Lee Kam Yoong v 1. ) Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia Berhad (BA-24NCvC-780-07/2021)

1.

KETUA PENGARAH INSOLVENSI BAGI HARTA LEE KAM YOONG (SI BANKRAP) …RESPONDEN-RESPONDEN GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Introduction [1] The Applicant, an undischarged bankrupt, is a co-owner of the Property, with his wife holding the other ½ part of the Property. They executed a charge over the Property in favour of the First Respondent’s bank. They defaulted on the charge. The First Respondent commenced foreclosure proceedings. The Respondent obtained an order for sale. The Property was about to be auctioned. The Applicant filed an Originating Summons to seek relief from the Court pertaining to the Property. The Applicant intends to sell the Property through a private treaty to obtain a higher purchase price to pay off his debt. Should the Order for Sale be set aside to allow for the private treaty? 3 | B A - 2 4 NCVC - 7 8 0 - 0 7 / 2 0 2 1 [2] I heard the application. Based on the cause papers and parties’ submissions, I dismissed the Applicant’s Amended Originating Summons dated 28.09.2021 with costs. Background Facts [3] Applicant Lee Kam Yoong and his wife, Liew Yoke Lin are the registered owners of a double-story semi-detached house held under Hakmilik PN 6531 Lot 506 Seksyen 5 Bandar Petaling Jaya (“Property”). Applicant and his wife hold 1/2 share of the Property respectively. [4] First Respondent Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia Berhad provided a loan facility to the Applicant for an amount of RM 960,000.00 which has been charged to the First Respondent vide Gadaian Perserahan No: 20579/1996 dated 8.05.1996. [5] The Applicant and his wife defaulted on the charge when failed to make repayment under the loan facility. The First Respondent has issued a Notice in Form 16D to the Applicant and his wife with regard to the breach of the charge. [6] Subsequently, First Respondent obtained an Order for Sale at the Shah Alam High Court vide Originating Summons No: BA-24MFC-210- 4 | B A - 2 4 NCVC - 7 8 0 - 0 7 / 2 0 2 1 04/2019 to auction off the Property to which the Order for Sale has been granted by the Shah Alam High Court on 9.12.2019. [7] The Applicant then filed an Amended Originating Summons (OS) dated 28.09.2021 to seek the following reliefs:- i) Pemohon diberi keizinan dan kebenaran untuk menjual ½ bahagian hartanah tersebut kepada pihak ketiga dengan harga sebanyak RM 750,000.00; ii) Kesemua daripada hasil jualan ½ bahagian tersebut dibayar kepada Responden Pertama untuk memenuhi liabiliti Pemohon kepada Responden Pertama; iii) Timbalan Pendaftar/Penolong Kanan Pendaftar diberikan keizinan dan kebebasan untuk menandatangani semua dokumen-dokumen dan instrumen yang perlu bagi penyempurnan penjualan tersebut; dan iv) Apa-apa relif tambahan dan/atau lanjut sebagaimana ia adalah difikir wajar dan suaimunafaat oleh Mahkamah yang mulia ini. [8] The Applicant filed Amended OS before this High Court on the basis that High Court has discretionary powers to sanction and review, including the power to allow the envisaged sale by the Applicant. The provisions of 5 | B A - 2 4 NCVC - 7 8 0 - 0 7 / 2 0 2 1 the Insolvency Act relied upon by the Applicant are subsections 38(1)(a), 38(1)(ba), sections 41,51, 52, 53B, 53C, 54 and 91. The Applicant reckons that he is incompetent to maintain any action without previous sanction of the Director of Insolvency (DGI) and any financial dealing has to be approved by the DGI. Preliminary objections [9] First Respondent raised the following preliminary objections against the Amended Originating Summons filed by the Applicant:- i) Parties to the Application Parties to this Application should be both the Applicant and his wife as they are co-owners and the charge is over the whole Property. It is not possible just to apply half of the Property for sale. The application should be made by both owners. Further, no evidence to support that a 3rd party agrees to purchase the Property. Therefore, it is a bare assertion by Applicant to delay the auction. As the whole Property has been charged to the First Respondent, First Respondent has rights over the Property that exceeds the rights of the owners. As a registered chargor, the First Respondent has a right to sell the whole Property. 