Lakefront Residence Sdn Bhd v Ang Sok Choo (WA-12ANCvC-132-10/2025)

ANG SOK CHOO (NRIC NO: 740328-11-5172)

LEE HAI PING (NRIC NO: 790304-02-5792)

LEE THIN YOW (NRIC NO: 700521-08-6215)

SAK YOKE MENG (NRIC NO: 560121-01-5205)

TAM KWEE THAI (NRIC NO: 670815-05-5356)

TEH HUI BOON (NRIC NO: 911023-10-5380) (T3-20-10) 28/05/2026 16:25:24

YAP HAN CHONG

SHIRLEY TEO (NRIC NO: 750918-10-5686) … RESPONDENTS [IN THE SESSIONS COURT AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORIES OF KUALA LUMPUR WRIT SUMMONS NO.: WA-A52NCVC-643-08/2023

ANG SOK CHOO (NRIC NO: 740328-11-5172)

GAN LIN LING (NRIC NO: 730714-07-5296)

HIOW MUI KIM (NRIC NO: 840910-14-5594)

LEE HAI PING (NRIC NO: 790304-02-5792)

LEE THIN YOW (NRIC NO: 700521-08-6215)

SAK YOKE MENG (NRIC NO: 560121-01-5205)

TAM KWEE THAI (NRIC NO: 670815-05-5356)

TAN JIM SIM (NRIC NO: 641115-10-7087)

LEE YIM LENG (NRIC NO: 711210-10-5478)

TEH HUI BOON (NRIC NO: 911023-10-5380)

YAP HAN CHONG

SHIRLEY TEO

YEOH LAY HUN (NRIC NO: 790514-14-5864) (T3-17-06) … PLAINTIFFS AND LAKEFRONT RESIDENCE SDN BHD [COMPANY NO: 201101005895/(934038-V)] … DEFENDANT S/N Qhufbv8aW0eisSmmIhP04A

This appeal brings into sharp focus the intricate computation of liquidated ascertained damages ("LAD") payable by a licensed housing developer, a task that requires navigating the statutory currents of the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Act 1966 ("Act 118"). More particularly, it calls for consideration of the relationship between two recent decisions of the Federal Court in PJD Regency Sdn Bhd v Tribunal Tuntutan Pembeli Rumah & Anor and other appeals [2021] 2 MLJ 60 (“PJD Regency”) and Obata-Ambak Holdings Sdn Bhd v Prema Bonanza Sdn Bhd and other appeals [2024] 5 MLJ 897 (“Obata-Ambak”). It is said that these authorities point in different directions, leaving the trial judge to choose a path through the thicket.

The appeal is brought by the defendant below, Lakefront Residence Sdn Bhd ("the appellant"), against the decision of the learned Sessions Court Judge delivered on 3 October 2025. The learned Judge allowed the plaintiffs’ ("the respondents") claim for LAD arising out of a housing development known as Lakefront Residence @ Cyberjaya (“the Project”).

The central issue is whether the respondents’ claim is defeated by the principles of limitation and estoppel said to arise from Obata-Ambak, or whether, consistently with PJD Regency, the S/N Qhufbv8aW0eisSmmIhP04A clock for the delivery of vacant possession begins ticking from the moment the purchaser commits their money for the payment of the booking fee rather than from the formal date of execution of the sale and purchase agreements (“SPAs”).

The appellant contends that Obata-Ambak establishes a controlling principle which precludes the respondents’ claim. The respondents, by contrast, submit that the consumer protective approach affirmed in PJD Regency remains determinative of the present dispute, and that the learned Judge was correct to compute time from the booking fee.

Having carefully considered the record of appeal, the written and oral submissions of counsel, and the relevant authorities, I am satisfied that the learned Sessions Court Judge directed herself properly on the law and applied the correct principles to the facts. The reasoning below discloses no misdirection of law, nor any error warranting appellate intervention. The appeal must therefore be dismissed.

The material facts are largely undisputed. The appellant is the licensed developer of the Project. The respondents are eight individual purchasers of residential units in Tower 3 of the Project. Five other original plaintiffs withdrew their claims by order dated 25 September 2024; nothing further turns on their position.

The chronology is of central importance, for the controversy is one of computation rather than factual contest.

The narrative begins in or about April 2015. Each of the respondents paid a sum of RM3,000 to the appellant pursuant to a document described as "Registration Form", bearing the letterhead of the appellant's parent company, MCT. The respondents describe this payment as a booking fee, whereas the appellant prefers the term registration fee. The nomenclature is immaterial as it does not obscure the essential fact that the payment of RM3,000 formed part of the purchase price of the respective units.

Thereafter, between September and October 2015, the parties executed their respective SPAs. These agreements were in the statutory form prescribed under Schedule H of the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Regulations 1989 ("HDR 1989"), and were therefore subject to the mandatory regime imposed by Act 118.

Clause 25(1) of the SPAs provided: Vacant possession of the said Parcel shall be delivered to the Purchaser in the manner stipulated in clause 26 within fifty four (54) calendar months from the date of this Agreement [Emphasis is mine]

Clause 27(1) imposed a corresponding obligation in respect of common facilities: The common facilities serving the said development shall be completed by the Vendor within fifty-four (54) calendar months from the date of this Agreement. The Vendor’s architect shall certify the date of completion of the common facilities. [Emphasis is mine]

Clause 25(3) provided that the cause of action for LAD accrues upon the purchaser taking vacant possession: For the avoidance of doubt, any cause of action to claim liquidated damages by the Purchaser under this clause shall accrue on the date the Purchaser takes vacant possession of the said Parcel

On 12 March 2020, the appellant issued notices purporting to deliver vacant possession. Pursuant to clause 26(3), vacant possession is deemed to have been taken fourteen days after such notice. On a literal application of that clause, vacant possession would have been deemed delivered on 26 March

However, in light of the exclusion period from 18 March 2020 to 31 August 2020 mandated under the Temporary Measures for Reducing the Impact of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (Covid-19) Act 2020 (Act 829), the effective deemed date of vacant possession was 17 March 2020.

The dispute turns entirely on the proper commencement date for the 54-month contractual period stipulated in clauses 25(1) and 27(1).

If time is computed strictly from the date of execution of the SPAs, namely September or October 2015, the 54-month period would expire in or about March 2020. On that footing, there would be no actionable delay.

If, however, time is computed from April 2015, when the RM3,000 forming part of the purchase price was first paid, the 54-month period would expire in or about October 2019. On that basis, delivery of vacant possession in March 2020 was approximately five months late, thereby entitling the respondents to LAD.

It is this divergence in computation, the SPA date as against the booking fee date, which lies at the heart of the appeal.

Stripped to its essentials, the question is whether, under the statutory housing regime, the developer may rely strictly on the words “from the date of this Agreement” in Clause 25(1), or whether, in light of the Federal Court’s pronouncement in PJD Regency, time must be reckoned from the date on which the purchaser first paid monies towards the purchase price.

The appellant contends that Obata-Ambak circumscribes the reach of PJD Regency and reasserts the binding force of the S/N Qhufbv8aW0eisSmmIhP04A contractual language. The respondents submit, conversely, that PJD Regency remains authoritative on the commencement of time for LAD under statutory SPAs, and that any attempt to defer the starting date beyond the payment of the booking fee would undermine the consumer-protective purpose of Act 118.

It was in resolving that question that the learned Sessions Court Judge found in favour of the respondents. For reasons which follow, I am in respectful agreement with that conclusion.

The respondents commenced these proceedings by writ of summons on 19 April 2023 in the High Court. The matter was subsequently transferred to the Sessions Court. An application for summary judgment under Order 14 of the Rules of Court 2012 ("ROC") was filed by the respondents but was dismissed on 11 July 2025, the learned Judge being of the view that the matter was not suitable for summary disposal at that stage.

Subsequently, the appellant filed an application under Order 14A and Order 33 rule 2 and rule 5 of the ROC to dispose of the matter on questions of law. By consent, the following four questions were framed for determination:

Whether the pleadings filed by the plaintiffs are insufficient to enable reliance on the legal principles articulated in the case of PJD Regency;

(ii) If question (i) above is answered in the negative, whether the plaintiffs' cause of action commenced upon the execution of the SPAs and, if so, whether the claim is barred by the Limitation Act 1953;

(iii) Whether the plaintiffs are estopped from contending that LAD ought to be calculated from the date of payment of the registration fee, having admitted that they did not challenge the terms of the SPAs; and

(iv) Whether the plaintiffs are precluded from jointly bringing the action in the Sessions Court on the basis that each individual claim is less than RM100,000.

