L O B v H O B (WA-33-592-12/2021)

Spousal maintenance – In deciding whether spousal maintenance should be awarded to the Respondent, the following broad issues were imperative to consider:

The cause of the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage, namely:

(A) Whether the Respondent’s allegations of adultery between the Petitioner and Party-Cited had been established, and whether the Respondent had found such adultery, if at all, intolerable;

(B) Whether the Respondent had established that it was the Petitioner’s unreasonable behaviour, such as excessive gambling, drinking, smoking, and lack of involvement in family life that had caused the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage

(ii) Whether the Respondent had satisfied the ‘means and needs’ test to justify the amount of spousal maintenance sought. 16 August 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 4

Guardianship; custody, care and control; child maintenance – In relation to the Son, the issues for determination were whether the Petitioner and Respondent should be granted joint guardianship and joint custody, and, if sole custody, care, and control were awarded to the Respondent, what form of access the Petitioner would have. A further issue was whether the Petitioner was obligated to pay child maintenance.

Matrimonial assets – In relation to the matrimonial assets, the central question was whether both the Petitioner and the Respondent were entitled to a division of those assets based on their respective claimed contributions [7] During the trial of the Divorce Petition, two intermediate rulings were required. The first pertained to the admissibility of documents prepared by a private investigator. This issue arose because the investigator who had personally observed and photographed the events in question was not called as a witness. Instead, his superior, another private investigator (SR2), sought to tender the evidence on his behalf. [8] The second ruling was in relation to an application by the Respondent to compel the Petitioner to undergo a DNA test to determine whether he is the biological father of the child of the Party-Cited (“the Child”). [9] In the first matter, I held that the documents prepared by the private investigator were admissible through SR2. In the second, I dismissed the Respondent’s application to compel the Petitioner and the Child to undergo DNA testing. 16 August 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 5 [10] At the conclusion of the divorce trial, the Court granted the divorce and apportioned the matrimonial assets according to the Parties’ respective contributions. The Parties were awarded joint guardianship of the Son, though sole custody, care, and control remained with the Respondent. The Petitioner was ordered to pay monthly child maintenance, while the Respondent’s claim for spousal maintenance and her claim for damages against the Party-Cited were both dismissed. [11] The following were my reasons. Contentions, evaluation, and findings Spousal maintenance [12] The Respondent had claimed monthly spousal maintenance in the amount of MYR5,000. [13] In determining the issue of maintenance, reference was made to section 77(1) of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act, which reads: Section 77 – Power of court to order maintenance of spouse

The court may order a man to pay maintenance to his wife or former wife:

during the course of any matrimonial proceedings;

when granting or subsequent to the grant of a decree of divorce or judicial separation;

if, after a decree declaring her presumed to be dead, she is found to be alive. [Emphasis added.] 16 August 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 6 [14] In exercising its discretion to award maintenance to the Respondent, the Court was governed by both the fault principle and the 'means and needs' test, outlined by section 78 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act, which reads: Section 78 – Assessment of maintenance In determining the amount of any maintenance to be paid by a man to his wife or former wife or by a woman to her husband or former husband, the court shall base its assessment primarily on the means and needs of the parties, regardless of the proportion such maintenance bears to the income of the husband or wife as the case may be, but shall have regard to the degree of responsibility which the court apportions to each party for the breakdown of the marriage. [Emphasis added.] [15] In my evaluation of whether the Respondent was deserving of maintenance that she claimed, I found guidance in established legal precedents, specifically the cases of Dr Shameni Pillai PB Rajedran v Dr S Arulselvam Sanggilly & Anor [2011] 6 CLJ 782, and V Sandrasagaran Veerapan Raman v. Dettarassar Velentine Souvina Marie [1999] 5 CLJ 474. These cases underscore the importance of considering several key factors, such as the following:

the income, earning capacity, property, or financial resources that each party presently possesses or is likely to possess in the foreseeable future;

the financial needs, obligations, and responsibilities that each party currently or is likely to have in the foreseeable future;

the standard of living enjoyed by the family prior to the breakdown of the marriage; 16 August 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 7

the age of each party;

any existing health, physical, or mental disability of the parties;

the respective contributions made by each party to the welfare of the family; and

the duration of the marriage. [16] Furthermore, the rationale behind the law imposing a duty on a man to maintain his former wife is to even out any financial inequalities between the spouses, taking into account any economic prejudice suffered by the wife during marriage, as explained in the Singapore cases of Tan Sue-Ann Melissa v Lim Siang Bok Dennis [2004] 3 SLR(R) 376, and Quek Lee Tiam v Ho Kim Swee (alias Ho Kian Guan) [1995] SGHC 23. [17] In my analysis, I drew valuable insights from the Singaporean legal precedents set forth in the cases of Foo Ah Yan v Chiam Heng Chow [2012] 2 SLR 506, ATE v ATD [2016] SGCA 2, and VPU v VPT [2021] SGCA. These cases, being of a more contemporary nature, provide a pragmatic perspective on the issue of spousal maintenance post-divorce, particularly concerning the wife's entitlement. [18] Accordingly, it was imperative for the Court to first ascertain which party was responsible for the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. 16 August 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 8 Adultery [19] The Respondent asserted that the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage was primarily caused by the Petitioner's adulterous relationship with the Party-Cited, as well as with several other women. This determination was to be made in accordance with sections 53 and 54(1)(a) of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 (“Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act”), both of which read: Section 53 – Breakdown of marriage to be sole ground of divorce

Either party to a marriage may petition for a divorce on the ground that the marriage has irretrievably broken down.

The court hearing such petition shall, so far as it reasonably can, inquire into the facts alleged as causing or leading to the breakdown of the marriage and, if satisfied that the circumstances make it just and reasonable to do so, make a decree for its dissolution. … Section 54 – Proof of breakdown

In its inquiry into the facts and circumstances alleged as causing or leading to the breakdown of the marriage, the court shall have regard to one or more of the following facts, that is to say-

that the respondent has committed adultery and the petitioner finds it intolerable to live with the respondent; … [Emphasis added.] [20] Based on such allegations, the Respondent had sought damages against the Party-Cited pursuant to section 58(3) of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act, which provides: 16 August 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 9 Section 58 – Damages for adultery may be claimed against co-respondent …

