LEE YUNG-WAI, JOSHUA (NRIC No.:950303-06-5223) ... Second Defendant GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Introduction [1] This is the Respondent's Notice of Application (Enclosure 6) seeking an order to strike out the Appellant's Notice of Appeal dated 25 August 2025. [2] The appeal arises from the decision of the learned Sessions Court Judge dismissing the Appellant's applications for summary judgment under Order 14 and alternatively, for judgment on admissions under Order 27 of the Rules of Court 2012. [3] The Respondent contends that the appeal is incompetent by virtue of section 28(1)(b) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 ("the CJA"), which prohibits an appeal against the dismissal of an application for summary judgment. The Appellant disputes that contention and relies principally on the decision of the Federal Court in MT Ventures Sdn Bhd & Anor v QM Print Sdn Bhd & Anor & Another Appeal [2025] 6 MLRA 595 ("MT Ventures"). [4] The sole issue before this Court is whether the present appeal is barred by section 28(1)(b) of the CJA or whether, applying the principles laid down by the Federal Court in MT Ventures, the appeal nevertheless remains competent. Brief Facts [5] The Appellant is an advocate and solicitor practising under the name and style of Messrs Thurairaj T. Kumar & Associates. The Respondent and the Second Defendant were formerly clients of the Appellant in relation to several legal matters. Following the termination of the solicitor-client relationship, a dispute arose concerning legal fees allegedly due to the Appellant. The Appellant subsequently commenced proceedings in the Sessions Court to recover the outstanding fees. [6] During the course of those proceedings, the Appellant applied for summary judgment pursuant to Order 14 of the Rules of Court 2012 and in the alternative, for judgment on admissions under Order 27. The applications were however dismissed by the learned Sessions Court Judge. [7] Aggrieved by that decision, the Appellant lodged the present appeal. Before the appeal could be heard on its merits, the Respondent filed the present application seeking to strike out the appeal on the ground that it is prohibited by section 28(1)(b) of the CJA. [8] The Appellant opposes the application. In essence, the Appellant contends that the appeal raises a threshold legal issue concerning the operation and effect of sections 124,126 and 128 of the Legal Profession Act 1976 ("the LPA"). According to the Appellant, the learned Sessions Court Judge's refusal to grant summary judgment and judgment on admissions effectively denied the Appellant the benefit of the statutory consequences said to arise under those provisions. Relying on the principles enunciated by the Federal Court in MT Ventures, the Appellant argues that the order possesses the requisite element of finality and that the appeal is therefore not barred by section 28(1)(b) of the CJA. The Parties' Contentions [9] Learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that the appeal is incompetent and ought to be struck out pursuant to section 28(1)(b) of the CJA. It was argued that the appeal arises directly from the dismissal of the Appellant's applications for summary judgment under Order 14 and judgment on admissions under Order 27 of the Rules of Court 2012 and therefore falls squarely within the statutory prohibition against appeals. According to the Respondent, the learned Sessions Court Judge merely found that the matter disclosed triable issues requiring determination at trial. Such a decision, it was submitted, does not finally determine the parties' substantive rights and is therefore not appealable. [10] Learned counsel for the Appellant accepted that section 28(1)(b) generally prohibits appeals against the dismissal of applications for summary judgment. However, it was submitted that the Federal Court in MT Ventures has clarified that section 28 cannot be construed in isolation but must be read harmoniously with the definition of "decision" in section 3 of the CJA. Counsel argued that where an interlocutory order finally determines substantive rights, it constitutes a "decision" within the meaning of section 3 of the CJA and is therefore not caught by the prohibition in section 28(1)(b). [11] In support of that submission, the Appellant contended that sections 124, 126 and 128 of the LPA establish a statutory regime governing solicitor-and-client bills and prescribe the legal consequences where such bills are not challenged through taxation within the time permitted by law. It was argued that by refusing the applications for summary judgment and judgment on admissions, the learned Sessions Court Judge had effectively denied the Appellant the benefit of those statutory consequences and required the Appellant to prove at trial matters which Parliament intended to be treated as final. [12] It therefore becomes necessary to consider the proper scope of section 28(1)(b) of the CJA in light of the principles laid down by the Federal Court in MT Ventures, before determining whether the present appeal falls within the category of cases recognised by that decision. Analysis Section 28 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 and the effect of MT Ventures [13] The starting point is section 28(1)(b) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 ("the CJA"), which provides that no appeal shall lie to the High Court where a subordinate court has dismissed an application for summary judgment. [14] Read in isolation, the provision appears straightforward. It seems to suggest that once a subordinate court dismisses an application for summary judgment, the unsuccessful party has no right of appeal. Prior to the Federal Court's decision in MT Ventures, this was generally understood to be the effect of section 28(1)(b). [15] The Federal Court in MT Ventures, however, clarified that section 28 cannot be read in isolation. Rather, it must be read harmoniously with the other provisions of the CJA, in particular the definition of "decision" in section 3 and the appellate jurisdiction conferred under section 26. The proper inquiry therefore extends beyond the procedural description of the order. The Court must examine its legal effect. The question is whether the order merely regulates the conduct of the proceedings pending trial or whether it conclusively determines substantive rights. It is only after answering that question that section 28 falls to be considered. [16] Properly understood, MT Ventures did not