicants, on seeing the weakness of their client's case, would resort to application for stay and thereby waste the time of the other party and the court. The party simply cannot resort to the interlocutory of stay proceedings on having the slightest disagreement with any ruling of a trial judge. Courts are enjoined not to encourage such unwholesome practice.

An applicant for stay of proceedings must come with clean hands because what he is asking is an equitable relief. Equity will not assist the unclean. That is why the court has to look into the antecedents of the parties. [23] This court's focus at this stage must remain on deciding whether or not parties have disclosed favourable conditions for or against the grant of the relief sought which is for stay of the impugned order, pending the determination of the petitioner's appeal. Of course, we have to look into the grounds of judgment of Page 6 of 15 the JC. But this however, should not extend to deciding the pending appeal, as it will be premature at this stage to do so. It is not for the court deciding the application for stay to declare that the grounds of appeal are frivolous or not arguable. This is to avoid a situation where the court be accused of descending into the arena even before the appeal is argued”. [11] With the above stated principles firmly in mind, I now consider the issues raised by the Plaintiff to support his stay application, which are opposed by the Defendants. No res to protect [12] It is imperative that in any stay application the essence of the res of the matter being litigated and intended to be preserved in the stay is properly identified. It has first and foremost to reside in the litigation proceedings that is being applied to be stayed. In other words the res must be in the present suit. It cannot reside in Suit 192 or Suit 1560. [13] The cause of action against the 14th Defendant is for breach of stakeholders‟ duties and breach of trust in respect of the payment by K3 Metal, and the placing of the sums received into an interest-bearing stakeholder account. The cause of action by the Plaintiff against the 1st to the 12th Defendants, being former directors and officers of CFB and CFT is grounded separately from the claim against the 14th Defendant, for it is clear from the pleadings that the complaint against them is founded on the allegation of fraud as sought to be particularised in paragraph 35 of the statement of claim. The allegation against the 14th Defendant, in clear contrast, is separately pleaded in paragraph 37. And the issue pertaining to the payment by K3 Metal is only one of the various issues raised by the Plaintiff against the other 12 Defendants. [14] The decision of this Court striking out the claim against the 14th Defendant was arrived at principally by having regard to the terms of the Consent Judgment and the Interpleader Order which have never been set aside, and despite the Plaintiff being party to the same. The Plaintiff should have raised his concerns, if any, in those suits which resulted in the Interpleader Order and the Consent Judgment, in Suits 192 and 1560 respectively, in which the res is firmly embodied. The res is not in the underlying suit or in the striking out application. Page 7 of 15 Nugatory argument unmeritorious [15] The Plaintiff argued that there are special circumstances justifying a stay in that a successful appeal would otherwise be rendered nugatory if the stay is not granted for there are merits and a good arguable appeal, which is not doomed to fail, and that the balance of convenience lies with the granting of one. [16] The underlying thrust of this assertion of the Plaintiff concerns the finding of this Court in allowing the striking out of the Plaintiff‟s claim against the 14th Defendant on the basis that the payment of RM1 million by the 14th Defendant of the sum from K3 Metal to CFT challenged by the Plaintiff had been effected in pursuance of the terms of the Consent Judgment. [17] The Plaintiff argued that this finding in striking out in favour of the 14th Defendant would now in the main suit be relied on by the other Defendants to avoid their liability vis-à-vis the RM1 million payment from K3 Metal given that the 14th Defendant was the solicitors for CFB and CFT. [18] Thus, although the merits of the appeal itself may not constitute special circumstances, it is still relevant, according to the Plaintiff, to show that the appeal is not doomed to fail. The appeal is meritorious because the 14th Defendant was at all material time the solicitors for CFT and CFB, and that this Court‟s decision that the 14th Defendant did not have to pay the RM1 million into the stakeholder account in light of the Consent Judgment meant that, in the words of the Plaintiff in his written submissions:- “…if the solicitors for CFB and CFT (who is also the stakeholder) is able to escape from their responsibility, certainly the other Defendants will argue that as directors under the advice of the 14th Defendant are able to escape liability for the claim of the RM1,000,000.00..” [19] I do not see the critical relevance of the Plaintiff‟s argument that the 14th Defendant had never produced any evidence that the firm did not place the monies in an interest bearing stakeholder account, or the accusation that in the event the firm had done so and taken the interest acquired for their own benefit, it would have been a breach of solicitors‟ ethics and constituted unjust enrichment. Page 8 of 15 [20] In my view, the argument that a decision not to allow stay will directly affect the Plaintiff‟s entire claim in relation to the payment by K3 Metal of RM1 million against the other Defendants who are directors or officers of CFB or CFT at the material time cannot be sustained. It is unmeritorious. [21] After all, the issue is simply