Where damages have been claimed against a co-respondent-

if, after the close of the evidence for the petitioner, the court is of the opinion that there is not sufficient evidence against the co-respondent to justify requiring him or her to reply, the co-respondent shall be discharged from the proceedings; or

if, at the conclusion of the hearing, the court is satisfied that adultery between the respondent and co-respondent has been proved, the court may award the petitioner such damages as it may think fit, but so that the award shall not include any exemplary or punitive element. [Emphasis added.] Proving adultery [21] In assessing the Respondent’s burden and standard of proof in establishing adultery, the Court first had to consider the legal definition of ‘adultery’. [22] The classic formulation is found in Clarkson v. Clarkson [1930] 143 LT 775, 46 TLR 623, where adultery is defined as voluntary sexual intercourse between a man and a woman who are not married to each other, with at least one of them being married to another person. This definition highlights the requirement for evidence of a physical sexual relationship, mere suggestive messages or compromising photographs are insufficient. [23] Further guidance was drawn from Indian jurisprudence, including Geeta Bai v. Fattu AIR [1966] Madhya Pradesh 130 and D Henderson v. D Henderson AIR [1970] Madras 104, where adultery is similarly described as consensual sexual intercourse between a 16 August 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 10 married person and someone of the opposite sex who is not their lawful spouse, during the subsistence of the marriage. [24] Accordingly, the evidence must go beyond raising mere suspicion or establishing opportunity. It must be cogent enough to lead the Court to conclude that adultery must have taken place, having regard to the circumstances. Where the evidence is purely circumstantial, the Court will not infer adultery unless the facts presented are incapable of any other reasonable explanation. [25] There was no doubt that the Respondent had the legal burden to prove adultery by virtue of section 103 of the Evidence Act 1950, as it was she who had wanted the Court to believe in the existence of a particular fact. However, the issue that required consideration was the standard of proving adultery. [26] It was suggested that the Respondent was required to prove the alleged adultery beyond a reasonable doubt and that the evidence adduced was insufficient to establish any adulterous relationship between him and the Party-Cited. [27] However, I disagreed with such contention and held that the appropriate standard of proof in such matters is the balance of probabilities, for the following reasons. [28] The higher threshold of proof beyond a reasonable doubt applies strictly to criminal proceedings. In the context of non-Muslim marriages in Malaysia, adultery is not a criminal offence but, at most, a matrimonial offence. Therefore, civil standards of proof are applicable. 16 August 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 11 [29] It was important to appreciate that the legal framework governing marriage and divorce in Malaysia underwent a substantial transformation following the coming into force of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act on 1 March 1982. Prior to that date, adultery was treated as a matrimonial offence, and the courts generally required proof of such misconduct to be established beyond a reasonable doubt in order to grant a decree of divorce. [30] With the enactment of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act, however, the legal foundation for divorce shifted from the traditional fault-based model to a more progressive principle, that of the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. As a result, the standard of proof likewise evolved, that is, from the stricter criminal standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt" to the civil standard of "balance of probabilities." [31] It must also be emphasised that, notwithstanding the seriousness of the allegation, be it adultery, fraud, or forgery, the Family Court remains a civil court. Accordingly, the applicable standard of proof in all such matters is uniformly that of the balance of probabilities. Reference on this point was made to GGC v. CCC [2016] 1 LNS 885, where in alluding to the Federal Court case of Sinnaiyah & Sons Sdn Bhd v. Damai Setia Sdn Bhd [2015] 7 CLJ 584; [2015] 5 MLJ 1, it was stated by Lee Swee Seng J (as he then was), in the following passages: [99] Based on the cogent arguments of the Federal Court in Sinnaiyah & Sons Sdn Bhd v. Damai Setia Sdn Bhd [2015] 7 CLJ 584; [2015] 5 MLJ 1, which has held that fraud in civil cases should be proved on the standard of proof of the balance of probabilities, the time has come for standardisation of proof even in cases of adultery in a divorce petition which is essentially fraud on a spouse in a civil proceeding: it should be 16 August 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 12 henceforth on a balance of probabilities as well. The anomaly has to be realigned. To perpetuate the dichotomy would be to create an artificial distinction devoid of merits. The Federal Court could not have made it clearer when in declaring the standard of proof on a balance of probabilities in civil fraud as follows: [49] With respect, we are inclined to agree with learned counsel for the plaintiff that the correct principle to apply is as explained in In re B (Children). It is this: that at law there are only two standards of proof, namely, beyond reasonable doubt for criminal cases while it is on the balance of probabilities for civil cases. As such even if fraud is the subject in a civil claim the standard of proof is on the balance of probabilities. There is no third standard. And '(N)either the seriousness of the allegation nor the seriousness of the consequences should make any difference to the standard of proof to be applied in determining the facts. [Emphasis added.] [32] Be that as it may, it was pertinent to note that the balance of probabilities standard ranges from merely tipping the scales at more probable than not (or at 51 percent as prescribed by Abang Iskandar Abang Hashim JCA (as he then was) in Unsung Rasad v. PP [2019] 1 LNS 662), to a higher degree of probability, but one which has not reached beyond a reasonable doubt. [33] It is undeniable that the allegation of adultery was serious in nature. Therefore, although the standard of proof should be on a balance of probabilities, it was my view that a higher degree of such standard had to be considered in light of the seriousness of the allegation. [34] On this point, I was guided by the case of Bater v. Bater [1950] 2 All ER 458, wherein Lord Denning had, in the following passage, explained the relationship between the seriousness of the allegations made in a civil case and the varying degree of the standard of proof of balance of probabilities: 16 August 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 13 ...So also in civil cases. The case may be proved by a preponderance of probability, but there may be degrees of probability within that standard. The degree depends on the subject matter. A civil court, when considering a charge of fraud, will naturally require a high degree of probability than that which it would require if considering whether negligence was established. [Emphasis added.] [35] Also on point is the Court of Appeal case of Teoh Meng Kee v. PP [2014] 7 CLJ 1034, where in applying the civil standard of proof, reference was made to the Briginshaw sliding scale in Briginshaw v. Briginshaw [1938] 60 CLR 336, where it was held by the High Court of Australia that although the scale is rooted in the civil standard of balance of probabilities, the degree of persuasion needed to convince the Court varies in accordance with the seriousness or gravity of the allegation. [36] I also found guidance from the Federal Court case of PP v Kuala Dimensi Sdn Bhd & Ors [2021] 2 MLJ 469, where reference was made to the explanation by Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead in Re H (Minors) [1996] 1 All ER 1 that the standard of proving on a balance of probabilities was a flexible test: ... on the evidence, the occurrence of the event was more likely than not. When assessing the probabilities the court will have in mind as a factor, to whatever extent is appropriate in the particular case, that the more serious the allegation the less likely it is that the event occurred and, hence, the stronger should be the evidence before the court concludes that the allegation is established on the balance of probabilities. [Emphasis added.] [37] Accordingly, while the standard of proof for establishing adultery remains the balance of probabilities, the seriousness of the 16 August 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 14 allegation necessitates a correspondingly higher degree of scrutiny and weight in the evaluation of the evidence. Whether adultery between Petitioner and Party-Cited had been proved [38] To support the allegation of adultery between the Petitioner and the Party-Cited, the Respondent relied principally on the fact that the Party-Cited had given birth to the Child, and on evidence of a trip to Taiwan undertaken by the Petitioner and the Party-Cited— accompanied by her mother and the Child (“the Taiwan Rendezvous.”) [39] At the outset, it was necessary to rule on the admissibility of the evidence presented by the Respondent through SR2, a private investigator. The central issue was whether the entirety of the Private Investigator’s Report (“PI Report”), especially the portion on the Taiwan Rendezvous, was admissible under section 73A of the Evidence Act, as it was based on the information provided by another private investigator based in Taiwan, who was not called as a witness in these proceedings. [40] The Petitioner contended that the entirety of the testimony of SR2 amounted to hearsay. In contrast, the Respondent argued that the evidence fell within an exception to the hearsay rule. I, therefore, directed the parties to submit arguments on the applicability of section 73A of the Evidence Act, in order to determine whether the testimony of SR2 could be admitted under that provision. [41] Having heard submissions from learned Counsel and carefully considered the evidence presented, I was satisfied that the 16 August 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 15 testimony of SR2 fell within the ambit of section 73A(2) of the Evidence Act 1950, which provides as follows: Section 73A – Documentary evidence in civil cases, etc …

