a
(a) a declaration (i) that the 2nd S&P (because the learned Judge said that the 1st S&P was irrelevant) and transfer Form 14A are wrong, invalid and void and (ii) that the Plaintiff is the registered owner of the Property; 30
/akn/my/judgment/court-of-appeal/2019/b769af1e-2622-4a74-8275-f69c55a273e4
Court of Appeal of Malaysia14 Feb 2019N-02(NCvC)(W)-478-03/2018
The written judgment as the court issued it, with the coram, case number, and source links. Every paragraph has its own anchor.
Text
1 5 DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN MALAYSIA BERSIDANG DI PUTRAJAYA (BIDANG KUASA RAYUAN) 10 RAYUAN SIVIL NO: N-02(NCvC)(W)-478-03/2018 ANTARA 15 LASER EQUITY SDN BHD … PERAYU (No. Syarikat: 671800-P) 20 DAN ABDUL WAHAB BIN HUSIN … RESPONDEN 25 DIDENGAR BERSAMA DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN MALAYSIA BERSIDANG DI PUTRAJAYA 30 (BIDANG KUASA RAYUAN) RAYUAN SIVIL NO: N-02(NCvC)(W)-477-03/2018 35 ANTARA PALANISAMY A/L MUNIANDY (beramal sebagai pemilik tunggal 40 firma guaman bernama Tetuan M.P. Samy & Co.) … PERAYU DAN 45 ABDUL WAHAB BIN HUSIN … RESPONDEN 2 5 [Dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Seremban Dalam Negeri Sembilan Darul Khusus Guaman Sivil No: S-22NCVC-106-11/2015 10 Antara Abdul Wahab bin Husin (No. K/P : 480909-05-5173) … Plaintif 15 Dan
section
1. Laser Equity Sdn Bhd 20 (No. Syarikat: 671800-P)
section
2. Palanisamy a/l Muniandy (beramal sebagai pemilik tunggal firma … Defendan-guaman bernama Tetuan M.P. Samy & Co.) Defendan] 25 KORUM ZALEHA YUSOF, HMR 30 YAACOB MD SAM, HMR LAU BEE LAN, HMR GROUNDS OF DECISION 35 Introduction [1] There are 2 appeals before us. Appeal No. N-02(NCvC)(W)-478- 03/2018 (‘Appeal 478’) and Appeal No. N-02(NCvC)(W)-477-03/2018 (‘Appeal 477’). Appeal 478 and Appeal 477 are appeals brought by the 1st and 2nd Appellants/1st and 2nd Defendants respectively against the 40 order of the High Court dated 27/2/2018 allowing the 3 Respondent/Plaintiff’s claim. (There is no mention of any dismissal of the 5 1st Appellant/1st Defendant’s Counterclaim in the said order although the same was mentioned in the Grounds of Judgment). Dissatisfied with the said decision, the 1st and 2nd Appellants/1st and 2nd Defendants appealed. We shall for purposes of these appeals refer to the parties as they were referred to in the High Court. 10 [2] At the High Court, the 1st Judge heard the evidence of the Plaintiff’s 1st witness, Abdul Wahab bin Husin, the Plaintiff himself (PW1). The 2nd Judge (‘the trial Judge’) who took over conduct of the case continued with the trial and heard a minor re-examination of PW1, 15 the Plaintiff’s 2nd witness, Iskandar bin Azaman (PW2), the document examiner and all of the witnesses for the Defendants, namely, two witnesses for the 1st Defendant : (i) Moghan a/l Murugiah (DW1) (real estate agent and licenced auctioneer) and (ii) Parimela Devi a/p Veerarajulu (DW2) (Director of the 1st Defendant) and two witnesses for 20 the 2nd Defendant: (i) Sithradevi a/p P. Nagalingam (DW3) (freelance consultant) and (ii) the 2nd Defendant (DW4), Palanisamy a/l Muniandy. [3] Having considered the submissions of the respective counsel, both written and oral and having perused the Records of Appeal before us, 25 and for the reasons that now follow, we unanimously allowed the appeal. Background Facts [4] The Plaintiff was the registered owner of a three storey shop house held under H.S.(D) 110429, P.T. 849, Pekan Bukit Kepayang, 30 District of Seremban, Negeri Sembilan (‘Property’) until it was transferred to the 1st Defendant on 5/9/2007. When the Plaintiff was the 4 owner of the Property, he entered into an agreement on 6/2/2006 to sell 5 it to M. Lachimi a/p Muniandy (‘the 1st S&P’)(exh.P1, p.38, CCB (Common Core Bundle) Vol.2) for a purchase price of RM330,000.00 within a stipulated period of 3+1. The Plaintiff received RM40,000.00 as deposit. As Lachimi did not pay the balance purchase price of RM290,000.00, the 1st S&P was terminated on 6/6/2006. The Plaintiff 10 further alleged that Lachimi as at 17/10/2008 still owed him a balance purchase price of RM30,000.00 with interest of RM47,845.33 totalling RM77,845.33. In the 1st S&P, Lachimi was represented by Sithradevi of M/s Sithra & Partners (DW3). The Plaintiff was not represented. 15 [5] The 1st Defendant then entered into a sale and purchase agreement with the Plaintiff on 21/5/2007 (‘the 2nd S&P’) (exh.D11, CCB Vol.2 p.54) for the purchase price of RM200,000.00. In the 2nd S&P, the Plaintiff was represented by the 2nd Defendant and the 1st Defendant by M/s Nurliny, Pannir Mannar & Co. 20 [6] However, the Plaintiff in the 2nd part of his Statement of Claim alleges that he did not execute exh.D11, the transfer Form 14A dated 18/7/2017 (exh.D34, CCB Vol.2 pp.70-73), a Power of Attorney (‘PA’) dated 21/5/2007 between Plaintiff and D1 (exh.D35, AR (Appeal Record) 25 Vol.3 (iv) pp.928-933) and the PA dated 9/4/2007 between Plaintiff and DW3 (exh.D23, CCB Vol.2 pp.70-73) authorising DW3 to transact the sale and also he did not give any letter of authorisation dated 18/5/2007 authorising the 2nd Defendant to release the balance purchase price of RM168,000.00 to DW3 (exh.D25, CCB Vol.2 p.74). Hence the Plaintiff 30 alleges that the Property was transferred to the 1st Defendant assisted by the 2nd Defendant by fraud or forgery and claims a host of matters, some of which have been mentioned earlier including the Plaintiff’s 5 denial of appointing the 2nd Defendant or ever meeting him with regard to 5 the 2nd S&P. [7] The 1st Defendant’s position is that it has paid the entire purchase price, RM32,000.00 to DW1 as his fees and the balance RM168,000.00 to the 2nd Defendant as solicitor for the Plaintiff. The 2nd Defendant 10 maintains that he met the Plaintiff in his office, where the Plaintiff appointed him to act in the 2nd S&P and received the balance purchase price which was forwarded to the Plaintiff through DW3. According to DW3 the Plaintiff received a total of RM414,000.00 from the sale of the Property to Lachimi and to the 1st Defendant. The said sum also consists 15 of rental of the Property. Decision of the High Court [8] The Grounds of Judgment (GJ) of the learned trial Judge appears at pp.22 to 37 of the Supplementary AR. The learned trial Judge found 20 that the Plaintiff has proved fraud and forgery against the 1st and 2nd Defendants. These findings are contained in paras 29A to O of the GJ wherein the learned trial Judge commented “the proof [are] overwhelming [especially,] paras G, H and I”. The learned trial Judge then granted the following order - 25
a
(a) a declaration (i) that the 2nd S&P (because the learned Judge said that the 1st S&P was irrelevant) and transfer Form 14A are wrong, invalid and void and (ii) that the Plaintiff is the registered owner of the Property; 30
b