6 | B A - 2 4 NCVC - 7 8 0 - 0 7 / 2 0 2 1 ii) Order for Sale and Public Auction An Order for Sale has been granted on 9.12.2019 by the Shah Alam High Court in respect of the Property which provides leave for the First Respondent to sell the charged Property by public auction. The said Order has never been appealed against or set aside. Therefore, Applicant’s action in filing this OS is void as all the disputes arising in respect of the charged Property should have been raised at the Shah Alam High Court under the Originating Summons No. BA -24MFC-210- 04/2019 (Case 201). In the case of Badiuddin Mohd Mahidin & Anor v Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd [1998] 2 CLJ 75, the Federal Court held – “It is also long established that one can apply to set aside an order of a superior court only in direct proceedings filed for the very purpose of having it set aside on valid grounds, but without doing so, one cannot attack its invalidity laterally by raising an objection to its invalidity in any other proceedings, without filing proceedings for applying to have it set aside first. When one wishes to file such proceedings to set it aside, one must do so within the same proceedings or action in which the same order was obtained and not in a separate fresh proceeding or new action on any ground 7 | B A - 2 4 NCVC - 7 8 0 - 0 7 / 2 0 2 1 other than those mentioned in Hock Hua Bank v. Sahari Murid [1980] 1 LNS 92”. iii) Res Judicata First Respondent also raised the issue of res judicata whereby this OS was filed on a similar basis to the Applicant’s wife Affidavit in Reply filed to oppose the application for an order for sale filed against the Applicant and her in Case 201. First Respondent has referred to the case of Perwira Affin Bank Bhd v Tan h Tong [2003] 2 CLJ 320 where the Court held – Res judicata has also been considered in the case of Chee Pok Choy & Ors v. Scotch Leasing Sdn Bhd [2001] 2 CLJ 326 in which Gopal Sri Ram JCA in delivering the decision of the Court of Appeal stated: Now, res judicata is not merely a technical rule of pleading. It is a doctrine of substantial justice. It is a process whereby justice is achieved procedurally by precluding a party from re-agitating in subsequent proceedings a complaint or an issue that has, or could fairly have, been disposed in earlier proceedings between the same parties or their privies. Analysis and Finding of this Court [10] The main issue for this Court to consider is in respect of the right of an undischarged bankrupt, whether an undischarged bankrupt has a right 8 | B A - 2 4 NCVC - 7 8 0 - 0 7 / 2 0 2 1 to apply for the sale of the Property by private treaty when the Order for Sale is still valid, neither appealed against nor set aside. This Court has considered the Preliminary Objections put forth by the First Respondent and is inclined to agree with the objections raised. Be that as it may, this Court continued to hear the full submissions by parties, and below are the grounds for the decision to dismiss the application. [11] This Court noted the reason Applicant commenced this action in the Civil High Court is due to the position taken by the DGI that DGI has no power to consider Applicant’s request unless the First Respondent i.e. the chargee bank returns the Property to the Insolvency Department. In this respect, subsection 8(2) of Insolvency Act (IA) gives First Respondent the exclusive right along with the provisions under the National Land Code 1965 to foreclose on the Property, in the event of non-payment of loan amounts due to the chargee bank, the First Respondent. [12] This Court further noted that Applicant’s primary reason for filing this amended OS is to overcome an impediment faced by the Applicant. As co-owner, Applicant is desirous of selling his half share of the Property by ‘private treaty’ in order to settle its debt with the First Respondent expeditiously. This application is made only in respect of the Applicant’s 9 | B A - 2 4 NCVC - 7 8 0 - 0 7 / 2 0 2 1 share despite the Property charged to the First Respondent being the whole Property. [13] It is acknowledged that the impediment suffered by the Applicant is due to Insolvency Department’s refusal to grant sanction to allow the Applicant to pursue the matter in Court. Due to the position taken by the Insolvency Department, no sanction was obtained by Applicant from the DGI. [14] First and foremost, this Court is in agreement with the position taken by the DGI by virtue of subsection 8(2) of the IA which provides an exception to section 8, giving priorities to secured creditors as follows:- “(2) This section shall not affect the power of any secured creditor to realize or otherwise deal with his security in the same manner as he would have been entitled to realize or deal with it if this section had not been passed ….” [15] This Court finds that both the First Respondent and the Applicant are aware that Applicant would not be able to pursue the matter