In any civil proceedings, the court may at any stage of the proceedings, if having regard to all the circumstances of the case it is satisfied that undue delay or expense would otherwise be caused, order that such a statement as is mentioned in subsection (1) shall be admissible as evidence or may, without any such order having been made, admit such a statement in evidence-

notwithstanding that the maker of the statement is available but is not called as a witness; and

notwithstanding that the original document is not produced, if, in lieu thereof, there is produced a copy of the original document or of the material part thereof certified to be a true copy in such manner as may be specified in the order or as the court may approve, as the case may be. …

For the purpose of deciding whether or not a statement is admissible as evidence by virtue of subsections (1) to (4), the court may draw any reasonable inference from the form or contents of the document in which the statement is contained, or from any other circumstances, and may, in deciding whether or not a person is fit to attend as a witness, act on a certificate purporting to be the certificate of a registered medical practitioner, and, where the proceedings are with assessors, the court may in its discretion reject the statement notwithstanding that the requirements of this section are satisfied with respect thereto, if for any reason, it appears to it to be inexpedient in the interests of justice that the statement should be admitted.

In estimating the weight, if any, to be attached to a statement rendered admissible as evidence by this Act, regard shall be had to all the circumstances from which any inference can reasonably be drawn as to the accuracy or otherwise of the statement, and, in particular, to the question whether or not the statement was made contemporaneously with the occurrence or existence of the facts stated, 16 August 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 16 and to the question whether or not the maker of the statement had any incentive to conceal or misrepresent facts. [Emphasis added.] [42] I drew guidance from the cases of Arab Merchant Bank Bhd v. Chong On Foh Medical Hall & Liquor Dealers [1996] 1 CLJ 113, Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi (Malaysia) Bhd v. Sim Lim Holdings Bhd & Ors [2001] 2 CLJ 474, and Kubota Agricultural Machinery Sdn Bhd v. Shahrizan Sdn Bhd & Anor; Shahrizan Sdn Bhd & Ors (Third Parties) [2001] 6 CLJ 104 to admit the PI report. [43] In Kubota Agricultural Machinery Sdn Bhd v. Shahrizan Sdn Bhd & Anor; Shahrizan Sdn Bhd & Ors (Third Parties), it was stated by Ramly Ali J (as he then was) in the following passages: [38] In addition to sections 32(1)(b) and 73A(1) of the Evidence Act, resort was also had to section 73A(2) of the Evidence Act, which allows the judge to exercise his discretion to dispense with both the maker of, and the original document, if he is satisfied that undue delay or expense would otherwise be caused. The subsection reads: … [39] The discretion prescribed by section 73A(2) of the Evidence Act was exercised not only in Arab Merchant Bank Bhd v. Chong On Foh Medical Hall & Liquor Dealers [1996] 1 CLJ 113, but also in Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi (Malaysia) Bhd v. Sim Lim Holdings Bhd & Ors [2001] 2 CLJ 474, and Kubota Agricultural Machinery Sdn Bhd v. Shahrizan Sdn Bhd & Anor; Shahrizan Sdn Bhd & Ors (Third Parties) [2001] 6 CLJ

[40] In exercising my discretion under section 73A(2) of the Evidence Act, I was guided also by section 73A(5) which reads: … [Emphasis added.] 16 August 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 17 [44] However, despite allowing SR2 to be cross-examined on the PI Report, I eventually was unable to rely on it or lend any weight to for the following reasons. [45] Firstly, the facts relating to the Taiwan Rendezvous were not pleaded. Counsel for the Respondent argued that these facts were omitted because they arose only after the close of pleadings. I found this explanation unconvincing. The Taiwan Rendezvous took place between 27 December 2023 and 3 January 2024, which would have afforded the Respondent ample time to amend her pleadings. Indeed, a review of the case management minutes indicated that such an amendment was procedurally possible. However, no steps were taken to do so. The failure to plead these facts could not now be justified on the basis that they post-dated the close of pleadings. [46] Given this, I agreed with the Petitioner's argument that the Respondent must strictly adhere to the issues raised in his pleadings and should not be allowed to roam beyond the same. This principle was clearly established by the Federal Court in Samuel Naik Siang Ting v. Public Bank Bhd [2015] 8 CLJ 944; [2015] 6 MLJ 10, where Ramly Ali FCJ stated in the following passages: [29] It is a cardinal rule in civil litigation that parties are bound by their pleadings and are not allowed to adduce facts and issues which they have not pleaded.... [30] The Supreme Court in Lee Ah Chor v. Southern Bank Bhd [1991] 1 CLJ 667; [1991] 1 CLJ (Rep) 239; [1991] 1 MLJ 428, had also emphasised the importance of pleadings and ruled that where a vital issue was not raised in the pleadings it could not be allowed to be argued and to succeed on appeal (see also Ambank (M) Bhd v. Luqman Kamil Mohammed Don [2012] 3 CLJ 551; [2012] MLJU 56 FC). 16 August 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 18 [Emphasis added.] [47] Accordingly, the facts relating to the Taiwan Rendezvous could not be relied upon to establish that the alleged adulterous relationship between the Petitioner and the Party-Cited had caused the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage between the Petitioner and the Respondent. Whether Respondent had found the adultery intolerable [48] Even assuming that the facts pertaining to the Taiwan Rendezvous were in fact relevant and admissible, the subsequent issue was whether the Respondent had found such adultery intolerable, as outlined in section 54(1)(a) of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act, which stipulates: Section 54 – Proof of breakdown

