Berdasarkan eks. NA 2 di kand 4, responden juga telah mengeluarkan Borang G pada 16 Jun 2005. [9] Saya tidak dapat menerima hujahan peguamcara bijaksana pemohon bahawa oleh kerana Borang H hanya diterima pada 22 November 2005 maka enam minggu hanya bermula daripada tarikh tersebut kerana jelas daripada s. 16 Akta tersebut, Borang H adalah berkaitan dengan penyerahan award dan bukan berkaitan dengan tempoh masa memfailkan bantahan.” [41] The High Court in Uda Holdings Bhd v Pentadbir Tanah Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur [2012] 10 CLJ 867 also came to the same conclusion. In this case, the applicant argues that time starts to run from the receipt of Form “H” under section 16 of the LAA 1960 from the respondent, and therefore the applicant was well within time when they lodged Form “N”. So, the question for the court to adjudicate upon is from when does the period of six weeks for serving Form “N” begins to run under section 38 LAA 1960. The learned Judge held as follows: “[9] The question for the court to adjudicate upon is from when the six weeks time period for serving Form “N” begins to run. Looking at s. 14(1) of the said Act it clearly provides that upon a conclusion of the enquiry held by the respondent the respondent prepares a written award under his hand under Form “G”. [10] To my mind Form “G” is not an offer of compensation but a written award and is final and conclusive as provided in s. 14(2) of the said Act. Section 16 deals with the service of the said written award under s. 14(1) by issuing of Form “H”. Section 38(3)(a) of the Act, provides expressedly that as in our case the applicant was present when the respondent made its award, the period to file the Notice of Objection runs within six weeks from the date of the Land Administrator’s award under s. 14 of the Act, with regards to filing of the Notice of Objection to the award Form “N”, s. 38(3)(a) of the Act applies and it is to be observed, the said section makes no reference at all to s. 16 of the said Act. It is also to be noted that had the applicant not been present at the enquiry then the argument that the six weeks runs from receipt of Form “H” would tenable but not so in this case. [11] I am unable to accept submissions of counsel for the applicant that Form “G” pursuant to s. 14(1) of the said Act is merely an offer subject to Form “H” being issued and served on the applicant. In my view the provisions of the said Act are clear and s. 16 relates to the service of the written award of the respondent in Form “H” and the options that are statutorily options available to the applicant. Section 38(a) of the said Act clearly sets out when the prescribed period the objection is to be filed and is to run from, ie, from the time the respondent made his award. I find support for my approach in the dictum of His Lordship Zulkefli Ahmad Makinudin FCJ in the decision of the Federal Court in Singapore Para Rubber Estate Ltd v. Pentadbir Tanah Daerah, Daerah Rembau, Negeri Sembilan reported in [2009] 1 CLJ 13, and particularly at p. 31 of the report para. 73 and I quote: [73] It is my view that if at all there has been a non-compliance by the respondent of the statutory requirements under the Act in making the award under s. 14 of the Act, this issue should be taken up and argued at the hearing of the objection of the appellant in the reference to the High Court under s. 36 of the Act. In fact on this point the appellant as an aggrieved party has a recourse to state his case in challenging the award of the respondent at that stage of the proceedings by producing its own Private Valuation Report before the court. But this is not the case before us now. The true position in the present case is that the appellant had been out of time in filing its application for objection to the award within six weeks from the date of the Land Administrator’s award was made under s. 14 of the Act. The appellant in fact has already failed in the first hurdle of satisfying the High Court and the Court of Appeal of the justification to grant enlargement of time to file objection proceedings under Form N. [12] I refer also the case of Dynamic Plantations Bhd v. Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Segamat reported in [2008] 3 CLJ at p. 37 which forms the pivot of the applicant’s submissions. In view of my interpretation of the relevant sections of the said Act I with respect, I am unable to agree with the views expressed by His Lordship in that case. [13] I therefore rule that in this case where the applicant was present, when the respondent made his award, the period to file the objection runs from six weeks from the date the award was made and therefore the applicant was out of time in filing of Form “N” and therefore prayer 1(a) of encl. 1 is dismissed.” [42] We are therefore of the considered opinion that the High Court decision in Dynamic Plantations Bhd relied by the Appellant is plainly wrong when the learned Judge failed to consider the effects of subsection 38(3) LAA 1960. Instead, the learned Judge in Dynamic Plantation made a finding that the Land Administrator’s award under section 14 LAA 1960 is not an award at all but an offer of compensation as determined by the Land Administrator, to the land owner. Since it is an offer, it must be communicated to the land owner via section 16, who later determines whether to accept the offer or rejects the same. [43] In fact, section 14 is clear, that after completing the enquiry under Section 12, the Land Administrator must prepare a written award in Form G and that the award is final and conclusive, regardless of whether the interested parties attended the enquiry. The said award can only be challenged via the filing of Form N under section 38. Therefore, it is wrong to say that the award under section 14 is merely an offer which the owner may accept or reject after informed of the same via From H. [44] In the present appeal, when subsection 38(3)(a) of the LAA 1960 is read with section 14, the Appellant is required to make their objection by a written application in Form N to the Land Administrator pursuant to subsection 38(1) within six (6) weeks from the date of the Land Administrator’s award made at the conclusion of the inquiry, that is to say, six (6) weeks from 19 June 2022. In other words, the last date for the Appellant to file Form N was 30 July 2022. But in the