without sanction from the Insolvency Department. It is admitted by the Applicant that a ‘private treaty sale’ could not be effected without DGI’s involvement as all the legal documents required have to be executed by the DGI. 10 | B A - 2 4 NCVC - 7 8 0 - 0 7 / 2 0 2 1 [16] Following the DGI’s refusal to grant the sanction, the Applicant commenced this action. The Applicant submits that the High Court is vested with complete jurisdiction in bankruptcy under section 91(1) of the IA and has full powers to decide all questions of priorities and all other questions whatsoever, whether of law or fact. Subsection 91(1) states as follows:- “Subject to this Act, under its jurisdiction in bankruptcy, shall have full power to decide all questions of priorities and all other questions whatsoever, whether of law or fact, which may arise in any case of bankruptcy coming with the cognizance of the Court, of which the Court deems it expedient or necessary to decide for the purpose of doing complete justice or making a complete distribution of property in any such case.” [17] Notwithstanding the fact that Applicant is aware that as an undischarged bankrupt, he is subject to duties and disabilities as specified under the IA, the Applicant, on the other hand, proceeds to file this OS before this Court by relying on vested powers of the High Court. It is this Court considered opinion that in view of the status of the Applicant as an undischarged bankrupt, his rights are limited and fully governed by the Insolvency Act. 11 | B A - 2 4 NCVC - 7 8 0 - 0 7 / 2 0 2 1 [18] In addition, since Applicant is a bankrupt, the proper Court to refer this application is the Winding Up/Bankruptcy Court, a special court to deal with bankruptcy matters that has been established for better management of matters involving insolvent individuals and companies. The case of Government Of Malaysia v Poh Mah Housing Development Sdn Bhd; Affin Bank Bhd, Koh Huat Kwan & Symphony Paradigm Sdn Bhd (Applicants) [2015] 2 CLJ 375 shows that -

The application was made under s. 236(3) and s. 279 of the CA

The reference to the ’court’ in these sections would mean the winding-up court and any application arising out of any matter in the course of a winding-up should be referred to the winding-up court. [19] Similarly, Jivol @ Edmund Doudilim v. The Director General Of Insolvency Malaysia [2021] 1 LNS 277 that refers to the case of Ungku Nazaruddin (supra) held - [15] From the reading of the OS and the Plaintiff's affidavits, it is plain and clear that the Plaintiff's application is solely premised on the subject matter of bankruptcy. As such, the proper court to hear the matter is the bankruptcy court. This contention is based on Section 91(1) of the Insolvency Act 1967. [17] Adopting the principle above, the application by the Plaintiff should have been initiated at the bankruptcy court under its bankruptcy jurisdiction premised on the Insolvency Act 2017. Any 12 | B A - 2 4 NCVC - 7 8 0 - 0 7 / 2 0 2 1 application to the bankruptcy court then shall be filed by way of Summon in Chambers. (M/S 8) [19] The DGI, therefore, submitted that the Plaintiff's application is premised on the wrong application of law and the error committed is not only irregular but also illegal as it is incurable and cannot be rectified in the name of justice as the avenue that the Plaintiff is relying on is flawed from the beginning. It is the Defendant's submission that the High Court, not in its bankruptcy jurisdiction has no power to allow the Plaintiff's OS, as to do so would render the order illegal and nugatory. [20] Following the case of Jivol (supra), the Appellant should have initiated his application in the Winding Up/Bankruptcy Court, and the fact that the refusal of DGI to give its sanction does not warrant this application in this Court and is tantamount to an irregular application. Order for Sale dated 9.12.2019 is valid and enforceable [21] In the present case, based on merits, an Order for Sale has been granted on 9.12.2019 by the Shah Alam High Court under sections 256 and 257 of the National Land Code 1965. As such, this Court has no jurisdiction to make another order by setting aside the said Order for Sale unless the Order was challenged and set aside, or allowed the Property to be sold by a Private Treaty. 13 | B A - 2 4 NCVC - 7 8 0 - 0 7 / 2 0 2 1 [22] Reference is made to the case of Badiaddin v. Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd (supra), where the Federal Court also held - [1] It is settled law that one High Court cannot set aside a final order regularly obtained from another High Court of concurrent jurisdiction. [23] The First Respondent also refers to the case of United Malayan Banking Corp. Bhd v Chong Bun Sun & Another case [1994] 2 CLJ 673 where the Court held that only public auction is allowed - There is no express provision in the National Land Code enabling the Court to order a sale of the charged land by way of private treaty. Section 257 of the National Land Code only empowers the Court to make an order for the sale of the charged property by way of a public auction. Considering the true nature of the statutory remedy of the chargee to apply for an order for sale under s. 257 of the National Land Code, this Court is of the view that once an order for sale has been made by the Court by way of a public auction under s. 257 of the National Land Code, the Court does not have the power to make a subsequent order to vary or set aside the earlier order, and to make a new order for the charged property to be sold by way of private treaty. 14 | B A - 2 4 NCVC - 7 8 0 - 0 7 / 2 0 2 1 Provisions under the Insolvency Act 1967 (IA) [24] Applicant has relied on several provisions under the IA to support its application. Upon examination of the cited provisions, this Court is of the view that these provisions are not relevant to support his application. i) Section 41 This section obliges a creditor who engages in mutual dealings with the company and also its debtor, to set-off the debts and prove only for the balance. In the Federal Court case of Sime Diamond Leasing (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd v JB Precision Moulding Industries Sdn Bhd [1998] 4 CLJ 557 the FC held that – “[2a] For s.41 of the BA to apply, there must have been mutual credits, mutual debits or other mutual dealings between the parties. In the present application, there is no evidence to show that there are mutual dealings between Applicant and the Respondent. As such, this Court is of the view that this provision is irrelevant.”. ii) Section 52 The Federal Court case of Yui Chin Song & Ors v. Lee Ming Chai & Ors [2019] 7 CLJ 740 held- “[23] Section 52 of the Bankruptcy Act affects only settlement or transfer of shares by the bankrupt transferors under the 15 | B A - 2 4 NCVC - 7 8 0 - 0 7 / 2 0 2 1 section, any transfer of property shall be absolutely void against the DGI if the transferor becomes a bankrupt within two years after the date of the transfer; and shall be void against the DGI if the transferor becomes a bankrupt after two years but within five years after the date of the transfer. It must be stressed that the avoidance under s. 52 is only "against the Director-General of Insolvency". As such only the DGI is entitled to a declaration that the said transfer or transaction is void, under the section”. There is no transfer taking place. in this case. As such section 52 is irrelevant. iii)

Where a person has acquired property of the bankrupt under a transaction that is void or under a voidable transaction (that is subsequently set aside) and sold, disposed of, realized or collected the property or any part of it, the money or other proceeds from any such dealing, whether further disposed of or not, shall be deemed to be the property of the Director General of Insolvency. [25] In the case of Koh Thong Chuan v. The Official Asignee Of The Property Of Koh Liang Hee, Bankrupt [2003] 1 CLJ 125 (TAB-L MS 127 IARP) where the Court of Appeal held as follows:- 16 | B A - 2 4 NCVC - 7 8 0 - 0 7 / 2 0 2 1 [3a] Based on the facts, the trial judge was correct in holding that the said transfer of property from the bankrupt to the first defendant was a fraudulent conveyance which constituted an act of bankruptcy within s. 3(1)(b) of the Act. This rendered the conveyance void and by virtue of s. 53B(1) of the Act, the said property was deemed to be the property of the official assignee. [26] In the present case, there is no sale transaction which is void or voidable which requires the proceeds of the sale from the transaction to be deemed to be the property of the DG of Insolvency. Therefore, this provision is also irrelevant. The Law on the Setting Aside of an Order for Sale [27] Subsection 256(3), provides that ‘the Court shall order the sale of the land to which the charge relates unless it is satisfied with the existence of ‘cause to the contrary’. [28] The locus classicus for what is meant by ‘cause to the contrary’ is the case of Low Lee Lian v Ban Hin Lee Bank Bhd [1997] 1 MLJ 77; [1997] 1 AMR 1036; [1997] 2 CLJ 36. Our Supreme Court propounded that ‘cause to the contrary within s 256(3)’ may be granted on three grounds as follows:- 17 | B A - 2 4 NCVC - 7 8 0 - 0 7 / 2 0 2 1 i) The first category