In its inquiry into the facts and circumstances alleged as causing or leading to the breakdown of the marriage, the court shall have regard to one or more of the following facts, that is to say-

that the respondent has committed adultery and the petitioner finds it intolerable to live with the respondent; … [Emphasis added.] [49] At this stage, it was crucial to understand the concept of ‘tolerance’ in the context of adultery. [50] Tolerating adultery means enduring or accepting its existence without necessarily approving or forgiving it. A spouse who tolerates 16 August 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 19 adultery may be aware of the adultery but refrains from taking immediate action for personal, emotional, or practical reasons. For instance, if a spouse remains in the matrimonial home after discovering an adulterous relationship but continues to express dissatisfaction, he or she may have still have tolerated the adultery. [51] On the basis of tolerance, it was imperative to emphasise that allowing an individual to use adultery as grounds for divorce after years of inaction would contradict principles of justice and accountability. [52] While the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act does not prescribe a time limit, the Singapore’s Women’s Charter 1961, in section 95, stipulates that a spouse cannot seek divorce on grounds of adultery if they continue living with the adulterous spouse for six months or more after discovering the affair. This provision encourages timely decision-making and prevents the ‘weaponising’ of adultery in matrimonial disputes. [53] Unfortunately, the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act lacks such a limitation, which can lead to prolonged uncertainty, potential manipulation, and complications in legal proceedings due to outdated evidence. Introducing similar provisions would promote prompt action, prevent abuse of process, and enhance legal efficiency. Although no statutory limitation exists under section 58 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act for claims against third parties, the Court cannot condone undue delay by litigants. 16 August 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 20 [54] In the present case, the issue was whether the Respondent had tolerated the adultery. In my view, she had, for the following reasons. [55] It was undisputed that the Respondent was aware of the Petitioner’s adulterous relationship with the Party-Cited since 2018 but continued to cohabit with the Petitioner and conduct herself as his wife. [56] In my view, there was no doubt that the Respondent’s actions amounted to tolerance of the adulterous relationship between the Petitioner and Party-Cited. Despite claiming to have discovered the adulterous relationship between the Petitioner and Party-Cited, the Respondent continued living with the Petitioner, and engaged in marital relations as part of her conjugal obligations. [57] I must also address the various allegations made by the Respondent concerning the Petitioner’s purported relationships with women other than the Party-Cited, known in this judgment as TY, JC and SF, all between 2015 and 2018. Upon careful consideration of the evidence, I found that these allegations were not proved. The Respondent failed to produce credible or corroborative evidence to substantiate the claims of adultery or improper conduct involving the Petitioner and other women. [58] Even if I were to assume, for the sake of argument, that I was wrong on the issue of proof and that some of these extramarital relationships may have occurred, the overall context is telling. [59] The evidence revealed that the Respondent had long been aware of these alleged relationships. She did not confront them at the time 16 August 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 21 nor take any meaningful steps to address or object to them. On the contrary, she appeared to have tolerated the situation and continued cohabiting with the Petitioner. Such tolerance, whether out of convenience, indifference, or personal choice, may not be uncommon in the realities of marital life. However, a party who knowingly accepts or overlooks such conduct for an extended period cannot later come to court and claim that the same conduct was the root cause of the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. [60] To do so would be disingenuous and inconsistent with the Respondent’s own prior conduct. In the absence of timely objection or genuine distress at the time these events allegedly occurred, I could not allow the Respondent to weaponise those past events as justification for the present breakdown of the marital relationship. [61] The Court is entitled to look at the conduct of the Parties in its entirety and assess the credibility and fairness of such claims. On this score, the Respondent’s case fell short. Whether Respondent’s application seeking to compel Petitioner and the Child to undergo a DNA test should be allowed [62] A subsequent ruling that I had to make was whether the Petitioner and Child should have been compelled to undertake a DNA test to determine if he was the father of the Child. This was based on an application filed by the Respondent in enclosure 97 (“Enclosure 97”). [63] After hearing submissions of Counsel, I dismissed the Respondent’s application for the following reasons. [64] First and foremost, Enclosure 97 was made very late in the day. 16 August 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 22 [65] It was crucial to highlight, as explained in Charles Koo Ho-Tung & Ors v. Koo Lin Shen & Ors [2016] 2 CLJ 267, that delay is a key factor in the determination of an application filed by any litigant. Unreasonable delay may undermine the efficiency of legal proceedings, prejudice the opposing party, and go against the overarching objective of ensuring that justice is delivered without undue obstruction. [66] In this context, observations made by Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was) in Khor Cheng Wah v. Sungai Way Leasing Sdn Bhd [1997] 1 CLJ 396; [1996] 1 MLJ 223, are particularly pertinent, especially concerning the general principle of delay in legal proceedings, as highlighted in the following passages: It is a cardinal principle of law, that when a litigant seeks the intervention of the court in a matter that affects his rights, he must do so timeously. The maxim vigilantibus, non dormientibus, jura subveniunt, though having its origins in the Court of Chancery, is of universal application. Even in cases where a right is exercisable ex debito justitiae, a court may refuse relief to an indolent litigant. In all cases in which delay in approaching the court is in issue, the burden is upon the litigant who has delayed to render a satisfactory explanation for it. [Emphasis added.] [67] The case of Khor Cheng Wah v. Sungai Way Leasing Sdn Bhd underscores the principle that courts must balance the need for thorough adjudication with the imperative of maintaining procedural efficiency. Delay, if unjustified, can lead to dismissal of an application, especially when it disrupts the natural progression of a case or imposes unnecessary burden on the opposing party. 16 August 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 23 [68] In the present case, the Petitioner filed the Divorce Petition in December 2021, while the Respondent filed her Reply in February 2022, subsequently amending it in February 2023. In June 2023, the Respondent applied to join the Co-Respondent as a party to the proceedings. However, it was only in January 2025 that the Respondent filed Enclosure 97. [69] When questioned about the delay in filing Enclosure 97, Counsel for the Respondent explained that he had initially wanted to observe whether the Petitioner would admit to the adulterous relationship with the Party-Cited. As the Petitioner continued to deny the allegation throughout cross-examination, the Respondent only then proceeded with filing Enclosure 97. [70] I found the explanation wholly unpersuasive. The Respondent was already in possession of the relevant information concerning the Party-Cited, including the fact that the Child had been born during the period of the alleged adulterous relationship. To file the application in Enclosure 97 at such a late stage was, in my view, inequitable, an unnecessary use of judicial resources, and a burden on the Court. [71] Even on the merits, I dismissed the application in Enclosure 97 for several compelling reasons. It was undisputed that the sole purpose for which the Respondent sought the DNA test was to establish that the Petitioner had committed adultery with the Party-Cited. The Respondent’s theory was that, by proving the Petitioner to be the biological father of the Child, she could indirectly establish the existence of an adulterous relationship between him and the Party-Cited. 16 August 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 24 [72] In this regard, I was guided by the pronouncement of the Federal Court in MPPL v CAS [2024] 4 MLJ 524, where it was made clear that ordering a paternity test, particularly a forced one, is an extreme measure which intrudes into the child’s personal autonomy. Such a measure ought not to be taken lightly, particularly where the child does not seek to determine her paternity. The Federal Court has emphasised that, even where the Court possesses the jurisdiction to order such a test, it should be directed only in rare and compelling circumstances, and only where it is necessary for the welfare of the child. [73] In the present case, it was evident and beyond dispute that the application for a DNA test bore no genuine connection to the welfare or best interests of the Child. Rather, it served solely to advance the Respondent’s own personal agenda. The Court could not ignore that such an application, when divorced from any consideration of the Child’s well-being, risked undermining the very principles that underpin its discretionary powers in ordering such intrusive measures. [74] Further support may be found in the Indian Supreme Court case of Aparna Ajinkya Firodia v. Ajinkya Arun Firodia [2023] SCC OnLine SC 161. That case similarly involved allegations of infidelity, and the issue arose as to whether a DNA test could be ordered to establish adultery. While the High Court, in that case, had initially granted liberty to the mother to either comply with the DNA testing order or face an adverse inference, the Supreme Court overturned that view. It held that a DNA test cannot be compelled solely to prove adultery, and no adverse inference could be drawn against a party who refused to subject a child to such a test. 16 August 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 25 [75] Taken together, these authorities underscore a fundamental principle, that is, that a child's bodily autonomy and right to privacy cannot be compromised simply to support a claim of infidelity in matrimonial litigation. The Respondent’s application in enclosure 97, being grounded in precisely such an objective, was, therefore, dismissed. Unreasonable behaviour Whether Respondent had established unreasonable behaviour on part of the Petitioner [76] The Respondent also levelled a series of accusations against the Petitioner, alleging that he was irresponsible, engaged in habitual gambling, excessive drinking, womanising, and generally neglected his duties as a spouse. [77] However, these allegations were made in sweeping and general terms, without any specific particulars or supporting evidence. The Respondent did not provide any credible documentation, witnesses, or independent corroboration to substantiate these claims. The assertions were vague and appeared to be more in the nature of bare allegations rather than facts supported by proof. [78] It is a well-established principle that the burden of proof lies with the party making the allegation. In this case, it was incumbent upon the Respondent to produce cogent and reliable evidence to support these serious claims. She had failed to do so. The allegations, standing on their own without substantiation, did not reach the threshold required in civil proceedings. They lacked the necessary weight and specificity for the Court to give them any meaningful consideration. In the absence of proof, these accusations are no 16 August 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 26 more than unproved assertions, and I am unable to attach any evidentiary value to them [79] In any event, despite her claims of the Petitioner’s alleged misconduct, the Respondent continued to reside with him for a considerable period after the alleged behaviour took place. There was no evidence to suggest that she found the Petitioner’s conduct so intolerable that cohabitation became impossible. On the contrary, it was the Petitioner who eventually left the matrimonial home and filed for divorce. This conduct was inconsistent with the assertion that the marriage had broken down irretrievably due to the Petitioner’s unreasonable behaviour. It indicated that, whatever the alleged grievances, the Respondent was still willing and able to continue the marital relationship up until the point the Petitioner chose to exit. [80] Accordingly, even if the Petitioner had exhibited a laid-back or irresponsible attitude, such conduct on its own could not form the basis for the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. [81] As such, I found that the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage could not be attributed to the Petitioner, as the Respondent had failed to establish such proof. The remaining question, therefore, was whether the Respondent had satisfied the Court on the application of the ‘means and needs’ test. Whether Respondent had fulfilled the “means and needs” test [82] The Respondent had unequivocally stated that she had been solely responsible for the financial upkeep of the family throughout the marriage. According to her own evidence, the household’s income 16 August 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 27 was generated entirely through her businesses, which she had incorporated and managed independently. She further maintained that the Petitioner had not, at any point, made any financial contribution towards her personal needs or the welfare of the children. In fact, her account consistently portrayed the Petitioner as financially dependent on her, rather than the other way around. [83] Given this narrative, it would be inherently contradictory for the Respondent to now seek spousal maintenance from the very person she claimed had not contributed to the family’s financial wellbeing. Spousal maintenance is typically grounded in the notion that one party is in need of support and the other has the means and, to some extent, the responsibility to provide it. That basis simply does not exist in this case. The Respondent cannot, on one hand, assert her financial independence and the Petitioner's lack of contribution, and on the other, claim entitlement to maintenance. Such a position lacks both legal and factual coherence. [84] As such, the Respondent’s claim for spousal maintenance was dismissed. Guardianship; custody, care and control; child maintenance – Whether Petitioner was obligated to pay child maintenance [85] Although the Petitioner had no obligation to provide spousal maintenance to the Respondent, he was legally required to pay child maintenance. This duty is well-established under sections 92 and 93 of the Law Reform (Marriage & Divorce) Act, which clearly outline a parent's responsibility to support their child. The provisions read: 16 August 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 28 Section 92 - Duty to maintain children Except where an agreement or order of court otherwise provides, it shall be the duty of a parent to maintain or contribute to the maintenance of his or her children, whether they are in his or her custody or the custody of any other person, either by providing them with such accommodation, clothing, food and education as may be reasonable having regard to his or her means and station in life or by paying the cost thereof. ….. Section 93 - Power for court to order maintenance for children