(b) the registration of the Property in the name of the 1st Defendant is wrong, invalid and void; 6
c
(c) any other consequential orders; and 5
d
(d) costs for the Plaintiff. [9] Having made the findings above, the learned trial Judge dismissed the Counterclaim of the 1st Defendant. 10 Decision of this Court [10] We are mindful of the trite principles of appellate intervention i.e. where facts are to be reviewed, it is undesirable to disturb the findings of the Court below unless it appears that those findings are clearly wrong and appellate interference will take place where there is insufficient 15 appreciation of the evidence (see China Airlines Ltd. v. Maltran Air Corp. Sdn. Bhd. & Another Appeal [1996] 3 CLJ 163 (FC) at p.175; Sivalingam a/l Periasamy v Periasamy & Anor [1995] 3 MLJ 395 (CA); and Gan Yook Chin & Anor v. Lee Ing Chin & Ors. [2004] 4 CLJ 309 which endorsed the view of the Court of Appeal in Lee Ing Chin & 20 Ors v. Gan Yook Chin & Anor [2003] 2 CLJ 19 and followed in Ho Hup Construction Company Bhd v. Woo Thin Choy [2015] 9 CLJ 706 at 730 [64]). [11] We shall deal with the Grounds of Appeal as contained in the 25 Memorandums of Appeal (MOA(s)) of both the 1st and the 2nd Defendants together. At the outset we state that we agreed with both the 1st and 2nd Defendants’ submission that in arriving at his findings, the learned trial Judge has merely considered the Defendant’s oral and documentary evidence adduced by the Defendants but failed to 30 consider the entirety of the evidence, namely that of the Plaintiff as well. We further agreed that in doing so, the learned trial Judge fell into error as an examination below of the Grounds of Appeal vis a vis the GJ, 7 adopting the headings of the learned trial Judge though not necessarily 5 in chronological order, would reveal. Grounds of Appeal 1 to 6, 7, 9, 13 and 14 of 1st Defendant’s MOA [12] The learned trial Judge erred in law and in fact - in failing to critically and fairly analyse and evaluate the evidence 10 adduced in its entirety; in failing to find whether the evidence of the Plaintiff is more probable than that of the Defendants by comparing and putting to test the evidence of the Plaintiff against the evidence of the 15 Defendants; in failing to weigh the evidence of the Plaintiff as he only criticised the Defendants’ evidence and failed to find whether the Plaintiff’s evidence is unbelievable; and 20 when he relied on irrelevant facts in disbelieving the Defendants’ defence. [13] The above Grounds of Appeal also constituted grounds under 25 Points 1, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13 and 14 of the 2nd Defendant’s MOA. [14] Before delving into the merits of the appeal proper we observed the following statements highlighted in the 2nd Defendant’s submission of the GJ are inaccurate based on evidence which will be unfolded later: 30 8
a
(a) The date “… through an earlier S&P dated 6 June 2007” under the 5 heading “Salient Facts” at para 5, ought to read as “6 February 2006”; and
b
(b) The statement “Sithra and SD managed to sell property for Plaintiff” under the heading “Summary of SD’s Submission” at para 28 ought 10 to read as the 1st Defendant did not sell the Property for the Plaintiff but it was Sithra as the holder of the PA who arranged for the sale of the Property. A. Relationship between the Plaintiff and Lachimi 15 [15] In his GJ the learned trial Judge stated - “29. First, what happened between Plaintiff and Lachimi regarding the first S&P between them should not be the concerned of this court. This is because both the FD and SD agreed that the S&P between Plaintiff and Lachimi had failed to 20 be performed. The FD and SD cannot dispute this fact because if the S&P between Plaintiff and Lachimi is still good, the FD cannot buy the Property. So, what was paid or not paid by Lachimi to Plaintiff is not the concern of this court. If indeed the Plaintiff had received money or enriched by Lachimi, it is for 25 Lachimi to sue the Plaintiff. This has nothing to do at all with the FD or SD.” (Emphasis added) [15.1] With respect we disagreed. The following facts pertaining to 30 payment of the 1st S&P are pertinent: Lachimi had on 6/2/2006 paid a deposit of RM40,000.00 and later paid part payment of RM40,000.00 totalling RM80,000.00. The Plaintiff had in examination in chief testified that the consideration for the sale of the Property was RM330,000.00 9 and as at 17/10/2008, Lachimi still owed him RM77,845.33. He 5 explained that the breakdown for the computation was as per exh.P2, CCB Vol.2 p.2, the Plaintiff’s complaint letter titled “Per: No. Report : SEREMBAN/018005/07. Harta: H.S.(D)110429 No. P.T. 849 (sekarang dikenali sebagai GRN 77913 No. Lot 21710) Mukim Pekan Bukit Kepayang Daerah Seremban. Pembeli : M. Lachimi a/p Muniandy” to 10 Chief Inspector Khairil Anuar dated 24/10/2008. We observed the following statement preceded the para numbered 1 (a) and (b) of the said letter regarding the two said payments: “Saya ingin memaklumkan kepada tuan bahawa dibawah ini dinyatakan urutan waktu (kronologi) urusan jualbeli harta di atas yang dikendalikan 15 oleh Tetuan Sithra & Partners untuk perhatian dan pertimbangan tuan.” Thus we find the Plaintiff concealed the fact that he received another RM40,000.00 by only pleading he received RM40,000.00. 20 [15.2] We find the unchallenged evidence showed that DW3 refunded RM80,000.00 to Lachimi through her lawyer Moghan & Co. for the termination of the 1st S&P as is evident from exh.D27 E, Ambank Draft No. 520382 dated 5/6/2008 for the sum of RM30,000.00 and the corresponding letter from DW3 and from exh.D27 F, Alliance Bank’s 25 Cashier’s Cheque No.820869 dated 3/7/2008 for the sum of RM50,000.00 and the corresponding letter from DW3 (CCB Vol.2 pp.17- 19). The sum of RM80,000.00 was to be returned by Plaintiff to DW3 but the Plaintiff did not do so as can be viewed from the following evidence of the Plaintiff (p.157 AR Part B (Vol.2)(i): 30 “Ct. : Yang dia bagi tu sebenarnya deposit. Perjanjian jual beli. : Mula mula dia bagi RM40,00.00. 10 : Betul, sekarang lawyer tanya dia kata sekarang ni p erjanjian 5 untuk beli rumah itu telah tamat, so dia kata kalau dah tamat, bermakna rumah tu tak jadi jual? : Ya : Kalau tak jadi jual, kenapa tak pulangkan semula RM80,000.00 tu 10 kepada Sithra? : Dia pun tak minta. : So, kalau dia tak minta, tak perlu pulangkan? : Pasal dia lawyer, lawyer pun tak minta daripada saya. Dia ada 15 lawyer, sepatutnya tuan haji ini kasi pulangkan balik.(sic) Saya pun tak tahu benda ini berjalan. Tau-tau dia bagi saya cheque. : Never mind, as far as he concerned he get the money.” 20 Such conduct of the Plaintiff revealed that he was less than honest in concealing the receipt of RM80,000.00. [15.3] The 2nd Defendant pleaded in para 12 of his Statement of Defence that he obtained evidence of documents from DW3 whereby 25 DW3 on 25/5/2007, 6/6/2008, 29/6/2007, 9/4/2008, 5/6/2008, 3/7/2008, 14/7/2008, 7/8/2008, 8/8/2008, 16/10/2008, 17/10/2008 paid sums totalling RM334,400.00 to the Plaintiff and his lawyer Abdul Latiff & Co. We find having received these sums the Plaintiff did not plead receipt of the same but merely pleaded the sum Lachimi owed him the balance 30 purchase price of RM30,000.00 and interest of RM47,845.33 (para 9.2 of the Statement of Claim). We observed yet in his Reply to Defence of the 2nd Defendant at paras 9 and 12 the Plaintiff pleaded that he received RM334,400.00 from Lachimi pursuant to the 1st S&P despite it being expired on 6/6/2006. Later we observed the Plaintiff contradicted 35 himself at para 10 of his Reply when he pleaded - 11 “Wang RM334,400.00 tersebut diterima daripada Lachimi dan atau 5 peguam Lachimi (sic) Puan Sithra bukan ejen Plaintif dan tidak pernah dilantik sebagai ejen Plaintif.” [15.4] Next we find the learned trial Judge erred when he omitted to consider para 9 of the Plaintiff’s Reply to para 12 of the Defence of the 10 2nd Defendant that “Wang RM334,400.00 telah diterima oleh Plaintif dari Lachimi sebagai sebahagian wang balasan yang dibayar dibawah Perjanjian jualbeli bertarikh 6/2/2006. ... Jumlah sewa yang diterima dari Lachimi adalah RM34,400 yang dibuat pada 25/5/2007, 6/6/2007, 29/6/2007 dan pada 8/8/2008”. We are of the view that this pleaded fact 15 contradicted para 9.2 of the Statement of Claim where the Plaintiff pleaded - “Setakat 17/10/2008 Lachimi masih berhutang wang sebanyak RM77,845.33 dalam mana RM30,000.00 adalah baki harga balasan dan RM47,845.33 adalah faedah yang kena dibayar.” 20 [15.5] We are of the view that the evidence will unfold later that (i) part of the monies received by the Plaintiff were proceeds from the sale of the Property to the 1st Defendant (which will become apparent under the heading “The S&P (the 2nd S&P)”) and (ii) despite the fact that the 1st 25 S&P had expired and of no legal effect, the Plaintiff maintained that RM334,400.00 was paid by Lachimi out of which RM34,400.00 was rental leaving a balance of RM300,000.00 which unfortunately was an unpleaded fact. 30 [15.6] Learned Counsel for the 2nd Defendant cross-examined the Plaintiff on the balance purchase price of RM290,000.00 as follows (CCB Vol.1 p.83) : 12 “40. Q: ltu kita akan datang kemudian, you jawab sekarang. Kamu 5 kala Lachimi kena bayar 290 ribu. Kamu kata Sithra yang kena bayar pada kamu kepada Abd. Latiff tetapi itu adalah fakta lain. lni saya akan buktikan kepada kamu. Lachimi ada bayar wang kepada kamu atau tidak. Awak ada apa apa bukti untuk tunjukkan 290 ribu ini dibayar oleh Lachimi? 10 A: Saya tidak ada bukti.
section
41. Q: You ada cek? A: Saya tidak ada cek. 15
section
42. Q: Kamu ada apa apa penyata bank mengatakan Lachimi yang bayarkan wang ini. Ada atau tidak? A: Tidak.
section
43. Q: Jadi Lachimi tidak bayar? 20 A: Saya tidak tahu. Sithra
section
44. Q: Kalau awak tidak tahu kenapa awak tak tanya peguam Latiff kamu? Ini wang datang dari mana? A: Wang datang dari Sithra.” 25 We are of the view that the Plaintiff contradicted his testimony when all along he said that Lachimi paid all the money but in cross-examination he said it was paid by DW3. 30 B. The S&P (the 2nd S&P) D. The 1st Defendant admitted handing no money to the Plaintiff. [16] The learned trial Judge made a finding that the 2nd S&P is a fake and a forgery for these reasons - 35 13
a
(a) the recital of the 2nd S&P stated that the amount of RM32,000.00 5 as deposit is paid directly to the Plaintiff (Vendor) but DW1 stated (in his witness statement) that he was given the amount by the 1st Defendant as agent; and
b
(b) there is no documentary proof from either 1st or 2nd Defendants or 10 DW3 that the Plaintiff received RM32,000.00 as stated in the 2nd S&P. “[A]t least there must be a cheque for this amount given to the Plaintiff.” This contradicted the recital which stated it is paid directly to the Plaintiff. 15 [17] As a preliminary point, before arriving at the abovementioned findings, the learned Judge stated - “On 3 Jan 2018 when the case was scheduled for clarification, this court became suspicious of the Property transaction. Thus, on that date this court asked the counsel for FD to say what amount of money paid by FD directly to 20 the Plaintiff. After being queried, FD’s counsel admitted no money was paid by the FD directly to the Plaintiff.” (para 35 GJ) [17.1] We are of the view that the statement of the learned trial Judge quoted above is a bare assertion as there is no mention of this 3/1/2018 25 clarification by any of the counsel in their submission. Neither could we find evidence of any record of this 3/1/2018 clarification. What was available before us in terms of the Notes of Proceedings are : (i) Notes of Proceedings at trial CCB Vol.1. pp.1-273; and (ii) the Court’s decision on 27/2/2018. 30 [17.2] Further, with respect we are of the view the learned trial Judge fell into error with regard to the findings in para 16 above. Firstly, the 14 learned Judge failed to consider that DW1 (agent) had admitted 5 receiving RM32,000.00 from the 1st Defendant and asked to retain as an agency commission by Messrs Sithra & Partners (Q&A 4 of Witness Statement). In fact DW1 confirmed in cross-examination that he received RM32,000.00 from the 1st Defendant and therefore DW1’s evidence remained unrebutted. 10 [17.3] Secondly, there is the explanation from DW2 that there was a typographical error in the recital in that it should read that RM32,000.00 was to be paid directly to the agent (DW1) and not the Plaintiff (Vendor) which error she realised during the trial between the 1st Defendant and 15 Lachimi. We are of the view that the learned trial Judge failed to consider DW2’s explanation, whether he accepted or rejected the same. This has to be seen against the backdrop of the unchallenged evidence of DW1 that he received RM32,000.00 from the 1st Defendant coupled with the fact that payment of RM32,000.00 as agent’s fee is not a 20 disputed issue at the trial nor is it the pleaded case of the Plaintiff. The evidence showed that the Plaintiff was paid RM32,000.00 as part of the purchase price of RM200,000.00. [17.4] Thirdly, we are of the view that the learned trial Judge failed to 25 consider the following evidence of DW3 and DW4. DW4 was cross-examined by the Plaintiff’s counsel regarding the non receipt of the deposit of RM32,000.00 as follows (CCB Vol.1 p.267): “79. Q: Did you tell him that he has already receive MR32,000.00? That is what in the S&P. Did you tell him? 30 A: I did tell the Plaintiff that Shitra will pay him immediately upon me receiving the balance of purchase price and by Vendors authorisation letter [exh.D25], I will pay by cheque by 15 Shitra as PA holder. Shitra will settle with him. This was told in 5 my office.
section
80. Q: I put it to you Mr. Palanisamy that you are buddy to fraud committed by somebody the third party. Do you agree with me? A: I don’t agree. There is no fraud involve.” 10 [17.5] DW4’s aforesaid testimony was corroborated by DW3’s testimony in examination in chief (Q&A 21, CCB Vol.1 p.177) - On 21/5/2007, I was at M.P. Samy's office. Hj Wahab came. I took himinto (sic) the office and it ole dhte (sic) Plaintiff we engage Mr. M.P. Samy orally to which he agreed and M.P. Samy further showed 15 the i) S&P, ii) Boang (sic) 14A and explained to Abd. Wahab, and also about the non payment of the deposit RM32,000.00 which I explained to Abd. Wahab its being aghent (sic) commission and that all the BPP I will pay to the Plaintiff to which the Plaintiff said: "saya semua serah kepada Sithra dan setuju apa-apa puan Sithra buat. Janji saya 20 dapat wang baki.". The Plaintiff then signed al (sic) the documents in the presence of M.P. Samy and in my presence. Ple refer to pages 9-24 ID-D2. Yes. This is Plaintiff's signature and this was attested by Mr. M.P. Samy's. Please also refer to p.25 - ID-D2: Yes this Plaintiff's sign (sic) and p. 26 attested by Mr. M.P. Samy.” 25 DW3 identified the Plaintiff’s signature which was attested by DW 4. [17.6] Fourthly, there is documentary evidence in the form of the letter of authorisation dated 18/5/2007, exh.D25 wherein the Plaintiff 30 authorised DW4 to release RM168,000.00 directly to DW3 which fact was unchallenged. [17.7] Fifthly, DW3 was cross-examined regarding which version was correct: DW2 stated that she received RM32,000.00 before signing the 35 16 2nd S&P which she gave to the Plaintiff or DW3’s version that DW1 5 (agent) received RM32,000.00 as deposit. DW3 replied (CCB Vol.1 pp.200-201) - The RM32,000.00 initially taken by Mr. Moghan. Then later, when the balance purchase price has been release to me we have a meeting, this incident was taken place on 21st of May 10 2007. So, Mr MP Samy informed the Plaintiff the RM32,000.00 is not paid because it is agent's fees. Then, I told En. Wahab the Plaintiff that this payment I can pay to you later. If you need the money urgently, we can make the payment because you have to pay RM80,000.00 to Lachimi 15 for the termination of the agreement so the Plaintiff was complaining the money was not sufficient how can I pay Lachimi on that point of time. So what I told him we collect the balance purchase price, that will be release to us. Later the deposit sum RM32,000.00 I will pay it to you. This is what 20 I said but I never got it in my hand.” [17.8] We find DW3’s aforesaid evidence was further strengthened by her evidence under re-examination (CCB Vol.1 p.228) - “Mr MP Samy explained the content of the S&P, the 14A, the form and 25 whatever document have been executed and then he said I leave everything saya serah kepada Sithra setuju dapat wang baki. This is what he said and that is where from there then I did all the necessary transaction.” 30 [17.9] DW3’s aforesaid evidence as to what transpired at the office of DW4 corroborated DW4’s testimony in chief (Q&A 15 CCB Vol.1 p.245). Under cross-examination by the Plaintiff’s counsel regarding the deposit of RM32,000.00, DW4 answered - Dalam bilik kamu apakah terjadi? 35 17 Pn. Sithra telah beritahu kepada Plaintif bahawa mereka lantik 5 Peguam M.P. Samy secara lisan dan Plaintif setuju. Setelah itu saya: telah terangkan tentang Perjanjian, B.14A dan tentang tiada bayaran deposit RM32,000, Pn. Sithra kata Pembeli telah bayar kepada ejen Sithra (Mohan) dan En. Mohan setelah tolak komisyen telah bayar bakinya kepada Pn. Sithra dan Pn. Sithra berurusan 10 dengan Plaintif - masa ini Plaintif telah bersetuju dengan Sithra. Kemudian Plaintif telah menandatangani Perjanjian jual-beli, P/A, dan instrument Pindahmilik dalam kehadiran saya dan Pn. Sithra.” DW4 had identified the Plaintiff’s signature and his own signature on the 2nd S&P and the Plaintiff’s signature in Form 14A which was 15 witnessed by him. C. The 2nd Defendant is lying [18] The learned trial Judge made a finding that there was no proof of payment of RM168,000.00 or RM163,900.00 (after deduction of 20 RM4,100.00: 2nd Defendant’s fees) to the Plaintiff or DW3 and that the 2nd Defendant was lying. On a perusal of the evidence as to how the purchase price of RM200,000.00 was received and disbursed we find the learned trial Judge has erred when he failed to look at the relevant documentary evidence. 25 [18.1] To reiterate, RM32,000.00 was the agent fee paid directly to DW1 by the 1st Defendant. The balance fee of RM168,000.00 was paid by the 1st Defendant’s solicitor, Messrs Nurliny, Pannir Mannar & Co. vide MBB cheque no.414293 for the said sum (ROA Vol. 3 (iv) p. 943) under cover 30 letter dated 24/5/2007 addressed to the 2nd Defendant (exh.P10 CCB Vol.2 p.11). The receipt of payment of the said RM168,000.00 is evident from the official receipt dated 24/5/2007 from the 2nd Defendant’s firm, 18 Messrs M.P. Samy & Co. to Messrs Nurliny, Pannir Mannar & Co. 5 (exh.D36A CCB Vol.2 p.83). [18.2] The balance payable was RM163,900.00 which was arrived at after the 2nd Defendant deducted his fees of RM4,100.00. The breakdown for the said amount of deduction is found at exh.26A, a letter 10 dated 28/5/2007, CCB Vol.2 p.12 read together with exh.36B and exh.36D CCB Vol.2 pp.84-85. [18.3] The said sum of RM163,900.00 was then paid by the 2nd Defendant to Messrs Sithra & Partners vide CIMB cheque no.718913 15
preamble
pursuant to a letter dated 18/5/2007 from the Plaintiff to the 2nd Defendant titled “Surat Kebenaran Untuk Pembayaran” (exh.D25, CCB Vol.2 p.74). Vide exh.D25, the 2nd Defendant was authorised by the Plaintiff to issue payment of RM168,000.00 directly to DW3 based on a Power of Attorney dated 9/4/2007 between the Plaintiff and DW3 20 (exh.D23 AR Vol.3 (iv) p.934). The learned trial Judge failed to consider exh.D23 which was signed before one Suliana binti Abdul Samat, an advocate and solicitor and which was duly registered in KL High Court registration no.15543/07. Exh.D23 was not objected nor challenged by the Plaintiff’s counsel. 25 [18.4] The evidence showed that the 2nd Defendant in examination in chief (Q&A 19 of Witness Statement of DW4) confirmed that DW3 collected the CIMB cheque no.718913 from him. DW3 acknowledged receipt of the CIMB cheque no.718913 under cover letter, exh.26A and 30 the voucher from the 2nd Defendant’s firm dated 28/5/2007(exh.D26B, CCB Vol.2 p.75). This piece of evidence was not challenged by the Plaintiff. 19 5 [18.5] The evidence of DW4 is corroborated by DW3 who in examination in chief stated that she attended the office of Messrs M.P. Samy & Co. on 28/5/2007 and signed the Client’s Account voucher dated 28/5/2007 and took the CIMB cheque no.718913 for the total sum of RM163,900.00 after deductions which documents were not objected 10 to and accordingly marked as exhibits hereinbefore referred. [19] The learned trial Judge stated, amongst others, “SD was never appointed by the Plaintiff.” (para 33 GJ). With respect we disagreed as we find the learned trial Judge failed to consider the following evidence. 15 In this regard we refer to DW3’s testimony in examination in chief that on 21/5/2007 she and the Plaintiff were at DW4’s office and she told Plaintiff orally that we engage DW4 to which the Plaintiff agreed. In cross-examination, DW3’s evidence that it was the Plaintiff who appointed and she informed Plaintiff to appoint DW4 remained 20 unshaken. The issue of DW4’s appointment as solicitor by the Plaintiff in respect of the 2nd S&P was corroborated by the evidence from DW4 who remained steadfast in cross-examination. This can be seen from CCB Vol.1 pp.258-260 at Q&A(s) 18, 21 culminating in the following answers: 25 “30. I put it to you Mr. Samy that Haji Wahab the Plaintiff did not come to you office to sign anything at all? I don’t agree. He did came to my office as stated at the relevant papers of transfer.
section
31. So, are you saying to this court Shitra asked him to come to 30 your office and he appointed you orally in the Sales and Purchase property? Yes.”. (Emphasis added) 20 5 E. 2nd Defendant cannot explain what is the amount that he paid to the Plaintiff [20] At para 36 of his GJ the learned trial Judge, amongst others, stated - “On [3/1/2018] this court asked the counsel for SD to explain how much SD 10 paid the Plaintiff [and] he gave different amounts but the amounts do not tally to RM200,000.00 … or RM168,000.00. [T]he notes of evidence on 3 January 2018 showed that SD’s counsel said the total payment after periodical/staggered payments to Plaintiff from SD is only RM41,000.00.” 15 [20.1] We reiterate our position there are no such notes of evidence and therefore the learned trial Judge’s statement is with respect unsubstantiated. [21] The learned trial Judge further stated that - 20 “The bottom line is [SD] failed to show how the alleged periodical/staggered payments tally to these two amounts of RM200,000.00 or RM168,000.00. In any event, normally a lawyer acting for a vendor makes one payment only or the most two to the vendor and not periodical/staggered payments. SD cannot show a cheque from him to Plaintiff amounting to RM200,000.00 or 25 RM168,000.00. All these add to the probability that this Property transaction is nothing more than a fraud.” [21.1] With respect we had to disagree with the findings of the learned trial Judge. As alluded in para 18.3 above, the 2nd Defendant was 30 dealing with DW3 pursuant to a letter of authorisation dated 18/5/2007 (exh.D25) issued by the Plaintiff which was not denied by the Plaintiff and the 2nd Defendant did not release any money to the Plaintiff directly. The balance purchase price was disbursed to the Plaintiff through DW3 21 and the payments were made either directly to the Plaintiff or to his 5 lawyers Messrs Moghan & Co. or Messrs Abd. Latiff Ahmad & Co. In fact the 2nd Defendant pleaded the sequence of the payments by DW3 as particularised below which we find is in accord with the details of the disbursement of the purchase price as per Q&A 25 of DW3’s Witness Statement. The Plaintiff received in total RM334,400.00. Particulars of 10 these payments are as follows: “Tarikh Amount Penerima Cek/Voucher Sebagai bayaran 25/5/07 RM24,000/- Plaintif Bank Islam, Bk. Bayaran untuk harga Inslip (Ek.D27A) belian 6/6/2007 RM6,400/- Plaintif Citibank Cek-sama- 15 (Ek.D27B) 29/6/2007 RM1,000/- Plaintif Citibank Cek-sama- (Ek.D27C) 9/4/2008 RM7,000/- Plaintif Vocer bayaran-sama-tunai (Ek.D27D) 20 5/6/2008 RM30,000/- M/s.Moghan AmBank Cek refund by DW3 to (Ek.D27E) M/s. Moghan & Co for Lachimi for termination of P1 3/7/2008 RM50,000/- M/s.Moghan Alliance Bankers-sama- 25 & Co. Cek (Ek.D27F) 14/7/2008 RM30,000/- M/s. Abd. Citibank Cek Bayaran untuk Latiff (Ek.D27G) Harga Belian 7/8/2008 RM20,000/- -sama-Ambank Cek-sama- 30 (Ek.D27H) 8/8/2008 RM3,000/- Plaintif wang tunai-sama- (voucher) (Ek.D27I) 16/10/2008 RM83,000/- M/s. Abdul HSBC Bankers-sama- 35 Latif & Co. Cek 22 (Ek.D27J) 5 17/10/2008 RM65,800/- M/s. Abd. PB Bhd Bankers-sama-Latif & Co. Cek (Ek.D27K) 17/10/2008 RM14,200/- M/s. Abd. HLB Bhd Bankers-sama-Latif & Co. Cek 10 (Ek.27DK).” [21.2] We are inclined to agree with learned counsel for the 1st Defendant that the learned trial Judge erred in focusing on what was the amount paid by the 2nd Defendant to the Plaintiff directly rather than 15 directing his mind to the question of whether the Plaintiff had received the monies from DW3. It is not disputed that the 2nd S&P was signed on 21/5/2007. It is significant to note that the 1st payment on 25/5/2007 into the Plaintiff’s Bank Islam account no.0504902003204-4 (exh.D27A) in the sum of RM24,000.00 which DW3 confirmed vide letter dated 20 6/6/2007 (exh.D28, AR Vol.3 (iv) p.1053) at para 1 reads - “We write to confirm that you have received a sum of RM24,000/- as first payment received from us being part of the payment received from your solicitor M.P. Samy & Co pursuant to the Sale and Purchase Agreement entered between you and Laser Equity Sdn Bhd which has been banked 25 into your Bank Islam Account No.05-049-02-003204-4 on 25/5/2007.” (Emphasis added) [21.3] In the same letter dated 6/6/2007 (exh.D28) from DW3 paras 2 and 3 read - 30 “… [W]e forward to you the second payment of RM6,400.00 via Citibank Cheque No.2969 dated 6/6/2007 as part payment received from the payment mentioned above. 23 … [K]indly acknowledge receipt of the said payments on the copy of the 5 aforesaid cheque No.296987 for our safe keeping.” It can be seen that the Plaintiff acknowledged receipt by signing on the said cheque for a sum of RM6,400.00 (exh.D27 B) on 6/6/2007 at DW3’s office and this unequivocal evidence was unchallenged. The 10 unrebutted evidence before us is that based on exh.28, the Plaintiff was aware and had knowledge that the payments were made in respects of the 2nd S&P. [21.4] Further we find pertaining to the sequence of payments in para 15 21.1 above, learned counsel for the Plaintiff during re-examination did not refer exh.27A-K to the Plaintiff and questioned him whether he accepted or denied the payments as the burden of proof is borne by the Plaintiff. Hence all the payments made by DW3 were not rebutted by the Plaintiff. 20 [22] We find that “periodical/staggered payments to Plaintiff” came about due to the failure of the learned trial Judge to appreciate that it was due to DW3’s failure in not releasing the balance purchase price promptly and issuing cheques that bounced (which is addressed in para 25 24 below) which led her to disburse the purchase price in instalments as mentioned in para 21.1 above. [23] The Plaintiff testified that he asked DW3 for the return of his title. However when cross-examined by the 2nd Defendant counsel, the 30 Plaintiff said that he did not write any letter seeking a return of the title and even after engaging another lawyer in July 2008, he did not do. Further, neither did he ask Lachimi to vacate the Property although the 24 1st S&P expired and he collected rental from DW3 for the Property and 5 the Plaintiff acknowledged receipt of payment of the rental (RM31,400.00 for period 1/1/2006 to 31/12/2008 and cash payment of RM13,000.00, part payment of rental for the same period as per exh.D33A) (CCB Vol.2 p.88). 10 F. 2nd Defendant is again untruthful [24] The learned trial Judge stated “Since SD is the solicitors for the Plaintiff, why did the SD say Messrs Abdul Latiff & Co is the Plaintiff’s solicitors” and “SD is not telling the truth” (para 37 GJ). With respect we disagreed with the trial Judge’s statement as it is against the weight of 15 the evidence. DW3 testified in re-examination that somewhere in July 2008, Messrs Abdul Latiff & Co. wrote to him stating that he was appointed by the Plaintiff to act for him and thereafter DW3 disbursed the sum of RM30,000.00 (exh.27G) and RM20,000.00 (exh.27H) alluded in para 21.1 above and the payment thereof was accepted by the 20 Plaintiff. [24.1] The fact of the appointment of Messrs Abdul Latiff & Co. was mentioned by the Plaintiff himself in the Seremban Police Report (exh.P5, CCB Vol.2 p.9) which he lodged stating the appointment came 25 about when the Citibank cheque No.338556 for RM100,000.00 dated 12/7/2007 issued by DW3 to him bounced. To back track the Plaintiff from 25/5/2007 (the 2nd S&P was signed on 21/5/2007) to 29/6/2007 collected RM31,400.00 from DW3 as the balance purchase price (exh.27A-C). Upon the Plaintiff’s failure to make further payment, the 30 Plaintiff lodged the Seremban Police Report (exh.P5) wherein he reported he did an official search on the Property on 3/9/2007 and 25 found a caveat vide Presentation no.3964/2007 registered on 23/5/2007, 5 entered against the Property by the 1st Defendant and the Property was transferred to the 1st Defendant (exh.D16, CCB Vol.2 p.37). [24.2] The evidence showed the Plaintiff and Messrs Abdul Latiff & Co. from 7/11/2007 continued dealing with DW3 taking 2 more cheques 10 dated 12/7/2007 (RM100,000.00) and 10/8/2007 (Citibank cheque no. 338567 for RM200,000.00) which were bounced. Based on the sequence of payments alluded in para 21.1 above, it is clear that the Plaintiff and his lawyer wanted the balance purchase price from DW3 and having received all the monies on 17/8/2008, they remained silent 15 and it was only on 19/11/2015 (7 years later), the Plaintiff instituted this Suit against the 1st and 2nd Defendants which impinged on the question of unjust enrichment and estoppel which shall be discussed later. [24.3] There are other evidence which we found the learned trial Judge 20 did not consider. The evidence are -
a
(a) DW3’s letter dated 16/11/2007 (exh.D31, CCB Vol.2 p.86) to Messrs Abdul Latiff & Co. duly acknowledged by the latter stating - “[W]e are willing to forward to you the Original Issue Document of Title for the above property subject to your client to refund to us the sum of RM31,400.00 25 received by your client for the above property and also to refund the payment made by us for cukai tanah and cukai pintu amounting to RM1783.64 for the above property.”
b
(b) DW3’s letter dated 20/11/2007 (exh.D32, CCB Vol.2 p.87) to 30 Messrs Abdul Latiff & Co. duly acknowledged by the latter reiterating the 26 same content as DW3’s letter, exh.D31 since the Plaintiff did not accept 5 DW3’s proposal of payment.
c
(c) Plaintiff’s letter dated 21/1/2009 wherein he sold back his property again to DW3 (the Property in issue) (exh.D30, CCB Vol.2 p.76) for RM300,000.00 and acknowledging receiving RM220,000.00 which was 10 not challenged by the Plaintiff.
d
(d) DW3’s letter dated 27/10/2009 to Messrs Abdul Latiff & Co (exh.D33C, CCB Vol.2 p.90), amongst others, stating that “… oleh itu kesemua bayaran telah saya langsaikan untuk pembelian hartanah 15 tersebut (the Property in issue)”; and letter dated the same to Messrs Abdul Latiff & Co (exh.D33D, CCB Vol.2 p.91) demanding for the return of the keys to the Property despite the Plaintiff having received RM31,400.00 as rental. 20 [24.4] There was no response from the Plaintiff or his solicitor to all the relevant correspondences above because as DW3 stated in re-examination (Q&A 56 CCB Vol.1 p.240), “A: The Plaintiff has received the money so I don’t see how he could say that I am the architect of all these whole thing. He has received the money.” 25 G. The Transfer Form H. Purported Presence of Plaintiff in 2nd Defendant’s Office [25] Under this heading, basically the learned trial Judge stated that the “purported transfer form [p]rove fraud and forgery” as - 30
a
(a) the Plaintiff did not sign the “purported transfer form”; 27 5
b
(b) the 2nd Defendant pleaded that the Plaintiff signed the “purported transfer form” on 21/5/2007 when the Plaintiff went to the 2nd Defendant’s office and witnessed by DW3 and the 2nd Defendant but the transfer form itself is dated 18/7/2007 and not 21/5/2007 and in the transfer form, the 2nd Defendant said he witnessed the Plaintiff signing 10 the transfer form on 18/7/2007; and
c
(c) therefore it could not be true that the Plaintiff signed the “purported transfer form” on 21/5/2007 and that the Plaintiff went to the 2nd Defendant’s office on 21/5/2007. 15 [26] With respect we disagreed with the finding of the learned trial Judge regarding the Transfer Form, Form 14A (exh.D34, CCB Vol.2 p.70) in para 25 above. There are 2 main points here: (i) the so called discrepancy between the 2 dates of 21/5/2007 and 18/7/2007; and (ii) 20 whether the Plaintiff went to the 2nd Defendant’s office on 21/5/2007. [26.1] Dealing with the 2nd point first, we find there is unwavering evidence from DW3 during cross-examination that the Plaintiff only went once to the 2nd Defendant’s office on 21/5/2007 (CCB Vol.1 p.203). This 25 is supported by the steadfast evidence of the 2nd Defendant at para 19 above that the Plaintiff came to the 2nd Defendant’s office on 21/5/2007 to sign the relevant papers for transfer. [26.2] Having established that the Plaintiff and DW3 were at the office of 30 the 2nd Defendant on 21/5/2007, we now turn to the 1st point. We find the learned trial Judge erred in not considering DW3’s evidence in cross-examination when she was attempting to proffer an explanation as to 28 why the Transfer Form was dated 18/7/2007 and not 21/5/2007 as 5 follows (CCB Vol.1 pp.203-204): I am asking you is that correct? He signed on the 21/5. He signed Borang 14A in … undated. Borang 14A. Can I elibrate (sic) on that? … 10 I am asking you, do you want to deny that? He signed on he (sic) 21/5 so I am denying this. He sign on 21/5 the S&P with Laser Equity and the Borang 14A. That is the convencing (sic) practice to do that. You don’t date Borang 14A.” DW3 amplified in re-examination (CCB Vol.1 p.237): 15 Remember earlier you were telling you, Plaintiff went to Mr MP Samy office, and that was on the 21/5. Was this transfer dated 18/7/2007 why? YA it is a convencing (sic) practice. When a sale and purchase transaction it won’t date the Borang transfer at the beginning stage 20 because once the time has laps (sic) and then when you present for presentation for the registration of transfer form. They will be a panel team (sic - penalty), they impose if there be any delay. That is why the Borang 14A were dated until at the latest stage when the whole process take place.” 25 [26.3] On Form 14A, DW4 in cross-examination confirmed (CCB Vol.1 p.266): This 14A prepared by me. First half of the 14A prepared by me before 21st and was signed in my office on 21st May in the present (sic) of the 30 Plaintiff and Shitra witness. 29 I plead you Mr. Palanisamy. This document was signed on the 18th of July 5
section
2007. Will you agree with me? It was unlated (sic) taken signature in … Where is it written in … It is a normal conveying (sic) practice. 10 But I put it to you that it was sign on 18th of July 2007. Do you agree? It was later dated by Nurliny Pannir Mannar solicitor … Would you agree with me? 15 I don’t agree with you, he was present in my office. It is conveying (sic) practice to obtain signature in F14A in escroe (sic).” [26.4] Plaintiff’s Counsel submitted that oral evidence cannot be accepted to vary the written date citing Tindok Besar Estate Sdn. Bhd. 20 v. Tinjar Co. [1979] 2 MLJ 229 at pp.232-233. In our opinion, the principle in Tindok Besar does not apply because the evidence before the Court is (i) the Plaintiff had signed Form 14A in DW4’s office on 21/5/2007 which was undated and later dated 18/7/2007 by Messrs Nurliny Pannir Mannar; and (ii) this is consistent with conveyancing 25 practice where the memorandum of transfer will not be dated on the same day as the sale and purchase agreement; it will be dated on the day when the memorandum of transfer is ready for adjudication for determination of the stamp duty payable on the transfer of property as once the memorandum of transfer has been dated, it has to be 30 presented at the Land Office for registration and transfer within 3 months of the date of memorandum of transfer, failing which a penalty will be levied by the Land Office for late registration. 35 30 5 [26.5] We are of the view the learned trial Judge fell into error when he failed to consider the explanations of DW3 and DW4 and state whether he is accepting the explanation or not and if he did not accept, the reason for his refusal. 10 I. The PA and the S&P (2nd S&P) [27] In our judgment the learned trial Judge’s finding that the Plaintiff could not have signed the PA dated 21/5/2007 and the 2nd S&P is flawed because that finding is predicated on the ground that Form 14A could not have been signed on 21/5/2007. We have found the latter finding 15 erroneous for the reasons adumbrated in paras 25 and 26 and the subparagraphs thereunder. It follows that any finding based what is erroneous will likewise be flawed. [28] Further the PA dated 21/5/2007 and the 2nd S&P were never sent 20 to a handwriting expert to confirm that the signatures found therein are not that of the Plaintiff. Therefore the inference drawn by the learned trial Judge that the Plaintiff “cannot be signing” the PA dated 21/5/2007 and the 2nd S&P is again flawed. 25 K. FD [First Defendant]’s evidence [29] The learned trial Judge relied on the 1st Defendant’s evidence through DW2 that “the company is dormant, meaning the FD is not in business. Since it was not in business, it is more likely FD has no money to buy the Property” and “there was no company’s resolution to buy the 30 Property.” (p.32 GJ). As these issues were not pleaded and not issues to 31 be tried, it is incumbent on the learned trial Judge to reject these 5 unpleaded issues as it is trite that a trial should be confined to the pleadings (see Yew Wan Leong v. Lai Kok Chye [1990] 2 MLJ 152 (SC) at p.155 D-E). In our view the learned trial Judge’s statement “FD’s evidence in court will also show the probability of fraud” rings hollow in the absence of any evidence. 10 [29.1] In this regard we find the learned trial Judge had failed to appreciate the fact that the 1st Defendant’s solicitor had forwarded the balance purchase price of RM168,000.00 on its behalf to the 2nd Defendant as alluded in para 18 and the subparagraphs thereunder and 15 para 19 above. L. Sithra’s evidence [30] The learned trial Judge commented that Sithra’s evidence is highly suspect as she is “supposed to be a lawyer purportedly acting for the 20 Plaintiff” but “she cannot show her practising certificate” and she “cannot show the cheque or banking documents on the balance purchase price of the Property that was purportedly given by the SD to her.” [31] With respect we find that the learned trial Judge’s findings were 25 erroneous as His Lordship failed to analyse and appreciate the following evidence which showed to the contrary. [31.1] Sithra’s (DW3) practising certificate is not an issue at the trial and this material fact was not pleaded by the Plaintiff. Be that as it may, 30 when cross-examined, DW3 said she was a solicitor with a practising certificate in 2007; she was not acting in conflict of interest because the 32 1st S&P had expired and the Plaintiff came to see her and asked her to 5 arrange as he needed money urgently and had been waiting for 1 year. [31.2] DW3 at the material time was not acting for the Plaintiff in the 2nd S&P but equipped with the PA dated 9/4/2007, she was empowered to sell the Property without the presence of the Plaintiff (Vendor). 10 [31.3] Documentary evidence was led which proved that the Plaintiff and his lawyers had received RM334.000.00 as alluded in paras 21.1 through 21.4 above. 15 M. Handwriting Expert [32] We find the learned trial Judge was correct in not taking into consideration the handwriting report when His Lordship stated he “totally ignored” the handwriting report to prove fraud and forgery. Notwithstanding the same we felt compelled to state that His Lordship 20 erred when he concluded “the report is favourable to the Plaintiff”. [32.1] In this regard we agreed with the submission of the learned counsel for the 1st Defendant that the handwriting report has no evidential value because - 25
i
(i) only Form 14A (exh.34) was sent to the expert, PW2 for analysis, however the 2nd S&P was not. In the circumstance the Plaintiff’s signature in the 2nd S&P is not challenged and must be his; 30
subparagraph
(ii) PW2 failed to state the methodology that was used to verify the signature; 33
subparagraph
(iii) PW2 was of the opinion that the impugned signature in D34 was 5 “probably not written by the writer of the specimens” (Plaintiff) and this is the lower end of the scale;
subparagraph
(iv) there is insufficient contemporaneous documents given to PW2 to confirm the signature in D34 is not his. To be a contemporaneous 10 document it should be existing, occurring or originating at the same time or in the same period. In this appeal, if a window of 6 months is used to classify a document as contemporaneous, none of the 6 specimens will be contemporaneous; and if 1 year is used, only 1 specimen will be contemporaneous; and the minimum requirement seems to be 8-10 (see 15 handwriting report, D8 and Ch’ng Kheng Phong v. Chung Keng Huat & Ors. [2011] 8 MLJ 32 at 70[65]). Failure to consider the evidence of the Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s failure to discharge burden of proof 20 [33] The Plaintiff pleaded as a result of Lachimi failing to pay the balance purchase, RM30,000.00 and interest RM47,845.33, he terminated the 1st S&P vide letter dated 24/10/2008. However in his witness statement (Q&A15), the Plaintiff contradicted and said the 1st S&P was terminated by DW3 vide letter dated 18/5/2007. The letter of 25 24/10/2008 was not produced as exhibit and the Plaintiff’s Counsel did not re-examine on the contradiction. [34] In his witness statement (Q&A16) the Plaintiff said that he had only known that the Property was transferred to the 1st Defendant when 30 testifying at the Seremban Sessions Court Summons No.52-1752 -2008. The Plaintiff testified in the Sessions Court on 21/10/2010 and which continued on 26/3/2011 and 30/3/2011. However the Plaintiff in his 34 police report, Seremban Report No.018005/07 (exh.P5) made on 5 7/11/2007, said on 3/9/2007 he did a search at the Seremban Land Office and found the Property was transferred to the 1st Defendant’s name and the said police report was made with the assistance of Messrs Latiff & Co. Thus we find the Plaintiff was obviously not telling the truth when he said he knew of the said transfer of the Property in 10 2010 when the evidence clearly showed that he knew as early as 3/9/2007. This is yet another instance of the Plaintiff’s inconsistent and contradictory evidence. [35] We find further inconsistencies of the Plaintiff’s evidence at para 15 15.1 through para 15.4 on the amounts of monies he received. [36] Even after knowing that the Property was transferred to the 1st Defendant, the Plaintiff did not bother to lodge a caveat to protect his interest. The Plaintiff filed the present Suit on 19/11/2015 although he 20 knew on 3/9/2007 that the Property was transferred. The unexplained delay of 8 years in filing the Suit in our considered view is but an afterthought and is not consistent with the conduct of a person who has lost his property. 