one of a decision made by this Court that struck out the claim of the Plaintiff against the 14th Defendant. The action against the other Defendants, the few against whom the Plaintiff still wishes to pursue, should continue. The cause of action and the case against them, as mentioned earlier, are not identical to that against the 14th Defendant. They were former directors and officers of CFB and CFT. The nature of the claim is also different, for the case against the 14th Defendant (and against the 13th Defendant before the withdrawal of the suit against the 13th Defendant) revolves around their role as solicitors for CFB and CFT at the material time. [22] The Plaintiff asserted that the cause of action against the 14th Defendant is closely linked to the cause of action against the other Defendants wherein similar evidence will be presented. Thus the 14th Defendant‟s submission that a new proceeding can be initiated against the 14th Defendant is challenged by the Plaintiff on the basis that any new proceeding would require the same witnesses to attend and give evidence as they would for these proceedings, especially the directors and officers of CFT and CFB. [23] The Plaintiff cannot validly contend that in the event the appeal is allowed, the Plaintiff would have lost the opportunity to proceed in this action against the 14th Defendant. [24] The argument that the Plaintiff would be seriously prejudiced if stay is not granted but the appeal is allowed because the Plaintiff would be unable to present its case fully against the Defendants especially when conspiracy and fraud are pleaded is similarly in my view misconceived. It cannot be denied that the Plaintiff could adduce evidence concerning the 14th Defendant even without making them a party to the proceedings. In fact, the solicitor from the 14th Defendant who was involved in the transaction at the material time has already been listed in the witness list of the Plaintiff himself, as filed in Court. [25] In other words, there is nothing preventing the Plaintiff from fully making its case against the Defendants. For three reasons. First, as I have Page 9 of 15 said, the Plaintiff is at liberty to call and examine witnesses from the 14th Defendant. Secondly, the case against the 14th Defendant and that against the rest is in any event not identical. There are more allegations against the other Defendants too, which were not made against the 14th Defendant. [26] Thirdly, even on the narrow issue of my specific finding in the striking out application, such a determination is one made in an interlocutory proceeding. Thus my findings in the striking out application, to the extent that they require further determination in the main suit, may or may not later change. For context, I need only refer to the following passage from the judgment of Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was) in Hock Hua Bank (Sabah) Bhd v Yong Liuk Thin & Ors [1995] 2 CLJ 900:- “It is part of the function of a Judge hearing an application for an injunction to decide whether a serious question requiring trial is disclosed. He therefore does not exceed his proper role in such an interlocutory proceeding by commenting upon the credibility of the evidence or any issue as it lies before him at that stage. And any comments that he may make upon the nature and quality of the evidence or pleadings presented to him at that stage does not and cannot be said to infect his mind with bias. In my judgment, it is a most serious matter to allege bias against a Judge whose sole function is to decide a case according to the evidence before him. I notice an unhealthy trend of late to allege bias too readily against a judicial arbiter on insufficient material. Nothing is capable of eroding public confidence in the judicial arm of the State than unwarranted and unfounded allegations of bias. It is therefore to be avoided at all costs, if necessary, by having resort to the power to punish for contempt. In my judgment, a Judge may, after expressing a view in the course of an interlocutory proceeding, quite properly hear the main action and come to a conclusion diametrically opposite to that expressed at the interlocutory level. Translated to a case such as the present, a Judge may grant an interlocutory injunction because he finds a particular line of defence taken to be untenable and yet, after hearing all the evidence and detailed argument at the trial, reach the opposite conclusion and dismiss the suit. I cannot help but think that such an occurrence is commonplace in our Courts as it is indeed in other jurisdictions”. [27] The Plaintiff‟s other argument that stay should be allowed to avoid any conflicting or contradictory decisions between the High Court and the Court of Appeal is wholly misconceived. There is absolutely no issue of conflicting decision between Courts of different status. One simply does not characterize such difference as a form of conflict. Any „conflict‟ in the nature Page 10 of 15 contemplated by the Plaintiff is not uncommon and typically resolved in our judicial system as indeed in similar fashion in other jurisdictions by the very mechanism of appeal, where the higher or appellate court reverses and set aside the decision of the lower court the former finds unsupportable under the law. [28] Thus, if the decision of this Court striking out the claim against the 14th Defendant is reversed by the Court of Appeal, then the suit against the 14th Defendant is revived and trial should be set down for such purpose, against the 14th Defendant. Similarly, if this Court refuses stay and proceed to try the suit against the other Defendants, whatever decisions arrived at following conclusion of that trial are of course subject to further judicial scrutiny at the appellate level by the Court of Appeal. There is absolutely nothing close to nugatory about the appeal in either of the above two scenarios. [29] I accept the merit in the contention that if the trial against the Defendants is pursued now, and the Plaintiff later succeeds in his appeal against the striking out, parties may have to incur costs and spend more time of preparing and attending the trial once again, with the possibility of the same witnesses having to be examined again, as the claim against the 14th Defendant is reinstated as a defendant vis-à-vis the issue of the payment by K3 Metal. [30] But the balance of convenience, in my assessment, would not lie in favour of such a contention. The 14th Defendant is only one of several other Defendants, and the cause of action and basis of claim, I repeat, are not identical. Even if the suit against the 14th Defendant is revived, any ensuing trial would be very much more confined and focussed vis-à-vis the case against the 14th Defendant only. And the evidence adduced in the trial against the rest can also be considered for reliance in the subsequent trial against the 14th Defendant. [31] It bears repetition that the cause of action against the 14th Defendant is for essentially for breach of stakeholders‟ duties and breach of trust. In contrast, the pleaded cause of action against the 1st to the 12th Defendants, as the former directors and officers of CFB or CFT is one of conspiracy with one another to allegedly deprive the Plaintiff of his rights. The 13th Defendant (against whom the suit has been withdrawn) and the 14th Defendants were on the other hand both law firms involved in the maintaining the stakeholder accounts for CFB and CFT. Page 11 of 15 [32] As such, it bears repetition that clearly, the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for in the statement of claim of the Plaintiff are not the same. The cause of action against the 14th Defendant is preserved. Thus, should the Plaintiff succeed in his appeal against the striking out, the Plaintiff would still be able to proceed against the 14th Defendant independently of the suit against the 1st to the 12th Defendants. The nugatory argument as advanced by the Plaintiff to justify the stay of the proceedings is therefore lacking in merit. [33] Furthermore, I am of the view that the suit should proceed and ought indeed to be disposed of expeditiously, not only given that there are other Defendants who should not be unnecessarily burdened by the prolongation of the suit and its uncertain outcomes like the Sword of Damocles hanging over their heads. More pertinently, the suit is in fact grounded on issues that supposedly happened more than a decade ago, concerning debts dated back to 2005. It is as clear as day that the longer the delay in proceeding with the matter the more difficult it is for the witnesses to recollect the happening of the relevant events. These other Defendants would be further prejudiced should they be made to wait the appeal vis-à-vis the claim against the 14th Defendant be disposed of first, one that strictly has no direct relevance to the case against the other Defendants. The Plaintiff moved less than expeditiously [34] My decision striking out of the Plaintiff‟s claim against the 14th Defendant was made on 24 October 2017. The trial for the suit have been fixed to commence on 16 November 2017. Yet, the appeal against that decision was only filed on 1 November 2017, and the instant stay application on 3 November 2017. Under the circumstances it does appear that the Plaintiff did not move sufficiently timeously. [35] It should also be mentioned that neither did the Plaintiff furnish any certificate of urgency that ought to have been filed to have the appeal heard on an urgent basis. In that sense, this application for stay could be said to be bordering on as an attempt to delay the trial of this claim. More so as the Plaintiff had even withdrawn his claim against the 2nd Defendant, 3rd Defendant, 4th Defendant and the 7th Defendant. The 1st Defendant‟s assertion that this shows that the Plaintiff was not ready to proceed to trial when the suit was filed or that the Plaintiff recognises the weakness of his case against the other Defendants such that essentially, the Plaintiff is praying for a stay to delay proceedings is not entirely without basis. Page 12 of 15 Compliance with pre-trial directions [36] It is also a fact that the pre-trial case management directions had at the time of the hearing for the stay not been complied with. The issues to be tried and agreed facts have yet to be filed. The complete documents to be tried at the trial are yet to be available and is said by the Defendants to be furnished in batches by the Plaintiff. And even the documents which originated and marked for by the Defendants have yet to be compiled by the Plaintiff. At the hearing of the stay application however, the counsel for the Plaintiff explained that parties had not yet finalised the issues to be tried and the agreed facts which led to the delay. [37] The importance of ensuring strict compliance with case management directions cannot be emphasised enough. I have thus stated the following in the case of How Hock Sing @ Low Kim Chwee v Lee Say Peng & Ors [2015] 9 CLJ 368:- “[19] It surely therefore stands to reason that a necessary pre-requisite for a workable and efficient environment where the Courts are under the duty “to secure the just, expeditious and economical disposal” of actions is that there ought to be a robust case management system which does not easily tolerate lax enforcement of case management orders. This is acknowledged by the new provision in Order 34 r 2 (3) which is more specific in stating the consequence of not complying with such orders if compared against the previous Order 34 r 7 of RHC 1980. The latter reads as follows:—