present case, the appellant had only filed their objection on 18 September 2022 and there was therefore a delay of 50 days. By reason of the delay, the filling of the Form N was rightly rejected by the Respondent. special circumstances to extend time [45] As an alternative argument, the Appellant submitted that subsection 38(4) of the LAA 1960 also provides the Court with the discretion to enlarge the timeframe for filing an objection to the Land Administrator's award if there are special circumstances deemed appropriate by the Court. [46] Subsection 38(4) of the LAA 1960 reads as follows: “The period of six weeks prescribed by paragraph (3)(a) and the periods of six weeks and six months prescribed by paragraph (3)(b) shall not be capable of enlargement by any Court, except in such special circumstances as the Court may think fit.” [47] In order for the Appellant to succeed under subsection 38(4) LAA 1960, the Appellant will have to establish that there existed special circumstances to warrant the court to exercise that discretion. The onus is therefore on the Appellant show special circumstances and the court must exercise its discretion to enlarge the time for filing of objection sparingly. [48] In this regard, we make reference to the Federal Court case of Singapore Para Rubber Estate Ltd v. Pentadbir Tanah Daerah, Daerah Rembau, Negeri Sembilan [2009] 1 CLJ 13, where the apex court held as follows: “[50] In order for the appellant to succeed under s. 38(4) it had to establish that there existed special circumstances to warrant the court to exercise that discretion. The onus therefore was on the appellant. [51] The discretion to be exercised by the court was not absolute and unqualified and had to be exercised sparingly (see Sungei Bongkoh Estate Sdn. Bhd. v. Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Kuala Muda [1995] 1 CLJ 400).” [49] On the issue of what constitutes special circumstances, reference is made to the Federal Court case of Kosma Palm Oil Mill Sdn. Bhd. & Ors v. Koperasi Serbausaha Makmur Bhd. [2004] 1 CLJ 239; [2004] 1 MLJ 257, where the judges of the Court referred to the case of Government of Malaysia v. Datuk Haji Kadir Mohamd Mastan and Ors [1993] 4 CLJ 98; [1993] 3 MLJ 514 at p 521: "An attempt was made to define special circumstances by Raja Azlan Shah (as His Majesty then was) in the case of Leong Poh Shee v. Ng Kat Chong [1965] CLJU 212; [1965] 1 LNS 212; [1966] 1 MLJ 86, viz: 'Special circumstances, as the phrase implies, must be special under the circumstances as distinguished from ordinary circumstances. It must be something exceptional in character, something that exceeds or excels in some way that which is usual or common.' The definition only serves to emphasize the fact that there are myriad circumstances that could constitute special circumstances with each case depending on its own facts. I am of the opinion that the list of factors constituting special circumstances is infinite and could grow with time. Any attempt to limit the list or close a category would be to impose a fetter on the exercise of the discretion of the court whether to grant or stay an execution; making the discretion less of a discretion. This is surely not what discretion is all about." [50] As to the Court's discretionary power to grant an extension of time to file the Form N, in Singapore Para Rubber Estate case, Alauddin Mohd Sheriff, CJ (M) (later PCA) remarked: “[59] Any prejudice or injustice, if at all, caused to the appellant is actually the result of their own attitude. [60] Had the appellant remained vigilant in making the application for enlargement of time, they would have had the opportunity to ventilate their case before the High Court. [61] But the appellant had chosen to remain nonchalant and treated their right with apathy.” [51] In the same case, Zulkifli Ahmad Makinuddin, FCJ (as he then was) observed: "[73]... The true position in the present case was that the appellant had been out of time in filling its application for objection to the award within six weeks from the date of the LA's award. The appellant in fact had already failed in the first hurdle of satisfying the High Court and Court of Appeal of the justification to grant an enlargement of time to file objection proceedings under Form N." [52] Similarly, in Damai Motor Kredit Sdn. Bhd. & Anor v. Kementerian Kerja Raya Malaysia [2015] 1 CLJ 44, this Court made a similar pronouncement: " [23] Whilst the learned Senior Federal Counsel may be right in his submissions that the period of six weeks to file any objection may be extended or enlarged by the court under special circumstances as provided by s. 38(4) of the Act, we must emphasise that the burden is on the respondent to show special circumstances. [25] In this regard, we make reference to the Federal Court case of Singapore Para Rubber Estate Ltd v. Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Rembau, Negeri Sembilan [2009] 1 CLJ 13; [2008] 2 MLRA 469; [2008] 6 MLJ 763; [2009] 1 CLJ 13, where the court said: [50] In order for the appellant to succeed under s. 38(4) it had to establish that there existed special circumstances to warrant the court to exercise that discretion. The onus therefore was on the appellant. [51] The discretion to be exercised by the court was not absolute and unqualified and had to be exercised sparingly.” [53] In Tan Bun Cheonq v. Pentadbir Tanah, Pejabat Derah dan Tanah Bukit Mertajam Pulau Pinang [1992] CLJU 85; [1992] 1 LNS 85, the learned Judge applied the case of Singapore Para Rubber Estate and held as follows: "Apakah yang dikatakan sebagai keadaan khas di dalam kes ini? Hanya satu, iaitu Pemohon menyangka dia tidak perlu membuat bantahan bertulis, tegasnya dalam Borang N. Seperti yang saya katakan tadi bahawa kesilapan bona fide atau kejahilan tentang undang-undang bukanlah semestinya keadaan khas, walaupun boleh diberi pertimbangan. Di dalam kes ini saya akui memang terdapat kesusahan jika permohonan ini tidak diluluskan. Tetapi bolehkah dikatakan dia tidak bersalah (not at fault)? Pada pandangan saya dia tidak boleh dikatakan tidak bersalah.” [54] In the present appeal, the Appellant argues that there are special circumstances warranting the court's discretion to grant the Appellant's application under subsection 38(4) of the LAA 1960 and Order 92 Rule 4 of the Rules of Court 2012. These circumstances include as follows: