(h), (i), (j), (k), (n) and (o), 11.2, 11.3, 11.4, 11.5 and 11.6, 14, 15.2, 16.1, 2 16.2, and 16.3 (hereinafter referred to collectively as the impugned 3 paragraphs) in the Defendant’s AIR dated 3.7.2023 (Encl 4). 4 5 The Contentions of the Parties 6 [13] It was submitted on behalf of the Plaintiff that the facts and 7 statements deposed by the Defendant in the Defendant’s AIR dated 8 3.7.2023 and in particular the impugned paragraphs are relevant to the 9 maintenance application and are seriously disputed mainly on the ground 10 that there are no contemporaneous corroborative documents provided by 11 the Defendant to support those averments. On account of that the Plaintiff 12 has contended that only through cross-examination can the Court 13 ascertain whether any relevant facts had been suppressed by the 14 Defendant and what those facts are. 15 16 [14] The Plaintiff has denied all the averments made by the Defendant 17 in the impugned paragraphs, arguing that the statements made are either 18 bald statements devoid of any documentary evidence to support them or 19 outright untruths. The Plaintiff has contended that the issues of the living 20 expenses and maintenance of the children, the matrimonial home and the 21 other properties are pertinent to the current maintenance claim by the 22 Plaintiff. Furthermore, the earning capacity and actual income of the 23 Defendant are relevant and pertinent to the issues to be decided in the 24 maintenance proceedings against the Defendant. 25 26 [15] It was further pointed out that the Plaintiff had raised several serious 27 issues regarding the income of the Defendant and its sources and the 28 Plaintiff had gone so far as to lodge complaints to the Suruhanjaya 29 Syarikat Malaysia (SSM) and LHDN yet the Defendant had in his AIR 30 merely brushed aside these averments and responded instead with bare 1 denials. Therefore, the learned counsel for the Plaintiff forcefully asserted 2 the Defendant must be made to explain orally through cross-examination 3 to resolve the outstanding issues. 4 5 [16] The Plaintiff argued that the application was made in good faith with 6 no intention whatsoever to delay the proceedings or intimidate the 7 Defendant contending that the Plaintiff’s burden of proof would be 8 severely prejudiced if not allowed to cross-examine the Defendant. 9 10 [17] The Defendant strongly opposed the application on the ground that 11 the Plaintiff had failed to meet the necessary threshold for the granting of 12 leave. It was submitted that the Plaintiff’s reasons to support the 13 Application were based merely on suspicions and conjecture and the 14 statements deposed to by the Plaintiff in her affidavits were false and 15 fraudulently made. 16 17 [18] In addition to the above it was the contention of the Defendant that 18 the Plaintiff’s intention to cross-examine the Defendant on various issues 19 concerning a number of companies are not relevant or pertinent to the 20 present application for spousal and child maintenance. 21 22 [19] In further response to the Plaintiff’s submissions the Defendant has 23 contended that the Plaintiff is estopped by per rem judicatum as these 24 issues raised by the Plaintiff in the Affidavit in Support had been 25 determined in the Winding Up Proceedings and the Plaintiff did not file 26 any appeal against the said decision. 27 28 [20] In any event it was contended that the Plaintiff had more than 29 sufficient documents obtained through the previous proceedings filed 30 such as the Winding-Up Proceeding, the interim maintenance applications 1 in the Shah Alam Sessions Court and the KL High Court to conduct her 2 claim. 3 4 Findings of the Court 5 [21] The instant application is made pursuant to Order 38 rule 2(2) of the 6 ROC 2012 which states as follows : 7 8 “(2) In any cause or matter begun by originating summons and on any 9 application made by notice of application, evidence shall be given by 10 affidavit unless in the case of any such cause, matter or application any 11 provision of these Rules otherwise provides or the Court otherwise 12 directs, but the Court may, on the application of any party, order the 13 attendance for cross-examination of the person making any such 14 affidavit, and where, after such an order has been made, the person in 15 question does not attend, his affidavit shall not be used as evidence 16 without the leave of the Court.” 17 18 [22] The court is thus conferred an absolute discretion whether to allow 19 or refuse cross-examination of a deponent to an affidavit. That discretion 20 is to be exercised in accordance with well settled judicial principles. The 21 application must be made bona fide and the applicant bears the legal 22 burden to persuade the Court to exercise its discretion whether or not to 23 allow it. 24 25 [23] I accept the correctness of the 3 criterias for cross-examination as 26 set out well in a number of cases. See Tetuan Kumar Jaspal Quah & 27 Aishah v The Co-Operative Central Bank Ltd [2007] 4 CLJ 487, 28 Petrochemical Commercial Company International Ltd & Ors v 29 Nexus Management Group Sdn Bhd & Ors [2022] MLRHU 2240, Ng 30 Pik Lian v United Eastern Resources Sdn Bhd [2022 CLJU 388. 31 [24] From these cases, the applicable principles can be summarized as 1 follows : 2 3