abolish the statutory prohibition contained in section 28. Nor did it hold that every dismissal of an application for summary judgment or striking out is appealable. The general rule remains that such orders are ordinarily not appealable. What MT Ventures recognised is a limited but important exception. Where an interlocutory order has the effect of finally determining substantive rights, it may nevertheless constitute a "decision" capable of appeal notwithstanding the procedural character of the application. [17] The distinction may be illustrated by a simple example. Suppose a court dismisses an application for summary judgment because important facts remain disputed and witnesses must be called to testify. In that situation, the court has not decided who is ultimately right or wrong. It has merely concluded that it cannot yet determine the dispute because further evidence is required. The controversy remains alive and will ultimately be resolved at trial. [18] In such a case, the dismissal possesses no element of finality. Nothing has been conclusively determined. The court has merely postponed its decision until all relevant evidence has been heard. Such an order ordinarily falls within the prohibition contained in section 28 because permitting an immediate appeal would simply interrupt the normal progress of the litigation before the real issues have been adjudicated. [19] The position is materially different where the interlocutory application raises a pure question of law or a threshold legal issue which does not depend upon the assessment of oral evidence. In such cases, the court is not asked to choose between competing versions of disputed facts. Instead, it is asked to determine the legal consequences flowing from facts which are either admitted or objectively ascertainable. [20] The Federal Court recognised that certain interlocutory applications raise threshold questions of law, such as locus standi, state immunity or compliance with statutory preconditions before an action may be commenced. Such issues ordinarily do not become clearer merely because witnesses are called to testify. Their determination depends upon the legal consequences flowing from objective or undisputed facts rather than the resolution of disputed factual issues. [21] The Federal Court illustrated this distinction by reference to a derivative action. The issue was whether the statutory threshold permitting such an action had been satisfied. That question did not depend upon disputed oral evidence or the credibility of witnesses. Rather, it depended upon whether the statutory requirements had been fulfilled. If they had not, the action could not proceed. Conversely, if they had, the action was entitled to continue. In either event, the answer lay in the legal consequences flowing from the statutory requirements themselves and not in the resolution of disputed facts at trial. [22] It was for that reason that the Federal Court held that not every dismissal of an interlocutory application is necessarily caught by section 28 of the CJA. Where the dismissal merely reflects the Court's conclusion that disputed facts require determination through viva voce evidence, the Court has simply deferred the adjudication of the parties' rights until trial. Conversely, where the application raises a threshold legal issue capable of conclusively affecting those rights without the need for further evidence, the order possesses the degree of finality contemplated by the CJA and may therefore constitute an appealable decision notwithstanding its interlocutory character. [23] The principle emerging from MT Ventures is therefore both clear and practical. The Court should not ask merely what type of application was dismissed. Rather, it should ask a more fundamental question; what did the dismissal actually determine? If the order merely postpones the determination of disputed facts until trial, section 28 will ordinarily bar an appeal. If, however, the order determines a threshold legal issue capable of conclusively affecting the parties' substantive rights, it may nevertheless constitute an appealable decision. [24] The illustrations discussed by the Federal Court are not, in my respectful view, exhaustive. They serve to demonstrate the underlying principle rather than to define closed categories of appealable decisions. The enquiry is not whether a particular issue bears a recognised legal label but whether it concerns the legal consequences flowing from objective or undisputed facts such that no amount of oral evidence is capable of altering those consequences. Where that is so, the interlocutory order may possess the requisite element of finality notwithstanding its procedural form. Application to the present appeal [25] Against that backdrop, I now turn to the present appeal. The issue before this Court is not whether the learned Sessions Court Judge was correct in refusing summary judgment or judgment on admissions. That question falls to be determined in the substantive appeal. The only question presently before this Court is whether the appeal itself is competent. [26] In answering that question, it is necessary to identify what the learned Sessions Court Judge's order actually determined. As explained in MT Ventures, the enquiry is one of substance rather than form. The Court must look beyond the procedural nature of the application and examine the legal effect of the order. [27] Having examined the grounds of appeal, I am satisfied that the Appellant does not merely complain that the learned Sessions Court Judge ought to have reached a different conclusion on the evidence or that there were no triable issues in the ordinary sense. Rather, the appeal raises a threshold question concerning the operation and legal effect of the statutory regime established under sections 124, 126 and 128 of the Legal Profession Act 1976 ("the LPA"). [28] Those provisions regulate the manner in which a solicitor's bill may be challenged and prescribe the legal consequences where the statutory procedure for taxation is not invoked within the time prescribed by law. The Appellant's case is that the Respondent failed to invoke that statutory procedure. If that contention is correct, the issue is not whether the Appellant can prove each individual item contained in its bills through oral testimony. The real issue is whether the law still permits those bills to be challenged at all. [29] That issue is one of statutory interpretation. The material facts relating to the delivery of the bills, the