By a decision dated 3 October 2025, the learned Sessions Court Judge answered all four questions in the negative and allowed the respondents' claim. It is against that decision that the present appeal is brought.

The appellant’s submissions were advanced on two principal fronts. First, it was contended that the respondents are legally precluded from relying on PJD Regency. Counsel argued that the ratio of that decision rests upon the illegality of collecting booking fees prior to the execution of the statutory SPA. Since illegality was not expressly pleaded in the statement of claim, the respondents are said to be disentitled from invoking that S/N Qhufbv8aW0eisSmmIhP04A authority. Reliance was placed on Yow Man Kong @ Senthil Kumar v Ghandirajan a/l Arjunan & Anor [2023] 5 MLJ 64 for the proposition that illegality must be specifically pleaded.

Secondly, and more substantially, the appellant relied upon Obata-Ambak. Counsel submitted that Obata-Ambak has, in effect, circumscribed the reach of PJD Regency. The argument proceeded on the basis that the respondents executed the SPAs in 2015 and thereby agreed that the 54-month period would run “from the date of this Agreement”. Any attempt now to compute time from an earlier date was said, in substance, to constitute a challenge to the contractual terms of the SPAs. Under Obata-Ambak, such a challenge must be brought within six years from the date of the agreement. As the present suit was commenced in 2023, more than six years after execution of the SPAs, the claim is said to be statute-barred under the Limitation Act 1953.

In addition, the appellant invoked estoppel. It was submitted that, having admitted in their pleadings that they did not challenge the terms of the SPAs at the time of execution, the respondents are bound by the contractual commencement date and precluded from asserting a different starting point for the computation of LAD.

In response, counsel for the respondents submitted that the pleadings were entirely sufficient. The statement of claim expressly pleaded the payment of the RM3,000 booking fee in April 2015 and averred that it formed part of the purchase price. That, it was said, provided the essential factual substratum necessary to engage the principle in PJD Regency. No separate plea of illegality was required.

It was further contended that PJD Regency remains binding authority and has not been overruled, whether expressly or by necessary implication, by Obata-Ambak. The two decisions, counsel argued, address distinct juridical questions. PJD Regency concerns the proper construction of the commencement date for the statutory completion period where monies are collected prior to execution of the SPA. Obata-Ambak, by contrast, addresses the validity and legal effect of extensions of time granted by the Controller of Housing, and the limitation consequences of challenging such extensions.

The respondents emphasised that they do not seek to invalidate, vary, or set aside any clause of the SPAs. They accept the statutory form of the agreements. Their case is simply that, applying the rule of construction laid down by the Federal Court, the 54-month period began to run when monies were first paid towards the purchase price. On that footing, the cause of action for LAD accrued upon delivery (or deemed S/N Qhufbv8aW0eisSmmIhP04A delivery) of vacant possession in March 2020. The writ having been filed in April 2023, was therefore comfortably within the six-year limitation period.

It is against that procedural and forensic background that the issues arising in this appeal fall to be determined.

I have given the submissions of learned counsel my anxious and careful consideration. The resolution of this appeal hinges upon a proper appreciation of the ratio decidendi in PJD Regency and its relationship with the later decision of the Federal Court in Obata-Ambak. It is convenient to address the framed questions sequentially.

The appellant's primary contention is that the respondents are precluded from relying on PJD Regency because they did not expressly plead illegality. With respect, that submission proceeds upon a mischaracterization of both the pleadings and the Federal Court’s reasoning in that case.

It is elementary that pleadings must set out material facts, not evidence, and certainly not legal argument. What constitutes a material fact depends upon the nature of the cause of action. S/N Qhufbv8aW0eisSmmIhP04A The respondents’ claim is for LAD under statutory SPAs governed by Act 118 and the HDR 1989. The material facts, therefore, are those necessary to establish: (i) the contractual timeline, (ii) the date from which that timeline runs as a matter of law, and (iii) the date of delivery of vacant possession.