25 Unjust enrichment [37] We find there is much force in the submission of the 1st and 2nd Defendants that the Plaintiff cannot be allowed to reprobate and approbate. If the Plaintiff has terminated the 1st S&P then he cannot be receiving money from Lachimi. We find the evidence showed the 30 monies the Plaintiff received, other than the RM80,000.00, came from the Property pursuant to the 2nd S&P, i.e. the purchase price paid by the 35 1st Defendant (see paras 16, 17, 18, 19 above and the subparagraphs 5 thereunder). [37.1] In our view Lord Scrutton’s LJ’s description in Verschures Creameries Limited v. Hull and Netherlands Steamship Company, Ltd [1921] 2 KB 608 (p.612) quoted by Nantha Balan J in Cheong 10 Huey Charn v. Pang Mun Chung & Anor [2017] 6 MLRH 633 at 647[35] aptly applied. The passage reads - "A person cannot say at one time that a transaction is valid and thereby obtain some advantage, to which he could only be entitled on the footing that it is valid, and then turn round and say it is void for the purpose of securing some 15 other advantage. That is to approbate and reprobate the transaction." [38] Learned counsel for the 1st Defendant further submitted that the learned trial Judge erred in law and in fact when he failed to hold that the Plaintiff was unjustly enriched in that he has received RM334,400.00 20 (see paras 15.3, 15.5 and 21.1 above) and also claimed the Property. We find there is merit in this argument as the requirements of unjust enrichment has been succinctly propounded by Azahar Mohamed FCJ (delivering judgement of the Federal Court) in Dream Property Sdn Bhd v. Atlas Housing Sdn Bhd [2015 ] 2 MLJ 441 at 484 [117] as 25 follows: “(a) the plaintiff must have been enriched;
b
(b) the enrichment must be gained at the defendant's expense;
c
(c) that the retention of the benefit by the plaintiff was unjust; and
d
(d) there must be no defence available to extinguish or reduce the 30 plaintiff's liability to make restitution.” 36 5 Estoppel [39] Learned Counsel for the 1st and 2nd Defendants submitted that the learned Judge erred in law and in fact when he failed to hold that the Plaintiff by accepting RM334,400.00 which included the purchase price for the 2nd S&P is thereby estopped from disputing that he sold the 10 Property to the 1st Defendant. [40] We find there is no reason to disagree with the aforesaid submission of the 1st and 2nd Defendants because as a matter of evidence we find the Plaintiff received RM334,400.00 and this included 15 the purchase price for the 2nd S&P. It is unconscionable for the Plaintiff to now dispute otherwise and he is estopped as opined by Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was) (delivering the judgment of the Federal Court) in the case of Boustead Trading (1985) Sdn. Bhd. v. Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Berhad [1995] 4 CLJ 283 at p.296 - 20 “The estoppel here relied upon is known as an equitable estoppel, or estoppel in pais. The law upon the subject is well settled. The vital principle is, that he who, by his language or conduct, leads another to do what he would not otherwise have done, shall not subject such person to loss or injury by 25 disappointing the expectations upon which he acted. Such a change of position is sternly forbidden. It involves fraud and falsehood, and the law abhors both. This remedy is always so applied as to promote the ends of justice.” 30 Admission of Plaintiff of receipt of monies [41] Learned Counsel for the 1st and 2nd Defendants submitted that the learned trial Judge erred in law and in fact when he failed to hold that the 37 Plaintiff admitted receiving the monies even after the Property was 5 transferred to the 1st Defendant. [42] We find there is merit in the aforesaid submission. Having perused the evidence we find the payment of the purchase price made by the 1st Defendant and received by the Plaintiff was done after the Plaintiff knew 10 that the Property had been transferred into the 1st Defendant’s name. Overall the Plaintiff received RM340,400.00 as shown at para 21.1 above. Whether special and general damages should be allowed 15 [43] Learned Counsel for the 1st Defendant submitted the learned Judge erred in law and in fact when he allowed the Plaintiff’s claim for special and general damages when the Plaintiff failed to lead evidence and prove the same during trial. 20 [44] We agreed with the submission of the 1st Defendant that the learned trial Judge erred because -
a
(a) there was no agreement between the parties that the trial would be bifurcated in that liability would be decided by the trial judge and for 25 damages to be assessed by the Registrar if liability was established; and
b
(b) the Plaintiff did not adduce evidence on both special and general damages. 30 Conclusion [45] For all the reasons discussed above, we are of the view that the learned trial Judge had failed to evaluate the evidence adduced in its 38 entirety: (i) erred in failing to critically analyse the evidence adduced by 5 the Plaintiff and the 1st and 2nd Defendants and then decide which version is inherently probable or improbable; (ii) failed to consider the observations and comments made by the 1st Judge on the demeanour of the Plaintiff; (iii) his findings were against the weight of the evidence as he had failed to give sufficient judicial appreciation of all the evidence 10 and had omitted to consider and/or evaluate or give sufficient weight to the evidence. [46] Under such circumstances we find there are merits in the appeal which compelled us to exercise our appellate intervention. Accordingly 15 we unanimously allowed both appeals in Appeal 477 and Appeal 478 with costs of RM30,000.00 for each Appellant (1st and 2nd Defendants) here and below subject to allocatur. The High Court Order dated 27/2/2018 is set aside. 20 Dated: 6 November 2019 Sgd. 25 LAU BEE LAN Judge Court of Appeal Malaysia Putrajaya 30 35 39 5 COUNSEL: 10 N-02(NCVC)(W)-478-03/2018 S. Ravichandran for the Appellant [Messrs Seah Balan Ravi & Co.] 15 Ramasamy for the Respondent [Messrs Lim Ram & Associates] 20 N-02(NCVC)(W)-477-03/2018 Zamani bin Dolmat for the Appellant [Messrs Yaacob Mentol, Zamani & Associates] 25 Ramasamy for the Respondent [Messrs Lim Ram & Associates]
Wrong text, a broken link, out-of-date content, or a removal request — tell us and we'll check it against the official source.