lapse of time and the absence of taxation proceedings are capable of objective determination. They do not depend upon the credibility of witnesses or the resolution of conflicting oral evidence. The real controversy concerns the legal consequences flowing from those facts under the statutory framework enacted by Parliament. [30] Once the issue is properly characterised in that manner, its similarity to the derivative action illustration discussed in MT Ventures becomes apparent. In both situations, the Court is not asked to determine disputed questions of fact. Rather, it is asked whether a statutory regime has attached a particular legal consequence to facts which are already established or objectively ascertainable. [31] Just as the Federal Court held that the question whether the statutory threshold for commencing a derivative action had been satisfied was capable of determination without a trial, the issue in the present appeal is whether the Respondent's failure to invoke the statutory taxation procedure has exhausted its right to challenge the Appellant's bills. That question does not become clearer by calling additional witnesses. Its resolution depends upon the proper construction and application of the Legal Profession Act 1976. [32] Similar considerations may arise in other contexts where Parliament or the common law attaches definitive legal consequences to established facts. Whether a claim is statute-barred, whether an issue is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, or whether a statutory right has been lost through noncompliance with prescribed procedural requirements are examples of issues which ordinarily turn upon the legal effect of objective facts rather than disputed oral evidence. In each instance, the issue is not what happened, but what legal consequence the law attaches to what has happened. In my judgment, the present appeal falls within the same analytical framework because it concerns the legal consequences said to arise under the statutory regime governing solicitor-and-client bills. [33] If the Appellant's interpretation of the statutory scheme is ultimately correct, requiring the parties to proceed through a full trial would serve no useful purpose. It would require the Appellant to prove, item by item, matters which the statutory regime may already regard as final and binding. More significantly, it would permit the Respondent to circumvent the statutory scheme by challenging, through the ordinary trial process, bills which the Appellant contends have already become final by operation of law. [34] It is important to emphasise that this Court expresses no concluded view at this stage on whether the Appellant's interpretation of sections 124, 126 and 128 of the LPA is correct. That is the very issue to be determined in the substantive appeal. The present application is concerned with a different question, namely whether that issue is capable of bringing the appeal within the principle recognised in MT Ventures. [35] In my judgment, it plainly is. Properly analysed, the Appellant's appeal raises a threshold question concerning the legal consequences flowing from a statutory regime rather than disputed questions of fact requiring determination at trial. Whether that statutory consequence exists is a matter of law. It is therefore capable of finally affecting the parties' substantive rights without the necessity of viva voce evidence. It follows that the learned Sessions Court Judge's dismissal of the applications cannot be regarded merely as a procedural decision postponing the resolution of factual disputes until trial. On the Appellant's case, the order effectively determined that the statutory consequences asserted under the LPA did not entitle the Appellant to judgment without trial. That determination possesses the element of finality contemplated by the Federal Court in MT Ventures. Accordingly, the Respondent's contention that the present appeal is absolutely barred by section 28(1)(b) of the CJA cannot be sustained. Conclusion [37] Having considered the Respondent's preliminary objection in light of the principles laid down by the Federal Court in MT Ventures, I am satisfied that the present appeal is not directed merely against the learned Sessions Court Judge's refusal to grant summary judgment or judgment on admissions. Rather, it raises a threshold question concerning the legal consequences said to arise under the statutory framework established by the Legal Profession Act 1976. [38] The issue raised in the appeal is one of law. It concerns the proper construction and application of the statutory provisions governing solicitor-and-client bills and the legal consequences flowing from the Respondent's alleged failure to invoke the taxation procedure prescribed by Parliament. Whether the Appellant's interpretation of those provisions is ultimately correct is a matter for the substantive appeal. However, the issue is plainly one capable of conclusively affecting the parties' substantive rights without the necessity of resolving disputed facts through viva voce evidence. [39] Properly analysed, the learned Sessions Court Judge's dismissal of the Appellant's applications did more than merely regulate the conduct of the proceedings pending trial. On the Appellant's case, it determined that the statutory consequences asserted under the Legal Profession Act 1976 did not justify judgment without a trial. It is that legal determination and not simply the procedural refusal of summary judgment, which forms the subject matter of the present appeal. [40] In those circumstances, I am satisfied that the appeal falls within the category of decisions recognised by the Federal Court in MT Ventures. Accordingly, section 28(1)(b) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 does not operate to bar the present appeal. [41] The Respondent's Notice of Application (Enclosure 6) is therefore dismissed. [42] As this application concerns the proper interpretation of the Federal Court's recent decision in MT Ventures and raises an issue of general importance concerning the scope of the appellate jurisdiction of this Court, I make no order as to costs. Dated: 21 July 2026 (SAMRY BIN MASRI) Judicial Commissioner High Court Kuantan Counsel for the Appellant : Tetuan Thurairaj T. Kumar & Assc. Peguambela & Peguamcara Suite 18-9, Menara 1 MK Kompleks Mont Kiara, Mont Kiara 50480 Kuala Lumpur Counsel for Respondent Peguambela & Peguamcara No.20, Tkt.1, Jalan Lestari Utama Taman Amalina Lestari 27600 Raub