In PJD Regency, the Federal Court was concerned precisely with the question that arises here, namely, where a developer has collected a booking fee prior to the execution of a Schedule G or H sale and purchase agreement, from which date is LAD to be computed? The Court answered that question in clear and unambiguous terms. At paragraph [89], it held: “We agree fully with the views expressed above and as such we answer all related leave questions on the common issue to the effect as follows: Where there is a delay in the delivery of vacant possession by a developer to the purchaser in respect of Scheduled Contracts under Regulation 11(1) of the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Regulations 1989 (Regulation 1989) enacted pursuant to Section 24 of the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Act 1966, the date for calculation of liquidated agreed damages (‘LAD’) begins from the date of payment of deposit/booking fee/initial fee/expression by the purchaser of his written intention to purchase and not from the date of the sale and purchase agreement literally.” [Emphasis is mine]

The reasoning of the Federal Court was firmly anchored in the character of Act 118 as social legislation enacted for the protection of homebuyers. The discussion of illegality arose in the context of regulation 11(2) of the HDR 1989, which prohibits the collection of payments except as prescribed. Crucially, however, the Court made plain that the illegality did not render the SPA void. At paragraph [55], the Court observed: “Looking at the transactions herein holistically, we do not consider the agreements to be ex facie illegal as they are based on statutory contracts. There is no question of the scheduled contracts in this case being forbidden by law or that they are of such a nature that, if permitted, would defeat any law because they are themselves prescribed by law. What we have here is an instance whereby one party to the contracts namely the developers, have committed an illegal act in securing the contracts. Thus, it is not the contracts per se that are illegal rather it is their performance which has violated the strict terms of reg 11(2) of the HDR 1989 and the Schedules to the scheduled contracts.” [Emphasis is mine]

The Federal Court then explained, at paragraph [76]: “Thus, it can be said that the general principle of law flowing from this discussion is as follows. When it concerns social legislation and the stronger side to the transaction has committed an illegal act, the existence of a penal provision does not automatically render the contract void. If that were so, then the legislation would, if it were taken to destroy the contract or to erase the weaker side’s right to a S/N Qhufbv8aW0eisSmmIhP04A remedy, be to defeat the very protective purpose for which it was enacted. Accordingly, in such cases, the weaker party to the transaction will not be deemed to be in pari delicto and shall accordingly be entitled to the appropriate remedy. The natural result of this is that the stronger party will have that illegality construed against them. The result of that exercise depends very much on the facts of a particular case.” [Emphasis is mine]

Two propositions emerge with clarity from these passages. First, the statutory SPA remains valid and enforceable. Secondly, the developer’s unlawful collection of monies operates not as an independent cause of action, nor as a plea of voidness, but as the juridical basis for construing the commencement date against the developer in order to give effect to the protective purpose of the statute.

The respondents in the present case do not seek to impugn the SPAs. They do not allege that the contracts are void or unenforceable. Their case is simply that, as a matter of construction mandated by the apex court, the 54-month period must run from the date on which they first paid monies towards the purchase price. For that purpose, the only material fact is the payment of the RM3,000 in April 2015. That fact was expressly pleaded and, indeed, it is admitted by the appellant, albeit described as a registration fee.

The appellant's reliance on Yow Man Kong (supra) is, with respect, misplaced. That case concerned an attempt to rely on unpleaded illegality in order to set aside a judgment in the context of a moneylending transaction. It turned upon the well-established principle that a party cannot spring a case of statutory invalidity at trial without pleading it. The present case is fundamentally different. The respondents are not advancing a new cause of action founded upon illegality, they are invoking a rule of construction already authoritatively declared by the Federal Court in the specific context of Act 118.

In those circumstances, I am satisfied that the respondents’ pleadings were sufficient to engage the principle in PJD Regency and to put the appellant on proper notice of the case it had to meet. There was no ambush and no prejudice.

Accordingly, Question 1 was correctly answered in the negative. Question 2 and 3: The Application of Obata-Ambak, Limitation, and

These questions lie at the heart of the appeal. The appellant contends that the decision of the Federal Court in Obata-Ambak has so altered the legal landscape that purchasers may no longer rely on PJD Regency where proceedings are commenced more than six years after the execution of the SPA. That submission necessitates a careful examination of what S/N Qhufbv8aW0eisSmmIhP04A Obata-Ambak in fact decided, and whether its ratio governs the present case.

In Obata-Ambak, the developers had obtained extensions of time from the Controller of Housing under regulation 11(3) of the HDR 1989. Those extensions enlarged the contractual completion period from 36 months to 54 months. The purchasers executed SPAs reflecting the extended period. Following the earlier decision of the Federal Court in Ang Ming Lee & Ors v Menteri Kesejahteraan Bandar, Perumahan dan Kerajaan Tempatan & Anor and other appeals [2020] 1 MLJ 281, which held that the Controller’s power to grant such extension was ultra vires, the purchasers commenced proceedings seeking LAD calculated on the original 36-month period, contending that the 54-month clauses were invalid ab initio.