The court may at any time order a man to pay maintenance for the benefit of his child-

if he has refused or neglected reasonably to provide for the child;

if he has deserted his wife and the child is in her charge;

during the pendency of any matrimonial proceedings; or

when making or subsequent to the making of an order placing the child in the custody of any other person [Emphasis added.] [86] In the Divorce Petition, the Petitioner had consented to pay monthly child maintenance in the sum of MYR3,000, which I found to be fair and reasonable. In addition, the Petitioner would be required to bear an equal share of the Son’s education and medical expenses. Whether Petitioner was entitled to joint guardianship of the Son [87] The Petitioner sought joint guardianship of the Son, while the Respondent insisted on sole guardianship, arguing that she was the primary caregiver and that the Petitioner had not been cooperative in co-parenting. 16 August 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 29 [88] At this stage, it was essential to emphasise that the Son has a right to maintain an ongoing and meaningful relationship with both parents. As the Son had, thus far, been residing with the Respondent, I was of the view that sole custody, care and control should remain with the Respondent pursuant to section 88(3) of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act. Nevertheless, it was imperative to remind the Parties that neither parent is superior to the other. The nature of a child’s relationship with his or her father differs from that with the mother, but this distinction does not render the father’s rights in respect of the child inferior to those of the mother. [89] Reference was made also to section 5 of the Guardianship of Infants Act 1961 ("Guardianship of Infants Act"), which reads: Section 5 – Equality of parental rights

In relation to the custody or upbringing of an infant or the administration of any property belonging to or held in trust for an infant or the application of the income of any such property, a mother shall have the same rights and authority as the law allows to a father, and the rights and authority of mother and father shall be equal.

The mother of an infant shall have the like powers of applying to the Court in respect of any matter affecting the infant as are possessed by the father. [Emphasis added.] [90] Pursuant to section 3 (Duties of guardian of person) of the Guardianship of Infants Act, both parents have equal responsibilities for the Son's support, health, and education. The correlation to the Parties' responsibilities is the right of the Son, in this case, the right to bond with both parents. 16 August 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 30 [91] Furthermore, since the Petitioner was obligated to contribute financially to the Son's maintenance, covering all essential aspects of his upbringing, including education, healthcare, and daily expenses, it was only fair and reasonable that he also had a voice in decisions that would shape the Son's future. Parental responsibilities extend beyond financial support; they encompass active participation in key matters such as schooling, medical care, and overall well-being. [92] Although joint guardianship and joint custody have been granted to both Parties, with primary care and control of the Son vested in the Respondent, the Petitioner was granted reasonable access to the Son. Matrimonial assets Whether assets should be divided equally [93] The Petitioner asserted a claim to fifty percent of the value of the following assets: a) Immoveable properties; b) Shareholdings in companies; and c) Funds held in a Singapore bank account. [94] The Respondent, however, asserted a claim to 100% of all the properties, contending that she had purchased them entirely on her own without any contribution from the Petitioner. [95] The task of dividing matrimonial assets is prescribed by section 76 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act, which reads: 16 August 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 31 Section 76 – Power of court to order division of matrimonial assets

The court shall have power, when granting a decree of divorce or judicial separation, to order the division between the parties of any assets acquired by them during the marriage or the sale of any such assets and the division between the parties of the proceeds of sale.

In exercising the power conferred by subsection (1) the court shall have regard to-

the extent of the contributions made by each party in money, property or work towards the acquiring of the assets or payment of expenses for the benefit of the family; (aa) the extent of the contributions made by the other party who did not acquire the assets to the welfare of the family by looking after the home or caring for the family;

any debts owing by either party which were contracted for their joint benefit;

the needs of the minor children, if any, of the marriage;

the duration of the marriage, and subject to those considerations, the court shall incline towards equality of division. …

For the purposes of this section, references to assets acquired during a marriage include assets owned before the marriage by one party which have been substantially improved during the marriage by the other party or by their joint efforts. [Emphasis added] [96] At the outset, it was crucial to bear in mind that classification of assets as matrimonial cannot solely be determined by registered ownership. Drawing insight from the pertinent case of Ching Seng Woah v Lim Shook Lin [1997] 1 MLJ 109, Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was) provided a definition of ‘matrimonial assets’. In that 16 August 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 32 case, he outlined the concept beyond mere ownership, emphasising factors that contribute to the marital estate. The following passage from the case serves as a guiding principle in understanding the broader scope of matrimonial assets: The Act does not define what matrimonial assets are. We think that during the subsistence of a marriage the expression refers to the matrimonial home and everything which is put into it by either spouse with the intention that their home and chattels should be a continuing resource for the spouses and their children to be used jointly and severally for the benefit of the family as a whole. It matters not in this context whether the asset is acquired solely by the one party or the other or by their joint efforts. Whilst the marriage subsists these assets are matrimonial assets. Such assets could be capital assets. The earning power of each spouse is also an asset. [Emphasis added] [97] Section 76 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act requires the Court to assess both the financial and non-financial contributions of each party when determining the division of matrimonial assets. This assessment must be rooted in fairness, having regard to the actual contributions made by each spouse throughout the marriage. [98] Upon a thorough examination of the evidence adduced, I found no basis to grant the Petitioner an equal share of the matrimonial assets, for the following reasons. [99] In this case, based on the evidence adduced, it was my view that the Respondent was the primary contributor in every meaningful respect. It was undisputed that the Respondent was gainfully employed throughout the marriage and solely responsible for acquiring, establishing, managing, maintaining, and preserving the 16 August 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 33 matrimonial assets. The evidence adduced had also indicated that the Respondent had managed the household finances, cared for the Son, and her other two children, and shouldered the day-to-day burdens of domestic life, often without any meaningful support from the Petitioner. [100] The Petitioner, in stark contrast, made almost no meaningful financial contribution throughout the marriage. Although he claimed to have worked in the companies that both Parties had an interest in, the evidence showed that these entities had in fact been incorporated and established by the Respondent. [101] The Petitioner’s involvement in such companies was minimal and largely superficial, and he exaggerated his role significantly. For most of the marriage, he was effectively unemployed and made little to no effort to secure or retain gainful employment. The testimony before me founded in credible, consistent, and supported by contemporaneous records, painted a picture of a man who lacked drive, discipline, and any serious intention to contribute to the family’s welfare. [102] The Petitioner appeared content to coast on the Respondent’s hard work, while devoting himself to idle pursuits. He was routinely absent from the home without valid explanation and known to indulge in womanising and irresponsible conduct. What further undermined his position was his complete lack of credibility as a witness. [103] The Petitioner was evasive, inconsistent, and repeatedly contradicted himself on matters of importance. His testimony was 16 August 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 34 riddled with implausibility and, on several key issues, he was found to have lied outright. I had no hesitation in finding that the Petitioner was economical with the truth in an attempt to bolster his claims. His lack of honesty and integrity stripped away any residual merit in his case and left him with no moral or equitable standing before the Court. [104] The Petitioner asserted that he had played a role in the establishment and management of the companies incorporated by the Respondent. However, this claim quickly unravelled under cross-examination. When questioned on the details, the Petitioner was unable to demonstrate any real knowledge of the operational, financial, or structural aspects of the companies. His responses were vague, inconsistent, and at times wholly contradictory. When confronted with specific queries, he frequently defaulted to saying he could not recall or did not know, which significantly undermined his credibility. The Petitioner’s lack of familiarity with the day-to-day affairs of the companies suggested that his involvement, if any, was superficial at best. At most, he may have assisted with minor tasks or errands, but there was no cogent or reliable evidence to support his claim of being actively involved in the management or operations of the businesses. Consequently, I was unable to accept his version of events regarding his alleged contributions to the companies. [105] It bears repeating that marriage is a partnership, but the law does not reward inactivity or deceit. A party who has made no meaningful contribution, financial or otherwise, and who has shown dishonesty before the Court, cannot expect to walk away with an equal share. To do so would not only offend principles of equity but would amount to a perverse reward for indolence and dishonesty. 16 August 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 35 [106] Having considered all relevant factors, I concluded that it was just and equitable to limit the Petitioner’s entitlement to 20% of the matrimonial assets. This was in recognition of the Petitioner’s assistance to the Respondent in certain administrative matters, and the undeniable fact that the Respondent had, to some extent, benefited from the “Datin Seri” title derived from the Petitioner’s conferment as a Dato’ Seri. [107] The allocation of 20%, therefore, in my view, reflected a generous assessment of his minimal involvement in the marriage, and also took into account his egregious conduct and lack of credibility. Any higher apportionment would constitute a miscarriage of justice. [108] A total of 14 immoveable properties were involved. However, each property was given a different treatment depending on when it was purchased, the contribution of the Petitioner towards the property which depended on the length of the marriage, and whether the property was fully paid up, still on loan or was already sold. [109] Table A illustrates the method used to determine the Petitioner’s entitlement to the immovable properties. Table A No. Description of property Status of property Year of purchase Years of contribution/ Years of marriage Calculation