Failure to comply with Judge‟s direction “If any party to an action fails to comply with any direction given by the Judge at any pre-trial conference, such order may be made against the defaulting party by the Judge as meets the ends of justice”. [38] It should also be emphasised that as decided in Universal Trustee (Malaysia) Berhad v Lembaga Pertama Sdn Bhd & Anor (No.2) [2014] 5 AMR 57, an application for a stay of proceeding should bear a heavier burden than that for a stay of execution. For an application to stay proceedings, like the one presently before me, serves to impede an expeditious disposal of a suit. Page 13 of 15 [39] The High Court in that case observed pertinently as follows:- “D. When proceedings can be stayed pending disposal of appeal?

Case law does not distinguish stay of execution from stay of proceedings. Case law requires both applicants for stay of execution and stay of proceedings to show "special circumstances" to justify a stay.

I am of the view that an applicant for a stay of proceedings should bear a heavier burden vis-à-vis an applicant for a stay of execution. This is because an application to stay proceedings will hinder an expeditious disposal of a suit as decided by the following cases:

the Court of Appeal held in Jagdis Singh Banta Singh v. Outlet Rank (M) Sdn Bhd [2013] 3 CLJ 47, at 58, as follows:- It is important to stress that initiation of a suit in a court of law demands the suit will be heard expeditiously and completed without any inhibition midway. Therefore, where an application for stay of proceedings is intended to merely stop or suspend the proceedings, it will be refused. Some applicants, on seeing the weakness of their client's case, would resort to application for stay and thereby waste the time of the other party and the court. The party simply cannot resort to the interlocutory of stay proceedings on having the slightest disagreement with any ruling of a trial judge. Courts are enjoined not to encourage such unwholesome practice." (emphasis added); and

in L & M Concrete Specialists Pte Ltd v. United Eng Contractors Pte Ltd [2002] 3 SLR 312, at para 17, the Singapore High Court stated that if every interlocutory order is appealed against and a stay of proceedings is sought:- "The litigation process would become most unsatisfactory if all such interlocutory applications must first receive the attention of the highest court in our system of justice before the next step could be taken." Singapore cases on stay of proceedings are persuasive as s. 41(1) of the Singapore's Supreme Court of Judicature Act is in pari materia with the 2 Statutory Provisions.

In deciding whether proceedings can be stayed pending the disposal of an appeal, the following factors should be considered:

whether the applicant can show special circumstances - Jagdis Singh, at p. 58. An applicant can demonstrate special circumstances when his or her appeal to the Court of Appeal will be rendered redundant if proceedings in the High Court are not stayed;

in Chinese Chamber Realty Pte Ltd & Ors v. Samsung Corp (No 2) [2003] 4 SLR 313, at para 3, the Singapore High Court considered the balance of convenience (now popularly known as balance of justice), namely a comparison of the existence, nature and extent of prejudice which may be suffered by the parties if proceedings are stayed or otherwise;

if an application to stay proceedings constitutes an abuse of court process, such an application should be refused - Jagdis Singh, at p. 58; and

whether there is an unexplained delay in applying for a stay of proceedings:-

the High Court case of MCAT Gen Sdn Bhd v. Celcom (M) Bhd (No. 2) [2007] 10 CLJ 375, at 383; and

(ii) the Singapore High Court decision in MCI Worldcom Asia Pte Ltd v. Chembell Technology Sdn Bhd [2003] 4 SLR 748, at paragraph 7”. Conclusion [40] Having considered the circumstances and the arguments posited by all parties in the hearing for stay, in my view, the Plaintiff, as the applicant bearing the burden to justify the grant of a stay, has not succeeded in showing the existence of special circumstances, and that the balance of justice or convenience would for the reasons I have discussed earlier, inexorably lean towards the refusal of the stay. Accordingly, I dismiss the Plaintiff‟s stay application in enclosure 120 with costs to the 1st, 6th, 9th, and 12th Defendants. Page 15 of 15 Dated: 4 January 2018 (MOHD NAZLAN BIN MOHD GHAZALI) Judge High Court NCC1 Kuala Lumpur Counsel: Counsel for the Plaintiff Krishna Dallumah, Venka Arun & Y.H Yong Messrs Ven & Associates Kuala Lumpur Counsel for the 1st Defendant K. Vimalanathan & Mithran Messrs Vib & Associates Kuala Lumpur Counsel for the 6th Defendant Michael Chang Messrs Gregory Chan, Tam, Moo & Ang Kuala Lumpur Counsel for the 9th Defendant & 12th Defendant John Wong Yok Hon Messrs Shui Tai Petaling Jaya Counsel for the 14th Defendant Sarita Ashok Khandhar & Shaik Abdullah Messrs Alvin John & Partners Kuala Lumpur