The Federal Court in Obata-Ambak held, at paragraph [96]: “In the appeals before us, Obata and Vignesh are in effect challenging the validity of the clauses, which are, cll 25 and 27 of the SPA. Terms which they have agreed to when they signed the SPAs in 2012. In respect of limitation we are of the view that based on the law on limitation it is clear that time begins to run at the earliest point of time the claimants, Obata and Vignesh could commence action. The cause of action would have accrued from the date of the execution of the SPAs or if there was any breach of the terms of the SPAs…” S/N Qhufbv8aW0eisSmmIhP04A [Emphasis is mine]

The Court further observed at paragraph [98]: “The causes of action in the appeals before us are based on contract and s 6(1) of the Limitation Act requires civil claim to be filed before the expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued which would be the date the SPAs were executed. Both Obata and Vignesh executed the SPAs with the knowledge that the completion period of the housing project was 54 months. Prema had obtained the approval of the Minister of Housing and Local Government to vary the prescribed completion date by extending the completion period to 54 months prior to the execution of the SPA. When they signed the SPA at that material time they would have legal counsel and should have enquired or raised any doubts before or when executing the SPA. [Emphasis is mine]

Two critical features of Obata-Ambak must be emphasised.

First, the purchasers in that case were directly impugning the validity of the contractual clauses themselves. Their case was that the 54-month completion period was void because it rested upon an ultra vires administrative act. In substance, they sought to set aside or disapply clauses agreed upon at the point of execution. That was a frontal challenge to the legality and enforceability of the contractual terms.

Secondly, because the gist of the complaint was the alleged invalidity of clauses incorporated at execution, the Federal Court held that the cause of action accrued at that moment. The purchasers could, as a matter of law, have commenced proceedings as soon as they executed the SPAs containing the impugned terms. It was in that context that time was held to run from the date of execution.

The present case stands on an altogether different footing.

The respondents do not challenge the validity of clauses 25 or 27 of their SPAs. The 54-month completion period is not alleged to be unlawful. On the contrary, it accords with the statutory form under Schedule H of the HDR 1989. The respondents accept the contractual duration. What they dispute is the proper construction of the phrase “from the date of this Agreement” in circumstances where a booking fee forming part of the purchase price was collected months before the SPA was executed.

That precise question was answered in PJD Regency. There, the Federal Court authoritatively construed the commencement date in statutory SPAs and held that where a developer has collected a booking fee in breach of regulation 11(2), the calculation of LAD must begin from the date of payment of that fee, and not from the literal date stated in the SPA. The agreement was not declared void. Rather, it was construed in a manner consistent with the protective purpose of Act 118.

The effect of PJD Regency is therefore to operate as a binding gloss upon the statutory form contract. It recalibrates the starting point of the contractual timeline as a matter of law. It does not render the SPA or its clauses invalid. There is thus no “challenge” to the agreement in the sense contemplated in Obata-Ambak.

Once that distinction is appreciated, the limitation argument advanced by the appellant cannot be sustained. In Obata-Ambak, the cause of action accrued upon execution because the purchasers’ complaint was directed at the validity of clauses agreed at that point. In the present case, the respondents’ cause of action is one for LAD arising from late delivery of vacant possession. By virtue of clause 25(3) of the SPA and section 6(1)(a) of the Limitation Act 1953, that cause of action accrues upon delivery (or deemed delivery) of vacant possession.

Vacant possession was delivered, taking into account the statutory exclusion period under Act 829, in March 2020. The writ was filed in April 2023. The action is therefore comfortably within the six-year limitation period. No statutory bar arises.

I turn briefly to estoppel. The appellant relies upon the respondents’ admission that they did not challenge the terms of the SPAs at the time of execution. This argument is circular. The respondents are not resiling from the 54-month completion period, nor are they seeking to invalidate it. They seek only to S/N Qhufbv8aW0eisSmmIhP04A enforce it in accordance with the construction mandated by the apex court.