Petitioner’s entitlement Pacific Place, Ara Damansara, Selangor Subject to loan 2012 8/18 0.2 x 0.45 9% of its realisable value

Taman Tasek II, Batu Pahat, Johor Fully paid off 2009 11/18 0.2 x 0.6 12% of market value 16 August 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

Garden Plaza, Cyberjaya, Selangor Fully paid off 2016 4/18 0.2 x 0.2 4% of market value

GRN 82508, Bandar Penggaram, Batu Pahat Fully paid off 2016 4/18 0.2 x 0.2 4% of market value

Country Heights, Kajang, Selangor Subject to loan 2014 6/18 0.2 x 0.35 7% of realisable value

GM 2209, Batu Pahat, Johor Property disposed of 2011 9/18 0.2 x 0.5 10% of sale price

GM 3797, Batu Pahat, Johor Property disposed of 2011 9/18 0.2 x 0.5 10% of sale price

Taman Putera, Batu Pahat, Johor Property disposed of 2007 13/18 0.2 x 0.7 14% of sale price

GM 2887, Batu Pahat, Johor Property disposed of 2010 10/18 0.2 x 0.55 11% of sale price

Taman Impian Emas, Skudai, Johor Property disposed of 2011 9/18 0.2 x 0.5 10% of sale price

Concerto North Kiara, Segambut, Kuala Lumpur Subject to loan 2012 8/18 0.2 x 0.45 9% of realisable value

Jalan Universiti, Batu Pahat, Johor Property disposed of 2011 9/18 0.2 x 0.5 10% of sale price

Jalan Kempas Utama, Johor Bahru, Johor Property disposed of 2013 7/18 0.2 x 0.4 8% of sale price

Jalan Kepala Muda, Batu Pahat, Johor Subject to loan 2013 7/18 0.2 x 0.4 8% of realisable value [110] Column 3 indicates the status of each property, that is, whether it was under a loan, fully paid off, or had been disposed of. 16 August 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 37 [111] The Respondent had unilaterally disposed of several immovable properties after the marriage had irretrievably broken down. This conduct was highly improper and demonstrated a clear disregard for the legal process governing matrimonial asset division. Under section 76 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976, the division of matrimonial assets must be determined by the Court, which is entrusted with the responsibility of ensuring a just and equitable distribution, taking into account each party’s contribution. The Respondent, by disposing of the properties without the knowledge or consent of the Petitioner and without the Court's approval, effectively pre-empted and undermined this judicial function. [112] The Respondent claimed that she had disposed of the properties based on a power of attorney that had been granted to her by the Petitioner. However, upon careful consideration, it was my view that the said power of attorney had already lapsed, and was no longer valid at the material time. In the absence of a valid and subsisting authority, the Respondent’s disposal of the properties cannot be justified. Her actions, therefore, amounted to financial infidelity, that is, an intentional and strategic effort to dissipate, conceal, or unilaterally deal with assets that, under the law, would likely form part of the matrimonial pool subject to equitable division under section 76 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act. [113] This conduct not only reflected a disregard for the legal process but also called into question the Respondent’s bona fides in the proceedings. It suggested a deliberate attempt to frustrate the Court’s ability to fairly and justly determine the division of matrimonial assets and to deprive the Petitioner of his lawful 16 August 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 38 entitlements. Such behaviour undermined the principle of transparency and fairness that was central to matrimonial proceedings and may warrant closer judicial scrutiny. [114] Given the Respondent’s actions, it was necessary for the Court to intervene and restore the integrity of the asset division process. Accordingly, I directed that the proceeds from the sale of those properties be identified and divided accordingly between the Parties, as though the properties had remained part of the matrimonial pool. [115] Column 5 reflects the duration of the Petitioner’s contribution, measured by the number of years he remained in the marriage prior to its breakdown, relative to the total length of the marriage. [116] Column 6 reflects a computation where the Petitioner’s contribution is quantified as 20% (or 0.2), which is then multiplied by the number of years the Petitioner contributed towards the acquisition of each property, divided by the total number of years of the marriage. This was how the Petitioner’s entitlement to each property was calculated. [117] I must also add that, in relation to the properties listed in Table A that had not yet been sold, each party was given the option to purchase the other party’s share in the respective immovable properties. [118] Table B sets out the basis for calculating the Petitioner’s share in the value of the companies. 16 August 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 39 Table B No. Description of property Year of incorporation Years of contribution/ Years since company incorporated

Petitioner’s entitlement Agensi Prospect 2005 13/20 0.2 x 0.45 9% of its realisable value

Unilink 2004 13/21 0.2 x 0.6 12% of market value [119] Column 4 reflects the number of years Parties had cohabited as husband and wife before the breakdown of the marriage, corresponding to the period since the companies were incorporated. The Petitioner’s entitlement was calculated by multiplying the total years of cohabitation by 20% (0.2). [120] I calculated the Petitioner’s entitlement in Column 6 by multiplying the number of years the Parties cohabited as husband and wife before the breakdown of the marriage, relative to the total years since the companies were incorporated, by 20% (0.2). [121] The Petitioner also claimed a cheque in the amount of SGD186,770.78. Applying the 20% multiplier, and taking into account the proportion of the marriage during which he remained in the relationship prior to its breakdown, 13 out of 18 years of marriage, or approximately 0.72, the calculation was as follows:

0.2 × 0.72 × SGD186,770.78 [122] This resulted in an entitlement of SGD26,147.91. 16 August 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 40 [123] There were several other claims raised by both the Petitioner and the Respondent, including those relating to insurance policies and vehicles. However, these matters were resolved by mutual agreement, with the Petitioner consenting to change the beneficiary of the insurance policies from the Respondent to the Son. Anonymity Whether all parties should be anonymised [124] Right until the conclusion of the trial, there was no application to anonymise. However, I decided to anonymise all parties for the following reasons. [125] I acknowledge that open justice is a fundamental principle in many legal systems, rooted in the idea that justice must not only be done but must also be seen to be done, as reflected in section 15(1) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (“Courts of Judicature Act”), which reads: Section 15 – Courts to be open and public