is where the case of the chargor (Applicant) falls within any of the exceptions to the indefeasibility doctrine in section 340 of the National Land Code. Subsection 340(2)(b) provides that the title or interest of any such person or body shall not be indefeasible where registration was obtained by forgery, or by means of an insufficient or void instrument. This would mean that if there is any fraud involved in the registration of charge or title, the application may be set aside. ii) Secondly, a cause to contrary exists when a chargor is able to show that the charge has failed to meet the conditions precedent for making an application of an order for sale. iii) Third, when a chargor could establish that the grant of an order for sale by the Court will be contrary to some rule of law or equity. [29] Based on the facts, the Applicant is not able to demonstrate any of the grounds stated above. Thus, the charge, the enforcement of which is sought, is indefeasible. No cause to the contrary has been established under section 256(3) of the National Land Code 1965. The Order for Sale granted by the Shah Alam High Court on 9.12.2019 to the charge by way of a public auction is, therefore, valid and enforceable. 18 | B A - 2 4 NCVC - 7 8 0 - 0 7 / 2 0 2 1 The Reserve Price was too Low [30] First Respondent submits that the proposed sale price of RM750,000.00 for half (½) of the Property is below the current market value. Based on the assessment of the Jabatan Penilaian dan Perkhidmatan Harta, the market value is RM2,700,000.00 which is far higher than Applicant’s proposed price. Furthermore, both Applicant nor his wife has never objected to the reserved price fixed previously which has taken into consideration the valuation report prepared by the Insolvency Department. This is clearly provided by section 53C of the Insolvency Act 1967 which provides – Fair market value may be fixed on review

Where the court finds that the consideration given or received by the bankrupt in the transaction under review was conspicuously in excess of or conspicuously lower than the fair market value of the property or services at the time of the transaction, the court may give judgment in favour of the Director General of Insolvency against the other party to the transaction or against any other person who was privy to the transaction with the bankrupt or against all such persons and such judgment shall be for the difference between the value of the consideration given or received by the bankrupt and the fair market value of the property or services at the time of the transaction as determined by the court in accordance with subsection (3).

In making an application under this section, the Director General of Insolvency shall state what in his opinion was the fair market 19 | B A - 2 4 NCVC - 7 8 0 - 0 7 / 2 0 2 1 value of the property or services at the time of the transaction and what in his opinion was the value of the consideration given or received by the bankrupt in the transaction, and the values on which the court makes any finding pursuant to this section shall be the values so stated unless other values are proven. [31] It is noted that the price to sell half of the Property as proposed by the Applicant is RM750,000.00 as it would have covered his debt owing to the First Respondent. If the Applicant chose to propose his own valuation of the Property, it fell on the Applicant to produce his own valuation report to substantiate his own valuation (see People Realty Sdn Bhd v Hong Leong Bank Bhd & Anor [2007] 6 MLJ 595 at pp 598–599, paras [8] and [9]; [2007] 6 AMR 21; [2008] 1 CLJ 73). Failure to complete the transaction after approval was given by First Respondent [32] It is also noted by this Court, as submitted by the First Respondent that Applicant and his wife had been given permission and allowed to carry out transactions with a third party previously, but failed to do so within the time stipulated. The application to sell to a third party had been made since 2018 but no sale and purchase agreement has been entered by the Applicant and his wife. Without any explanation from the Applicant, this Court is inclined to agree with the submission of the First Defendant 20 | B A - 2 4 NCVC - 7 8 0 - 0 7 / 2 0 2 1 that this application is a delaying tactic on the part of the Applicant as it could be seen that he is not serious in disposing of the Property even though opportunities had already been given to him and his wife. [33] Case in point is Chan Yoke Chin v. Pegawai Pemegang Harta Mewakili Harta Benda Yap Sin Guan, Si Bankrap & Anor [2000] 7 CLJ 259, where the Court held as follows - The tardiness of the plaintiff in respect of the other two applications prevents this court from exercising its discretion to give her another order for sale. The plaintiff has given no reason nor any satisfactory explanation why she did not move in respect of the two earlier orders given. The plaintiff has delayed the completion of the sale of the charged property by way of a private treaty since 7 January 1997 when the 1st order was made. [34] Due to the failure of the Applicant to conclude any sale, the consent of the First Respondent is deemed to be void as held in the case of Chan Yoke Chin (supra) – Therefore since as of 21 August 1999 (as stated in the said letter dated 21 April 99), the plaintiff had not complied with the terms of the said letter, It is conclusive therefore that with the said termination of the composite settlement arrangement, there is no longer any consent available from the 2nd defendant to the plaintiff to proceed with the sale by private treaty in respect of the said charged property anymore. It remains therefore for the 2nd defendant to proceed to 21 | B A - 2 4 NCVC - 7 8 0 - 0 7 / 2 0 2 1 enforce the charge by way of foreclosure proceedings to sell the charged property by public auction. Conclusion [35] Based on the foregoing, this Court is of the view that the Amended OS has no basis. Hence no merit to justify the application. Not only Applicant failed to challenge the Order for Sale, as an undischarged bankrupt, Applicant’s rights are also limited and subject to the IA. Without sanction from the DGI, his application clearly could not stand. [36] His reliance on provisions under the Insolvency Act fails to support his application. Furthermore, this Court also find that the provisions relied upon are not relevant as the conditions and/or situations stated do not exist to warrant the provisions to be invoked. Be that as it may, the proper Court to hear any matters involving an insolvent person is the dedicated Winding Up/Bankruptcy Court. [37] Since the Order for Sale is valid and enforceable, First Respondent as the rightful chargee has the undefeated right to sell the Property in accordance with the Order for Sale by public auction and its rights are towards the whole of the Property and not only half as intended to be done by the Applicant. 22 | B A - 2 4 NCVC - 7 8 0 - 0 7 / 2 0 2 1 [38] I therefore held that the Applicant’s assertion was untenable to justify the sale by private treaty and the setting aside of the valid Order for Sale obtained by the First Respondent. Date: 21st October 2022 signed (ROHANA ABD MALEK) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi NCVC 2 Shah Alam 23 | B A - 2 4 NCVC - 7 8 0 - 0 7 / 2 0 2 1 Counsels: Solicitor for the Prayer Tetuan Chandran Nair & Associates No.10, (1st Floor), Jalan 52/10 46200 Petaling Jaya Tel: 03-79548227 Email: chandrannair.law@gmail.com Solicitor for the 1st Respondent: Tetuan Zulpadli & Edham Peguambela dan Peguamcara No. 24 Jalan Perumahan Gurney 54000 Kuala Lumpur Tel: 03-26946979/6997 Email: litigation@zulpadliedham.com Solicitor for the 2nd Respondent: Ketua Pengarah Insolvensi Bagi harta Lee Kam Yoong (sibankrap) Jabatan Insolvensi Malaysia Pejabat Negeri Selangor Lot F21-F42, Tingkat 1 Bangunan IDCC Shah Alam Jalan Pahat L 15/L, Seksyen 15 40200 Shah Alam Selangor 24 | B A - 2 4 NCVC - 7 8 0 - 0 7 / 2 0 2 1 Legislation referred National Land Code 1965, s 256(3), s.340 Insolvency Act 1967, ss 8(2),38,41(1),53(1)&(2),53B,53C,54,91(1) Rules of Court 2012 Cases Referred 1. Badiuddin Mohd Mahidin & Anor v Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd [1998] 2 CLJ 75 2. Perwira Affin Bank Bhd v Tan h Tong [2003] 2 CLJ 320 3. United Malayan Banking Corp. Bhd v Chong Bun Sun & Another case [1994] 2 CLJ 673 4. Government of Malaysia v Poh Mah Housing Development Sdn Bhd; Affin Bank Bhd, Koh Huat Kwan & Symphony Paradigm Sdn Bhd (Applicants) [2015] 2 CLJ 375 5. Jivol @ Edmund Doudilim v. The Director General of Insolvency Malaysia [2021] 1 LNS 277 6. Sime Diamond Leasing (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd v JB Precision Moulding Industries Sdn Bhd [1998] 4 CLJ 557 7. Yui Chin Song & Ors v. Lee Ming Chai & Ors [2019] 7 CLJ 740 8. Koh Thong Chuan v. The Official Asignee Of The Property Of Koh Liang Hee, Bankrupt [2003] 1 CLJ 125 9. Low Lee Lian v Ban Hin Lee Bank Bhd [1997] 1 MLJ 77; [1997] 1 AMR 1036; [1997] 2 CLJ 36 10. People Realty Sdn Bhd v Hong Leong Bank Bhd & Anor [2007] 6 MLJ 595 at pp 598–599, paras [8] and [9]; [2007] 6 AMR 21; [2008] 1 CLJ 73 11. Chan Yoke Chin v. Pegawai Pemegang Harta Mewakili Harta Benda Yap Sin Guan, Si Bankrap & Anor [2000] 7 CLJ 259.