To hold that a purchaser is estopped from invoking PJD Regency would be to emasculate the very protection which that decision was intended to confer. The mischief addressed in PJD Regency was the practice of collecting booking fees in advance, thereby securing an early bargain while postponing the formal commencement date in the SPA. The Federal Court was explicit in guarding against developers profiting from such conduct. At paragraph [78], it stated: “In construing the illegality against the developers, if it is their attempt to have secured an early bargain through the illegal collection of booking fees, then the protective veil cast by the legislature over the purchasers should operate in a way so as to bind the developers to the booking fees. In this way, the developers will have to bear the full extent of the LAD payable by them to the purchasers consistent with the overall intent of the written law in respect of late delivery of vacant possession.” [Emphasis is mine]

To accept the appellant’s estoppel argument would, in substance, permit a developer to rely upon its own breach of regulation 11(2) as a shield. That would be antithetical to the policy of Act 118 as recognised in PJD Regency.

The respondents are not approbating and reprobating, nor are they asserting inconsistent rights. They are simply exercising a statutory entitlement to LAD, computed in accordance with binding authority.

For these reasons, I am satisfied that the learned Sessions Court Judge was correct to reject both the limitation and estoppel arguments. Questions 2 and 3 were properly answered in the negative.

The fourth and final question before this Court pertains to the procedural propriety of the respondents' commencement and continuation of this action in the Sessions Court. The appellant contends that the respondents were precluded from jointly instituting and maintaining the proceedings in that court because each individual claim falls below RM100,000. It is said that, on a strict construction of the Subordinate Courts Act 1948, each plaintiff ought to have filed a separate action in the Magistrate's Court.

The relevant factual matrix is straightforward. The respondents are purchasers of units in the same development. The action was first commenced in the High Court of Malaya at Kuala Lumpur (Civil Suit No. WA-22NCvC-194-04/2023) and was subsequently transferred, by order dated 7 August 2023, to the Sessions Court, where it was registered as Civil Suit No. WA-S/N Qhufbv8aW0eisSmmIhP04A A52NCVC-643-08/2023. The claim in substance is for LAD arising from the alleged late delivery of vacant possession and common facilities.

The individual claims, as particularised in Jadual C to the re-amended statement of claim, range between RM26,177.44 and RM36,791.45, with the seventh and eighth plaintiffs jointly claiming RM34,730.81. The total aggregate sum claimed is RM204,771.35. There is no dispute as to these figures.

The appellant’s argument is twofold. First, it contends that since no individual claim exceeds RM100,000, the proper forum is said to be the Magistrates’ Court. Secondly, it submits that the joinder of the plaintiffs in the Sessions Court is a tactical device designed to circumvent the jurisdictional structure of the subordinate courts, thereby amounting to an abuse of process. Reliance is placed on Choy May May & Ors v Prema Bonanza Sdn Bhd [2022] MLJU 1619 for the proposition that purchasers under separate sale and purchase agreements cannot combine their claims where the causes of action are distinct.

The respondents rely on Order 15 rule 4 of the ROC. They submit that they share a common grievance and that their claims raise a common and determinative question of law, namely whether LAD is to be computed from the date of payment of the booking fee or from the date of execution of the SPA. They further contend that the joinder promotes consistency, efficiency, and the avoidance of conflicting S/N Qhufbv8aW0eisSmmIhP04A decisions, and they rely in that regard on Shefali Shenoy Choo Suat Chin & Ors v Potential Excelerate Group Ltd & Ors [2022] MLJU 808.

It is convenient to begin with section 65(1) of the Subordinate Courts Act 1948, which provides that a Sessions Court shall have jurisdiction to try civil actions where the amount in dispute does not exceed the jurisdictional ceiling of RM1,000,000. The aggregate amount claimed in the present action is RM204,771.35. On a plain reading of the statute, the Sessions Court is seised with jurisdiction over the action before it. The provision does not stipulate that jurisdiction is to be determined by reference to each individual plaintiff’s claim in isolation. Had Parliament intended such a restriction, it would have said so in clear terms. For convenience, section 65(1) provides:

Subject to the limitations contained in this Act, a Sessions Court shall have —

jurisdiction to try all other actions and suits of a civil nature where the amount in dispute or the value of the subject-matter does not exceed one million ringgit; and

However, the substantive thrust of the appellant’s argument is not that the Sessions Court lacks statutory jurisdiction over the total amount, but an alleged misjoinder of parties which, it is argued, ought to result in severance and the remittance of the individual claims to the Magistrates’ Court. That submission must be examined against the framework of Order 15 rule 4.

Order 15 rule 4 of the ROC provides the mechanism for joinder of parties:

Joinder of parties (O. 15 r. 4)

Subject to rule 5(1), two or more persons may be joined together in one action as plaintiffs or as defendants with the leave of the Court or where –

if separate actions were brought by or against each of them, as the case may be, some common question of law or fact would arise in all the actions; and

all rights to relief claimed in the action (whether they are joint, several or alternative) are in respect of or arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions. [Emphasis is mine]

Two cumulative requirements must therefore be satisfied, namely, a common question of law or fact and a sufficient transactional nexus. In my judgment, both limbs are plainly met. If separate actions were brought, each court would be required to determine the identical legal issue, on the interpretation of the phrase “from the date of this Agreement” in clauses 25(1) and 27(1) of the SPAs in the light of the payment of booking fees and the binding authority in PJD Regency. That issue is central and determinative in every claim. The fact that the quantum varies between respondents does not detract from the unity of the legal controversy.

Equally, the claims arise out of the same series of transactions, specifically, the purchase of units within the same development from the same developer, pursuant to materially identical standard-form SPAs. The appellant does not dispute that the SPAs are of a standard form identical to all purchasers. The factual substratum is therefore common, and the legal controversy singular.

The appellant’s reliance on Choy May May must be examined in its proper factual context. The case turned upon a materially different matrix. As the learned judge recorded: “(i) In delivering vacant possession of the parcel units, the defendant claimed to have paid LAD for late delivery computed from the fifty-four-month period to the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 6th, 9th and 12th plaintiffs under Clause 25 (2) of the SPA calculated on a day-to-day basis at the rate of ten per centum (10%) per annum of the purchase price. Parties entered into a settlement agreement concerning the said LAD payment as being full and final payment and that the said plaintiffs shall not be entitled to make any further claims, demand, and/or institute any legal suit or proceedings in respect of the same against the defendant (enclosure 8, p.447-468). As for the 4th, 7th, 8th, 10th, 11th, 13th, 14th, 15th and 16th plaintiffs, the defendant claimed by its computation that they are not entitled to any LAD as there is no delay in the delivery of vacant possession of the parcel units and common properties under the terms of the SPAs with the EOT in place” [Emphasis is mine]

That passage illustrates the critical distinction. The plaintiffs there were divided into categories; some had executed settlement agreements, others were said not to be entitled to LAD at all. The claims were fractured by differing factual and legal positions. In contrast, the present respondents advance a unified claim founded on an identical methodology of computation. There are no settlement agreements, no disparate defences, and no factual divergence that would render joinder inappropriate.

Moreover, the observations in Choy May May (supra) arose in the context of a striking-out application under Order 18 rule 19. The finding on representative capacity was closely tied to the court’s assessment of abuse of process in light of concluded settlements. As the learned judge observed: “(d) It is also my view that the plaintiffs in the instant case who had elected to execute the settlement agreements or letters with the defendant voluntarily must be deemed to have waived their right under the Contracts Act 1950 and cannot be allowed to resile from that bargain. It would be abusive and unjust in the circumstances to allow it unless there are legitimate vitiating factors in play…” [Emphasis is mine]

Those considerations do not arise here.

By contrast, the reasoning in Shefali Shenoy Choo Suat Chin & Ors v Potential Excelerate Group Ltd & Ors [2022] 10 MLJ 800 is directly applicable to the question of joinder and jurisdiction. The Court there held: “[27] In this action, notwithstanding that all six plaintiffs entered into separate agreements, and the amounts claimed by each plaintiff differed, it is however abundantly clear to me that there are common questions of law and fact as gleaned from the pleading… [29] There being common questions of law and fact, I hold that the plaintiffs are absolutely entitled to join in one suit pursuant to O 15 r 4. In addition, O 15 r 6(1) of the ROC 2012 makes clear that the action shall not be defeated by reason of the misjoinder of parties. The utility of a joinder of the parties cannot be underscored enough—to save precious time of not having separate trials which may culminate in the wholly unacceptable risk that different courts may arrive at conflicting findings of fact and decision premised on the same issues. In addition, the plaintiffs in my respectful view, also meet the criteria to under O 15 r 12(1) to bring a representative action as the plaintiffs are a class of persons with common interest and common grievance and the relief sought will be beneficial to all of them. The fact that the amounts due to each of the plaintiffs and the agreements are signed on different dates do not bar a representative action — see Maju Puncakbumi Sdn Bhd v Ch’Ng Han Keong [2019] MLJU 1290. I therefore accept the plaintiffs’ counsel’s submission on this point. Any defect, whether misdescription or non-description in the intitulement can be easily rectified by way of an amendment.” [Emphasis is mine]