The place in which any Court is held for the purpose of trying any cause or matter, civil or criminal, shall be deemed an open and public court to which the public generally may have access. [Emphasis added.] [126] The concept of open justice was powerfully articulated by Toulson LJ in the landmark case of R (Guardian News and Media Limited) v City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court [2012] EWCA Civ 420, in the following often-cited passage: In a democracy, where power depends on the consent of the people governed, the answer must lie in the transparency of the legal process. 16 August 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 41 Open justice lets in the light and allows the public to scrutinise the workings of the law, for better or for worse. Jeremy Bentham said in a well-known passage quoted by Lord Shaw of Dunfermline in Scott v Scott [1913] AC 407, 477: Publicity is the very soul of justice. It is the keenest spur to exertion and the surest of all guards against improbity. It keeps the judge himself while trying under trial. [Emphasis added.] [127] I am also aware of the recent English case of Tickle & Anor v The BBC & Ors [2025] EWCA Civ 42, where it was stated that the principles of open justice and transparency were as much applicable in family as in other proceedings. [128] The principle of open justice ensures transparency and public trust in the legal system. While anonymisation protects privacy, it can obscure key facts, hinder scrutiny, and reduce accountability, especially for public entities. In the digital age, anonymisation is increasingly fragile due to re-identification risks, calling for more robust data protection methods. [129] However, exceptions to open justice exist — matrimonial cases being a key example. Here, anonymity protects parties from the exposure of sensitive information and encourages full, honest disclosure, which is vital to family justice. Anonymity is typically maintained unless both parties waive it or the case falls within specific exceptions, such as contempt proceedings [130] Hence, I decided that anonymisation was necessary pursuant to section 15 (2) of the Courts of Judicature Act, which reads: Section 15 – Courts to be open and public 16 August 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 42 ...

A Court may at any time order that no person shall publish the name, address or photograph of any witness in any cause or matter or any part thereof tried or held or to be tried or held before it, or any evidence or any other thing likely to lead to the identification of any such witness; and any person who acts in contravention of any such order shall be guilty of an offence and shall, on conviction, be liable to a fine not exceeding five thousand ringgit or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or to both. [Emphasis added.] [131] My decision to anonymise was influenced by the involvement of the Party-Cited and the children concerned, namely the Child and the Son. While it was established that the Petitioner and the Party-Cited had engaged in an adulterous relationship, critical facts were not specifically pleaded, and the Respondent had, to some extent, tolerated such conduct. Consequently, the Respondent was not entitled to claim damages against the Party-Cited. In any event, I was satisfied that disclosing their identities would cause undue harm and reputational damage to individuals who were not principally responsible for the breakdown of the marriage. [132] It was crucial to add that all cause papers related to the matrimonial dispute are strictly prohibited from being disseminated or published in any form. However, this restriction does not extend to the publication of this judgment itself, as it constitutes an official court document intended for public access. Given that this judgment is to be made publicly available, the media and other interested parties are permitted to report on the case, provided such reporting is fair, accurate, and adheres to all applicable legal and ethical standards. Crucially, this includes strict compliance with the Court’s directive to 16 August 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 43 preserve the anonymity of all parties to these proceedings, at all times. Costs [133] Although I ultimately concluded that the allegation of adultery had not been established to the requisite standard, and in any event that the Respondent had tolerated the alleged misconduct, I declined to award costs to the Party-Cited. This was due to her overall conduct during the proceedings, which I found to be lacking in candour and decorum. The behaviour of the Party-Cited throughout the trial did not justify the exercise of the Court’s discretion in her favour on the issue of costs. [134] I found the explanation offered by both the Petitioner and the Party-Cited to be wholly implausible. They claimed that their presence on the same flight to Taiwan, their lodging at the same hotel, and their activities while there were all coincidental. The Party-Cited even went so far as to state that the Petitioner was seen holding her hand merely because he was helping her cross the road. These explanations, in my view, were contrived and clearly designed to mislead the Court. [135] The surrounding circumstances left little doubt that the Petitioner and the Party-Cited were involved in an adulterous relationship. While the Party-Cited denied any sexual involvement, she did not dispute that she had spent nights at the Petitioner’s residence. This, taken together with the timing of her pregnancy and the fact that the Petitioner had, during the same period, abandoned the Respondent and the Son, strongly supported the inference of an illicit 16 August 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 44 relationship. This conclusion was further reinforced by evidence that the Child was heard referring to the Petitioner as “Papa.” Instead of admitting the truth, both the Petitioner and the Party-Cited chose to offer misleading and implausible explanations. Their deliberate attempt to conceal the true nature of their relationship reflects a serious disregard for the judicial process and, in my view, constitutes a grave affront to the administration of justice. [136] The sole reason this evidence was ultimately excluded was that the Respondent had failed to amend her pleadings to expressly incorporate these facts, thereby rendering them outside the scope of the issues properly before the Court. In addition, it was established that the Respondent had, by her conduct, tolerated the alleged adultery. Such tolerance, in law, operates as a bar to seeking damages from the Party-Cited, as it undermined the basis of any claim for compensation arising from the alleged misconduct. [137] Nonetheless, as a mark of the Court’s disapproval of the dishonest and evasive conduct displayed by the Party-Cited, I ordered her to pay costs to the Respondent in the sum of RM30,000, subject to the usual allocatur. [138] Reference was made to Order 59 rule 8 of the Rules of Court 2012, which reads: Order 59 – Costs Rule 8 – Special matters to be taken into account in exercising discretion The Court in exercising its discretion as to costs shall, to such extent, if any, as may be appropriate in the circumstances, take into account-

any offer of contribution or offer of settlement under Order 22B; 16 August 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 45

the conduct of all the parties, including conduct before and during the proceedings;

the conduct of the parties in relation to any attempt at resolving the cause or matter by mediation or any other means of dispute resolution; and

in particular, the extent to which the parties have followed any relevant pre-action protocol or practice direction for the time being issued by the Registrar. [Emphasis added.] [139] The Petitioner on the other hand was ordered to pay costs in the amount of MYR50,000 (subject to allocatur). Conclusion [140] In the interest of justice, and after a comprehensive evaluation of all evidence adduced together with the written and oral submissions of all parties, the Court pronounced the divorce and made the decree nisi absolute forthwith. The Respondent’s claims for spousal maintenance and for damages against the Party-Cited were both dismissed. [141] The Petitioner and Respondent were granted joint guardianship of the Son, with the Petitioner ordered to pay monthly child maintenance. Sole custody, care, and control of the Son, however, were vested in the Respondent. In relation to the division of assets, the Petitioner was awarded only 20% of their market value, realisable value, or sale proceeds, as applicable. This entitlement was further apportioned in accordance with the number of years the 16 August 2025 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 46 Petitioner and Respondent had cohabited as husband and wife prior to the breakdown of the marriage. Date: 16 August 2025 SIGNED …………………………………………. (EVROL MARIETTE PETERS) Judge High Court, Kuala Lumpur Counsel: For the Petitioner and Party-Cited – James Chow, Pey Shau Xuan, and Loh Zheng Feng; Messrs Shang & Co For the Respondent – Liow Si Hoon, Adrian Chioh Jia Feng, and Ting