The Court further addressed the jurisdictional objection in terms which resonate in the present appeal: “[24] As for D3, D4 and D5’s contention that each plaintiff ’s claim is subject to the jurisdiction of the magistrate’s court or the sessions court as the amount claimed by each plaintiff is less than RM1m, save for the prayers in respect of ‘declaration’, I am of the view that it serves no useful purpose to remit the claims to the magistrate’s or sessions court as the case may be, to avoid the possibility of inconsistent findings by the different courts hearing the matters based on the same facts and both courts’ decisions may contradict each other. Letting the suit remain in the High Court would avoid such a potentially embarrassing outcome; particularly when D3, D4 and D5 have not demonstrated that they will suffer any prejudice. Indeed, O 1A of the ROC 2012 exhorts the court or judge to have regard to the overriding interest of justice, to ensure the merits of the case or appeal is heard to attain substantive justice. This ground of objection falls as I fail to see any fundamental irregularity in filing the suit in the High Court that goes to its roots whichO1A andO2 r 1(3) of the ROC2012 cannot cure, nor has it caused D3, D4 and D5 a substantial miscarriage of justice.” [Emphasis is mine]

That reasoning applies with equal force here. To sever the present claims generate a multiplicity of proceedings in which different courts might be called upon to determine precisely the same issue of law on identical facts. The risk of inconsistent determinations is real. Such an outcome would be inimical to S/N Qhufbv8aW0eisSmmIhP04A coherent adjudication and would burden both parties with unnecessary cost and duplication.

The appellant has not demonstrated any real prejudice that would result from the respondents proceeding jointly in the Sessions Court. The aggregate amount is well within the Sessions Court's monetary limit. The joinder is authorised by the Rules of Court and consonant with the policy of orderly and economical litigation.

For these reasons, I am satisfied that the learned Sessions Court Judge was correct to answer Question 4 in the negative. The joinder of the respondents is proper, the jurisdiction of the Sessions Court is established by reference to the aggregate claim, and the interests of justice favour the determination of the common issue in a single consolidated proceeding. .

For the reasons set out above, I am satisfied that the learned Sessions Court Judge did not err in law or in principle in answering the four framed questions in the negative and in allowing the respondents’ claim.

The principle in PJD Regency remains authoritative and directly applicable. Where a developer has collected a booking fee forming part of the purchase price prior to the execution of a statutory Schedule H agreement, the computation of S/N Qhufbv8aW0eisSmmIhP04A liquidated ascertained damages must, as a matter of binding construction, run from the date of such payment and not from the literal date of the sale and purchase agreement. Reliance upon that principle does not amount to a challenge to the validity of the SPA clauses.

The decision in Obata-Ambak does not avail the appellant. That case concerned a direct attack on the validity of contractual clauses and the consequent accrual of a cause of action upon execution. The present respondents mount no such challenge. Their cause of action is one for liquidated ascertained damages arising upon delivery of vacant possession in March 2020. The writ, having been filed in April 2023, is well within the six-year limitation period prescribed by section 6(1) of the Limitation Act 1953.

The arguments founded upon estoppel and misjoinder are likewise without merit. The respondents are not approbating and reprobating, they are enforcing their statutory rights in accordance with binding authority. The joinder is permitted under Order 15 rule 4 of the Rules of Court 2012, the aggregate claim falls within the jurisdictional limit of the Sessions Court, and no prejudice has been shown.

In the premises, the appeal is dismissed with costs of RM10,000, subject to allocatur. The order of the learned Sessions Court Judge dated 3 October 2025 is affirmed in its entirety. The respondents are entitled to liquidated ascertained S/N Qhufbv8aW0eisSmmIhP04A damages computed from the date of payment of the booking fee in April 2015 up to the deemed date of delivery of vacant possession, together with interest and costs as ordered below. Dated the 25th day of March 2026 … SGN … ……………………………………………….. MOH KOK WAI JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER OF THE HIGH COURT HIGH COURT (CIVIL DIVISION NCvC14) HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY OF MALAYSIA Counsel for the Appellant : Justin Voon and Tan Ko Xin Messrs Justin Voon Chooi & Wing Counsel for the Respondents : Joseph Ching Ern Hao and Vinci Ng Messrs Joseph, Vinci & Leong